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FULL INTRODUCTION

In the volume published by the Catholic University of America Press, our aim is two-fold: to make available an annotated translation of texts most of which have never been translated into English before, and to provide the reader with such orientation as an intelligent reading of the Scriptum requires.

This web-based Supplement contains three items in support of that aim: a fuller introduction than the one printed in the book; the 518 webnotes to which the book refers in the form of superscript numerals; and an extensive bibliography covering the relationship of the Scriptum to other writings of Aquinas, the many philosophical and theological sources that nourished or provoked the author during its composition, and the gradual elaboration of his teachings on love, friendship, charity, and similar topics over the span of his career. The webnotes serve a variety of purposes: they follow out obscure references, unfold condensed or difficult arguments, point out implications of and developments in Thomas's thinking, and refer the reader to secondary sources of greater scope and detail.

This Full Introduction (1) offers a brief overview of the Scriptum and some of its peculiar features; (2) speaks about the portions of it translated in the published volume, the editions on which the translation is based (with special attention to the two versions of Book I, Distinction 17), and other textual issues; and (3) explains the translators' strategy concerning various terms and phrases.


2. See, for example, the careful study by A. Stevaux, “La doctrine de la charité dans le commentaires des Sentences de Saint Albert, de Saint Bonaventure et de Saint Thomas,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 24 (1948): 59–97; other studies are mentioned in Sections 2 and 3 of the Bibliography. Speaking of the Scriptum as a whole, Torrell writes: “We find here a Thomas attentive to but also dependent on his contemporaries: Master Albert, surely, whose influence is very powerful in the first three books, but less clearly perceptible in the fourth. Bonaventure is there too. . . . But only the critical edition, yet to appear, will permit a more exact estimate of what Thomas owed to his predecessors and contemporaries” (Person and Work, 44–45).

3. Special mention should be made of the extensive notes found in the French (Revue des Jeunes), German (Die Deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe), and English (Blackfriars) editions of the Summa theologicae (see Section 1 of the Bibliography), where comparisons or contrasts are often drawn with earlier writings.

4. See Section 3 of the Bibliography.

5. When possible, I have preferred to draw upon the Scriptum itself when offering explanatory notes on this or that point in the text. In this way it has come about that translations of a good number of additional short passages have found their way into this volume.
1. OVERVIEW OF AQUINAS’S *SCRIPTUM SUPER SENTENTIIS*

The immediate background to the composition of St. Thomas Aquinas’s *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* (in its Latin title, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* or *Scriptum super Sententiis*, hereafter *Scriptum*) can be easily related. Having taken the habit of the Order of Preachers in April 1244 and having studied for some seven years under St. Albert the Great—first in Paris from 1245 to 1248, afterwards in Cologne from 1248 to 1252—Friar Thomas d’Aquino was sent by his Order to the University of Paris to earn the chair of *Magister in sacra pagina*. Under the direction of Master Elias Brunet de Bergerac from the Dominican province of Provence, Thomas, according to an already well-established custom, commenced lecturing on the *Sentences* in September 1252, writing up his lectures for publication as he went on. We are not certain about the exact details of composition, but we can surmise that he was still working at the text when he began to exercise the functions of *Magister* in 1256. If we take 1225 as his year of birth, this would mean Thomas was hard at work on the *Scriptum* from the age of 27 to the age of 31 or thereabouts.

The formation he received during his time with St. Albert must have been incredibly stimulating and fruitful, for genius alone cannot explain the extraordinary depth and power of Thomas's first major work. If the lecture-course delivered on the *Sentences* was meant to function (as Torrell puts it) “like the chef d’oeuvre that the apprentice was required to present in order to become a master artisan,” Thomas’s effort could well be called, with a nod to the Areopagite, a superexcessive superabundance. It would be rather like an apprentice designing and executing the cathedral of Rouen or Strasbourg. One can begin to appreciate just how ambitious an enterprise the *Scriptum* is by considering a quantitative measure: taking the four volumes together, the edition prepared by Mandonnet (Books I and II) and Moos (Book III and Book IV up to Distinction 22) contains over 4,000 pages—even with so large a part of Book IV left out.

6. The alternate spelling *Sententias* is also to be met with.


8. For further precisions on the dating of the *Scriptum*, see the revised edition of Torrell’s *Person and Work* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 424–25. The pagination in this edition remains the same as in the first, but a substantial appendix with updates has been added.

9. Weisheipl notes that most of Thomas’s predecessors in Paris had become *baccalarius Sententiarum*, or *Sententiarius*, in their forties; the fact that he was 27 goes far to explain his feelings of total inadequacy for the task at the time (Friar Thomas, 53). As stated, we do not know exactly when Thomas finished the text of the *Scriptum*, though it is not likely to have gone beyond 1256, given the many new responsibilities and projects that demanded his attention as a newly established *Magister*.


11. Omitting the table of contents, Mandonnet’s edition of Books I and II comprises 1,091 and 1,136 pages respectively, while Moos’s edition of Books III and Book IV (up to Distinction 22) comprises 1,313 and 1,105 pages respectively. If one were to take the approximate ratio of text to page in the portion of Book IV
Manuscripts of Aquinas’s *Scriptum* were considerably more diffused and studied in the centuries after Thomas’s death than either of his *Summae* tended to be, largely because of the fact that Lombard’s *Sentences* retained its status as a standard textbook. (A budding student of theology in the middle of the fourteenth century could readily find out what a whole sequence of great masters—e.g., Albert, Bonaventure, Thomas, Scotus—had to say about the Holy Spirit as charity by just looking up Book I, Distinction 17. Surely this common set of reference points must have been a major factor in the remarkable pedagogical endurance of the *Sentences.*) As Torrell remarks:

Thomas’s text [the *Scriptum*] was transmitted along with Lombard’s. The latter unintentionally contributed to the success of his young rival and to the persistence of a kind of misunderstanding. University rules required commenting on Lombard. Thomas’s commentary was used much more than the *Summa*, which expressed a more personally evolved thought . . . Even in the fifteenth century, the first great commentator on Thomas, Capreolus, the *princeps thomistarum*, comments on the *Sentences* and not on the *Summa*.

Romanus Cessario notes:

Capreolus’s use of Lombard’s *Sentences* as a starting-point to provide his own theological commentary reflects the enduring value of this twelfth-century theology textbook, which was used, moreover, in some schools of theology even up to the end of the eighteenth century. During the second half of the fifteenth century, however, the *Summa theologiae* gained ascendancy as the standard textbook for professors of theology, especially in those German universities where Dominicans taught.

In a reversal of its earlier fortunes, the *Scriptum* in more recent centuries—and especially since the revival of Thomism inaugurated by Pope Leo XIII—has been neglected by all
but specialists, attention being focused rather on the saint’s “more mature” works. There are several reasons for this. One reason is that the *Summa theologiae*, by far the best known of the saint’s writings today, is, in most respects, a superior pedagogical instrument. The *Scriptum* lacks an elegant, transparent structure, and so it is harder to find what one is looking for. (As a graduate student reading many works of Thomas for the first time, I remember feeling especially intimidated by the *Scriptum*, with its lengthy divisions of and random notes on the text of Lombard, its *quaestiaunculae* nested in *articuli* nested in *quaestiones* grouped in *distinctiones* gathered in *libri*, and the seemingly odd location of topics within books. It seemed simpler to go to one or the other *Summa*, or to the disputed questions.) A more practical reason is that very few portions of the *Scriptum* have been translated at all, and with the proportionate decline in Latin readership among students of philosophy and theology, a work of this kind risks being passed over unnoticed by new generations of readers. The surprising dearth of English translations from the *Scriptum*, combined with the fact that the best Latin edition hitherto available, published between 1929 and 1947, is a “long out-of-print, rare, and inaccessible text,” has meant that the *Scriptum* has become, for all intents and purposes, a closed book to the better part of the audience that might be expected to know about it, study it, and profit from it. Our intention in preparing the present translation has been to remedy this situation at least as far as one important area of Aquinas’s theology is concerned.

Why study the *Scriptum*? Leaving it to the reader to discover how much is to be gained in many particular cases, I will suggest a general answer. While there is considerable overlap between the content of the *Scriptum* and that of the two *Summae*, given that each one presents the fundamentals of Christian doctrine in systematic fashion, there are also striking differences, as well as numerous occasions where a subject is either treated more fully in the *Scriptum* than in other works, or even treated uniquely. Thomas’s avowed purpose in crafting toward the end of his life that masterpiece of streamlined conciseness, the *Summa theologiae*, was simply not his purpose in the *Scriptum*, where he writes freely and fully of divine mysteries and metaphysical subtleties with all the zest and zeal—though also, at times, with the hesitations and missteps—of youthful genius. His answers, and often the objections and re-

15. I say “in most respects” because some arguments in the *Summa* are so concisely crafted that they become rather obscure as a result, compared with the *Scriptum*’s easygoing volubility, replete with examples and digressions. In some ways the latter is more proportioned to a philosophically inquiring mind that has the leisure to unfold, explore, take its time, while the former is more proportioned to a student who needs to prepare for sacred ministry in the most efficient way—that is, by gaining maximum clarity about the conclusions to be drawn in *sacra doctrina*, yet without expending more time than is desirable in a formation program.

16. See Appendix II for a list of published English translations from the *Scriptum*.

17. Quoting another who has labored in the vineyards of *Scriptum* translation, E. M. Macierowski (*Thomas Aquinas’s Earliest Treatment*, 1). The Leonine critical editions of Books II and III are expected to appear soon. As will be discussed below, our translation is based, in large part, on the forthcoming critical edition.

18. An example of the latter would be *In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 5*, “Whether beatitude is the same thing as the kingdom of God.” There is no query quite like it elsewhere.

19. There can be, of course, no doubt of a process of development from the *Scriptum* to the *Summa theologiae*. As Torrell puts it, “it is important never to forget this: if he is consistent with himself in his large-scale choices, Thomas shows nothing of the fixed systematician. Rather, he is a genius in motion, perpetually in the act of discovery” (*Person and Work*, 67). Torrell offers this example: “It suffices to compare *Sentences* I d. 17 q. 1 a. 1 (or *Sent. II d. 26 q. 1 a. 1*) with *De veritate* 27, 1–2, and *ST* Ila Iae q. 10 a. 1 (or Ila IIae q. 23
plies, tend to be fuller than in the two *Summae* written later. For these reasons, it is problematic to view the *Scriptum* as a sort of rough draft of the *Summa theologiae*; it is more accurate to see them as complementary, as mutually illuminating.\(^{20}\) Indeed, for the serious student of Thomistic thought (or of Catholic theology), none of St. Thomas’s works can substitute for the others, but all must be used and used well. Torrell firmly underlines this point:

Since the 1980s, translations of other works [of Aquinas] into a number of languages have multiplied tremendously. Without enumerating all of them here, I should remind the reader that these other works of St. Thomas’s are the natural milieu in which to read the *Summa*. Following the maxim of his first disciples, Thomas is *sui ipsius interpres* (his own interpreter); this means that the reading of any one of his works, even if it be the most important, always gains by being done in conjunction with the others. This principle is best seen by the number of scientific monographs, sometimes of great value, that are now being published.\(^{21}\)

The *Summa theologiae* is often and rightly admired for its fusion of order and brevity. However, what makes it an attractive “summary” is ironically what can, at times, make it pedagogically troublesome. The very conciseness of treatment—where premises are given rapid-fire, not teased out of examples; where working knowledge of a vast wealth of philosophical and theological sources is presumed; where objections are pared down to the few that are

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\(^{20}\) Decades ago, Chenu drew attention to the importance of studying this work for a fuller understanding of Thomas’s thought: see *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, 272–76. Chenu rightly warns against a facile syncretism that would blend together the *Scriptum* and the *Summa theologiae* as if they were basically continuous and undifferentiated, but he warns equally against treating the *Scriptum* as if it were a rough draft superseded by later writings.

\(^{21}\) *Aquinas’s Summa*, 126. The importance of Torrell’s point will become apparent when we take up, below, the question of *loca parallela*. 

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\(a. 2\), to see how the large thesis about the created nature of charity or grace (contra the position of Peter Lombard) is reinforced and better organized” (ibid., 66, n. 52). (Yet at the same time, Torrell sees in the *Scriptum* treatment of charity a notable example of where we can find the first flowering of Thomas’s genius: ibid., 42, n. 25.) Recently, Michael Sherwin has spoken of the overall development of Thomas’s theory of love in *By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), and delivers the verdict that there are certain flaws in the *Scriptum* presentation that its author will later overcome (see 64–81 and 192–202). Other examples of progress in Thomas’s thought, including the revision or repudiation of earlier ideas, are furnished by Tugwell (*Albert and Thomas*, 276–78, 282, 285–86; cf. 242). For his part Weisheipl states: “In this earliest major work by Thomas [the *Scriptum*], all of his principal conclusions are established” (mention is then made of eight characteristically Thomistic positions); “in theology also his basic principles stand out clearly. . . . Nevertheless, Thomas did not reach full maturity of his speculative thought in the *Sentences*. There are many points on which Thomas later abandoned earlier opinions, resulting in some discrepancy between the teaching of the *Sentences* and the teaching of the *Summa theologiae*. After Thomas’s death there were not only numerous summaries and condensations of his works, but also concordances to harmonize or bring out more clearly the development of doctrine” (*Friar Thomas*, 76). Deserving of special mention among such tools are the monumental *Tabula aurea* of Peter of Bergamo (repr. Alba/Rome: Editioines Paulinae, n.d.) and the “*Articuli in quibus frater Thomas melius in Summa quam in Scriptis,*” edited by R.-A. Gauthier and published in *RTAM* 19 (1952): 271–326.

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20. The importance of Torrell’s point will become apparent when we take up, below, the question of *loca parallela*. 

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most cogent—can make the text almost impenetrable for a beginner who is not thoroughly trained prior to reading it.\textsuperscript{22} The Scriptum, on the other hand, though it lacks the advantages of the Summa’s order and brevity, can have a way of befriending a beginner, or at least an adventurous explorer. Premises are covered at length; metaphors and analogies are frequently employed; objections (including the sort of objections young students tend to raise) abound here, as do “on the contrary” arguments. In short, although one does not always find in the Scriptum the depth of penetration and economic style of the later works, there is often a more varied feast for the mind, a fuller unfolding of doctrine—and this can be a pedagogical asset in the hands of a teacher or a student who knows where to look for appropriate readings. The purpose of the present translation is, in part, to encourage the use of the Scriptum in the classroom as a supplement to more familiar texts on love and charity from the Summa theologiae.\textsuperscript{23} However much its author improved in pedagogical focus and the articulation of certain concepts, his “youthful” commentary remains an astonishing tour de force, bearing everywhere the stamp of profound reflection. It is an invaluable and even indispensable source of Thomistic doctrine, one that has been sadly neglected in the modern English-speaking milieu. My hope is that this translation, in addition to whatever academic purposes it may serve, will also motivate others to undertake the rewarding labor of translating the Scriptum.

It was with an awareness of the riches to be found in the Scriptum that, in 1999, I enlisted the aid of a student, now Brother Thomas Bolin, OSB, to undertake with me the project of translating from the commentary the most important passages on love and charity. The project took a decisive step forward when, due to the generosity of the Leonine Commission, we were given an unexpected opportunity to consult the Commission’s provisional critical text for the relevant distinctions in Books II and III—passages we had originally translated from the edition of Mandonnet and Moos. This made it possible to review and correct the translation line by line against the critical text (here again I was able to benefit from the help of a student, Joseph Bolin, the younger brother of the Bolin who first worked on the translation with me).\textsuperscript{24} In addition, we had the privilege of consulting, prior to its publication, the criti-

\textsuperscript{22} It has been observed that the kind of “beginner” presupposed by the Summa must be a mightily gifted student indeed—more like a beginning graduate student already well trained in philosophy and Scripture than a “rank beginner.” It would be hard to differ with the judgment of John Jenkins (Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 78–95) that the Summa cannot have been intended for “rank beginners,” so vast a wealth of prior knowledge does it simply take for granted. Anyone who has tried to teach the Five Ways without reducing them to a cartoon caricature knows how much they depend on a solid grasp of Aristotelian metaphysics; \textit{a fortiori}, what hope could there be for a neophyte confronted with the treatise on the Trinity, qq. 27–43 of the Prima pars? If Thomas really had in mind students with little or no metaphysical training prior to engaging the Summa, he was either working with unusually bright pupils ready to burn the midnight oil poring over Aristotle’s \textit{Metaphysics} and Augustine’s \textit{De Trinitate}, or he was—as is the case with many geniuses—incapable of realizing at how much lower a level than his most people are moving!

\textsuperscript{23} To facilitate this use I have provided a chart in which the Summa articles on love and charity in general are correlated to their parallels in the Scriptum (see Appendix I). This chart makes immediately apparent some interesting features of the Scriptum, such as the sheer breadth of In III Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, with the philosophical freight it carries, in comparison to the way Thomas divides up the same themes in \textit{ST} I-II, q. 28. Here, a single article in the Scriptum is doing the work, so to speak, of six articles in the \textit{ST}!

