

**COMMENTS ON ST. THOMAS'S TEACHING ON THE EUCHARIST
AS FOUND IN *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE* III, QQ. 73 et seq.**

from *De Eucharistia et Poenitentia* by R. Garrigou-Lagrange, OP
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[Overview of *ST* III, q. 73]

|| p. 44 || *Recapitulation of the method.* St. Thomas in his usual manner begins [the question] from a nominal definition of the Eucharist; he then seeks its real definition in terms of genus and specific difference. This he does under the light of revelation (1) through a conceptual and philosophical analysis, by dividing the genus of sacrament, and (2) inductively from things revealed, by seeking the specific definition of the Eucharist, before he draws theological conclusions.

If therefore in this first question [of the treatise] there are syllogisms or discursive arguments, they are solely *explicative* arguments, or rather, they are more arguments subjectively illative, not arguments objectively illative, which [sort] would arrive at new truth that is only virtually contained in revealed truths. A subjectively illative argument shows only that such-and-such an explicit formula is equivalent to another that is less explicit but of the same truth, e.g., that the assertion of the infallibility of the supreme pontiff speaking *ex cathedra* is equivalent to the assertion of Christ himself: "You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

In this way St. Thomas proceeds in our question 73: it is a theological inquiry into the definition of the Eucharist, and an explanation of its necessity, which are things already formally revealed.

And so, in article 1 it is shown, not properly deduced, that the Eucharist is a sacrament (this is the genus in its definition), and it is spiritual food (thus is pointed out its specific difference).

In article 2, it is shown that the Eucharist is one kind of sacrament, although it be materially double; the reason is that it is ordered to something one, namely spiritual nourishment [*refectio-nem*]. Thus no new truth or new proposition is drawn from revelation. He explains only why Councils always speak of the Eucharist as of just one sacrament and not as two, and why we speak in the singular of "the most holy Sacrament."

In article 3, nothing is properly deduced; explanation is given [only] of the necessity of the Eucharist revealed by Christ the Lord in these words: "Unless you shall eat of the flesh of the Son of Man, you shall not have life within you." || p. 45 || This is explained through a conceptual analysis: the Eucharist is necessary for salvation, non in reality [*in re*], because it does not grant the first grace, but in desire (at least implicitly), since the first grace essentially tends toward its consummation, which is given through this sacrament.

In article 4 is treated the reason why the Eucharist is named with different names with respect to past, present, and future. There is no deduction of new truth, but an explanation of names found in Sacred Scripture.

Again, in article 5 the fittingness of the institution is explained.

Finally, in article 6 the [Old Testament] figures of the Eucharist are enumerated, and the foremost among them is pointed out.

Therefore up to this point, there has been no objectively illative argument, no theological conclusion properly speaking, but only an explanation of revealed truth. And it should be noted that this part of sacred theology, analytical so to speak, is of great moment; indeed, it is superior to the deduction of a new theological conclusion, for through this analysis or explanatory argumentation is properly obtained a certain understanding of the very mysteries, that is, of the very starting-points of faith, which exceedingly surpass theological conclusions, just as the infused habit of supernatural faith, as far as its substance goes, exceedingly surpasses the habit of theology acquired by human effort. Infused faith is much higher than sacred theology which proceeds from it, although faith *together with* theology is something *extensively* more perfect than faith *without* theology. I say “extensively,” not “intensively,” because a great contemplative who is ignorant of theological conclusions but, with a great spirit of faith and by the gift of understanding, has penetrated deeply into the mysteries of faith, ranks higher than a theologian who knows to perfection theological conclusions about some mystery, yet has penetrated less intensely into that mystery itself.

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[On ST III, q. 75, a. 1]

|| p. 81 || These reasons of fittingness [on behalf of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist] may, in addition, be elucidated by a higher principle by which also are elucidated the mysteries of the most Holy Trinity and of the redemptive Incarnation, of which mysteries the Eucharist is the outward radiation [*irradiatio*].

Now this principle is stated by St. Thomas at the beginning of his treatise on the Incarnation, III, q. 1, a. 1, under this form: “It pertains to the nature of the good that it communicate itself to others; hence it pertains to the nature of the highest good that it communicate itself in the highest way.” From this principle of the diffusion of the good the mystery of the most Holy Trinity is elucidated in *ScG* IV, c. 11. There it is shown that it befits God, the highest good, first to communicate himself in the highest way *ad intra*, by communicating his whole nature by generating the eternal Son and by breathing forth the Holy Spirit. By the same principle is shown the fittingness of the Incarnation, namely, that God communicate himself in the highest way to the creature in the Person of his Son, made flesh for our redemption. Finally, by the same principle is manifested the fittingness of the Eucharist, namely since the good is essentially diffusive of itself, Christ wanted to give himself to us as food [*seipsum nobis dare ut alimentum*] and at the same time as a victim sacramentally offered until the end of the world. In this way, the author of grace and of salvation would remain present to us.

By the same principle is manifested, in the communication of the highest good *ad intra*, the intimate communion of the three divine Persons, which is the supreme exemplar of eucharistic communion and of the communion of the faithful among themselves, according to that prayer of Christ to his Father: “That they may be one, just as we are one,” namely, that they be one in faith, hope, charity, through eucharistic communion at the same banquet, just as we are one in nature.

Again, the arguments of fittingness for the real presence may be fortified by looking at it, on our part, with respect to the three theological virtues, as St. Thomas does to show the fittingness of the Incarnation in III, q. 1, a. 2.

And indeed, through the real presence our faith is confirmed, whose motive is the authority of God revealing; for in the Eucharist, the Word incarnate—really present and, by his saving influence, believed in—daily confirms what that he once upon a time said in his preaching. In this way, in the Eucharist he remains as the Teacher of the secrets of divine union. He is present to illuminate and draw us after him.

Equally, the real presence fortifies our hope, whose motive is God helping, because it is the presence not only of grace but also of the very author of grace. If, however, God gives us his Son in such wise that he continually remains with us even to the end of the world, he will not refuse the least thing necessary for salvation. If he gives us the Eucharist, *a fortiori* he will give us the actual graces that we ask with a view to persevering.

|| p. 82 || Finally, the real presence inflames charity towards God and neighbor on account of so great a manifestation of the love of Christ, by virtue of which he has bent down to live with us as a companion of our exile, and gives himself at once as victim and food [*sese dedit simul ut hostiam et cibum*], that we may be more and more incorporated into him. Charity towards one's neighbor is likewise inflamed by this, inasmuch as everyone—the rich and the poor, the learned and the simple—ought to unite in this heavenly banquet and be nourished by the same Savior, Christ. In this way are united the members of any and every family, so too diverse classes of the same people, so too diverse Christian peoples, as is plainly the case in the great international eucharistic congresses.


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[On ST III, q. 75, a. 1, obj. 1 & ad 1]

|| p. 82 || The first objection is laid down by St. Thomas (as the third objection of the first article), to wit: No body can be simultaneously in many places. But the true body of Christ is in heaven. Therefore it cannot really be in the Eucharist.

To this the response is made: the body of Christ is in the Eucharist *not as in a place*, or circumscriptively, but by a special manner, i.e., || p. 83 || sacramentally, as will be explained below, q. 76, aa. 3–5, namely in the manner of substance.

Before we come to explaining those articles of q. 76, it is fitting, for the sake of a fuller solution of this objection, to say that something can be in a place in three ways, namely, circumscriptively, definitively, and sacramentally. Thus the Council of Trent, session 13, chapter 1.



Something is “in place” *circumscriptively*, when it is in it by reason of quantity, in such a way that the whole is in the whole place and the single parts are in the single parts of the place. This is the way our body is here and now in its place. So, too, is the glorious body of Christ now in

heaven. Something is “in place” *non-circumscriptively*, or not as in a place, when it is in it, not by reason of quantity, but by reason of substance or even by reason of power; then the whole is in the whole place *and* the whole is in each and every part of the place. Now this can occur in two ways: either definitively or sacramentally.

Definitively, in such a way that it may not be elsewhere; this is the way our soul is in our body, the soul of a brute animal in its body, the vegetative soul of a plant in the plant itself; the essence of bread under its quantity is whole in the whole and whole in each and every part, and not elsewhere. These things are “in place,” not as in a place, but in the manner of substance [*haec sunt in loco, non sicut in loco, sed per modum substantiae*]. An angel is in place through its power inasmuch as it acts upon a body, and is not elsewhere [for as long as it is so acting].

Sacramentally something is “in place,” in such a way that it may also be elsewhere. This is the way the body of Christ is in this consecrated host, the whole is in it, and the whole is in each and every part of it, as was [the case with] the substance of bread, and is simultaneously elsewhere, namely in heaven and in other consecrated hosts.

|| p. 84 || . . . [T]he body of Christ is present in the Eucharist non-circumscriptively, but through the manner of substance. Thus only the sacramental appearances are truly distant from heaven, and are divided among themselves inasmuch as certain appearances are in Rome and others in Jerusalem or other places. But in all these places is one and the same body of Christ through the manner of substance, beyond the spatial or quantitative order, as will be shown below in q. 76.

In other words, the body of Christ in heaven is not distant according to entity or substance from the body of Christ which is in this consecrated host. What is impossible is that the body of Christ be simultaneously *circumscriptively* in two different places, because in that case it would be in these two places in the manner of quantity, and its quantity would be divided from itself.

. . . Objection: A figure cannot be without quantity locally extended. And yet the body of Christ cannot be without a figure, for thus it would no more be the body of a man than that of a lamb or of a dove. Therefore the body of Christ cannot be in the Eucharist without quantity locally extended.

In response: I distinguish the major premise: [if referring to] a figure extended or taken in terms of the order of parts with respect to place, I concede the argument; figure taken for the order of parts among themselves with respect to substance, I deny, shifting the burden of proof to adversaries. I distinguish the minor premise in the same way, and I deny what follows from the argument. Thus, in the Eucharist the head of Christ is not his heart, on the contrary it is outside his heart, with respect to substance, not with respect to place. For the quantity of Christ (cf. below, q. 76, a. 4) is present only by reason of transubstantiation and therefore in the manner of substance, not in the manner of quantity locally extended. Indeed these [sorts of arguments] conquer the imagination because the imagination and also geometry do not transcend the continuum; but the imagination is to be corrected in through faith and reason.

Such objections seem clearer than the response given them. This is because they are taken up in accordance with the exceedingly superficial and imperfect manner of our knowledge, a manner quite material and quantitative, while the response is taken from the lofty height of the mystery to be explained and presuppose a subtle distinction, which is not immediately perfectly understood, but only with maturity of intelligence and by a profound inquiry.

[On ST III, q. 75, a. 4]

|| p. 99 || Status of the question: More directly now is to be considered transubstantiation itself. From the foregoing articles it is apparent that this conversion is necessary for the real presence [to come to be], as was admitted by Tradition, but difficulties remain concerning the intrinsic possibility of such a conversion considered in itself.

The first difficulty stated at the start of the article is taken from the principle of change, viz., in every change there has to be some subject, which stands first one way, then another way [*aliter et aliter se habeat*]. And yet the conversion of bread into the body of Christ would be a change without a subject changed over [*subjecto transmutato*], for the whole substance of bread would be converted, even its matter. Therefore this seems repugnant [to reason].

The reason for this difficulty is that the principle of change, “every change supposes a subject changed over,” seems to have the same necessity and universality as the principle of efficient causality, “nothing comes to be without a cause,” and the principle of finality: “every agent acts for the sake of an end.” However, a miracle can be beyond the physical laws of nature, yet not beyond metaphysical principles; for neither can something be done miraculously without a cause, nor can an agent act without any purpose, and therefore, likewise, [it seems that] neither can a change be done miraculously without a subject changed over, which stands differently now than it did before.

To solve this difficulty, as we shall see, it has to be considered that “cause” in common is not said univocally but analogously of agent, of end, of form, and of matter, and that God, supreme agent and end, cannot be a material or formal cause of things. From this it will become clear that neither is || p. 100 || necessity found univocally, but analogously, in the aforesaid principles of efficient causality, finality, and change. But St. Thomas has formulated this difficulty best of all, and he, as we shall see, lucidly solves it.

Two other difficulties are just as pressing:

The second: Nor can it be said that the form of the body of Christ begins newly to be in the matter of bread. For this matter does not remain. Therefore this conversion seems to have no likeness at all to natural conversion; and therefore it is unintelligible [unthinkable].

The third: Nor can the matter of bread be converted into the matter of the body of Christ. For of things which are diverse in themselves, one of them can never become the other, for example, never can white be black; but the *subject* of white can become the *subject* of black. And yet two signate matters are diverse in themselves, as principles of individuation. Therefore this matter of bread cannot become this matter of the body of Christ, without any subject remaining.

Nevertheless, the response is: The whole substance of bread is converted into the whole substance of the body of Christ, and hence, this conversion is appropriately called “transubstantiation.”

[1. This can be proved from the authority of the Councils cited above, especially the Council of Trent. . . .]

2. In the body of the article St. Thomas makes manifest, in a certain way, the possibility of such a conversion; at very least, he shows that its possibility cannot be denied.

The argument may be reduced to this:

— Every agent acts in so far as it is in act, inasmuch as acting follows being and the mode of acting follows the mode of being.

— But God is infinite act.

— Therefore God can act not only up to the limit of the effect[’s power to act], i.e., the changing of a form in some remaining subject, but also [can bring about] the conversion || p. 101 || of the whole being, so that the whole substance of this is converted into the whole substance of that.

Briefly: God, and God alone, has immediate power over being as being, to the extent of producing being through creation (cf. *ST* I, q. 45, a. 5) and to the extent of immediately changing it [a thing’s being] through transubstantiation.

Compare the response to the third objection: “By the power of an infinite agent (which has action on the whole being) such a conversion can happen, because both forms and both matters are common to the nature of being; and that which is of entity in one (i.e., essence, subsistence, and existence) the Author of being can convert into that which is of entity in the other, with that through which they were distinguished being taken away.” Thus the Author of being can transubstantiate a stone into bread, a wolf into a sheep, a sheep into an angel—though not, as will be said below, an angel into God.

Many *dubia* remain concerning this demonstration, and it is better to examine them before proceeding to the replies to the objections. 1. Is it certain and evident that God alone can immediately change being qua being? 2. Has St. Thomas properly demonstrated that God can transubstantiate, or has he only offered a persuasive argument? 3. Whether the possibility of transubstantiation, as with the possibility of the Trinity, cannot be positively demonstrated by reason alone?

[*Dubium 1. . .*]

Dubium 2. This possibility is at least persuasively argued by St. Thomas, and at the same time he shows that this possibility cannot be disproved. For how could the Author of being not be able to convert the whole entity of any created substance into any other created substance, even a stone into an angel? The only thing that is really impossible is that God should convert a created substance into himself, into deity, since it cannot be said that “God himself is from bread” or from any other substance changed into him, because if that were true God would depend in a certain way upon that substance.