\textsuperscript{24} Writing in 1997, Steven E. Baldner and William E. Carroll remarked: “There is not as yet—nor likely
cal edition of the second (Roman) version or *Lectura romana* of Book I, Distinction 17, a translation of which we decided to include so as to make possible a fascinating comparison with the original (Paris) version. We also did not hesitate to include in the notes shorter translations of texts from other distinctions whenever these could throw valuable light on the topics at hand. The result is the present volume, which contains by far the most extensive English translation from the *Scriptum* to date. Finally, to enhance the value of the translation to those who are interested in the historical development of Thomas’s thinking and his methods of working, we made a point of including the more doctrinally interesting “drafts” from the autograph manuscript of Book III, as edited by P.-M. Gils. Here we see the author laboring hard on his materials, emending, canceling out, taking different points of departure. All in all, the inclusion of draft material, of the finished Parisian product, and of the bold Roman attempt at a second *Scriptum* offers an incomparable window into the first phase of Aquinas’s career as a theologian.

A few words are in order about unfamiliar features of the *Scriptum*. As with the *Summa contra gentiles*, the *Scriptum* is divided into four books. The main unit of division is not the question or chapter, but the “Distinction.” Each Distinction in the *Scriptum* opens with a *divisio textus* of Peter Lombard’s text, leading the reader to the points Thomas wishes to discuss. These points always have their roots, so to speak, in the rich soil of Lombard’s text, but

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25. See Appendix II.
27. Apropos the manuscript edited and published by Gils, Torrell writes: “Whatever Tocco may say, these lectures [on the *Sentences*] were not the fruit of an infused knowledge, but the result of hard work. The handwritten manuscript of the Third Book, which has come down to us, as has the *Super Isaiam*, with erasures and second thoughts, still bears the traces of that labor” (*Person and Work*, 44).
29. The division of Lombard’s text into Distinctions appears to have been the work of the master Alexander of Hales (cf. Torrell, *Person and Work*, 40).
30. It bears emphasizing, for those unfamiliar with it, that the *Scriptum* is not by any stretch of the imagination a commentary, strictly speaking, on another author’s text. As a finished product it bears more likeness to the disputed questions or the commentaries on Boethius, as this brief description from Baldner and
they grow and blossom well above it. As Torrell remarks, speaking of the authors of Thomas’s day: “In fact, theologians were not slow to abandon the servitude of a strict commentary and forcefully to introduce new considerations, sometimes quite distant from Lombard’s. . . . Thomas was, therefore, not the first or only commentator to go ‘beyond Lombard.’ But he was without question one of those who did so most resolutely.” The Distinction concludes with an *expositio textus*, a set of clarifications on phrases in the Lombard’s text that might give rise to misunderstandings (we have called this section “Notes on the Text,” because it is by no means an “exposition” of a text in the way that a commentary of Thomas’s on Aristotle or Dionysius or Proclus is). Torrell continues:

Between these two markers [the *divisio textus* and the *expositio textus*] we can see the vestiges of the literal commentary, which was honored less and less. If we wish to get an idea of the proportions of the young professor’s text compared with that of the Master, we can consider the example Father Chenu once gave: the two pages of distinction 33 of Book III provide Thomas with the occasion to pose 41 questions, which he develops over 88 pages.

The Distinctions in the *Scriptum* are subdivided in various ways by Aquinas. In some cases, a distinction simply contains a series of articles. In other cases, it will contain several questions, subdivided into articles. One curious aspect of the *Scriptum* for a reader new to it is the proliferation of so-called *quaestiunculae*—literally “little questions,” called here in “subquestions”—beneath the familiar question and article levels. This generates famously lengthy citations such as: “In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 3, ad 1,” where “III” identifies the book, “d. 27” the Distinction on love and charity in themselves, “q. 2” the question on charity, “a. 4” the article whether charity is one virtue or many, “qa. 3” the subquestion whether charity is the form of the virtues, and “ad 1” the reply to the first objection, on charity as exemplar form of the virtues.

Carroll indicates: “The work is not strictly a commentary but rather writings (scripta) or elaborations of the text in the form of questions and discussions of themes which arise from the text. As ‘bachelor of the Sentences,’ Aquinas read aloud a passage from the text, which he then analyzed. He explained briefly the meaning of the points made and then addressed a question or series of questions arising from the subject of the text” (*Aquinas on Creation*, 31). Tugwell makes a similar observation: “The lectures on the Sentences, which preceded graduation as a Master, gave scope for the exploration of isolated topics, since the lecturer was quite free to take up any point he wanted and tease it out with little reference to the actual text of the Lombard” (*Albert and Thomas*, 249).

32. *Person and Work*, 41.
33. Readers should be aware that at times Thomas or his editors introduce a heading styled “Question 1” which is then divided into articles, but after which no further question appears, rendering the “Question” heading entirely superfluous. Citations in secondary literature have waffled between keeping and dropping the “Question 1” in such cases. Here we mention “q.” only if there is more than a single question; otherwise the citation would read: In III Sent. d. 28, a. 3. There are also a few other numbering confusions in the *Scriptum*, but in most cases the problem is easily spotted and solved.
34. There are several acceptable ways of citing the *Scriptum* in written work, but probably the clearest is: “Sent. III or In III Sent. [the commentary on the third book of the Sentences], d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 3, ad 1.” The customary abbreviation for a *quaestiuncula* or subquestion is “qa.” One sometimes sees a more compact
According to the convention he followed, Thomas does not take up and solve the *quaestiones inquici* or subquestions in succession; they are organized in such a way that first, *all* the objections and sed contras of *all* the subquestions are presented, and only afterwards, all the solutions and replies, point by point. This happens to be an awkward way of proceeding that easily causes confusion in the reader’s mind; it is all the more odd for being most of the time quite unnecessary. The text’s readability is considerably improved by placing the main response and the replies to objections in company with their natural partners. This was also the unanimous advice of students who used a draft of this translation in a course offered in Spring 2005. Hence, in all cases but one I have brought together all the elements of each subquestion so that it reads like a regular article. The one exception is a place where Thomas deliberately builds one set of objections upon another, and then answers all the sets in the reply to the first subquestion.\(^{(35)}\)

### 2. THE CONTENTS OF THE PRESENT VOLUME

#### a. Summary of contents and editions

The final determination of which texts to include in this volume took place over a long period of time. My ongoing research into Thomas’s understanding of *amor*, *dilectio*, *caritas*, and *amicitia* had me frequently turning to discussions in Book III of the *Scriptum*, where he explores these themes in great detail. The treatment of *amor* itself (*In III Sent. d. 27, q. 1*) puts before us a distinctly “Dionysian” Thomas, eager to explore aspects of the topic that a more pedagogically minded Thomas will often omit later on.\(^{(36)}\) Discussions of the objects, order, commandment, and duration of charity,\(^{(37)}\) while less orderly than their parallels in the *Secunda secundae*, examine certain points more finely. Thomas’s manner of placing *caritas* squarely within his metaphysical understanding of *amor* and his adaptation of Aristotelian *amicitia* sheds much light on a theme that will become a leitmotif in his works—namely, charity as a purely gratuitous supernatural friendship between God and man which is nevertheless rooted deep within the ontology of man himself. From Book III, I was led by a natural progression to the discussion in Book I of the Holy Spirit as the love poured into the hearts of the faith-

\[^{(35)}\] Namely, the three subquestions of *In III Sent. d. 31, q. 1, a. 4*, on the charity with which a man rises up from sin.

\[^{(36)}\] It is noteworthy, too, that Thomas later in that Distinction (*In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 1*) does not rely on the Gospel of John for identifying charity as friendship, as he will do in the *Summa theologicae* (on this topic, see Anthony W. Keaty, “Thomas’s Authority for Identifying Charity as Friendship: Aristotle or John 15?” *The Thomist* 62 [1998]: 581–601). He seems more interested in showing that the reality that Aristotle, through philosophical analysis, had already identified as “friendship” can also be discerned in this wholly gratuitous and inconceivably lofty relationship with the divine Being (see Liz Carmichael, *Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love* [London: T&T Clark, 2004], 105–6). The conclusion in the response is reached by a logical analysis of the different kinds of love: “Friendship . . . embraces all definitions of love and manifests every possible aspect of it. *Caritas* must surely belong in the same perfect class” (Carmichael, *Friendship*, 107).

\[^{(37)}\] *In III Sent.* dd. 28, 29, 30, and 31; in addition, d. 36, a. 6 takes up the relationship between commandments and the “mode of charity.”
ful (where we witness first-hand Thomas’s famous disagreement with Peter Lombard over whether the charity given to Christians is the very uncreated charity that is the Holy Spirit—an opinion that Thomas, with uncharacteristic pugnacity, declares that he has “destroyed”),\footnote{\textit{In III Sent.} d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 4, referring back to \textit{In I Sent.} d. 17 (Paris version), q. 1, aa. 1–2. In addition to this Distinction 17 of Book I of the \textit{Scriptum}, concerned with charity as a created gift, Thomas Bolin and I also made draft translations of Distinction 10 (on the Holy Spirit as love, \textit{ut amor}), Distinction 18 (on the Holy Spirit as gift, \textit{ut donum}), and Distinction 32 (on love, \textit{dilectio}, in the Trinity). However, since these particular discussions occupy their place squarely within the broader, systematic examination of trinitarian doctrine in Book I—so much so that they are quite unintelligible apart from the other Distinctions they presuppose—we saw that it would be unsuitable to include them in the present volume. What is required is nothing less than a translation of the trinitarian Distinctions of Book I, an ambitious project in which expert help would be gladly welcomed!} as well as the opening article of Distinction 1 on \textit{fruitio}, which contains precious elements of doctrine. At about the same time I looked at crucial discussions in Book II of the love of God above self\footnote{\textit{In II Sent.} d. 3, q. 4.} and of the orientation of “right wills” toward a single end, which can be variously described as God, beatitude, and charity.\footnote{\textit{In II Sent.} d. 38, aa. 1–2.} Near the very end of Book IV, too, I found much enlightening material in the treatment of beatitude as man’s ultimate end, linked inextricably to the possession and exercise of charity.\footnote{\textit{In IV Sent.} d. 49, q. 1.} All these texts proved to be mutually illuminating and, as it turns out, stand well together.

An overview of the contents may thus be given, with an asterisk indicating that only part of that Distinction or question has been translated:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textit{In I Sententiarum} (Paris version) \[\text{\textbf{Mand.}}]\tabularnewline d. 1, q. 1* & Whether to enjoy is an act of intellect	abularnewline d. 17, q. 1 & Charity as something created in the soul	abularnewline d. 17, q. 2 & Charity’s increase and decrease	abularnewline
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textit{In I Sententiarum} (Roman version) \[\text{\textbf{Boyle}}]\tabularnewline d. 17, q. 1 & Charity as something created in the soul	abularnewline d. 17, q. 2 & Charity’s increase and decrease	abularnewline
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textit{In II Sententiarum} \[\text{\textbf{Leon.}}]\tabularnewline d. 3, q. 4 & The natural love of angels for God above self	abularnewline d. 38* & Charity as the single common end of right wills	abularnewline
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textit{In III Sententiarum} \[\text{\textbf{Leon.}}]\tabularnewline d. 23* & The theological virtues; the formation of faith by charity	abularnewline d. 27, q. 1 & Love in general	abularnewline d. 27, q. 2 & Charity (in general)	abularnewline
\end{tabular}
The Latin editions on which the translations are based: **Leon.** = provisional critical edition of the Leonine Commission; **Boyle** = *Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, ed. †Leonard E. Boyle and John F. Boyle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2006), 190–201; **Mand.** = *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, vols. 1 and 2 (containing Books I and II), ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929); **Moos** = *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, vols. 3 and 4 (containing Books III and IV, dd. 1–22), ed. Maria Fabianus Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1933 and 1947); **Gils** = P.-M. Gils, “Textes inédits de S. Thomas: Les premières rédactions du Scriptum super Tertio Sententiarum,“ *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 45 (1961): 201–28; 46 (1962): 445–62 and 609–28; **Parm.** (for Book IV, dd. 23–50) = Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, vol. 7/2: *Commentum in quartum librum Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi* (Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1858), pp. 872–1259. Within the translation, references to exact page numbers from the above editions are provided in a note placed at the start of each new Distinction. (Note that the titles of the Distinctions are not Thomas’s but those of later editors, usually Mandonnet and Moos, and for this reason they are bracketed. Although the provisional critical edition bears no such titles, they have been retained here for ease of orientation.) When Latin phrases are given in the notes, the orthography follows the edition that served as the basis of the translation; so, for Books II and III we take the Leonine edition’s spelling, while for Book I we take that of Mandonnet, etc.42 In texts translated from Gils’ transcription of Thomas’s handwritten revisions to Book III, I have signified (with Gils) major textual changes, namely the strikethroughs and rewordings.

Although not true critical texts, the volumes prepared by Mandonnet and Moos are of generally high quality, since their editors consulted an array of editions and manuscripts

42. The Leonine editors of Books II and III employ the now-familiar orthographical conventions of the Commission (e.g., *uis cogitatiua*, *uitus caritatis*, *Vnde amor amicitie*, rather than *vis cogitativa*, *virtus charitatis*, *Unde amor amicitiae*).
to establish the best text that could be arrived at in the circumstances. In comparing the provisional Leonine critical edition of the texts from Books II and III with the edition of Mandonnet-Moos, I have found, alongside a fair number of minor ones, rather few significant differences. The latter sort, and at times the former, have been indicated in the notes. With the prospect of a critical text with full apparatus being released soon to the public, we do not call attention to every instance of divergence between the Mandonnet-Moos text and the provisional text of the Leonine Commission that was shared with us; to do so would far surpass the ordinary functions of a translation.

b. Thomas’s citations of other authorities

For the hundreds of references Aquinas makes to other authors we have always provided sufficient data to locate the texts in a modern edition. Critical editions of Patristic authors have been used wherever available, substituting CCSL citations for the PL and PG citations in Mandonnet and Moos. We have made no effort to be perfectly comprehensive in this regard (by citing, for example, Latin versions of Aristotle or his commentators). When the Leonine edition appears, it will include, as always, detailed references to the source texts and versions from which St. Thomas draws his quotations.

All quotations from authorities, especially from Scripture, have been translated directly from Thomas’s text, not from modern translations. As is well known, Thomas cites from memory and so his quotations are not always exact; he occasionally elides different texts or ascribes to one author or book what is to be found in another. (The same is true for his rather frequent citations from “the Gloss,” which, as scholars of medieval exegesis know all too well, is a notoriously complicated tangle of sources found in many forms and variants.)

These discrepancies are duly noted. All the more necessary is it to pay attention to his take on Scripture passages, since modern translations can fail to capture just the point that Thomas discerns in a particular verse as he knew it in Latin. More significant discrepancies between a verse as cited by Thomas and the same verse as found in standard English translations (whether the Douay-Rheims or the Revised Standard Version) have been noted. In most cases, Thomas cites Scripture by book and chapter. In league with most editors and translators, we have taken the liberty of inserting verse numbers as well. When St. Thomas refers to psalms by number, he follows the numbering of the Vulgate; most modern psalm translations, on the other hand, follow the Hebrew numbering, which is, in most cases, one ahead of the Vulgate’s. Here, for simplicity’s sake, I have followed the Hebrew psalm and verse numbers as given in the RSV, although the translation is directly from the Latin and is more akin to what one would get in the Douay-Rheims version.

43. We do not enter into the exquisite minutiae of Gloss composition but are content, with a nod to the convenient PL edition, to refer in our notes to “Strabo’s Gloss”—aware that it is not really Strabo’s. See M. T. Gibson, “The Place of the Glossa ordinaria in Medieval Exegesis,” in Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers, ed. Mark D. Jordan and Kent Emery, Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 5–27.
c. The Lectura romana

Some particular comments are in order on the “Roman version” of Book I, Distinction 17, which, as noted above, is translated in this volume. The recently rediscovered Lectura romana or second attempt at a Sentences commentary has been the subject of much recent scholarly discussion, to which the reader is referred for a detailed treatment. Though it was long known to biographers that St. Thomas might have attempted a second commentary on the Sentences for the purposes of his studium in Rome, and though it was certain that he soon abandoned whatever he was doing to concentrate his energies on the Summa theologiae, it was only in 1983 that Leonard E. Boyle, in a brilliant piece of detective work, demonstrated convincingly that the extensive marginalia of an Oxford manuscript of the Parisian Scriptum actually reproduce a substantial portion (perhaps all there ever was) of a completely new and authentically Thomasian commentary on Book I of the Sentences. In his Gilson lecture of 1982, Boyle already announced his certainty on this point and emphasized the startling importance of the find: “[W]e are lucky to possess a part of a student reportatio of that class-room commentary which shows, among other things, that it was not at all, as has been conjectured, a reworking of his Scriptum super Sententiis of 1252–1256 at Paris but an independent work in a simple, direct style not unlike that of the later Summa.” One of Boyle’s students, M. Michèle Mulchahey, offers a succinct summary of the manuscript and its contents:

Lincoln College, MS. lat. 95, is a copy of the first book of Thomas’s Parisian Sentences commentary, the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, which carries in

44. The critical edition of the Lectura romana is equipped with a substantial introduction by John Boyle (pp. 1–57) that enters into the historical, textual, and doctrinal issues at stake in this intriguing text (for a brief summary, see Torrell, Person and Work, 45–47; cf. 412 in the rev. ed.). Boyle’s introduction makes full use of the wealth of research that has been devoted to the rediscovery of this text and to debates over its authorship and some vexed issues of doctrinal content. At the time of this writing, the majority opinion favors its Thomasian authorship, with only a few expressing reservations. Certainly it has been our experience as translators, comparing both versions of Distinction 17, that the text of the Lectura romana breathes the style of writing and the manner of thinking of Thomas Aquinas, and we know, at any rate, that (in the words of Mark Johnson) “the person who copied the marginal texts into the Oxford manuscript, quite possibly before the year 1286, thinks he’s copying Aquinas” (from the Thomistica newsletter of March 2006, www.thomistica.net/march-2006-on-line/, accessed March 15, 2006).