What is more, it is evident enough that transubstantiation can either be productive of a new substance or non-productive if it occurs with regard to a pre-existent substance, as bread is converted into the pre-existent body of Christ. And on account of difficulties to be considered below, which remain by reason of this pre-existence of the body of Christ, the argument of St. Thomas perhaps more persuades us of the possibility of transubstantiation than it positively demonstrates it. || p. 103 || At least, from this argument we gather that transubstantiation cannot be called impossible. That is, its possibility is proved at least negatively, in that, supposing divine omnipotence, one cannot prove transubstantiation impossible.

Dubium 3. It does not seem repugnant [to say that the possibility of transubstantiation might be positively proved] because transubstantiation is only a miracle of the highest order, it is not properly speaking a mystery essentially supernatural, since it does not pertain immediately to the intimate life of God, nor to the participation thereof, differing in that way from the mystery of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the life of grace and of glory. God, as author of nature, just as he can

create or produce being qua being, can equally transubstantiate the substance of wood into the substance of gold. For this production it is not required that God intervene as author of grace and glory; it suffices that he intervene as author and dominator of nature. Whence it does not seem repugnant that the possibility of transubstantiation be positively proved

It should be noticed that St. Thomas says, in IV *Sent.* d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, that the Incarnation, and even creation, are worthier [*dignior*] than transubstantiation. “The assumption of human nature has its terminus in the Person of the Son of God, which [Person] is worthier than the body of Christ, which is the terminus of transubstantiation.” In addition, creation is indicative of greater power than transubstantiation, because, “simply speaking, *non-being* stands further from *being* than *this being* stands from *that being*.” Nevertheless, he says in *ST III*, q. 75, a. 8, ad 3: “In this conversion (of bread into Christ’s body) there are many more difficulties (for our understanding) than in creation,” i.e., non merely the total conversion of the substance of bread, but also the continued existence [*permanentia*] of its accidents, and the fact that, e.g., we can even be nourished by them (cf. q. 77, aa. 3, 5, 6). The question of transubstantiation is much more complicated than the question of creation.

|| p. 108 || . . . *Final dubium* [7]. What is the relationship between St. Thomas’s teaching on transubstantiation and the metaphysical principles formulated by him?

As will have been clear from the solution to Scotus’s objections,¹ the Thomistic teaching on transubstantiation is connected with (1) the teaching on being as analogically common to all beings; (2) the teaching on substance as first-created, according to which substance has a claim on being in and of itself [*jus ad esse per se*], although it is not its own being [*esse*] but really distinguished from it, (3) the teaching on accidents as really distinct from substance, and their having in themselves an aptitude for being-in-another, in such wise nevertheless that their essence is really distinct from their being or better yet, their in-being or actual inherence; (4) the teaching on relation, according to which relation cannot be produced without a foundation, and which relation is not mutual “if the extremes are not of the same order,” e.g., the creature is really related to the Creator, but the Creator is not really related to the creatures (cf. *ST I*, q. 13, a. 7).

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Recapitulation of q. 75, aa. 1–4

St. Thomas has therefore most excellently organized the first articles of this question.

In article 1, he explained the words of revelation concerning the *real presence*, and gave arguments of fittingness.

In article 2, he shows that *the substance of bread does not remain* after consecration, not only since the real presence of the body of Christ cannot begin to be except by a conversion of the substance of bread into itself, as Tradition says, but also because the words of consecration would be false on any other account.

In article 3, he proves from the aforesaid that *the substance of bread is not annihilated*, because that which is converted into another is not annihilated, and again he affirms that the body of Christ cannot become really present except by the conversion of bread into itself.

¹ not translated here

In article 4, he returns to the conclusion of the preceding articles, and shows that *the possibility of transubstantiation cannot be disproved*, or more correctly, he at least offers a persuasive argument in its favor, because *the author of being has immediate power over the being, as being, of any creature*, and hence is able to convert that thing into the substance of another thing.

In such a way, the body of Christ, preexisting in heaven, is like the summit at which are ceaselessly converging all the transubstantiations of the celebrations of Mass; it is like the peak of a pyramid, remaining in itself immovable, toward which new lines extended from the pyramid's base have their term; or like the abiding sun, in which new acts of human sight have their term. For the preexisting body of Christ is not physically changed by the innumerable transubstantiations which are multiplied in time and have their term in Him.²

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Response to phenomenalism

|| p. 116 || The response to the second objection³ should be attentively explained, because here the question arises: Why [*Quaenam*] is the notion of substance altogether necessary for preserving the dogma of transubstantiation and the real presence? Four modern difficulties can be proposed:

1. Whether the notion of substance is sufficient which is had from ordinary experience [*a sensu communi*], or from natural reason, and which corresponds to the nominal definition, namely what this name (insofar as equivalents for it are found in all languages) means for men of all races.
2. Whether a more philosophical notion of substance is required [for the doctrine].
3. Whether the notion of substance proposed by nominalists and empiricists is insufficient, namely, a collection of phenomena⁴ to which is adjoined a name in common, 'substance'? Or rather, whether such a notion is repugnant to the doctrine.
4. Whether the notion of substance proposed by the subjectivist conceptualists, such as Kant, is insufficient, namely, that substance is a subjective category of our mind, without real value [*valore reali*].

Cf. Denz. 2025: This proposition of the Modernists is condemned: "Dogmas of the faith are to be retained only according to a practical sense, that is, as instructive norms of action, but not as norms of belief."

. . . || p. 117 || [T]o solve objections the common-sense notion of substance often does not suffice, and thus we need to explain it, passing over to the status of acquiring a distinct concept thereof. This is certainly the mind of St. Thomas, who, like Aristotle, always passes from a nominal definition (even if he does not expressly talk about it) or a confused concept, to a distinct one. And Aristotle accordingly gives high praise to Socrates for this reason, that he was always searching out definitions (cf. *Metaphysics* I, c. 6).

² Cf. also Jeremy's footnote to q. 76, a. 5; the exchange of letters between Holmes and Kwasniewski; M.-J. Nicolas, OP, *What is the Eucharist?*, 53–55.

³ [Which was: "There is no deception in this sacrament; for the accidents are there according to the truth of the reality, which accidents are discerned by the senses. And the intellect, whose proper object is substance, as is said in book 3 of *De Anima*, is preserved from deception by faith."]

⁴ [Or, in Bertrand Russell's phrase, a "bundle of events"]

What, therefore, is the common notion of substance, and how may a transition be made from this confused notion to the same, as distinct? In this we have an example of the development of dogma.

Commonly, the name 'substance' designates *any being subsisting per se or in se*, which is known by its various properties. Thus all men say that a stone, iron, gold, bread are substances and, at least in a confused way, they thus distinguish substance from its sensible qualities. This notion, after the manner of a nominal definition, is found in any ordinary vocabulary, for in it [such vocabulary] the explanation of the name *is* its nominal definition, namely, what men commonly mean when they use this word or noun. Common-sense or natural reason does not yet affirm, for example, that the substance of bread is whole in the whole bread and whole in each part of it, but if this is affirmed by some philosopher, common-sense does not deny it; on the contrary, in a certain way it understands this.

However, a transition from the nominal definition or confused concept to a distinct concept in a definition expressive of the real can be done either rightly and methodically, or without method and even at times arriving at a false definition. It is done methodically through the correct division of being into categories or genera, and through a progressive division of the highest genera, and also by comparing what is to be defined with other things like and unlike it. Or this transition from the nominal definition to another more explicit one is done without method and arrives at times at a false definition, which does not cohere with the nominal definition considered before.

How does St. Thomas pass from a confused concept of substance to a distinct one? He says in the reply to the second objection⁵ of our article, following Aristotle in *De Anima* III, ch. 6 (lect. 11): The proper object of the intellect is substance, namely, the substantial being of sensible things. And indeed, being as being is not something *per se* sensible, it is not extended, nor white, nor black, nor hot; it is therefore not *per se* knowable by the senses, neither as a common sensible such as magnitude, nor as a proper sensible like color or sound. Being is not *per se* sensible, but *per se* intelligible, or rather, is that by reason of which everything in sensible things becomes intelligible. Whence this can be understood by all, namely, *every being [omne ens]* (of which it may be properly said, not only "by which something is" but "what it is") *is one and the same under its various and successive phenomena*, e.g., under || p. 118 || its qualities whether permanent or variable, under its actions, passions, relations, etc. And this being, one and the same under various phenomena, is called in common "substance" or "being existing in itself" [*ens in se existens*], thus preserving and explaining the nominal definition of substance. What is more, from this follows *the principle of substance*, namely: "Everything WHICH properly is, is a substance, while an accident is that BY WHICH something is white or hot, etc." [*omne quod proprie est, est substantia, accidens est quo aliquid est album aut calidum etc.*].

Hence, the notion of substance is nothing other than a certain new determination of the notion of being, and the principle of substance likewise is a new determination of the principle of identity: "being is being, non-being is non-being." From this it follows that *every being is one and the same under its phenomena*, if it has phenomena. I say "if it has sensible phenomena," because there can be a substance which is altogether above the sensible order, that is, a substance simply spiritual, as God and angel.

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⁵ [quoted in an earlier footnote]

[On *ST III*, q. 75, a. 8]

. . . || p. 126 || In the body of the article, to show the truth of this proposition [“Out of bread, the body of Christ comes to be”] and other similar ones, as well as to exclude false propositions, St. Thomas articulates principles by comparing transubstantiation with creation and with [natural] generation. Thus by a comparative induction the hunt for a definition of transubstantiation is brought to its close.

In the body of the article, the comparison between transubstantiation, creation, and natural change is expressed as follows:

(a) In all three it is true that “after this there is that,” and these two are not simultaneous, but there is a succession of terms. The body of Christ is after the bread, in transubstantiation; fire is after air, in change; being is after non-being, in creation.

(b) In transubstantiation and in creation, there is not some subject common to both extremes; the contrary is true for natural changes.

(c) In transubstantiation and in natural change: (i) one of the extremes passes over into the other, while on the contrary in creation, non-being is not converted into being; (ii) in transubstantiation and in natural change something remains the same, but in a change, this same thing is the matter, whereas in transubstantiation it is the accidents.

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[On *ST III*, q. 76, a. 2, ad 1]

|| p. 134 || The second consecration is not superfluous, first, because “this is helpful for representing Christ’s Passion, in which the blood and the body were separated. Hence also in the form of the consecration of the blood, its being poured out is mentioned.” This reason is foremost, namely, the twofold consecration is required for the Eucharist as the sacrifice instituted by Christ, that, namely, it be a sacramental or unbloody immolation which represents the bloody immolation of Calvary, as the Council of Trent teaches (Denz. 940). We shall see below that the sacrifice of the Mass is a true sacrifice, although in it the immolation is only sacramental. The reason is that in sacrifice in general, while the internal sacrifice is in the genus of moral action, the external sacrifice or that which is done concerning the real victim offered up, is in the genus of sign, namely as a sign of an interior offering up, a sign also of confessing the supreme dominion of God over all things including exterior ones, a sign of making reparation for the debt incurred by sin. Thus in the sacrifice of the Mass the blood of Christ is poured out, not really and physically, but sacramentally or mystically. Nevertheless, this sacramental immolation of Christ the Savior himself, as far as the nature of a sign is concerned, expresses the interior, reparatory offering up and the supreme dominion of God, Lord of life and death, much more than the bloody immolations of all the victims of the Old Testament.

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[On q. 76, a. 3]

|| p. 136 || His argument, in which the major, as is frequently the case, is enunciated after the minor, may be thus reduced to syllogistic form:

— The nature of a substance is whole under each and every part of its dimensions, even when there is as yet no separation.

— However, the body of Christ is present in the Eucharist, not in the manner of quantity, but in the manner of substance, by reason of transubstantiation, which is produced by the force of the words, but without transaccidentation.

— Therefore the body of Christ is whole under each and every part of the appearances, even when there is as yet no separation.

The *major* is clear already according to natural reason, e.g., the whole nature of bread is already under each and every part of it, even before separation. For substance, which is not something *per se* sensible, but which is *per se* intelligible, is not of itself *extended*, but is something loftier than the extension that is of itself sensible. Nor is substance a lone indivisible point, because a point has a location in the continuum, as its term. Substance pertains to a higher order. It is said to be something more profound or more internal, if a sensible accident be considered as something external; it is said to be something higher, if an accident be considered as something lower, as pertaining *per se* to the sensible order. Thus substance is that by which each and every being of which it can be properly said *that it is* is one and the same under its various phenomena. Hence, the nature of substance is whole in the whole and whole in each and every part, e.g., the nature of gold or radium is, in the least part of it, the same costly metal, even before the separation of part from part.

The *minor* is certain from things said before, namely the body of Christ is in the Eucharist, not in the manner of quantity, because there was not a “transaccidentation” of the accidents of bread into the accidents of the body of Christ, but solely a transubstantiation, by reason of which this body is present, as was said. If therefore the quantity of the body of Christ is also present, it is not by the force of the words, but solely by concomitance, and so, as will be said in the following article, [it is present] not in virtue of itself but in virtue of the substance, and according to its relation to substance, which alone is [made to be] present in virtue of itself, by the force of the words. Therefore the whole body of Christ is under each and every part of the host, even before separation.

* * *

[On q. 76, a. 4: Is the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body in this sacrament?]

|| p. 138 || *Status of the question.* It seems that the whole dimensive quantity of the body of Christ is not in this sacrament, (1) because the *whole* quantity of the body of Christ cannot be under the least particle of the consecrated host, (2) because the dimensive quantity of bread remains in this sacrament, and two dimensive quantities cannot be simultaneously in the same place; they would be identical, and no longer two, (3) because the dimensive quantity of the body of Christ is much more than the extension of the host, thus it would extend beyond it [were it really present].

Nevertheless, the *response* is affirmative, namely, the whole quantity of the body of Christ is under this sacrament; which, at first sight, seems unbelievable, but which is not repugnant to reason if it be well understood that such quantity is under the sacrament concomitantly.⁶

⁶ I.e., not in the manner properly its own as an accident, but in a foreign manner, namely that of the substance that has the accident. Garrigou’s subsequent remarks on John of St. Thomas’s proof that this must be the case are worth reading, pp. 139–40. (*Trans.*)

|| p. 140 || The first objection was: No dimensive quantity can be whole in each and every part of what contains that quantity; however this would be the case here; therefore it is impossible. In response, I distinguish the major: that no dimensive quantity present in virtue of itself and according to its proper manner can be whole, etc., I concede; but that it cannot if present in virtue of substance and in the manner of substance, I deny; and I make a distinction in the minor. That is to say, the dimensive quantity of the body of Christ is present in the Eucharist, not in virtue of a transaccidentation, but in virtue of transubstantiation, and therefore solely by concomitance; i.e., according to the relationship that it has *to substance*, and not according to the relationship that it has *to place*.