45. The now-classic article by Leonard E. Boyle was “Alia lectura fratris Thome,” Mediaeval Studies 45 (1983): 418–29, written in response to the initially skeptical report of H.-F. Dondaine, “‘Alia lectura fratris Thome’? (Super I Sent.),” Mediaeval Studies 42 (1980): 308–36. Both the 1983 article and the 1982 Gilson lecture (The Setting of the Summa theologicae of Saint Thomas) have been reprinted in a collection of Boyle’s studies, Facing History: A Different Thomas Aquinas (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2000), 93–106 and 65–91. In the introduction he contributed to this volume, Torrell takes the opportunity to express his reservations about the Lectura’s authorship (pp. xxi–xxiv). L. Boyle’s “Alia lectura fratris Thome” has also been reprinted in the Lectura romana volume (pp. 58–69), immediately after the introduction by John Boyle.

46. The Setting of the Summa theologicae of Saint Thomas, in Facing History, 75. For background on the studium at Santa Sabina in Rome and the importance of Aquinas’s groundbreaking work there, see ibid., 71–78; cf. also the painstaking work of M. Michèle Mulchahey, “First the Bow is Bent in Study...”: Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), 278–306, esp. 280–94, where the Lectura romana is discussed in detail and related to Thomas’s effort to revamp the theology course in Rome.
its margins a second partial commentary on the same material. This marginal text appears to be or to derive from a student reportatio, and has now been shown to represent the lecture notes of someone who heard Thomas teach at Santa Sabina in 1265–66. In other words, these are pieces of Thomas’ lost Roman commentary, collated with the earlier Scriptum.

The surviving Roman notes cover the substance of the first eighteen [sic] and the twenty-third distinctions of book one of the Sentences.47 . . . In expounding this portion of the Lombard, the marginal commentary incorporates material from Aquinas’ own De veritate, from his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, and from the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum—referred to in the marginal reportatio as “brother Thomas’ other lecture on the Sentences,” “alia lectura fratris Thome.”

But this is no lazy man’s recapitulation of teaching done a dozen years before, for there is recognizable evolution in Thomas’ thinking . . .48

Mulchahey goes on to compare texts from the Parisian Scriptum, the Lectura romana, and the Summa theologiae on whether the name “God” should be predicated of the Three Persons of the Trinity in the singular or in the plural. With the inclusion in the present volume of translations of the two versions of Distinction 17—separated, as Mulchahey says, by about a dozen years—a like comparison may be undertaken between two texts that are impressively different in several ways. In the Roman version, one tastes the flavor of the coming Summa theologiae. A certain leanness or muscularity of argument is characteristic of the Lectura in general: there are fewer objections of greater force (usually three or four, as in the Summa), one “on the contrary” (again, as in the Summa),49 and a more direct pathway of argument in the main response as well as in the replies to the initial arguments. Such cutting away of all inessentials makes for a considerable increase in rhetorical power. It may not be fanciful to detect also a tone of growing confidence in the answers given and the arguments used to bolster them. In these features the Lectura shows itself, in retrospect, to be a genuine transitional exercise, a “missing link,” between the Scriptum and the Summa. The content is also handled differently: the material is broken out into articles in a more schematic and logical way. In the Paris version, for example, the opening article of Distinction 17 asks if charity is something created in the soul, and the second article if it is an accident. By contrast, in the Roman version the opening article asks, more broadly, whether a “supernatural light” is required in order to love God. This proposition it proves by way of a most elegant argument: love rests on knowledge, and so if there is a supernatural knowledge of God, there will be a supernatural love of him; but the knowledge of God as he is in himself is vouchsafed by the gift of faith, therefore the love of God for his own sake as our beatitude is vouchsafed by an analogous gift, that of char-

47. Actually it includes Distinctions 1 through 17 (not 18), 23, and a note to 24.
49. One notes a consistent reduction in size of the “on the contrary” section; two or three such arguments are not uncommon in the Paris version, whereas the Lectura romana gives but one, and that one has been streamlined to the barest auctoritas or syllogism.
ity. This point proved, Thomas then goes on to ask in the second article if this gift is created or uncreated. Having established that it is created, he finally asks in the third article if it is a substance or an accident. The whole approach is refreshingly direct, uncluttered, and lucid.

d. Loca parallela

Something must be said about the concept of loca parallela or parallel texts, a standard feature in the commentaries and lexicons of generations of disciples of Aquinas who have been eager to link together into an organic and self-correcting system, as much as possible, the many and varied presentations of doctrine found in the diverse genres of the master’s writings. When working on a certain text of St. Thomas, most readers find it highly useful to be aware of other places in his works where he treats of the same or similar matters and to study this range of texts to know the author’s mind as fully as may be, permitting a better understanding of the subject itself. Beginning with the great exponents of historical research into Aquinas, such as Chenu, the very notion of a “parallel text” has been called into question as an artificial construct that risks disintegrating the internal unity of individual works and risks overlooking subtle contextual and developmental facets. Chenu warns against “fall[ing] back upon the Sentences, as has sometimes been done, where the texts of the Summa are elliptical and too concise. This would be to proceed contrary to history and doctrine.”50 What Chenu is worried about, however, becomes clear: the fusion (or confusion) of loca parallela by inattentive neoscholastics. For in the same place he writes, apropo the Scriptum and the Summa:

In each one of these works, on the contrary, their original framework, particular context, own responses, own ways of proceeding, nuances, and conclusions will be examined. The purpose will not, of course, be to contrast them for the sake of contrast but to take part in the genesis of each one of the elements that make up the synthesis of Saint Thomas. . . . Today, the resources of the historical method, for the sake of doctrine and not just from a taste for erudition, have decided the interpreters of Saint Thomas to follow step by step the operations of his thinking, even where his conclusions are identical. . . . [D]ivergences [between the two works] have bearing as such only upon particular points, which explains why the common and simple practice is permissible of supporting the texts of the Sentences and of the Summa one upon the other. The listed divergences, however, invite us to read, within the movement that is proper to each, these two works of the Angelic Doctor.51

Dedicated students of St. Thomas have always known how to handle with care, and for the sake of acquiring a well-rounded and more penetrating understanding, the variety of overlapping treatments he left behind: one pays close attention to the genre of the work, the

exact question being investigated, the resources brought to bear on it, the purpose of the inquiry, and, of course, its place in the overall life and writings of its author. One treats an earlier text as, ceteris paribus, less definitive than a later text; one treats a disputed question or a quodlibet differently from a theological summa, or a paraphrase of Aristotle from a scriptural commentary. One may say, in short, that the notion of a parallel text is valid provided one does not entertain false expectations of the completeness or exactness of any parallelism; Thomas rarely did exactly the same thing twice, but he obviously discussed many of the same questions many times, refining and developing similar arguments. Aware though I am of the reasoning of Joseph de Guibert concerning the cautious and responsible use of such parallels, it is nevertheless invaluable to know where Thomas comes again at the same or similar issues in order to be able to trace the development of his thinking and to sharpen one’s own speculative insight. There are manifestly real parallels and they shed a tremendous amount of light on each other.

For these reasons, I have incorporated into the notes cross-references to loca parallela in other works of Aquinas, using several sources to check the lists for reasonable completeness (bearing in mind that in many cases looser or broader parallels abound to an uncountable extent). Effort was made to include all the extensive parallels a reader might wish to consult in search of further understanding of St. Thomas’s position on a given subject; hence, more tenuous or generic ones are not mentioned. The list of loca parallela is found in a note at the start of each self-contained unit of argumentation (that is, usually the article or subquestion). Since a reader equipped with such a list can easily find the texts that merit a more detailed comparison, the notes throughout do not attempt to specify every instance where Thomas speaks differently in later works—an enterprise that would, in the event, require a book-length commentary of its own.

52. Though that, too, was something he did—perhaps to save time, or because he was not able to devise a better formulation than one he had already hit upon. A good example is the discussion of the infinitude of Christ’s grace as found in two works: the Compendium theologiae I, ch. 215 (beginning “Est autem proprium Christi”) and the Super Ioannem 3, lec. 6 (beginning “Sed notandum, quod in Christo est triplex gratia”). The latter passage, written 1270–72, tracks the Compendium of ca. 1265–67 quite closely, showing at times an identity of wording in the vicinity of 95 percent. A more remote but still relevant example is the way Thomas borrows from an earlier dossier when preparing his sermons or scripture commentaries: see L.-J. Bataillon, “Les sermons de saint Thomas et la Catena aurea” in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974, Commemorative Studies, ed. Armand A. Maurer et al. (Toronto: PIMS, 1974), 1:67–75; Jeremy Holmes, “Aquinas’ Lectura in Mattheaeum,” in Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to His Biblical Commentaries, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum (London/New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 73–97, esp. 86–90, 96.

53. Les Doublets de Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Leur étude méthodique; Quelques réflexions, quelques exemples (Paris: Beauchesne, 1926). Among other things, de Guibert underlines the inexactness of lists of parallels in view of the frequently extensive reshuffling of contents and order within the major works of St. Thomas. For example, in some works Thomas combines several divine attributes into a single discussion taking them in one order, but in other works he takes them up separately in discussions far apart, and in a different order. Such a shift in material cannot really be accounted for by a list of “parallels,” since the formal argument and its material content are welded together into a single unit.
3. ISSUES OF TRANSLATION

a. General observations

How to translate St. Thomas into a readable English that at the same time faithfully reflects his style of arguing and way of thinking has been a question, a puzzlement, at times an anxiety, to many during the decades of the Thomistic revival in the twentieth century, which witnessed so great an increase in the number of those who wanted to study the saint’s writings yet did not possess the requisite fluency in Latin. Since we are right now witnessing an ever-growing “second revival” of general as well as scholarly interest in Aquinas, there could not be a better time for new efforts to bridge the gap between text and audience.

Our single goal was to produce a translation both accurate and readable—the former, by sticking to the text as it stands, not pretending that the original is more literary and filled-out than it really is (for scholastic Latin does at times have the characteristics of an abbreviated code language), the latter by supplying those words or phrases of which an English speaker would naturally avail himself simply to make his meaning plain, but that a Latin author, above all a scholastic author, can so easily omit, trusting to inflections, to context, and to his immediate audience’s considerable skill in dialectic. On the many occasions when a sentence or argument seemed to cry out for paraphrase or commentary, we have strictly confined our paraphrase and commentary to the notes, never imposing it on the translation itself.

One is almost guaranteed to displease readers of Latin, because each person would have done things a bit differently. Common idioms can be rendered many different ways. Should the translator translate in a style as word-for-word literal as possible, those who favor a smooth, idiomatic English version will denounce the result as unintelligible and useless. On the other hand, should he try his hand at “adaptation,” filling out phrases for clarity’s sake, lovers of literalism will denounce the result as relaxed, “too interpretive.” The great challenge is achieving the right middle course between ungainly literalism and irresponsible license. There will always be those who want a translation to read like the prose of a polished English gentleman, regardless of the violence that has to be done to the lean, sinewy style of St. Thomas.\textsuperscript{54} There will also always be those (fewer in number, it is true) who want a translation to stick to the text word-for-word, no matter how obscure or clunky the results. The translators of the present volume do not side with either camp, nor would Thomas have done so, if we may judge from his discerning remarks on the task of a good translator.\textsuperscript{55} We sought

\textsuperscript{54} I am thinking here of the legendary translations of Thomas Gilby, which may read sonorously, but often depart so widely from the actual Latin that it is hard to know which Thomas is the primary author!

\textsuperscript{55} It is a well-known passage from the Prologue of the \textit{Contra errores Graecorum} that can always be quoted again: “It is, therefore, the task of the good translator, when translating material dealing with the Catholic faith, to preserve the meaning, but to adapt the mode of expression so that it is in harmony with the idiom of the language into which he is translating. For obviously, when anything spoken in a literary fashion in Latin is explained in common parlance, the explanation will be inept if it is simply word for word. All the more so, when anything expressed in one language is translated merely word for word into another, it will be no surprise if perplexity concerning the meaning of the original sometimes occurs” (from the translation of the \textit{Contra errores Graecorum} made by G. H. Duggan and Peter Damian Fehlner, in James Likoudis, ed., \textit{Ending the Byzantine Greek Schism} [New Rochelle, NY: Catholics United for the Faith, 1992], 126). “Unde ad officium boni translatoris pertinet ut ea quae sunt catholicae fidei transferens servet sententiam, mutet autem
to avoid at all costs any smoothing-out or rewriting of phrases that would intrude our own thoughts into the text of a master who is perfectly capable of speaking for himself. Hence, at times, a certain awkwardness was allowed to stand, which could have been avoided only at the expense of giving the reader a quite different impression of what the original says.

So the two general principles of our translation: (1) maximal fidelity to Thomas’s text, the attempt to say things as he says them, with the weight and balance of his own statements—not glossing or paraphrasing something that is obscure or difficult in the Latin; (2) maximal clarity in English, often by using a turn of phrase more familiar to our ears and capturing the sense of the Latin better. Thus, sometimes “at work” or “working” is used instead of “operating,” and “activity” instead of “operation”; “has its term in” rather than “terminates in”; “in the manner of” rather than “through the mode of”; and so on. True, it is often impossible, or absurdly artificial, to find everyday English phrases for the technical vocabulary of Latin scholasticism; nor should one overlook the long-standing, honorable tradition of English-language scholasticism that has always borrowed heavily from the Latin (e.g., “actuality” and “potency”). The resulting policy for us has been a sort of pragmatism that keeps the translation as close to spoken English as possible, but does not go out of its way to avoid technicalities, especially those hallowed by custom. Since this translation is likely to be of greatest use to those who are already somewhat familiar with Thomas’s thought, such a policy offers no real difficulty.

Brackets [ ] have been used to indicate words added by the translators for the purpose of clarifying the basic sense of the text. Wherever Thomas’s condensed Latin permitted of a small non-interpretive expansion to help the English reader—an example would be a place where Thomas simply writes hoc, “This,” but where the translation supplies the noun or phrase intended, which might have been three or four lines back—we have expanded it without notice. Any “glossing” of the Latin text has been carefully noted. For all but a few who have devoted their careers to the study of his thought, it is no easy task to read the complex discourse of St. Thomas without at least some help in the way of explanations of this or that Aristotelian, patristic, or biblical argument. Thomas without commentary is as little help for us in the twenty-first century as Aristotle without notes was to the confreres of Albert and Aquinas in the thirteenth. This is particularly the case whenever the arguments given are (at least to us, at a distance of seven and a half centuries) cryptic or, as happens all too often, invite misinterpretation. It can also be helpful to have commentary that points out how certain ideas or avenues of argument in the *Scriptum* remain fruitful for problems that con-

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modum loquendi secundum proprietatem linguae in quam transfert. Apparet enim quod si ea quae litter-aliter in latino dicitur vulgariter exponantur, indecens erit expositio si semper verbum ex verbo sumatur; multo igitur magis quando ea quae in una lingua dicitur transferuntur in aliam ita quod verbum sumatur ex verbo, non est mirum si aliqua dubietas relinquitur” (ed. Leon. 40:A 71, ll. 62–72).

56. And this for no ideological reason (such as “terms with Anglo-Saxon roots are always better than terms derived from Latin”), but simply looking to how people speak and what comes more naturally to their lips. There is no getting around technical terms, of course, which remain just that: technical. No field, least of all philosophy and theology, is without them. One who tried to find a really adequate substitute for “irascible (or concupiscible) appetite” would reap more frustration than success.
The extensive webnotes that accompany our translation have these various aims in view.

A related issue is the expansion of quotations wherever it seems clear that Thomas is quoting only a few words not so as to limit himself to them, but rather to call to mind a familiar authority that a listener or reader could be counted on to know. In his commentary on Aristotle’s *On the Soul*, Thomas makes the point that Aristotle mentions only the beginning of a verse from Homer, expecting his readers to supply the rest. Boethius had supplied the whole verse for his Latin readership. We imitate Boethius in this regard. A good example is the abbreviated reference system employed in the *divisio textus* that opens each Distinction of Aquinas’s *Scriptum*. By means of this *divisio*, the teacher places before his student the argumentative structure, the topical outline, of some portion of the *Sentences*, to help the student more effectively work his way through the details of the text and to provide an aid to memory. In the medieval manner, Thomas economically writes down only a few words from the start of a paragraph (“Consequenter modum etc.”), expecting the reader to know just what part of the text he is referring to. To make for smoother reading we have always expanded these abbreviated citations to the extent of forming a complete sentence.

On the next pages will be discussed some of the more important and recurrent particular issues of translation that faced us in our project, and the solutions we arrived at. The vocabulary of love will be considered first, followed by miscellaneous items in alphabetical order. It should be borne in mind that many other more specific questions concerning Latin terms and their meaning and translation are addressed in footnotes throughout the book.