To the second objection: That two dimensive quantities cannot be *naturally* in the same place, in such a way that both be there according to the proper manner of dimensive quantity, I concede. But in this sacrament, it is not this way; for in it the presence of the body of Christ is not natural, but miraculous.⁷

|| p. 144 || According to Thomists and many others, bodily substance [as such] does not have distinct and actual integral parts, but is composed solely of matter and form, and demands⁸ *radicaliter* qualities and operative faculties by reason of form, quantity and material passivities by reason of matter. That is, these accidents are accidents of the composite, but follow upon the composite either on the part of form or on the part of matter, insofar as they bear a likeness either to form, as qualities do, or to matter, as quantity does. Hence, an actual distinction of integral parts, e.g., of the head and the heart, is not had from the substance itself, but from its quantity. This is quantity's first function, namely to distinguish parts among themselves, such that one is not another, and to distinguish their order with respect to the whole. Before quantity, indeed, there is already the whole *substantial entity* of the parts; but it is quantity that constitutes the integral parts in their formality as *parts*, making them to be distinct among themselves, such that one is not the other, and no one is the whole itself.

This is the first function of quantity, by the force of which the parts of a human body are distinct. And the second effect of quantity is that these parts are spread out with a view to being-in-place [*extensae in ordine ad locum*]. Thomists add: The spreading-out of parts with a view to being-in-place presupposes a certain distinction of parts, for something indivisible cannot be spread out in place, in it there is no capacity for spreading-out in place. An angel cannot be spread out in place, nor a substantial form of any body, nor prime matter. In addition, this at any rate is supported indirectly by experience, e.g., in the development of an embryo, in which first are distinguished bodily parts, e.g., the rudiments of the heart and the rudiments of the brain, and afterwards they are enlarged with regard to their place [they grow bigger, taking up more of a place]. Again, a microscope enlarges before our eyes, as if locally, things in the least parts of the body, which are scarcely visible without such an instrument; yet nevertheless a microscope could not thus enlarge

⁷ That is, there is no "competition" between one dimensive quantity in *its* place, and another in *its* place, such that the one would crowd out the other. The dimensive quantity of the bread remains as in a place (though it does so miraculously, having no natural subject, that is, substance, to give it being), while the dimensive quantity of the body of Christ is there *not* as in a place, because *only* the substance is present in its proper mode (*modus substantiae*), without any of that substance's accidental modifications. These accidental modifications—the size, shape, weight, color, etc. of the body of Jesus—are present "by concomitance," which in this case means: in a manner foreign to their own natural or physical manner of existing, which they have in one and only one place, namely, in heaven where the (glorified) body of Jesus has its true and proper place from the time of the Ascension to the Second Coming.

⁸ The verb is *exigit*, but I can't quite make sense of the phrase. The meaning seems to be: bodily substance is in itself composed of matter and form, and all its material and formal aspects or activities (e.g., its quantity, its active and passive powers) flow out from it as from a metaphysical root.

as if locally something that would be properly indivisible and not have any distinct parts. These animadversions are only of a remote analogy, but they show that spreading-out of parts with a view to being-in-place presupposes a certain distinction of parts; but something indivisible cannot be spread out in place, as the substantial form of any body, which surpasses the order of the continuous [i.e., bodies] and is invisible even with a microscope, since it is apprehended only by the intellect on meeting with a sensible thing,⁹ as is the formative law [*lex genetica*] of an embryo, which is as if the governing idea in the embryo itself.¹⁰ Hence, this distinction of the two functions of quantity is not arbitrary or without foundation.

. . . || p. 145 || Now, Thomists apply the above teaching on quantity to the Eucharist in the following way.

The quantity of the body of Christ is in this sacrament *as extensive of parts among themselves and in relation to the whole*, so that, namely, the heart is distinguished from the head, but this quantity is not present *as extensive of parts with a view to being-in-place*. How? Because it is there, not by the force of the words, but solely by concomitance, i.e., not by reason of itself, nor according to the manner proper to it, but by reason of the substance to which it is joined, and *in the manner of substance*, namely, so that it is whole in the whole and whole in each and every part, non part in a part. It ultimately comes to this: the quantity of the body of Christ is present by transubstantiation. Neither does this imply a contradiction, for the spreading-out of parts with a view to place is the *secondary effect* of quantity, and, as St. Thomas said in art. 3, ad 2: “such distance of parts is indeed in Christ’s true body itself, but it is not related to this sacrament according to this distance, but according to the manner of its substance.”

|| p. 146 || Thus is explained the fact that the body of Christ is in the Eucharist not circumscriptively, not definitively as the soul which is in its body and nowhere else, but sacramentally, in such a way that it can be simultaneously numerically the same in heaven.

. . . For sound theological knowledge, the terminology employed by St. Thomas in our article suffices, namely, that the dimensive quantity of the body of Christ is in this sacrament, not according to its proper manner (i.e., not circumscriptively, according to its relation to place, as the next article puts it more nicely), but in the manner of substance (i.e., according to its relation to the substance to which it is really conjoined). This terminology suffices, and in such supremely difficult matters it is necessary to have a taste for sobriety, for to wish to explain too much leads to specious subtleties, to acrobatics, as Aristotle said, which draws one away from the contemplation of mysteries. . . . || p. 147 || St. Thomas, who generally corrected his manuscripts in the direction of abbreviating them rather than expanding them, kept this sobriety in an extraordinary way, more than many of his commentators, who sometimes want to go into an excessive explanation of his teaching, not tending enough toward the contemplation of higher things. Commentary on the doctrine of St. Thomas, even if it is very fine, stands like a polygon inscribed in the circumference of a circle, which is a much simpler and more beautiful figure. St. Thomas’s teaching itself, moreover, is like a polygon inscribed in the yet higher and more beautiful circle of the Gospels or the teaching of the faith. Hence one must not confuse the vulgarization of theological knowledge which is beneath this science, whose substance it frequently does not preserve, and true Christian contemplation, which ascends above theology to the kernel [*medullam*] of the Gospel, of divine revelation.

* * *

⁹ ? *non nisi per intellectum apprehenditur ad occursum rei sensatae* ?

¹⁰ Cf. Fabre on the grey cricket.

[On q. 76, a. 5: Is Christ's body in this sacrament as in a place?]

|| p. 149 || Ad 3: The difficulty is this: *to be in a place* is a real accident of the body of Christ, therefore it ought to be concomitantly present. The response is: To be in a place is a real accident—not an intrinsic one, however, but one by comparison to an extrinsic container, and not by a comparison to the very substance of Christ's body, which alone is present in virtue of itself in the Eucharist.

* * *

[On q. 76, a. 6: Is Christ's body in this sacrament movably?]

|| p. 150 || After the explanation of the preceding articles, there is no need to linger much over this one. Thomas responds: Speaking *per se*, the body of Christ is not movably in this sacrament, but in a sense he is there movably *per accidens*, as is said in the reply ad 1.

The first reason is that to be *per se* moved in place includes to be in place, or to quit one place and arrive at another. Christ, however, is not in the Eucharist as in a place. Therefore, etc.

The second reason is that to be moved in place *per accidens* is to be moved not in virtue of oneself, but at the motion of another, as the rational soul is moved *per accidens* when our body moves *per se*. In this way, *per accidens*, the body of Christ is moved when the consecrated host is *per se* moved from place to place, e.g., when it is elevated, when it is carried in processions and to the sick. And yet it is moved more *per accidens* than a man sitting in a ship under sail, because the body of Christ lacks extension in place, which the sailor has, who is in the boat as in a place.