**b. Vocabulary of love, desire, appetite**

*Amor, dilectio, caritas.* Perhaps the best way to enter into the question of Thomistic love-terminology is to look at *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 26, a. 3, where St. Thomas poses the question: “Is love (*amor*) the same as dilection (*dilectio*)?” In the response he states that love, dilection, charity, and friendship (*amor, dilectio, caritas, amicitia*) are “four words that refer, in a way, to the same thing.” The basic difference is that *amicitia* is like a habit, whereas *amor* and *dilectio* are actions or passions, and *caritas* can be taken either way. Of the latter trio, the most general is *amor*, which signifies any first principle of appetitive motion, whether sensitive or

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57. “It should be known, however, that Aristotle does not put down the whole of this verse from Homer, but only the beginning of it; hence neither in the Greek text nor in the Arabic text is there more than this: ‘For such is the mind ...’, so that the whole dictum is thus understood, just as we are accustomed, in bringing forward a verse of some authority, to put down only the beginning, if the verse is familiar. But because this verse of Homer was not familiar to his Latin readers, Boethius put down the whole of it” (namely, “For the mind of mortals is such as the father of gods and men brings into light”). “Sciendum est autem quod hunc uersum Homeri Aristotiles non totum posuit, set solum principium; unde nec in Greco nec in Arabico plus habetur quam hic: ‘Talis enim intellectus est’, ut sic intelligatur hoc dictum sicut consueuimus inducentes aliquem uersum auctoritatis ponere principium tantum, si uersus sit notus. Set quia hic uersus Homeri non erat notus apud Latinos, Boetius totum posuit” (*Sent. II De anima*, ch. 28 [ed. Leon. 45.1:189]).
rational. *Dilectio* adds something, namely that a choice\(^58\) of the good is made, and for this reason it is found only in the will, not in the concupiscible power. *Caritas* denotes a certain perfection of love, because the beloved is held to be of great price.\(^59\) One should not overlook the remark Thomas makes regarding the sed contra quotation from Dionysius (“some holy men have held that *amor* means something more godlike than *dilectio*: “Amor denotes a passion . . . whereas *dilectio* presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love (*amor*), being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature of *dilectio.*”\(^60\)

For a translator wishing to be clear, *caritas* hardly presents a problem: it must be always translated “charity.” The fact that for some people “charity” has come to mean nothing other than tossing a coin into a beggar’s cup or the social work of the Salvation Army is no reason to throw it out of theology where it occupies the queenliest of places; like many another beautiful but threatened species in the English language, it rather needs to be rescued and multiplied in captivity. The traditional trio of theological virtues is “faith, hope, and charity,” and in our translation we have not deviated an inch from this manner of speaking. For the scholastics charity means nothing less than the very love which is God’s essence, the love that Christ manifested in his death on the cross. The reductionism that makes “charity” equivalent to almsgiving or other works of mercy—which are really charity’s *effects*\(^61\)—must be resisted in the name of both sound English and sound theology.

The trouble begins for the translator with *amor*/*amare* and *dilectio/diligere*. As we just saw, Thomas finds it useful to draw some distinction between them—but not an absolute and exclusive one. He never shows the slightest hesitation in using *amor*/*amare* for all loves, supernatural and natural, intellectual and sensual. (Think of the phrase used, in the prologues of *Prima Pars* questions 59 and 60, to announce the treatment of will and love in the angels: *amor sive dilectio.*\(^62\) In actual practice, when speaking of *caritas* he readily uses *dilectio*.

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58. This is familiar Thomasian (or Isidorean) word-play: *dilectio* comes from *electio*. “Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat” (ibid.).

59. Again, arguing from the word: *carus* means dear, so *caritas* means love of what is (most) dear to one. *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 3: “Quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum Philosophum in VIII Ethic., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accepi potest. Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit supra amorem, perfectionem quamdam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.”

60. *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 3, ad 4: “Ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quamdam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit judicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio.” Earlier in his career Thomas had given a similar evaluation of the terms in the Notes on the Text at the end of *In I Sent.* d. 10 (Paris version); this text is translated in webnote 230.

61. See *ST* II-II, q. 30 on mercy or pity, q. 31 on good deeds, q. 32 on almsgiving.

62. Similarly, at *ST* II-II, q. 27, a. 2, where Thomas writes near the end of the response: “Sic igitur in dilec-
and *amor* (with their verbs) as synonyms, quite interchangeably. That he does not worry too much about this can be seen in many texts. For example, an objection is phrased as follows: “‘Loved’ [dilectum] is named by a word taken from ‘love’ [dilectio]. Therefore love is not loved [dilectio non diligitur], nor is charity loved by charity [charitas charitatem amat].”⁶³ To make the linguistic parallel exact, Thomas would have needed a verb for *caritas*, but he had none, so he substituted the present passive indicative of *amare*—not, as one might have expected, of *diligere*. In another objection of the same article, he writes: “Everything which is loved [diligitur] is loved by some love [dilectione diligitur]. If therefore the act of charity itself is loved [actus caritatis amat], it must be loved [ametur] by some other act, and for the same reason, that act will also be something to be loved [erit diligendus].”⁶⁴ Here we see the whole gamut of terms.

Such texts—and they are numerous—indicate a fluidity of usage among *dilectio/diligere*, *amor/amare*, and *caritas*. It is relevant to point out that since Peter Lombard uses *amor*, *caritas*, and *dilectio* synonymously,⁶⁵ it is hardly surprising that the young author of a commentary on the *Sentences* follows suit, even when, in the interests of greater precision, he sees fit to invest each with a peculiar note or shade of meaning. All this suggests that one ought not to be troubled about using English “love” for Latin *dilectio/diligere* (and we will see more evidence, in a moment, that Thomas wouldn’t mind). This is an obvious strategy, especially when one considers that “dilection” is a rare and rather dry Latinism that does not at all convey what *dilectio* is supposed to convey, and hence seems useless.⁶⁶ (It would be like referring to yawning as “pandiculation,” or bread-making as “panification.” Perfectly real words—they’re in the Oxford English Dictionary—but perfectly useless.) Even if one wanted to use “dilection” out of a sense of obligation, more problematic still would be the verb *diligere*, for which there has never been a special English word. Such worries are misplaced, however, since most of the time there is no problem in translating both *amor/amare* and *dilectio/diligere* as “love/to love.” When Thomas speaks of “the charity by which God loves us” (de caritate qua Deus diligit nos) or of the Christian’s “love of charity” (dilectio caritatis), there is really no confusion possible, since we are manifestly speaking of an intellectual or rational love, just as in the sentence “an empty stomach loves the food that a full stomach abhors,”⁶⁷ the reader easily infers that “loves” translates *amat*, for a stomach is incapable of *dilectio*. Put differently, because *amor/amare* readily refer to every kind of love and *dilectio/diligere* are employed where there can be no doubt that the love is the activity of a rational being, there is no reason to employ stiff Latinisms or awkward conventions to distinguish them.⁶⁸ On the rare occasions when an argument hinges on the words as such, the underlying Latin has been indicated.

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⁶³. *In I Sent.*, d. 17 (Paris version), q. 1, a. 5, obj. 3.
⁶⁴. *In I Sent.*, d. 17 (Paris version), q. 1, a. 5, obj. 4.
⁶⁵. See Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, 85. In the notes on the text at the end of *In I Sent.* d. 10 (Mandonnet, 272; translated in webnote 230), Thomas takes up a statement of the Lombard’s—“The Holy Spirit is the love, or charity, or dilection, of the Father and the Son”—and explains the nuance of each term.
⁶⁶. Having sensed this, translators of Thomas’s works into English have, as a matter of fact, tended to avoid using “dilection” for *dilectio*.
⁶⁷. *In III Sent.* d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 3.
⁶⁸. As a matter of fact, such a procedure would have its distinct disadvantages, for while Thomas is con-
**Amans, amatum.** Many discussions of love in the *Scriptum* are cast in the framework of friendship between two persons, “the lover and the beloved,” which exemplifies love at its height. It is customary for Thomas to speak of the agent as *amans* and the object of his love as *amatum*, a neuter word that stands for any object of *amor* or *dilectio*. In translating *amans* there is every reason to say “lover,” though we shall have to purge this word of any narrowly erotic connotations it may have; surely we are better off risking too much passion than too little (besides, who could take seriously the alternative: “the one loving”?).

The real question is this: When we encounter *amatum* in the nominative case, with its unmistakably neuter gender, how shall we translate it? The same question can be raised about analogous formulae, as when Thomas writes (translating as literally as possible): “That love [of concupiscence] does not have its ultimate term in the thing that is said to be loved, but is bent toward that thing for whom that thing’s good is desired. In another way, love is borne to the good of something such that it has its term in that very thing, insomuch as the lover is pleased that the object of his love has whatever good it [or he] has, and desires for it [or him] the good it [or he] as yet lacks.” Or this statement: “But toward that one [ad illud] for whom the lover wishes good, he has the love of friendship.” In a study on Thomas’s “personalism,” David Gallagher, having cited this last text, suggests what Thomas’s use of the neuter gender in such passages indicates, and what it does not:

Thomas describes the structure of *amor amicitiae/amor concupiscientiae* using neuter pronouns (here, *illud*) to refer to that for which the goods are willed, i.e., that which is the object of the love of friendship. In my opinion, he does so in order to highlight the fact that we are dealing with a formal structure pertaining to the very nature of this love: a love which has as its object *both* that for which goods are willed and those goods which are willed for that thing. We should not take this to mean, however, that any kind of being at all could fit into this structure and so be the object of *amor amicitiae*. Rather, it is clear that for Thomas only rational beings can be loved in this way. Indeed, in other texts we find Thomas using the masculine pronoun to refer to the

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sistent in using *diligere* for rational love (arguing at *In III Sent.* d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 that *amor* is transferable from lower to higher levels of appetite or affection, but *dilectio* is never transferable from the spiritual level to the sensual), the Vulgate does not support him on that point. One of his favorite verses to cite in speaking about likeness as a cause of love is Sirach 13:19: “Every animal loves one like itself,” for which the Vulgate has: “omne animal diligit simile sibi”!

69. *In III Sent.* d. 29, a. 3, from the response: “Amor autem iste [scil., amor concupiscientiae] non terminatur ad rem que dicitur amari, set reflectitur ad rem illam cui optatur bonum illius rei. Alio modo amor furtur in bonum alicuius rei ita quod ad rem ipsam terminatur, in quantum bonum quod habet complacet quod habeat, et bonum quod non habet optatur ei.” Thomas is speaking of the contrast between what, in the end, he will fixedly call *amor concupiscientiae* and *amor amicitiae*, which mean: “the love of things (goods) intended for persons” and “the love of a person, the love characteristic of a friend.” In the translation of this passage contained later in the volume, the reader will notice that some slight modifications have been made, in accordance with the argument about to be made here.

70. *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 26, a. 4. The love of friendship is here directed toward a (grammatically) neuter object.
object of this love. In his general teaching, Thomas holds that the objects of *amor amicitiae* are only beings capable of friendship, an activity he considers proper to rational beings. Thus he consistently maintains that all beings inferior to human beings, whether animals, plants, or non-living beings, can be loved on the level of *dilectio* only with the *amor concupiscientiae* component and only in order to some rational being(s).

What we are seeing in such texts is, in short, a verification of Cajetan’s famous dictum *Sanctus Thomas semper loquitur formaliter.* In the texts cited, the thrust of the argument demands that the *illud*, the *rem illam* or *rem ipsam*, is no mere “thing,” but always a person.

So much for philosophical preliminaries; the question of English wording remains. “Are we to translate *amatum* ‘the beloved’ or ‘the thing loved’?” asks translator Eric D’Arcy. “The trouble with the former is that, in modern English, it is normally applied to love of a person, and indeed a person loved romantically; the trouble with the latter is that it would exclude persons.” Not without hesitations, D’Arcy chooses “the object loved,” noting that this is broad enough to include things or persons, and that “loving” can include that lesser degree of attachment we call “liking” (thus *amatum* can mean “something liked,” “something one is fond of”).

Reasonable enough, but a uniform translation has problems of its own. The Latin word *amatum* is a neutral place-holder for one accustomed to thinking *formaliter*, whereas to our post-Romantic ears, “object loved” sounds heavily impersonal, smearing a dull brown over the colorful places where Thomas is speaking of personal, even passionate, love. When Thomas asks whether *amans* and *amatum* “dwell within each other” (as he does in *Summa theologiae* I-II, question 28, article 2), he has persons in mind—so much so that the “on the contrary” argument is about the dwelling of Father and Son in the God-loving soul.

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71. Gallagher lists as examples *ST* I, q. 20, a. 1 ad 3; *Quaestiones quodlibetales* I, q. 4, a. 3.

72. “Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas,” *Acta Philosophica* 4 (1995), 57. On friendship as proper to rational beings and thus as inextensible to the subrational, see *ST* II-II, q. 25, a. 3; *De uirt.* q. 2, a. 7; *In III Sent.* d. 28, a. 2 (translated herein). Regarding the neuter gender, one notices that a baby is often referred to as “it,” the idiom asserting nothing against the humanity or sex of the child. More noteworthy is the extensive application in certain languages of neuter nouns to youths; cf. German *das Mädchen, das Fräulein.* In modern languages, the use of the neuter gender for an adult would, on the contrary, be highly offensive, for it would be perceived as a denial of personality or personal dignity.

73. For judicious thoughts on this idea, see Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, 117–23, concerning “the language of Saint Thomas.”


75. This claim will become self-evident to anyone who reads *In III Sent.* d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, which contains wording that some have even considered immature because too amorous, too “romantic” in our sense of the word. In reality, however, one may easily find in *all* of St. Thomas’s treatments of love those luminous indications of the intensity of personal attachment, of burning devotion and ecstatic self-abandonment, that he takes to be characteristic of charity as it grows in perfection. There are echoes of these qualities in his treatments of virtuous friendship in general—even taken at a “natural” level, prescinding from the gift of charity.

76. Accordingly, D’Arcy himself renders the ubiquitous *amatum* in *ST* I-II, q. 28, a. 2 as “the person loved” or “the person he [the lover] loves,” adding in a note: “This article makes sense only if it is taken as applying to the love of one person for another” (*The Emotions*, 93, note a).
some discussions the use of the time-honored pairing “lover and beloved” is not only the most appealing translation of amans and amatum but also the most profound. Such a translation does not imply that the discussion pertains only to what has come to be called “romantic love.” The “beloved” in question is anything that a moral agent can love for its own sake—parent, sibling, spouse, child, friend, confrere, neighbor, citizen, or, more generally, any community or group which can be styled a moral person. Hence, although the terminology is at times poorly suited, we consider “lover and beloved” applicable to all relationships predicated upon a common good, such as a family, a local community, a nation, a team of sportsmen, or an army going to war. Beloved family, beloved country, beloved team—these are phrases still heard and certainly meaningful. As for the problem that “lover” and “beloved” used just by themselves seem to be exclusively romantic in tone, we respond that it is easy enough to conceive of a wider extension of their meaning. There are, moreover, good Thomistic reasons for allowing the “erotic” connotations (in the Platonic sense of the word eros) to stand and to be heard in the language, uncontaminated by the contemporary reduction of the erotic to the carnal.

Hence, admitting with D’Arcy that the rendering of amatum (or, for that matter, any other neuter term that stands formally for the object of love) is a delicate business, we have taken a different route than he. There is no single solution that works across the board, so our translation varies according to context; and for the reasons just explained, we give precedence to the personal meaning over the impersonal grammar. English is, at any rate, ill equipped to track the abstract formality of the Latin; the moment one writes “beloved” or even “loved one,” a fortiori if one uses masculine or feminine pronouns, the personal note is so strong as to marginalize all other possibilities, even when it makes perfectly good sense philosophically to include those possibilities (such as a miser’s love of money, a ruler’s love of honor, a sportsman’s love of sport, a priest’s love of the Church or of his parish, a citizen’s love of his country, etc.). On the other hand, if one speaks of “what is loved,” “the thing loved,” “the object of love,” or similar turns of phrase, the impersonal note is so strong as nearly to cancel out personal applications. We never refer to our friends as what, only as who; to our sensi-

True, there are some interesting ambiguities. Jealousy (STI-II, q. 28, a. 4) can refer to sub-personal goods or to persons regarded as physical possessions. Consider Thomas’s example of the jealousy (zēlus) that belongs to amor concupiscientiae: “hoc modo viri dicuntur zelare uxores, ne per consortium aliorum impediatur singularitas quam in uxore quaerunt.” Such jealousy, which views the wife under the aspect of non-sharable material singular, can be accompanied by a noble sentiment of love for the woman for her own sake, but the point is that we can be jealous of a person as a thing, an amatum. Could we then conclude that Thomas, by using amatum throughout this article, is teaching that all zēlus views the object of love as a thing? Certainly not; what he says is just the opposite, that one kind of zēlus views the amatum as person, as a good in herself, and another kind views the amatum as thing, as desirable and pleasurable for somebody else. The dominant note is placed on jealousy over a person especially loved. It is, to be fair, an unsharable wife that the jealous husband gets worked up about in STI-II, q. 28, a. 4, not his horse or cart (though he might).