In the body of the article as well as in the replies ad 2 and ad 3, St. Thomas shows also that the body of Christ is not *per se* moved when it ceases to be present owing to the corruption of the appearances. The reason is that the body of Christ thus present is a glorious incorruptible body, and the cessation of its presence supposes only a change in the very appearances of the bread and wine, which [appearances] are corrupted. By the very fact that they are not any more the appearances of bread and wine, their relationship to the substance of Christ's body ceases, just as their relationship to the substance of bread would have ceased, if it had remained this substance. In somewhat the same way, when beings are corrupted, God is no longer present in them by the presence of immensity, yet without any change in God himself. Hence not *per se* but only *per accidens* does the body of Christ cease to be present under the appearances, namely, upon the loss of the appearances.

To the third, St. Thomas says: "When they cease, Christ's body ceases to be under them, not because it depends on them, but because the relation which Christ's body has to those appearances is destroyed. And in this way God ceases to be the Lord of a creature which fails." This relation [*habitus*] between the body of Christ and the appearances is not a real relation but one of reason, even as that between God and the creatures of which he is Lord is not a real relation but one of reason. On the contrary, the relation of the appearances to the body of Christ is real, just as the relation of creatures to God.

Further passages to translate:

* pp. 124–125 about precision in theological terminology

* pp. 126–27 on the conditions for speaking correctly about transubstantiation

* pp. 148–150, worth translating

[QUESTION 77]

|| p. 156 || . . . On the supposition, then, that the accidents of bread and wine remain, many things are inquired about them, as regards their being and as regards their acting and undergoing. Thus there are two sections in this question: the first section, as regards their being, contains the first two articles, whether the accidents remain without a subject, and whether dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents; the second section, as regards their acting and undergoing, contains the other articles: whether they can nourish, whether they can be corrupted, and whether from them something else can be produced. In this, many are the things to be marvelled at, which are explained only with difficulty, and which are, so to speak, the invisible consequences of the miracle of transubstantiation. It should be noticed that it is not to be wondered at if, for our lowly intellect, there should remain obscurity in this matter, and yet that this obscurity does not destroy our certainty concerning the real presence and transubstantiation; for our certainty is not founded upon what we can understand, but upon a different source—namely, revelation, according to the literal sense of Scripture and the infallible explanation of the Church. In this Sacrament, as in diverse mysteries, there is enough clarity for those who wish to believe, and enough obscurity for those who do not wish to believe. It is a *chiaroscuro* in which, if one negates what is clear on account of what is obscure, in place of the mystery, one sets down a contradiction in the very words of Christ instituting the Eucharist.

In this sense it is said: A thousand difficulties or obscurities do not cause even one deliberate doubt, if those difficulties do not destroy the formal motive of certitude, which is, in the present case, the authority of God revealing. Thus, too, in the natural order obscurities concerning the secret ways and means by which sensation is produced, or the abstraction of ideas from sensibles, do not destroy certitude about the real existence of external bodies and their knowability. And just as naturally we are certain about the existence of external bodies, so we are certain about the existence of the accidents of bread remaining after consecration. Indeed, concerning them, our natural certainty is bolstered by the infallible declaration of the Church. This is firmly to be held, against the Cartesian school.

[Comment on q. 77, a. 1, ad 2]

|| p. 159 || . . . St. Thomas had already clearly applied this doctrine of the real distinction [between being and essence] to the eucharistic accidents in IV *Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 2 where it is said: “In no created quiddity is *to be* or *to exist* an intrinsic or essential predicate.” For this is proper to God alone. If therefore existence as such is not of the essence of created being as such, it follows that such existence (*viz.*, to be in another) is not of the essence of such a being (*viz.*, an accident), but only an aptitude for such existence.

In addition, the present response rests upon the fundamental doctrine expounded in I, q. 104, a. 1: creatures need to be conserved in being [*esse*] by God, because God is not only the cause of the coming to be, but also of the being, of all things. Thus, God, by conserving the eucharistic accidents, supplies them with the causality of substance. But, as Cardinal Billot rightly points out (*De Sacra Eucharistia*, in the comments on this article), God supplies not the material causality of substance, but its quasi-efficient causality, in so far, namely, as the accidents flow from it according to a certain result. That is, God does not carry the burden in the place of a subject, but having removed the influx of the substance, whatever it be, he conserves the essence of the accident under the being [*esse*] proper to it.¹¹

¹¹ I'm not sure about the translation of these last couple of sentences.—*Trans.*

[Corollary to q. 77, a. 2]

|| p. 163 || By the arguments of this article, in the Eucharist the connatural manner of existing that belongs to other accidents is preserved, nor are miracles multiplied; but it suffices that [by one miracle] quantity exist separate from substance. Hence, no change in the other accidents occurs. [That is, they are still situated in their being as they normally are, namely dependent upon quantity, which in turn is *normally* dependent on substance for its being, but in this case is *miraculously* vouchsafed being independent of substance.]

[Q. 77, a. 3]

|| p. 164 || . . . It is proved by a theological argument, in the body of the article, as follows:

—Anything acts in so far as it is in act, and determines something else according to its own proper determination, for action follows being [*operari sequitur esse*].

—However, it is given to the sacramental appearances by divine intervention that they remain *in their being*.

—Therefore it follows that they remain also *in their action*.

That is: every action that was able to be exercised when the substance of bread and wine existed can now be exercised [in its absence]. This is indeed mysterious enough, but the major and minor premises of the argument prevail, nor are they destroyed by the objections.

[Q. 77, a. 4]

|| p. 164 || Status of the question: This question is more difficult than the question posed in the preceding article, because God can carry the burden [or: take up the role] of an absent efficient cause, but he cannot carry the burden of a material cause or a subject, for this would be an imperfection in God, because matter is a passive potency, determinable and perfectible, whereas God is pure act. . . .

The response is nevertheless that the sacramental appearances can be corrupted and are in fact corrupted. This is not properly speaking a theological conclusion but more of an explanation of what the senses establish.

|| p. 165 || . . . [W]hatever would have been able to corrupt the substance of bread and thus, in consequence, destroy its accidents, can now, in the same way, destroy these accidents. . . . To the third, reply is made: The corruption of these appearances is not miraculous, but natural. Yet it presupposes that these appearances miraculously retain their being without a subject. Nonetheless, there remains a difficulty, since the corruption of one thing is the generation of another, which cannot occur with matter [i.e., the subject of change]. This is the difficulty examined in the next article.

[Q. 77, a. 5]

|| p. 165 || Status of the question: It seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental appearances, for (1) nothing is generated except out of matter, yet the sacramental appearances exist without matter, nor can God play the role of matter; (2) substance cannot be generated out of an accident, which is of another genus. These objections are easier to understand than the re-

sponse, because they skim the surface, while the response is taken from high above, namely, from what almighty God can do in an extraordinary way.

|| p. 167 || . . . A difficulty still remains, namely: Whether the new thing composed [out of the accidents] consists only of quantity and substantial form, or whether, on the contrary, God produces matter out of whose potentiality [the new thing is made], and in which the substantial form of the new thing composed is received? This point is disputed among Thomists. Ferrara and certain others hold that the newly composed thing is without matter, and that in it quantity substitutes for the place of matter . . . But more commonly Thomists, e.g., John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Billuart, hold that it is more probably produced out of new matter, for otherwise it would seem to follow that there would be a perpetual miracle continuing even beyond the Eucharist, for from the newly composed thing, e.g., in the ashes, something else is generated and so on, until the end of the world.¹² And a composite generated from eucharistic appearances would not be a natural composite.

|| p. 168 || [After noting how difficult it is to understand such matters, citing as examples the process of sensation and of intellection, the local motion of bodies, and the reconciliation of seemingly opposed divine attributes, Garrigou then comments:] In all these things, as in the Eucharist, it is necessary to distinguish well between a superior obscurity which comes from too much light confronting the weakness of our intellects, and an inferior obscurity which comes from incoherence and even absurdity. Kant rejects supernatural mysteries on account of their obscurity, yet in his doctrine there is another obscurity, totally different, which does not come from too much light. It is not necessary to expend too much effort of study on Kantianism, it would be a great waste of time, time that could find a much more fruitful use for the salvation of souls. The same should be said of Cartesianism, whose feebleness is especially apparent in the fanciful and labored theories [*elucubrationibus*] of the Cartesian theologians concerning the Eucharist, on account of their confusion of substance with local extension.