77. While Thomas usually has individual relationships in mind when speaking of amans and amatum—parents and children, brothers, neighbors, friends—the structure of his arguments, combined with his teaching on justice and the common good, admits of extension to what have been called “moral persons.” On amor amicitiae for collectivities, see David M. Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude and Love of Friendship in Thomas Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies 58 (1996), 34–35; idem, “Person and Ethics,” 63.
bilities, they are never things, they are people. All this makes for a bewildering situation in regard to some of the texts of St. Thomas. There is no question that throughout these passages he intends to speak principally of love as it concerns human beings, and even more, love as it concerns “deified” human beings, namely Christians living ex caritate, from the love of God infused into their hearts. But at the same time, in his usual manner, Thomas comes at these intensely personal realities from the vantage of a speculative philosopher, and he treats of them accordingly in a language metaphysical, neutral, and abstract. Thus, he does not speak of “lover” and “beloved,” narrowing his treatment down to men and women, or humans, angels, and God, as he might have done in a sermon; he speaks of “the lover” in the sense of an agent exercising a certain kind of activity, and “the thing loved,” in the sense of the object, the target or goal, of this activity. Manifestly, the activity has a special nobility when exercised by a rational agent, a nobility enhanced by the kind and degree of the personal communion achieved.

These things being so, it seemed to us better to vary the translation according to context—to employ “what is loved” or “the thing loved” in more abstract analyses, but to say “beloved” in discussions that are more concrete. Of course, all of Thomas carries metaphysical depth and all of his passages admit of personal applications, so there is something a little arbitrary about such an approach. Still, it is better on the whole to vary the vocabulary in this way, provided the reader remains sensitive to the fact that “beloved” could also have been rendered “what is loved,” and vice versa.

Affectus, affective, secundum affectum. For modern English-speakers, “affection” and “affective” immediately suggest emotional attachment or sentimental love; the words refer to how someone feels, and in particular, to the concupiscible passions. Yet Thomas uses affectus and related words or phrases, like affective and per affectum, to refer broadly not only to all passions, irascible as well as concupiscible, but to all appetitive acts, whether sensitive or spiritual. In a context like that of Summa theologiae II-II, question 175, article 2, where contemplative souls are said to be carried up into the heights per affectum, Thomas is using the term with a meaning as broad and deep as the word “heart” or the philosophical term appetitus. The narrower contemporary meaning of “affection” can do little justice to what Thomas means by the phrase “affective union,” unio secundum affectum, or to the ways he contrasts such a union with a “real union,” unio secundum rem. By “affective union” he does not mean an emotional surge or fantasy, but a coming-together, within the appetitive power, of the appetite and the object loved, a kind of conforming of the power to its object such that it moves the whole animal to pursuit of the object in itself, in its own proper being and goodness. An affective union is thus eminently true, to be sure, but it is not existential, it is not yet the actual uniting of the lover with the object loved, so that the lover possesses it most fully—either by absorbing the good it has to offer (if it is an instrumental good), or by rejoicing in its very presence and inherent qualities (if it is a person loved with love of friendship). This

78. Walter Principe has written a study, “Affectivity and the Heart in Thomas Aquinas’s Spirituality” (in Spiritualities of the Heart, ed. Annice Callahan [New York: Paulist Press, 1990]: 45–63), gathering up the varied meanings of affectus and cor and using them to shed light on more familiar elements of Thomas’s thought.
being said, we can see why “real union” does not mean a true connection as opposed to a false or imaginary one; it means an existential rather than an intentional union, a union of having (and, in the best case, of being had), not a union in the heart that gives rise to longing, waiting, hoping, striving for a union “in person.” Further, real union, though it always signifies the presence of what is loved, does not always indicate a physical union, even if the examples that come readily to mind, such as friends enjoying one another’s company, do involve bodily presence. For Thomas, a far greater real union is possible at the spiritual level (the domain of truly common goods) than at the physical (the domain of private goods); and the most real of all unions, the most intimate and the most ecstatic, is the intellectual union of God and the soul in the beatific vision.

Appetitus and appetibilis have, for accuracy’s sake, been rendered by their clunky cognates “appetite, appetible.” While the appetible is also the desirable, there is a fundamental and important difference between appetite, which is a power, and desire, which more commonly names a passion or affection, and similarly between the appetible, which can refer to the objects of any passion or affection, and the desirable, which could suggest too close an association with the specific concupiscible passion of desiderium. (It is clear that here, as in so many other instances, St. Thomas is investing a term whose literal meaning is simply “seeking after,” ad-petere, with a broader and more philosophical meaning.) Unfortunately there is no cousin to the verb appetere (“to appetite”), so we must be contented here with “have appetite for.” This has the added benefit of forcing a reader to think about the issue at a metaphysical level, not limiting appetere to the emotional response suggested by the term “desire,” for which there are other more specific Latin terms.

Ea quae sunt ad finem. This familiar phrase admits of several approaches, one of which should be (and in these pages has been) excluded: the stark single word “means,” which ignores the utter concreteness of the original phrasing and thus evacuates the phrase of its philosophical density: “things that are toward/for an end,” “things directed to an end,” “things that stand in order to an end.” The phrase highlights the end-focused directionality of steps or goods chosen so as to attain that end. “End” is here understood either relatively or absolutely: relatively, as the particular goal or aim of any series of things to be chosen and executed with a view to it; absolutely, as the intellectual creature’s ultimate end, beatitude, which is naturally willed and cannot be an object of choice, in contrast with everything else that leads to it or away from it, the realm of choosable goods. The reader may mentally supply such glosses as “actions that contribute to bringing about the end,” “steps involved in reaching the end.”

c. Miscellaneous items

Absolute/simply. These terms are generally rendered “absolutely speaking” or “simply speaking.”

Augere, diminuere; augeri, diminui. It is unidiomatic to say “charity is increased, is decreased,” when usually the meaning is simply: “Does (or can) charity increase? Does (or can) it decrease?” Sometimes “diminish” works better in context than “decrease,” but both clearly point to the same Latin word.
**Dicendum quod.** Readers of St. Thomas are familiar with his customary “Dicendum quod . . .” at the start of each response and each reply to objections (Responsio. Dicendum, quod or Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod). Often, translators simply omit this phrase, and begin straight with the argument. 79 While this does sound more “to the point,” less cluttered, it can give a false impression of personal assertiveness on the part of the author. For, to take one example at random, Thomas does not write, as if imperiously announcing a truth that is his own: “Everything in pursuit of an end has to be determined to that end in some way . . .” (In III Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 2), but rather—as if paying tribute to the objectivity and universality of truths that command the mind’s assent—“It should be said that everything in pursuit of an end has to be determined to that end in some way, for otherwise it would not arrive at one end more than at any other.” We see here, in a phrase so common and seemingly negligible, the integrity and humility characteristic of ancient and medieval thinkers: the author wants to know what should be said, regardless of whether or not it has already been said, or whither it may lead; when he discovers this, he simply passes it on to others, enriched with the insights he himself can offer, expecting others to correct his mistakes or develop his arguments further.

**Gerund + est.** The construction gerund + est—e.g., utrum creature irrationales ex caritate diligende sint—has usually been rendered “are to be loved,” etc., rather than “ought to be loved.” The reason for this choice is that Thomas elsewhere uses the verb debere to bring in the notion of obligation—utrum homo magis debeat seipsum ex caritate diligere quam proximum—and so we want to bring out that nuance: “whether by charity a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.”

**Gradus.** Most of the time “degree” was the right translation for gradus, as in “degrees of charity” (the thought of speaking of a “first grade” of charity versus a “fourth grade” seemed too silly, given the usual meaning of these phrases in modern American English). Still, on occasion “grade” or “gradation” or “step” worked better.

**Honestum** has been rendered “noble” or “noble-minded.” Notes have been included to that effect.

**Nomen.** In many passages we find Thomas discussing the meaning of words. Sometimes he discusses what a certain word implies or conveys (intellectus importat . . ., passio includit . . .), where an apt translation would be: “The term ‘intellect’ implies . . .” or “The term ‘passion’ includes . . .” At other times, he poses the question directly (nomen amoris significat . . .). The latter cases raise a challenge. Do we render nomen as “name,” “word,” or “term”? It sounds strange to say, for nomina passionum, “the terms by which the passions are described” when we would normally just say “the names of the passions”; but if the same sentence then has nomen voluntatis, would we write: “the name ‘will’?” Read aloud, it sounds like parents talking about a name for a baby boy. On the other hand, to reduce all occurrences of nomen to “word,” which has its own word in Latin (verbum), would be to impose on Thomas a preoccupation with mere vocabulary far distant from his more philosophical concern with

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79. We ourselves do the same in many short texts incorporated into the webnotes, where the purpose is not so much to provide a translation in full context as to make available a particular insight.
naming. In view of all this, our solution was to write what, according to context, we judged most faithful to Aquinas's philosophical concern and most idiomatic in English. The reader should simply be aware that there is some overlap among these terms (or should we say, words?) in our translation.

**Operatio, operare, opus.** It would have been nice to be able to render these consistently as “working,” “to work,” and “work,” but an initial attempt to do so only made for clumsy and cluttered expressions. So we compromised by using whatever seemed most suited for the context. Whenever the language of “work” or “operation” is caught sight of, a reader can be sure that this family of Latin words is in the background.

**Participatio, participare** are sometimes rendered “participation, to participate,” sometimes “sharing, to share” if this is more idiomatic: a friend shares his friend’s life and activities. There was some overlap with communicatio, communicare, which are often rendered “sharing, to share.”

**In patria; in via.** “In the fatherland”; “in the wayfaring state.” There is no need to cancel out, and there is every reason to emphasize, the etymological link between God as heavenly Father (Pater) and heaven as our fatherland (patria). Any unpleasant ideological associations the latter term has acquired can only be buried for good by a resolute return to traditional speech. For Thomas, the Christian in this life is the viator, the pilgrim, the one who is “on the way” (in via) to the patria. Both in patria and in via refer to a condition or state, so that one might ask the questions: Can charity increase indefinitely in via, meaning, so long as one is still living this mortal life? Is faith emptied out in patria, meaning, can faith have any place in heaven?

**Potentiae; vires.** In discussions of psychology, there is little difference between these two terms; both are rendered “powers.”

**Praecepta** is translated “commandments.”

**Ratio,** as is well known, can mean a great variety of things: not only reason (in the sense of the power of reason), but also argument or claim; reckoning; discourse; logical account, definition, or notion; intelligible note or aspect; form, character, or nature. In fact, in many cases several of the meanings are intended. For this reason, and being dissatisfied with the alternatives, we decided to leave ratio for the most part untranslated and italicized. The reader is thus left free to pull out the meaning from the context: where it says “The ratio of virtue is . . . ,” one may think: “The definition of virtue . . .” or “The nature of virtue . . .” or “The notion of virtue . . .”—and all of these would be correct, each in its way.

**Secundum rem.** Most of the time, this phrase is rendered “in reality.”
WEBNOTES

WEBNOTES FOR BOOK I

1. In this context, *comprehensio* is to be taken not in reference to knowledge (which is comprised under *visio*), but in reference to affection, as being that stance toward the good in which the good is wholly embraced by the lover, who then lacks nothing. For the same trio and a clarification on the meaning of *comprehensio*, cf. *ST I*, q. 12, a. 7, ad 1 and *ST I-II*, q. 4, a. 3.

2. The language of “mutual penetration through love” is rare in St. Thomas. In only two other places does he use something like it: at *In I Sent.* d. 19, prologue, in connection with showing the equality of the divine Persons owing to their *mutua inhaesio,* and more amply at *ST I-II,* q. 28, a. 2, on whether *mutua inhaesio* is an effect of love (the first objection there connecting *inhaerere* with *penetrare*).

3. Obviously “accidental” is being said in the metaphysical sense. It is not something “incidental” to heavenly happiness that the blessed see and rejoice in Jesus Christ; but it is not his created human nature, as such, that is their last end and eternal rest. The soul attains its rest in uncreated divinity alone. Since the human nature of Christ is hypostatically united to the divine person of the Son, it follows that this secondary joy is inseparable from the primary joy, and is, so to speak, its outward sign and guarantee.


5. In formulating his answer, a Master of Theology is expected to give the *determinatio,* a determination of the truth of the matter. In St. Thomas’s works, Lombard keeps his honorific title *Magister,* but his opinions are not always deemed correct. (See Edward A. Synan, “Brother Thomas, the Master, and the Masters,” in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies,* 2 vols. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974], 2:219–42.) In both the Parisian and Roman versions of the present Distinction, Thomas relentlessly critiques Lombard’s position on charity. (For a good analysis of the arguments, see Mario Coccia, “Credit Where Credit Is Due: St. Thomas Aquinas versus Peter Lombard on the True Nature of Charity,” *Doctor Angelicus* 5 [2005]: 165–78; Torrell, *Spiritual Master,* 178–83; other articles on the subject are listed in the Bibliography below.) Though the phrase “determine about” is not idiomatic in English, it seemed preferable to alternatives that fail to convey the idea of giving a definite answer to a question on which various opinions have been entertained.

6. This difficulty is taken up in Question 2 of the present Distinction.

7. Or *seeks* to prove, since for Thomas the proofs are ineffective, as will be seen.

8. In other words, that God is called “charity” because he is the *cause* of charity; compare *ST I,* q. 13, a. 2, on the opinion of those who said that God is called “good,” “wise,” etc., because he is the cause of goodness, wisdom, etc., in creatures.

9. That is, what is brought about is still at the level of the original natures. When hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water, the water, though different in properties, is still physical or material, in that respect like its originating elements. When poetry and music are combined to form opera, the opera, though obviously its effects are different from those of recited text or instrumental music, does not go essentially beyond either of the media, as if one had left the domain of the fine arts altogether.
10. Note that this argument seeks to establish only that the soul’s participation in the uncreated love must itself be something created, not that there is no immediate presence of the Holy Spirit to the soul in a state of grace. The modest conclusion—that in the souls of the just there must be some (aliqua) created charity—takes for granted a truth on which all the saints agree and which therefore needs no special attention here, namely the indwelling of the Blessed Trinity (cf. Torrell, *Spiritual Master*, 90–100). Indeed, it is precisely because God makes these souls present to himself in a special way that he cannot fail to make the most profound impression on them. A passage in the next Distinction of the *Scriptum* (In I Sent. d. 18, a. 5, ad 6; Mandonnet, 446) underlines this very point: “Nevertheless it is in different ways that he can be called ‘God of all’ and ‘God of the just’; for he is called ‘God of all’ owing to the relation of principle, insofar as he is the creator of all; but he is called ‘God of the just’ in a special way, according to the ratio of an end that they attain; and thus he is said also to be had by them. For although everything is [in some way] ordained to him as to an end, nevertheless not everything attains him, but only the just who are conjoined to him by grace and glory: and consequently, too, of everyone taken together, he is called ‘the end’ or something of this sort, but it is only about the just that it is said in an absolute manner, ‘God is theirs,’ because they have him as [the one who has made them] his inheritance, and through a sort of suffering [quemdam modum passionis].”

11. The point is not, of course, that God does not, within the simple act of knowing and loving himself, know or will different things for different creatures, for otherwise there would be no differences among them at all. It is rather that the reality of the difference, as an existing differentiation, cannot be in God, who is supremely simple and therefore “relates” to each being as the simple actuality he is. It must rather be on the side of the creature, which embodies, as it were, the limitations or perfections God wills for it. God is the same God to the sinner and to the just man; but the sinner himself is not the same as the just man, and therefore the sinner is not the same to God as the just man is to God. The latter possesses, while the former lacks, the grace that makes the soul pleasing to God (gratia gratum faciens). Therefore, in looking upon the man whom his grace has made just, God is pleased with what he sees, for it is a reflection of his own beauty; whereas in looking upon the man without grace, he cannot see this, and so he is displeased. Still, it is altogether the same unchanging God who is pleased and displeased, due to the real differences on the part of different souls.

12. If this differentiating feature of the just man were not something deeper, more abiding, than an action, the moment he fell asleep and could not perform human actions, he would cease to differ from all other creatures who lack this feature. Surely this must be false, for a person truly sanctified (a “saint,” sanctus) is holy whether awake or asleep; this is taken for granted.

13. By “political virtue” St. Thomas has in mind all the natural virtues insofar as they are ordered, by general justice, to the highest natural end of man, the common good of political society, which includes the good of contemplating God as creator (cf. De caritate, a. 2). A similar formula is used at ST I-II, q. 61, a. 5, where St. Thomas adopts Macrobius’s Neoplatonic classification of virtues into political virtues (i.e., all the acquired virtues), purifying virtues, virtues of the purified souls, and exemplar virtues.

14. If it is really man who is doing the good work (though of course by God’s grace, without which no salutary work can be done), then he himself must possess a principle of this act, namely a habit, just as fire heats up something actively only because it is already formally hot.

15. All works of the Trinity ad extra are common to the three divine Persons. However, since God creates according to his nature which is triune, created effects bear traces of their trinitarian source (cf. In I Sent. d. 3, q. 2; d. 10, q. 1, a. 1; d. 14, q. 1, a. 1; d. 14, q. 2, a. 2; d. 32, q. 1, a. 3; etc.). Insofar as a created reality bears a likeness to something proper to a divine Person, it can be “appropriated” to that Person. Thus, since the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son, he can be viewed in a way as their very commonness, their bond; and as a result, all that binds as to God and to each other is appropriated to the Spirit, although such binding is really the work of the undivided Trinity. To use the language of this particular passage, charity is efficiently caused in us by the Trinity, but its exemplar cause is the Spirit. For a text that concludes to this exemplarity, see, inter alia, In I Sent. d. 18, a. 3, translated in webnote 136. Further discussion of all these points may be found in Torrell, *Spiritual Master*, esp. 58–63, 162–63, 175–78.