[Observation after Q. 77, a. 6]

|| p. 169 || In regard to these questions, something should be noted which pertains to the ascent or upward climb of matter [*ascensum*]. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas says many times that matter, which is naturally ordered to form, desires form, nay more, that it progressively desires a superior form, as the matter of an element desires the form of a plant, and afterward, the form of a brute animal, e.g., a cow, and afterward the form of a man, which is the most excellent of all forms that are received into matter. Thus is the wondrous ascent of matter to what is superior, for the sake of supporting and serving our understanding and our love of God. In the supernatural order, however, some part of matter is united to the soul of Christ, which is personally united to the Word, and the matter and form of bread are converted into the glorified body of Christ; there cannot be a higher ascent of matter. All these things are certain; the former are [known to be] certain on account of reasoning, the latter on account of faith.

These certainties are in no way lessened owing to the aforesaid obscurity, such as: how can a new composite be generated from the corruption of the mere appearances of the Eucharist? God in a manner pleasing to Him produces new matter either through an invisible creation, or better, through an invisible conversion of the quantity of bread into the substance of the thing newly composed; this conversion would be a consequence [*sequela*] of transubstantiation, and a conse-

¹² In other words, it would be miraculous that bodily substance could be generated from a quantity without matter, and if this occurred, then in the resulting body something would be existing miraculously, and when from *that* body another was generated, the miracle would be, so to speak, passed on down the line—a non-stop miracle until the end of time.

quence that arises according to this law: “the corruption of one is the generation of another.” For God, the creator and preserver of matter, has immediate power over it.

[Corollary to Q. 77, a. 8]

The real presence of the blood of Christ either ceases or does not cease in so far as there is made or not made so great an admixture of additional liquid that the appearances or qualities of wine do not remain, so great, that is, that the substance of wine would itself have ceased, had it been present. When exactly the substance of wine would cease to exist from the admixture of another liquid it is difficult to determine concretely, but knowledge [*scientia*] is not had of such singular things, which are contingents; as if one were to seek exactly when grains of sand began to constitute a mound, for a mound is something accidental, and has no determinate essence. Sophists multiply similar questions, which fall outside knowledge.

[Recapitulation of Question 77]

1. After transubstantiation, these accidents remain without a proper subject, this is *de fide*; moreover, they remain without any subject whatsoever, as is commonly held.
2. The dimensive quantity of the bread is the subject of the other accidents, e.g., color, resistance, taste.
3. Because these accidents remain, by divine power, in their being, they also remain in their action, and thus they bring about change in external bodies.
4. These accidents can be corrupted both *per se*, namely, by reason of an accidental alteration, and *per accidens*, namely through any action that would have destroyed the very substance of bread [were it still there].
5. Out of these accidents, something can be generated, in so far as the quantity plays the role of [or: substitutes for, *vices gerit*] substance, and in turn matter is produced by God in the generated composite, through a miracle coming out of transubstantiation itself [*per miraculum subsequens ex transsubstantiatione*].
6. In this way, the sacramental appearances are able to nourish [the one who receives them]. These are the chief points of this question.

If these articles of St. Thomas on transubstantiation and the eucharistic accidents are compared with the writings of theologians preceding or contemporary with him, the great step forward becomes apparent. Biographers narrate that St. Thomas asked the Lord in prayer if this teaching on the eucharistic accidents were true; apparently he obtained from Him the following response: “You have written well of me, Thomas” [*Bene scripsisti de me, Thoma*].

Here ends the questions pertaining to the *MATTER* of the Eucharist, which were four in number: q. 74, on the type of matter; q. 75, on the conversion of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ; q. 76, on the manner in which Christ exists in this sacrament; q. 77, on the accidents of bread and wine that remain in this sacrament. Now we go over into q. 78, on the *FORM* of this sacrament.

[On ST III, q. 78: The form of the Eucharist]

|| p. 172 || . . . It is clear that the questions that have arisen between Catholics and schismatics concerning the form of consecration and the epiclesis may only now be treated, the questions of the real presence and of transubstantiation being presupposed.

To begin with, we have before our eyes definitions of the Church. The Church has declared that the form of this sacrament are the words of Christ, not the epiclesis (the subsequent prayer, as the Greeks call it). Cf. Denz. 414, 698, 715, 876, 938, 3043, 3035.¹³ The Council of Florence (D. 698) says: “The form of this sacrament are the Savior’s words, with which he confectioned this sacrament; the priest then speaking *in persona Christi*, confectioned this sacrament. For by the power of those words the substance of bread is converted into the body of Christ, and the substance of wine into His blood.” . . . The Council of Trent (D. 876) says: “By the force of the words [of consecration], the body of Christ is under the appearance of bread and the blood under the appearance of wine.” [See also D. 938 and 949.] Innocent IV, in the year 1254, concerning the Greek rite, declares: “The Greeks should be permitted to celebrate Masses at the hour which is according to their own custom, provided that they observe, in the confection or consecration, the very words expressed and handed down by the Lord” (D. 3043.¹⁴) In fact, Pius X, in the year 1910 (D. 3035), condemning doctrine recently defended, declares against certain errors of the Orientals: [in brief, consecration is effected by the words of consecration, not by the epiclesis, which is not strictly necessary]. Denziger notes here that many earlier popes have declared that the epiclesis is not required for consecration, namely Benedict XII (D. 532), Clement VI, Benedict XIII, Benedict XIV and Pius VII.

From the fourteenth century on, schismatic Greeks say that the Eucharist is confectioned by the prayers which are poured out *after* the words “This is my body, This is my blood” have been pronounced, according to their liturgical prayers as follows: “We beseech you, Father, that you send Your spirit over us and over these gifts set before us, and make this bread the precious body of your Son and that which is in the chalice the precious blood of your Son.” To say that this prayer is necessary for consecration is to affirm that the Masses celebrated in the Roman Church are invalid and is, moreover, contrary to the declaration of the Council of Florence (D. 698 and 715). The chief proponents of this error were Cabasilas, Mark of Ephesus, and Simeon of Thessalonica, who were refuted by Cardinal Bessarion in his work *De Eucharistia*, as well as by Allatius and Arcudius. (Cf. *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, s. v. «Epiclèse», P. Salaville.) According to Dom Cabrol, in the most ancient liturgies, the epiclesis *preceded* the consecratory words, hence no difficulty.¹⁵

There is a twofold explanation of the meaning of the epiclesis after the words of consecration. || p. 174 || (1) One explanation is: When it is read after the consecration, as it now is [in the Greek rite], the epiclesis invokes the Holy Spirit, not to effect transubstantiation, which is already accomplished, that is, not so that the bread become the body of Christ, but that it may become this *for us*, namely, that it may profit the priest and the faithful, especially those who are going to re-

¹³ [Check these numbers against a more recent edition of Denziger-Schönmetzer.—*Trans.*]

¹⁴ [Check this translation.]