16. In the next Distinction of the *Scriptum*, expanding on the point made here—namely, the way in which it is true to say that “our love is the Holy Spirit” and “the Holy Spirit is our love”—Thomas offers a careful analysis of how God’s names can be applied to us (In I Sent. d. 18, a. 5; Mandonnet, 445): “It should be said that God cannot have any relation to us except in the manner of a principle. Now, since there are four
causes. [we can say that] he is not our material cause, but stands to us under the aspect of efficient cause, end, and exemplar form, though not under the aspect of an inhering form. In the matter of divine names, therefore, it should be considered that all those names that imply the ratio of principle in the manner of an efficient or final principle receive the addition of possessive adjectives [pronominum], as we say: ‘our creator’ and ‘our good’; whereas those things that are said in the manner of an inhering form do not receive the addition of the aforesaid adjectives, and such are all divine names which are signified in the abstract, since all such abstract names are signified in the manner of form, as ‘essence,’ ‘goodness,’ and things of this sort. Hence in such names, no addition can be made; for we cannot say that God is ‘our essence’ or ‘our substance’ or anything of the sort. Nevertheless there is a certain order to be considered in these names. For certain of these abstractions imply the ratio of an efficient and exemplar principle (as do ‘wisdom’ and ‘goodness’ and things of this kind) when an addition of the aforesaid adjectives is made, as when we say ‘God is our wisdom’ causally, in the sense in which he is called ‘our hope’—since through his wisdom there comes to be in us the wisdom that has his wisdom as its exemplar, and through which [participated likeness of divine wisdom] we are formally wise. Certain things however do not imply the ratio of a principle (except perhaps of an exemplar), and to such it is not customary for the aforesaid addition [of adjectives] to be made; for it is not customary to say that ‘God is our essence’ or [God is] our substance. Still, even to those names such an addition is sometimes made, due to their being exemplar principles, as [for example] Dionysius says that ‘the being of all things is the super-being of deity’—although locutions of this kind are more to be expounded than further employed.”

17. vivere dicitur esse viventium. There are two senses in which people speak of “living”: to be alive (literally, the “to be” of living things), which focuses on a simple actuality; to be doing the things living beings do or do best (as in the sayings “now we’re really living” or “he lived a good life”).

18. These remarks are filled out by some comments at the end of the next Distinction, In I Sent. d. 18, exp. text. (Mandonnet, 447): “For that is not our spirit by which we are.” It should be known [for clarifying this statement] that (1) we are ‘in the Holy Spirit’ not formally, but effectively; we exist, formally, by a created spirit, which is the soul; but by the Holy Spirit we are holy both effectively and formally, insofar as through charity, which has as its exemplar the love that is the Holy Spirit, we are formally sanctified, and through this [gift] the Holy Spirit is conjoined to us [as mover].”

19. “Partly as a term,” in the sense that God created its being; “partly as a means,” viz., between God and the meritorious operation. By grace man is re-created, in the sense that a new formal principle of acting is put into his soul, analogous to the role played by the soul itself vis-à-vis the powers and actions natural to man.

20. Aquinas is referring to a formal, not a material, infinity: the object of charity is in-finite because it has no limit or measure, nothing greater than it or comparable to it, not because it is the measure of or greater than an infinite number of things. The latter statement is also true, but true in consequence of the former. And of course, from the fact that the object of charity is set before all others, it follows directly that nothing is set before it.

21. That is, that we love as much as it is possible for us to do.

22. That is, an accident numerically one can never be in two subjects simultaneously.

23. In other words, in both active and passive operations, the accident extends beyond the subject to another object; but in the former case, the operation has its term in the extrinsic object itself, to which a likeness of its own form is communicated (or, put differently, where a likeness of its form is produced), while in the latter case the operation has its term in the subject, into which a likeness of the extrinsic object is received. Here, Thomas lines up both knowing and loving as examples of the latter kind of activity, but in other places he wishes to emphasize that knowledge and love tend in opposite directions. Knowledge brings a form into the knower and so, in a sense, limits the object to the subject, whereas love tends toward the very being of the loved and so takes the lover out of himself, conforming him to the object. For further elaboration of this contrast, see, among other texts, In III Sent. d. 27, q. 1, aa. 1 & 4 (at pp. 118 and 137).

24. That is, properties of the species as such.

25. In the sense that neither water as such nor this water naturally has the accident of heat; the heat in water is always imparted to it by some external source of heat, as we see in natural hot springs or a puddle made warm by the sun.

26. The accidents are “substantified” or “substantiated” insofar as they belong to the subject. Without the subject, they could not—naturally speaking—either acquire or preserve their being. The great exception is
the miracle of transubstantiation. The point Thomas is making here and in the next response as well is that
created charity depends upon the soul in order to exist (for it is not a separate substance but a modification
of an already-existing substance), and yet it does not emerge from within the soul, as if caused by man’s
own natural principles. It is divinely infused, yet once infused, it has the mode of being of an accident sub-
stantiated by the intellectual soul, parallel (in this respect) to natural accidents that inhere in the soul, such
as wisdom, prudence, or justice.

27. Anything that needs to be perfected achieves its ultimate goodness in the possession of that which
perfection. There are many perfections that are not innate in man but accrue to him. If, therefore, it were
impossible that an accident be in any respect nobler and better that its subject, nothing that contributes to
man’s perfection could belong to him as an accident. However, among created beings, something is either a
substance or an accident. Therefore these perfections would have to be substances. But they could not ac-
crue to man as substances, since it would follow that each time a man becomes better, he undergoes a sub-
stantial change and thereby ceases to exist as himself (the fusion of two substances produces a third and dif-
ferent substance). But that is absurd. Hence these perfections could only be separate substances. But if they
are separate, a man would have to participate in them in order to gain something of their good. Yet one
must again inquire: Would this participation itself be an accident or a substance? If an accident, then the
same problem arises as before. If a substance, then the separate substance ceases to be separate, and man un-
dergoes a substantial change.

28. That is, being (esse) taken in isolation from its perfections is less noble than being taken with its per-
fections. Since all perfections are forms of being and presuppose substantial being, being is always nobler
than a subsequent perfection viewed simply in terms of its being. Viewed in terms of operation or of what a
substance is meant to achieve, simple being by itself is less noble than being that has been duly perfected by
accidents.

29. The sense of the question is, does God give the supernatural good of charity in proportion to a per-
son’s already existing capacity for natural goods? Is greater ability or potency in the recipient the reason why
charity is given in greater abundance? Cf. ST III, q. 69, a. 8, ad 3.

30. In other words, in composite beings, a substantial form exists only inasmuch as it acquires being in a
subject, and only in proportion to the latter’s capacity; thus, prime matter is able to accommodate only one
form at a time, and instantiates only one possible individual of that form (one and the same horse cannot be
both a sleek race horse and a powerful draught horse, owing not to the limitations of the horse’s form but
to those of its matter). Similarly, runs the objection, charity, which has been proved to be a certain formal
principle, exists in proportion to the capacity of the subject to receive that form. But that subject is the will.
Hence the form has its perfection according to the will’s own potential.

31. That is, the one who has received more grace has, by that very fact, a greater capacity of grace for glo-
ry. The parallel being set up is: grace as a material disposition has a capacity for glory; nature as material has
a capacity for grace.

32. Given the context in Prov. 30:24-28, where ant, rabbit, locust, and lizard are put forward as exam-
iples of power or cleverness, the first part of the verse implies that much can be done by effort to surpass the
limits of a seemingly insignificant or weak nature. The point is that it is not nature but activity (endeavor,
exertion) in proportion to which grace is given. This exertion itself, depending on God as mover, is not nec-
essarily in proportion to the natural faculty. It is evident from Thomas’s response that he considers this a le-
gitimate distinction. It may be noted that Thomas does not quote this rather obscure verse, or Gregory’s gloss
on it, anywhere else in his writings.

33. The simple God is related fully and equally to all his effects; the difference is in how they relate to
him. See webnote 11. St. Thomas holds the same principles in the present article as in the ST treatment (II
- II, q. 24, a. 3), but prioritizes them differently. Here he begins his answer with the principle that “God stands
alike to all things,” while in the ST he begins with “God is the proper cause of charity.”

34. This principle applies to those cases in which there is a diversity of the recipients to which it is fitting
that the gifts correspond, not to cases where there is nothing already given to the recipient to correspond
with the gift given, such as creation (where nothing at all pre-exists), the sanctification in the womb (where
there is no cause in the child for the privilege bestowed, but only in divine Providence), and the baptism of
infants. In the latter two cases, indeed, a nature is present and “given,” but not in such a way that it would
supply, of itself, a reason for diversity in relation to a gift of grace.
35. The argument made in the last sentence is developed more fully elsewhere: cf. ST II-II, q. 24, a. 2; SCG III, ch. 151; De duabus praecaeptis (Opuscula theologica). Marietti ed., 2:248–49, nn. 1153–1159). A sign that Thomas was aware of the lack, in his Paris version, of an adequate consideration of the manner in which charity is given to the soul is the restructuring of the Lectura romana's d. 17, q. 1 (see p. 58), which, in its opening pair of articles (the first of them altogether new), builds up more gradually and convincingly to the conclusion that the ability to love God as our happiness requires that he infuse into the soul a supernatural perfection, viz., a created habit called “charity.”

36. The point being made is not an implicit Pelagianism, as if to say it is the work or the amount of work that “claims” the grace, but simply that human effort makes a difference when God actually gives grace, since it is within man’s freedom to dispose himself more or less well for this gift. This implies, of course, a belief that human nature is not totally corrupt and totally enslaved on account of original sin. It should also be pointed out that Thomas acknowledges in many places that not only are good works truly ours but not sufficiently a term; hence it does not immediately attain grace, but attains only further readiness for grace.) (3) But nature is not such a middle term in God’s movement. (Imperfect preparation is a middle, as in the second case God moves a man from one order to a higher order (that is why efforts cannot merit glory), whereas in the first case God moves a man from imperfect to perfect (that is why grace can merit glory), where as in the second case God moves a man from one order to a higher order (that is why efforts cannot merit grace). (3) But nature is not such a middle term in God’s movement. (Imperfect preparation is a middle, but not sufficiently a term; hence it does not immediately attain grace, but attains only further readiness for grace.)

37. Thomas’s point is that if a man and an angel perform an act of adoration, the angel is likely to do a better job because his nature allows him to be focused on that single work, whereas the man will probably have to fight off distractions from the senses or the imagination, tiredness from lunch, etc. On the other hand, if a human being should exert his will to the same act of adoration with great fervor, he may well dispose himself to an increase of grace even better than an angel shall have done.

38. It is not merely one’s natural powers that have relevance for gifts received, but also the disposition created in the subject by the efforts that are “brought to” those powers.

39. Although the co-principles of corporeal nature are substantial form and prime matter, and the form immediately informs the matter, nevertheless it is also true that concretely a substantial change naturally occurs only when already-formed matter is suited to be the recipient of the new form. Thus, not any kind of material body can become a plant or an animal, but only certain kinds of bodies. A cow can generate flesh from grass, but not from iron or lead. So, the point in this reply is that one must consider matter’s capacity for form not solely in terms of matter’s nature as pure potency, but also in terms of a given material subject’s disposition to receive a given form.

40. The argument here is extremely concise; it may be expanded as follows. (1) Grace is a middle term in God’s movement of a man to glory, and this is why glory is the “natural” result of grace. Considering only its created being, however, grace would not result in glory. (2) Similarly, efforts are a middle term in God’s movement of a man to grace, and this is why the man who strives for grace obtains grace. The difference is that in the first case God moves a man from imperfect to perfect (that is why grace can merit glory), whereas in the second case God moves a man from one order to a higher order (that is why efforts cannot merit grace). (3) But nature is not such a middle term in God’s movement. (Imperfect preparation is a middle, but not sufficiently a term; hence it does not immediately attain grace, but attains only further readiness for grace.)

41. Cf. In II Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, but especially the last note of the expositio primae partis textus (mistakenly entitled expositio secundae partis textus in Mandonnet, 106) placed after this first question of d. 3. Starting with the sentence in Lombard on which Thomas is commenting, we read (Mandonnet, 107): “The very ones who had preeminence over others through their natural endowments were also set over the others through [corresponding] gifts of grace.” For those who posit that angels were created already endowed with grace, it is easy to assign a reason for this correspondence: because the only measure by which grace could be measured was the capacity of nature. If, however, the angels are held to have been created unendowed with
grace, then in [considering] ‘natural endowments’ one has to take into account [not only powers but also] effort (according as we include in ‘natural endowments’ also those things of which we are capable by our natural principles, in the way that natural [in general] is distinguished from gratuitous); it is still likely [according to this supposition] that as an angel’s nature was nobler, so much the greater would have been its effort toward those things to which it was ordered by its nature, since there would not have been anything holding it back, as there is in us, in whom ‘the corruptible body aggravates the soul’ (Wis. 9:15). And therefore, whatever be the case regarding the angels, it is certain that grace is infused in us, not according to the measure of natural endowments, but rather according to the measure of our effort."

42. A formulation like this one, taken together with the frequent occurrence of the phrase “grace or charity” (or “grace and charity”) throughout this Distinction, may give the impression that Aquinas is equating charity with sanctifying grace. This is not, however, his position, as a number of texts make clear. See, e.g., In III Sent. d. 30, a. 5, ad 1 (p. 259), with the further references given there in the note. In the somewhat confused or at least confusing relationship of grace and charity in the Sentences, we have, observes Torrell, a good example of the limitations of a design that compelled an author to treat formally of charity prior to treating of grace: “Beginning with the De seriatate, Thomas, master of his order of exposition (which was not the case in the commentary on the Sentences) speaks of grace before speaking of charity. This is understandable since grace qualifies the soul in its essence, in making of it a radical principle of action in this supranatural realm—after the way of our nature in the natural realm (entitative habitus in his language)—while charity qualifies the will as a power of the soul (operative habitus in the scholastic language)” (Spiritual Master, 179, note 11).

43. “All these things have I considered in my heart, that I might carefully understand them: there are just men and wise men, and their works are in the hand of God: and yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love, or hatred” (Douay-Rheims). “But all this I laid to heart, examining it all, how the righteous and the wise and their deeds are in the hand of God; whether it is love or hate man does not know” (RSV).

44. The Douay-Rheims translates more literally from the Vulgate: “I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified.”

45. Here Thomas briefly states his well-known interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of human intellection as the combined work of an agent (or active) intellect, which renders potentially intelligible forms of material singulars actually intelligible, and a possible (or passive or potential) intellect, upon which those forms, rendered actual, are impressed; thus is brought about actual understanding. Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, chs. 4–5, and Thomas’s commentary thereupon (Sent. III De anima, chs. 1–4, ed. Leon. 45.1:201–23); other valuable treatments of the topic include De anima, a. 4; ST I, q. 79; Compend. theol. chs. 80–83.

46. In other words, if you look at the kind of act performed, e.g., the giving of alms to a beggar, you cannot tell if that act proceeded simply from the power of the will and other powers used by the will (an isolated free act), or from a habit of giving alms, because in either case the visible, describable result would be the same. Of course, there will be other signs to consider, as Thomas goes on to say, but they all fall short of certainty. If you contrast a Christian who continually and joyfully gives alms to the poor and a robber baron who subjects the poor to misery, the probability that we are looking at a saint and a sinner is strong; but still there is no guarantee, since only God sees their hearts.

It is curious that Thomas seems to speak here as if the will, as a natural power, and the habit of charity in the will tend to the same object, when in fact charity is distinguished from natural love precisely because charity tends to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, while no act of natural love has such an object. So the distinction in regard to “the act itself” either means to distinguish charity from some but not all natural love (a very unlikely option), or pertains already to the subsequent discussion of mode and effect.

47. For example, were one to compare Mother Teresa and the Princess of Wales strictly in terms of charitable works toward the needy, one could not say whether these works proceeded from a virtue given by God or from a likeness of that virtue acquired by a certain way of acting over many years. As Thomas points out, there are other ways of inferring the presence or absence of charity, but in any case sensible evidence will yield only probable signs.

48. Later in Book III, St. Thomas, taking up a broader question—whether we can know any of our habits—faces a first objection that focuses on charity in particular (In III Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 1; Moos, 700, §32): “Charity is foremost among habits. But one who has charity does not know that he has it, since ‘no one knows whether he is worthy of love or of hatred,’ as it says in Eccles. 9:1. Therefore neither can some-
one know other habits.” The reply (Moos, 703): “To the first, therefore, it should be said that charity can
well be known, in the sense that [ex hoc quid] a man knows, through reason instructed by authority and
by faith, what is required for the act of charity. But whether one actually has charity cannot be known for
certain either by the one who has it or by another; for since the act of charity [as such] requires something
through which it merits eternal life, it cannot be seen for certain whether this [principle of merit] is in a giv-
en act, but someone, looking to certain signs, can make a conjecture that he or another has charity.”

A helpful distinction is offered at the end of In I Sent. Prologus, in the division-exposition of the text
(Mandonnet, 21): “This [idea] is taken from 2 Cor. 5:14, ‘The love of Christ urges us.’ But on the contrary
is Eccles. 9:1, ‘no one knows whether he is worthy of love or of hate.’ Therefore, etc. I respond: in one way
‘charity’ names an infused habit, and, apart from revelation, no one can know for certain that he has this
habit, but on the basis of some probable signs he can conjecture that he has it. In another way, ‘charity’
names love that greatly appreciates the beloved [amor multum appetiens amatum]; and in this way, one can
know that he has charity.”

St. Thomas (in general, when he is distinguishing acquired virtues from infused virtues and the gifts
of the Spirit: cf. In III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, qa. 4; De virt. in comm., a. 10, resp. and ad 8, 9, 13) sometimes suggests
that charity provides a sufficient motive for difficult acts that is not provided by natural love. But this is only
relatively true. A sufficiently intense act of natural love could impel someone to martyrdom or any other particular act. Hence the signs are not directly or primarily signs by being proper effects of charity, but by being dispositions to charity: reception of the sacraments, repentance from sin, faith, good works. Taken in isolation from the knowledge of God’s generosity or promises, no sign would be really a probable sign of charity.

49. That is, the charity by which we love our brother is, in itself—as a light-filled gift that reflects with special brilliance the divine nature—more knowable than the brother whom we love, but the brother whom we love is, to us, more knowable than this gift of love. Even if this is true, it is hard to see how it could have been what Augustine or Lombard intended to say. We are evidently dealing with pia expositio.

50. Two issues are conflated here. (1) Whoever has an intellectual act of knowledge or understanding has an intellectual habit. (2) Whoever has an intellectual act of knowledge knows that he has such an act. This latter knowledge is attained by the following argument: (a) one knows that one assents to the proposition as true on account of certain things; (b) one knows that these things cause the truth of the proposition—otherwise one would not know, with scientia, in the first place; (c) one concludes (and thus, one knows) that one knows the proposition in question. In the contrasting case of error, the three steps run parallel: (a) one knows that one assents to a proposition as true, whereas, in fact, it is false; (b) one believes that the grounds on which the assent is based cause the truth of that proposition; (c) one concludes that one knows the proposition, yet in reality this conclusion, like the proposition itself, is only an opinion or belief.

51. The contrast implied in this terse response is as follows: the object of both natural love and charity is the divine good, while the object of faith is truth divinely revealed, which is not the same as the object of natural knowledge or human opinion.

In regard to the habit of faith, one could argue thus: (1) one knows, immediately, that one believes, but not that one believes by supernatural faith; (2) one believes, by supernatural faith, that a certain proposition belongs to the faith while supposing that it does so belong (for otherwise one might believe it by natural faith); (3) one concludes, and therefore believes (by natural faith), that one has supernatural faith. It is not possible to believe this by supernatural faith, because one’s own particular state is no more included among the articles of faith than is the valid consecration of a particular host. Therefore one may believe a proposition by natural faith, yet believe that he has supernatural faith—e.g., one who is deceived about the Church’s teaching.

52. The argument may be restated: Just as one does not call whiteness “white,” since the very word
“whiteness” is taken from “white” (the statement “whiteness is white” is a tautology), so one does not call
love “loved,” since the word “loved” is taken from “love.” Hence love is no more a loved thing than whiteness is a white thing; and just as it would be absurd to call whiteness something white, it would be absurd to call love something loved. As the reply will say, this argument draws a false parallel. “Whiteness,” a quality expressed in the abstract, is derived from “white,” which signifies the same quality as concretely present in a subject; but “loved” does not signify something derived from “love,” but rather love’s object.

53. A proper sense is one of the five senses, each of which can perceive only its own proper objects, but not itself in the activity of sensing. This stands in contrast to the so-called “common sense” or sensus commu-
n is, the root source and support of all sensation, which not only is aware of each sense in its very sensing, but also makes possible the comparison of sensibles and sense-acts. Like memory and imagination, the *sensus communis* is an “interior” sense that plays a crucial role in human intellection. See Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, chs. 1–2; Aquinas, *Sent. II De anima*, chs. 25–27 (ed. Leon. 45.1:172–86); ST I, q. 78, a. 4; *De anima*, a. 13.


Early Thomists discerned a shift, if not a conflict, between the way Thomas speaks here and the way he speaks later about how one loves the virtue of charity: “[In I Sent.] d. 17, a. 5, in the first section, he says that charity ‘is not loved . . . with a love of friendship . . ., but . . . with a certain complacency.’ In the Seconda se- cundae, however, q. 25, a. 2, he says that ‘by friendship, something is loved in two ways: in one way, as a friend . . ., in another way as a good that we want for a friend, and in this [latter] way we love charity by charity’” (Gauthier, “Les ‘Articuli in quibus frater Thomas melius in Summa quam in Scriptis’,” 321, no. 55).

55. It is a commonplace in Thomistic psychology that the sense-organ, precisely as instrument of the sense-power in act, is not changed physically into its object, but undergoes an “intentional” or “spiritual” change whereby it is formally identical to a formal quality of the object. When red is seen, the eye or pupil does not become colored red, but takes on the form of redness in an immaterial mode. A distinction has to be made between senses in which only a “spiritual immutation” is to be found (the most excellent of these being sight), and senses in which there is both a spiritual and a natural or bodily immutation (the most earthy of these being touch and taste). For explanation, see *ST I*, q. 78, a. 3; *Sent. II De anima*, ch. 14 (ed. Leon. 45.1:127–28).


57. A person could love his own act of love not as a distinct object to be loved, but as the formal reason why he himself is to be loved. In this case, he stands to that act as matter to form, and it is the composite, so to speak, that he loves as one reality. Hence there is but a single act of love there. However, if he were to focus on that activity of will and view it as a distinct good in and of itself (an accident of the spiritual order), then that good could itself become an object of willing, over and above the good of himself that he also loves, and which is a good of a different order (a substance both material and spiritual).

58. The words in brackets are implied. There is in theory no end to the number of reflexive acts of intel- lect and will—one could always take a further step back (one might try to know the knowledge of knowledge, or love the loving of love, etc.) But conceptually the object becomes murkier the further back one goes, since one is moving further away from actual content and further into intentional relations. Moreover, there is no reason to do so and one would get quickly bored of this abstruse enterprise. And no matter how many steps back one took, one would always be dealing with an actually finite number of acts.

59. Since it could not be wished if it were not loved.

60. Thomas is clarifying a point that may not have been fully clear. It is the *habit* of charity that cannot be directly known by us, though in itself it is more knowable (i.e., has greater intrinsic intelligibility). One can, on the other hand, know for sure that one has done an act of love (indeed, since it is a voluntary act, one can hardly be unaware of it) and would also be able to know if it met the “external criteria” of an act of char- ity. But whether this act stems from an infused habit and is thus a supernatural act remains unknown, for the very reason that the habit is not directly known.
61. A nice precision is offered later in Book III about the four possible relations that can obtain between the Holy Spirit and man’s spiritual condition. *In III Sent.* d. 34, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 1 (Moos, 1149, §219): “Certain things [in us] are from the Holy Spirit that are not with the Holy Spirit [i.e., he is not himself present with them], such as unformed faith and servile faith (this is only due to a defect that attaches to such things); while other things are both from the Holy Spirit and with him, such as charity; while certain things are with him [i.e., can coexist with his presence] but not from him, such as venial sin; and again, certain things are neither from him nor with him, such as mortal sin.” As Torrell observes (*Spiritual Master*, 97, n. 45): “Though departing from Lombard, who did not establish the existence of a habitus for created grace, Thomas retains his teaching—and with a good deal of firmness—that it is truly the *Spirit in person* who gives himself.”

62. On the Holy Spirit as the ratio of all gifts and charity as his likeness, see the translated texts from *In I Sent.* d. 18, a. 3, in webnote 136.

63. Implied: hence charity may be called “divine” by a certain causal predication, so that it is not wrong to say that “the charity in us is God”—as long as we understand that we are saying “the charity in us is God’s gift, a participated likeness of his own love, enabling us to love him as he loves himself.”

64. To use the language of later theologians, faith and patience are not “pure perfections,” since the one implies lack of sight of the truth, and the other implies bearing up under suffering. Therefore while God causes the faith of Christians and the patience of martyrs, he himself neither believes in the truth nor endures pain, for he is unchangeable truth, impassible goodness. Put differently, what is faith in the believer is transparent truth in God, and what is patience in the believer is invincible strength. The same account has to be given of any virtue whose ratio includes imperfection. Charity precisely lacks any such imperfection: what is charity in the believer is also, though infinitely, charity in God, with no difference in definition. Therefore it is a pure perfection that can be analogously predicated of God and of spiritual creatures.

65. *Condividentur.* The meaning is that (1) gifts and virtues fall under a single division, namely, of habits; and from this perspective, “virtue” and “gift” are species of the genus “habit.” Below, at (2), the perspective shifts to viewing virtues as themselves God’s gift; here the genus is “any gift of God,” and the species “virtue” and “gift.” Thus we get two different meanings of “gift”: according to (1), wisdom is the best gift; according to (2), charity is the best gift.

66. Infused wisdom is the most dignified gift because acquired wisdom is the best virtue. Wisdom, whether acquired or infused, is best because man’s beatitude, to which all virtue is ordered, consists in the contemplation of the first truth itself, and wisdom is nothing other than the habit of this contemplation, a seeing of the whole of reality in light of its highest cause. On the virtue of wisdom, see *ST I-II*, q. 57, a. 2 and q. 66, a. 5; on the gift of wisdom, see *In III Sent.* d. 34, q. 2, a. 1 and *ST II-II*, q. 45. See also Lawrence Dewan, “Wisdom as Foundational Ethical Theory in St. Thomas Aquinas,” in William Sweet, ed., *The Bases of Ethics* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2001), 39–78.

67. St. Thomas frequently mentions the derivation of sapientia from sapor: here, sapientia is said to be the most dignified because it savors divine truth (*saporat divinam veritatem*). Yet the link to charity is immediately made: one cannot have wisdom without charity (*sine caritate*), because it is love that conforms the appetite to the object and makes the beloved “connatural” to the lover, as Thomas will teach in Book III (see esp. d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, at p. 118). Without this connaturality one cannot have a taste for divine truth—a discerning, lingering enjoyment of it. The knowledge of truth would be “cold” without the fire of love animating the knower, making him desire this knowledge and rejoice in it. The wise man is a truth-lover (compare the etymology of “philosopher,” one who is a lover of wisdom). For a masterful discussion of these ideas, see Etienne Gilson, *Wisdom and Love in Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1951).

68. Hence Thomas maintains that while the gifts are superior to the infused moral virtues and a fortiori to all acquired virtues, they are inferior to the theological virtues, particularly charity, because these unite us immediately to God as first truth and sovereign good. Cf. *ST I-II*, q. 68, a. 8.

69. Since people speak of the “growth” of charity, the question then becomes: If charity did not really admit of increase, then how can it be said to increase? We are led through various possibilities, which are shown to be dead ends. Note that it makes no difference to the arguments whether *augeatur* is rendered as active (“increases”) or passive (“is increased”).

70. Toward the end of the main response Thomas takes up the distinction between these two kinds of quantity. A clear definition of them may be found at *ST I*, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1. Put briefly, “quantity of mass” or “dimensive quantity” (*quantitas molis* or *quantitas dimensiva*) is found in bodily things only, and refers to their
bulk or size, whereas “quantity of power” (*quantitas virtutis*) is seen in connection with the perfection of a nature or form such as the hotness of a body or the wisdom of a soul. Augustine adverts to both kinds in a famous remark: “in those things which are great not by reason of their mass, that thing is greater which is better” (*in his quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse, quod est melius esse*). So, the first sentence of the objection here is asserting that charity, while not a dimensive quantity, could be viewed as a certain quantity of power to be or to act in a certain way, and in that case, you might well have more or less of such power. Then a rejoinder is made: such power is measured by the objects it can reach, but according to the common opinion of theologians, the least charity extends to as many objects as the greatest. Therefore it cannot be viewed as allowing increase or decrease of power.

71. In other words, if a man has really made progress in charity, then there must be something in him now which was not in him before (otherwise he would be just as he was), but this new thing cannot be merely another act of charity, for man never performs isolated acts that do not stem from powers that are either formed or uniformly by habits. The difference between beginner and proficient has to be at a deeper level, namely at the level of habit, the shaping of a power vis-à-vis its acts. The progress would consist, then, in acquiring an ever-greater ability to act. But this clearly shows that the charity in question cannot be identical to the Holy Spirit, who changes in no way. On the contrary, it is the Christian who, in proportion to his possession of the habit of charity, draws nearer to the Holy Spirit.

72. Put simply, if the charity has a greater power, it also has a greater essence.

73. That is, when the larger fire uses up the fuel of the small fire.

74. “Fervent” or burning in a metaphorical sense refers to the property of charity as a force that, like fire, consumes what is contrary to it, as it seeks to continue in being and to give off light and heat. Such “burning” is a characteristic of charity as such, and so it increases or diminishes with charity itself. “Fervent” or burning in a literal sense refers to an overflow of voluntary love into the sensitive part of the soul, in particular the concupiscible appetite. Thus, when a man glimpses the woman he loves, this love—which begins, like the apprehension, in the rational part of the soul—can quickly overflow into the sensitive part of the soul and bring about a literal heat in the body. Likewise, divine love, though seated in the will, can by its intensity bring about bodily changes, such as sweating or sensations of burning. The lives of the saints supply many examples of what Thomas is speaking of. One example will suffice: Blessed Mary of Oignies (+1213) did not need to keep a fire going in her stove during the deep northern winter because her prayers made her physically hot (see Butler’s *Lives of the Saints*, ed. and rev. Herbert J. Thurston and Donald Attwater, 4 vols. [Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1990], 2:626; cf. the account of St. Juliana Falconieri, *Butler’s Lives*, 2:582). Also bearing witness is Philo, who writes in his treatise *On Drunkenness*, ch. 36: “For with the God-possessed not only is the soul wont to be stirred and goaded as it were into ecstasy, but the body also is flushed and fiery, warmed by the overflowing joy within, which passes on the sensation to the outer man, and thus many of the foolish are deceived and suppose that the sober are drunk” (*Philo in Ten Volumes*, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker for the Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968], 3:395–96).

Thomas’s last point is that “fervor” in this literal sense is at the bodily level, and so is not strictly pertinent to the perfection of the will in divine love, however much it may help the will by spurring the lower powers to obedience. It is a familiar point of spiritual theology: you neither merit nor demerit, regress or progress by your emotions or passions or any bodily states, except to the extent that they can be and actually are willed or nilled. “The more fervent do not always merit more,” i.e., those who get emotionally excited about praising God or doing works of mercy, etc., do not always will these goods with a charity equal to that of another person who may altogether lack these emotions. Indeed, it is evident that in many cases the satisfaction of following the bent of emotions would be capable of motivating someone to do or suffer something that he might not have done or suffered without them, while another person, lacking such a stimulus, may act exclusively on the belief that something is pleasing to God—even when it is contrary to the bent of emotion. Although the best of all scenarios would be the total integration of body and soul, still, short of that, the latter person will have acted with a purer intention and a fuller charity than the former.

75. The final clause is as much as to say: provided he is still a wayfarer. Once a man dies, the time of either gaining merit or losing merit is over, and the judgment is at hand.

76. This is shorthand for: charity does, in fact, permit of increase not only accidentally (in reference to something else) but also essentially (in itself), and in some souls is actually so increased.
77. Virtual quantity—how much power or ability something has for a given work—belongs not to the category of quantity but to that of quality (if we are speaking of a disposition or habit) or to that of substance (if we are speaking of the powers rooted in the essence). “Not divided by the division of essence”; it belongs to the essence of quantity, strictly speaking, that it be divisible (it is divided by division of the amount, which is its essence), whereas a virtus, whether habit or power, is simple and thus indivisible. In short, what is called virtual quantity is not, strictly speaking, a quantity at all; this is why Thomas goes on to say it is either a quality or a substantial form.

78. That is, if we would assign it to a predicament.

79. Example: a plant or animal growing larger by the conversion of food into bodily substance. Here, the very thing itself is getting bigger. See Aristotle, On the Soul II, ch. 4 (416a19–416b19); On Generation and Corruption I, ch. 5.

80. Example: when something gets bigger not because it gets bigger, but because something is added on to it, as a telephone network gets bigger not because a telephone gets bigger, but because more telephones are wired into it, or as a population gets bigger not by individuals getting larger, but by new babies being born. A house “grows” by boards added to boards, not by a small house increasing until it reaches full size. Of course, it is possible to have both kinds of increase going on simultaneously, as when a herd of animals increases both in its individuals through feeding and in its numbers through generation, but the two kinds of increase remain utterly distinct. That is why Thomas writes apropos the second kind: “in this case no part whatsoever is increased.” Fire might seem to be a case where something inanimate “grows” as if a single thing were getting bigger (hence we speak of “feeding a fire”), but in reality, the fire that is already consuming one portion of wood spreads to another portion where a new fire, continuous with the former, begins to burn. The fire “grows” inasmuch as it spreads to new fuel; hence this sense of “growth” is equivocal.