¹⁵ The falsity of the opinion of the schismatic Greeks is shown from Sacred Scripture and Tradition. For it is not possible that the Evangelists and St. Paul, in referring to the words of Christ by which the Eucharist was instituted and saying “Do this in memory of me,” would have omitted words altogether necessary for a valid consecration. Moreover, many Fathers, even Greek ones, assign as the cause of the conversion of bread into the body of Christ, the words related in the Synoptics and by St Paul, without any others [added]. And not one among the Fathers insinuates that these words do not suffice. Moreover, even among the schismatic Greeks this error was unknown prior to the fourteenth century. (Garrigou)

ceive communion. In this way speak Vasquez, Bellarmine, Suarez, de Lugo, Billuart, and among the recent authors, Billot. But this explanation doesn't seem literal enough [i.e., it doesn't account for the seemingly obvious meaning of the prayer].

(2) The second explanation, which is more common, was proposed by Cardinal Bessarion, as follows. The epiclesis invokes the Holy Spirit exactly inasmuch as the consecration, being a work *ad extra*, is common to the three divine Persons, and accordingly the Holy Spirit is invoked, so that, with the Father and the Son already having been invoked, He Himself [in unity with them] may bring about transubstantiation. Indeed, this transubstantiation is accomplished in an instant, by the words of consecration already pronounced; but because, *by our human speech*, all these things cannot be expressed in one and the same instant, “things which are completed in an instant are declared one after another.” In this way speak Bessarion, Bossuet, Ferraris, Cagin, Franzelin, Salaville.¹⁶

[From Ott, *Fundamentals*, 392–93]

THE FORM OF THE EUCHARIST CONSISTS IN CHRIST'S WORDS OF INSTITUTION, UTTERED AT THE CONSECRATION. (SENT. CERTA.)

While the Greek-Orthodox Church wrongly placed the power of transmutation either in the Epiclesis alone, following after the narrative of the institution, or in the connection of the words of institution with the Epiclesis (*Confessio orth.* I 107), the Catholic Church adheres firmly to the view that the priest consummates the transubstantiation solely by the uttering of the words of institution. [Ott then cites the *Decretum pro Armenis* of Florence and the parallel passage of Trent, and makes an argument from the Gospel narrative. He then cites explicit testimonies from Tertullian, Justin Martyr, Ambrose, and John Chrysostom, with implicit testimonies from Irenaeus and Origen. The words of Chrysostom are particularly noteworthy: “The priest stands there and sets up the outward sign, while speaking these words; but the power and the grace are of God. ‘This is my body,’ he says. These words transmute the gifts” (*De proditione Judae*, Hom. I 6).]

In agreement with Cardinal Bessarion, the words of the Epiclesis are to be taken as referring, not to the time at which they are spoken, but to the time to which they are related. That which happens in one single moment in the consecration, is liturgically developed and explained in the subsequent words of the Epiclesis. The Epiclesis has no consecratory, but only a declaratory significance.

¹⁶ *Trans.*: Later, Garrigou notes that a similar principle is at work in the narrative of the Last Supper, where Jesus takes bread, blesses it, breaks it, and speaks the words. “[N]arration is successive and announces words after facts, when really the words spoken are simultaneous with the facts.”]

The reason why this kind of temporal disjunction happens is not hard to see. We humans can only speak of an instantaneous coming-to-be in language of change and therefore of time duration (consider all the troubles Thomas has to face when speaking of “creation *ex nihilo*”). Thus the liturgy speaks at length, one might say, of the conversion of the gifts—it calls down the Spirit, recalls or repeats the institution, offers up the gifts to the heavenly Father, and so on—in different sequences for different rites—but really, these things are occurring simultaneously. This we cannot express with our time-bound language. If angels had liturgies, they'd be able to do it.

On Question 79

After the consideration of this sacrament in itself and in its parts, now are treated its effects, and after that, in qu. 80, its use, or communion and the conditions prerequisite for this. These are maximally vital questions pertaining to the interior life, of highest importance for everyone. In the present question there are eight articles, which may be grouped into four sections:

- The first section (aa. 1–2) treat of the positive effects, namely the increase of grace and the attainment of glory, to which the Eucharist, especially as viaticum, disposes one more than any other sacrament;
- The second section (aa. 3–6) treat of the quasi-negative effects, which are the remission of sin and punishment, and preservation from future sin;
- The third section (a. 7) is whether this sacrament can benefit others besides those who receive it;
- The fourth section (a. 8) treats of the impediment to the effects of this sacrament. This last article is the transition to the following question, which concerns holy communion.

This question 79, attentively considered, is not only about the Eucharist as a sacrament, but also about the same as a sacrifice, for in art. 7 is shown that the Eucharist profits its recipients in the manner of both sacrament and sacrifice, while it profits non-recipients in the manner of a sacrifice [alone]. [It should also be noted that] the diverse effects of the Eucharist were expounded with great piety by St. Thomas in his office for the Blessed Sacrament. (One should also consult Book IV of *The Imitation of Christ*.)

[cf. p. 190, on the *bonum est diffusivum sui* principle behind the Eucharist.]

[After the commentary on q. 79:] Now is to be treated the communion itself, on our part, for after a consideration of the effects of the Eucharist, the matter next to be handled [q. 80] is the requisite conditions for receiving it on the part of the recipient.

On Question 80

In this question, there are twelve articles, which may be grouped into two sections:

- The first section (aa. 1–5) considers the use of the Eucharist according to itself [*secundum se*], in regard to the dispositions required of necessity by the very nature of the sacrament;
- The second section considers the use of the Eucharist in view of the divine precept and the precepts of the Church, where the eucharistic fast, communion under both species or under one alone, etc., are spoken of.

***Divisio textus* of ST III, q. 82:
On the Minister of the Eucharist**

1) Regarding priests who preside over the Eucharist [Or: To whom does it belong to preside over the Eucharist?]

a) As regards consecration:

- i) alone (art. 1) [Does the consecration of the Eucharist pertain only to a priest?]
- ii) in company, i.e., concelebration (art. 2) [May several priests consecrate the same host and chalice?]

b) As regards distribution

- i) to the faithful (art. 3) [Must the priest communicate others?]
- ii) to himself (art. 4) [Must the priest communicate himself?]

2) Regarding *unworthy* priests who preside over the Eucharist

a) The unworthy priest himself

- i) The sinful priest, in general
 - (1) Can an evil priest consecrate? (art. 5)
 - (2) Is the Mass of an evil priest as powerful as that of a good priest? (art. 6)
- ii) Particular cases of sinful priests
 - (1) Can an heretical, schismatic, or excommunicated priest consecrate? (art. 7)
 - (2) Can a demoted priest consecrate? (art. 8)

b) Those who communicate from an unworthy priest (art. 9)

3) Regarding the necessity of an individual priest's *offering* Mass (art. 10)

Garrigou's division is a bit different:

- 1) Of the minister of consecration [aa. 1 & 2]
- 2) Of the minister of dispensation [a. 3]
- 3) Of the relationship between the communion of the priest and the consecration [a. 4]
- 4) Of any priest's obligation of celebrating [a. 5]
- 5) Of the requisite conditions for a priest to consecrate licitly: state of grace, faith, not excommunicated [aa. 6–8]
- 6) Then is sought whether those who receive communion from an unworthy minister sin [a. 9];
- 7) Finally is sought whether a priest may licitly refrain altogether from celebrating [a. 10]