81. Aristotle speaks of the due size of animals, e.g., On the Soul II, ch. 4 (416a13–18); Physics I, ch. 4 (187b14–21); Physics III, ch. 6 (207a8–14).

82. An accidental form is not susceptible, of itself, to becoming greater or lesser. Is whiteness more or less white; hotness more or less hot? No, it is the white wall that can become darker with age or brighter with new paint, it is the hot furnace that can be stoked to a higher temperature or let alone to burn out and lose its heat in the ashes.

83. “Whiteness” changes in virtue of something else becoming more or less white. If the same surface receives a more intense whiteness, or if the area of the surface that is white increases, then we say that the whiteness increases, even though it is a simple form and a quality.

84. The argument may be expanded: it belongs to a body to be in place; but this follows from the essence of body; therefore if the body is moved to a different place, it is moved with respect to what belongs to its essence, and this motion is called “essential motion” only because it is in reference to something that belongs to the essence as such. In this case, the “being moved” is properly said not of the essence of the thing but of something conjoined to the essence. Thus, while we say that a body increases when the quantity which follows upon the essence of body is increased, nevertheless it is the quantity that increases properly speaking, and the body only on account of the quantity. In like manner, if something changes place because it gets bigger, we say that it changes place per accidens, because it increases in bulk per se and only changes place per accidens.

85. This conjoined something is either actually the same as the essence, even though its ratio (viz., “something that follows upon the essence”) is different, or it is something actually other than the essence.

86. The soul, being a substantial form, is not directly subject to this kind of motion, which occurs rather in the composite qua material. This does not mean, of course, that the physical motions are irrelevant to the soul; quite the contrary.

87. For Thomas, as this response nicely shows, there are always two relevant factors in understanding the motion of the rational creature toward God: the divine initiative and, with it, a measure of good determined by divine wisdom; the creaturely receptivity for this good, since God creates beings that have their own reality and nature, a genuine spiritual identity and freedom. A difference in either efficient or material cause makes a difference in the effect.

88. A participant is nobler by participating in a greater number of gifts, but the participation itself is nobler when it is simpler. Since therefore the participation has to be simpler to be better, if charity were increased by means of composition, its nobility as a participation of the divine goodness would decrease in
proportion to its increase in quantity. This is obviously unfitting: the greater created charity is, the more it ought to resemble its uncreated exemplar, the Holy Spirit.

89. In other words, you can add a quality to a quality only by adding a qualified thing to a qualified thing. So, if you add a gallon of white paint to a gallon of white paint, you “increase” the quality, in the sense that you have increased the amount of substance so qualified.

90. The reader should note that this passage is not to be taken as a complete account of change, but one that focuses on a kind of “pre-presence” of the form in the matter even before it has been acted upon by a particular agent. This observation is meant to ward off the false imagination of change as the dumping of a foreign item into an unrelated receptacle; change is rather the bringing forth into act of something already within the patient’s possibilities.

91. Taking “nature” in the narrower sense; cf. above, q. 1, a. 1, ad 8. The potency of the soul for grace is an “obediential potency,” such as a stone has to become a child of Abraham. For Thomas’s use of this concept, see, inter alia, De veritate, q. 8, a. 4, ad 13; q. 8, a. 12, ad 4; q. 29, a. 3, ad 3; De virt. in comm. a. 10, ad 13; for discussion by two advocates of the importance of this concept, see Steven A. Long, “Obediential Potency, Human Knowledge, and the Natural Desire for God,” International Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1997): 45–63; idem, “On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 211–37, at 213–18; Peter A. Pagan-Aguir, “St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Finality: Paradox or Mysterium Fidei?” The Thomist 64 (2000): 375–99.

92. This is a slightly odd statement, given that in the response of the very next article Thomas asserts that “an act that comes from charity is ordered to an increase of charity both in the manner of a disposition and in the manner of merit” (see also the response to the third objection of the same article, which makes the same point). It is consistent with his argumentation throughout this Distinction to hold that we do not merit grace to begin with, but we do merit its increase; hence the parallel drawn in this response is only relatively true, insofar as God’s efficiency is primary in either case.

93. Thomas’s argument: if a person, say someone at the moment of death, is given grace to perform only one act of loving God with supernatural love, that is enough to lay hold of eternal life. But laying hold of eternal life is much greater than laying hold of an increase in the intensity of a habit. Therefore, if the former is possible, the latter is possible.

94. That is, an act of charity, properly speaking, makes the soul more fit to receive an increase, and also merits such an increase de condigno.

95. For an explanation of why “nothing can be meritorious before charity is had,” see the text from In II Sent. d. 40, a. 5, translated in webnote 409.

96. In other words, however much one might dispose oneself to receive charity in the first place, or however much one might dispose oneself to (and merit) an increase in the same, one could never in fact endow oneself with that charity: it remains a divine gift, infused into the soul by God alone, and at the good pleasure of his will. To attribute to man any agency in this matter would be the error of Pelagianism.

97. Good, that is, in regard to their species, e.g., a just or temperate act—not yet salutary or meritorious, but still “morally” good, at least viewed narrowly on its own terms. This is not the global perspective that we see at other times, when the question is posed: What conception of the ultimate good, or of happiness, is leading a person onwards from choice to choice?

98. Insofar as man is passive, his acts act upon him in forming his character; that is why an act can be said to act on him.

99. The verb Thomas uses in this example is cavere, which means to hollow out or excavate, but can also mean to cut through. The example as described could be misunderstood. Thomas is not thinking that there are thousands of drops doing nothing but readying a stone to be hollowed out, while one last drop does the hollowing out. He means that it may not be every drop of water that takes away a piece of rock, but after many drops have loosened something of the surface, all it takes is one more drop to clear that bit away—to “complete the hollowing out,” as he puts it (complet cavationem). Thus all the drops are contributing to the hollowing out, not just the last one, even though it has the distinction of finishing off a certain process.

100. A fire always heats up and burns things around it according to the full capacity that that particular fire has for heating and burning; a plant always seeks to grow and flower when circumstances permit; an animal always pursues its instinctual ends with full vigor provided it is healthy. Only man can work at half capacity, make a choice against moral or intellectual growth, pursue his natural ends feebly or not at all. Ob-
viciously, this fact is yet another manifestation, though not a direct proof, of his free judgment \((liberum arbitrium)\), which flows from his intellectual nature.

101. This statement means either: (1) every act of charity is ordered to/merits an increase of charity in the sense that it merits the perfect charity of heaven—part of the perfection of the reward—in contrast to an increase of the charity of the wayfaring state, which is the first principle of meriting; or (2) some acts merit an increase of charity insofar as this increase is part of the perfecting or bringing-into-being of the reward, i.e., insofar as it is a step toward heaven. As a response, the first is much more likely here. Later on, Thomas takes the second view, and is led to hold that all acts of charity merit an increase of charity: see ST I-II, q. 114, a. 8, resp. and ad 3; II-II, q. 24, a. 4. This was among the differences noted by early Thomists: “Again, [in Book I], d. 18, q. 3, \(in \ pede\), [he says] that a man does not merit an increase of charity by every act of charity. In the \textit{Prima Secundae}, last question, a. 8, in the solution of the third argument, he says the contrary” (Gauthier, “Les ‘Articuli in quibus frater Thomas melius in Summa quam in Scriptis’,” 302, no. 6).

102. The scenario depicted here is a kind of philosophical staging of the question: Were we to abstract from the ordinary manner in which charity is infused, viz., by the sacrament of baptism, what kind of “preparation” would be required of a man such that God would deem him sufficiently “ready” for so great a perfection? Note that it is not a question of earning the grace, but of having done \textit{all} that is within his soul’s power—which, Thomas notes, is “barely enough” \((vix \ sufficit)\)—merely to lay bare the fact of his neediness and his desire for a superior life, be that desire explicit or implicit. This makes the sacrament of baptism all the more striking as a revelation of divine mercy: God, in his liberality, does \textit{everything}, as long as man has a sincere intention to let this be done to him (the man’s sanctification is a letting-be-done, not a doing of his own). The normative practice of baptizing infants underlines this truth even more dramatically. Cf. \textit{ST} III, q. 68–69.

103. The \textit{habitus scientiae} is referring to the certain knowledge of a conclusion demonstrated syllogistically from proper principles. If this act of demonstrating is truly accomplished by the intellect, then it alone suffices to generate a firm and unshakeable knowledge of the conclusion. When a student of Euclid successfully demonstrates the Pythagorean theorem (Book I, proposition 47), he has not merely brought a truth to light, he \textit{knows} that he has brought it to light. There is no longer any question about whether it may or may not be true. Well might Pythagoras have been moved to sacrifice an ox in thanksgiving. Opinion, on the other hand, where the necessary connection of two terms via a middle term is lacking, requires repetition, persuasion, and custom, and it never contains within itself the conditions for a decisive settlement.

104. If you cannot be somewhere, you have no ordering or ordination to that place, and since local motion is defined by the beginning and end of the motion \((\text{terminus a quo} \text{ and the terminus ad quem})\), it is impossible for there to \textit{be} a motion that aims at an impossible place. There might well be a motion aiming at some place short of it, but that would then be a different motion.

105. During, that is, this life of pilgrimage, when meritimg is possible.

106. In other words, a certain form can be received only to the extent that the matter is proportioned to receive it. Thus, wood is disposed to receive the form of fire univocally, such that new fire can be generated from wood, whereas water is not disposed to receive the form of fire as such, but does receive a share of fire’s effects, namely hotness and the power to burn organic matter.

107. The idea is this: foggy or smoky air blocks out, to a greater or lesser extent, the light that would otherwise shine through it. But when these “mixed vapors” are banished and all you have is plain and simple air exposed to light (say, the light of the sun), the light shines in this medium as brightly as it can, not could the air be further purified or the light further intensified. There is a \textit{natural limit} to the air’s capacity for brightness, and this limit can be reached when all obstructing factors are removed. Application is then made to the problem at hand: according to its finite nature, the soul has a finite capacity for grace or charity that could be filled up when all impediments are removed, and could not then be surpassed. Thomas, of course, rejects this argument because it rests on the error of imagining material limitations in an immaterial subject. Strictly speaking, the soul’s capacity is as infinite as the objects it is capable of knowing and loving; though its mode is finite (e.g., while the soul can apprehend the infinite, it cannot comprehend it: it can touch the infinite but not surround or exhaust it). See the reply to the first objection.

108. At \textit{In Physic.} III, lcc. 12, Thomas concludes a discussion of Averroes on infinite addition with the observation that not only can any number have \textit{some} number added to it, but any number can have \textit{any} number added to it. Hence in any and every number there is potency for infinite addition—yet still, every actual
addition will be the addition of something determinate to something determinate, yielding something determinate.

109. Any number, however great, added to any other number, however great, always generates a specific (finite) number. With each new number that comes into being by an act of addition, a new power of addition comes into being, a power to add or be added to another number. Thus, it is impossible that one should, as it were, add together “all numbers” at the same time; one can only add one number at a time, and after that, another number. Any given number has its own power, and this can be actualized by addition to another number. The new number has a new power, and so on. The application to the soul: the actual charity in a particular soul at a particular time is a finite amount, but with this finite amount goes a power of addition, i.e., potential for increase. This potential is realized by the influx of more charity. Then the capacity increases and a new power of addition is present. The process can continue indefinitely in a state of meriting, even as the addition of numbers can increase indefinitely. For the soul as for the numbers, every new actual item involves a potency for a finite addition.

110. malum culpae, a voluntary evil or sin (sometimes called “moral evil”), as opposed to a malum poenae, an evil of punishment suffered by the sinner (sometimes called “natural evil” or “physical evil”). On the two kinds of evils, cf. In II Sent. d. 35, a. 1 and d. 37, q. 3, a. 2: STI, q. 48, aa. 5–6.

111. That is, if one considers the successive conditions of a man who has lost charity by mortal sin and afterwards is restored to a lesser charity than he had before, one could speak, albeit loosely, of an “essential decrease” in the amount of charity.

112. In other words, it is not only the works that are affected if we stop using acquired habits, but the habits themselves are affected; they lose strength and firmness. With charity, if we were to stop doing works of charity we would lose those opportunities to be further likened to the divine goodness, but this would in no way lessen the strength or firmness of the habit in itself, since it derives these qualities from God, not from the exercise of the will.

113. Meaning: should the end aimed at be incompatible with the specifying end at which charity aims, i.e., the divine goodness and happiness as the common good of spiritual creatures.

114. The exact contrast between mortal and venial sin as regards adherence to the last end is brought out well in a later text from the Scriptum, namely In II Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 4 (Mandonnet, 1060–61): “Now sin can be imperfect [i.e., can fail to be sin in the fullest sense of the word] in two ways: (1) either from the genus of the act, or (2) from the side of the one who sins.

“(1) Now the genus of an act is taken from the matter and from the [moral] object; hence as something is said to be good according to its genus on account of due matter, so it is said to be evil according to its genus on account of sundae matter; and a sin is venial according to its genus on account of the matter in which one sins. Now sin is found perfectly in that matter in which, if one should sin [in its regard], the virtue of charity for God and for neighbor is destroyed—that virtue through which the soul has life. And therefore when someone sins in those things that must be rightly kept if man’s subjection to God and the bond [foedus] of human society is to remain, then the sin is mortal according to its genus. (Such sins the Philosopher calls ‘wickedness’; accordingly he holds that not every unvirtuous act is wicked [non omnis vitiosus sit malus].) For example, it is evident that man cannot be duly subject to God if he does not believe [in] God, if he does not obey him, and the like. Similarly, the society of human life could not be preserved unless what belongs to each man were safeguarded as his own [nisi unicumque servaretur quod suum est], and therefore theft and other kinds of injustice are mortal sins according to their genus; and it is the same in all other such cases. Those things, however, that are not necessary for the preservation of human society [but pertain rather to its well-being] do not make a sin mortal according to its genus, although it too is a deformed act—for example, needless frivolity [superflus ludus], and other things of this kind. Such things are said to be venial according to their genus. But as that which is good according to its genus can be done badly, whereas the converse cannot happen, so too that which is venial according to its genus can be done in such a way that it will be mortal, as, for example, if that which is venial be thought to be mortal, or if someone delights so much in a temporal thing that he places his end in it; for in so acting, due reverence is not preserved for God, who is the last end, and below whom [i.e., after and in order to whom] all things are to be loved.

“(2) On the part of the sinner, the imperfection of sin is due to the imperfection of the power eliciting the act—for example, as the first motions of sensuality, which precede [reason’s] deliberation, are venial sins, even if the matter to which they pertain is matter for mortal sin [quamvis in materia sint mortalis peccati]. But
these [motions] are venial per accidens; and therefore if the consent of deliberate reason is given to them, they become mortal."

115. In which case the contrary is not apt to come to be, since the subject would be apt to exclude it. Water, being of itself without a definite temperature but able to be hot or cold, is indifferently disposed to hotness and coldness; and so, hotness and coldness are apt to come to be in regard to water as a subject. On the other hand, they are not apt to come to be in regard to fire, because fire is naturally hot; hence, since hotness is naturally in fire, fire naturally excludes coldness. The general principle enunciated is therefore shown to be incomplete unless a qualifying phrase is added about the character of the subject: contraries are apt to come to be in regard to the same subject when, and to the extent that, it is indifferently disposed to either.

116. And thus, our failure to act, or our acting badly, either retards the process of being disposed for receiving charity in the first place, or causes a lesser advancement than was possible.

117. This discussion of venial and mortal sin parallels a number of other texts in which Aquinas affirms the equivocation of the term “sin” when speaking of mortal sin, which extinguishes the life of grace in the soul, and venial sin, which does not so extinguish it, but places obstacles in the way of its growth. Cf. SCG III, ch. 139; end; ch. 143; ST I-II, q. 71, a. 4; q. 72, a. 5; qq. 88–89; II-II, q. 24, aa. 10–12; III, q. 87. At In IV Sent. d. 16, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 2 (Moos, 784, §92), we get an explanation of why one cannot set up the proportion “mortal sin is to charity as venial sin is to charity’s fervor”: “Any mortal sin is opposed to even the very least charity, whereas not any venial sin is opposed to any fervor of charity. For charity’s ‘fervor’ is spoken of by way of likeness, inasmuch as charity spills over onto external things, as it were by boiling over [secundum quod ad exteriores quodammodo ebuliando reflectitur]. Now charity’s fervor makes no appearance in that matter in which venial sin is committed, but [what one sees instead is] something apart from charity [praeter caritatem]. Hence although [in a certain person] there is fervor of charity with respect to some things, there can still be lukewarmness with respect to others; and thus, not any fervor is opposed to any venial sin. Hence the comparison of mortal sin to charity is not the same as the comparison of venial sin to charity’s fervor.” The idea seems to be that the more fervent the one who has charity is, the more readily and spontaneously will his habit of charity be able to express itself in actions calling upon all his powers.

118. Although we come to be aware of first principles by formulating them to ourselves in terms of experience gained through the senses, we do not acquire the principles from the sense-data, much less verify them by looking back to these data, but rather, the principles are virtually contained in the very power of intellect, are put there by the Creator, and need only to be activated. The parallel with charity: while a man can dispose himself to receive charity by, for example, calming his passions and living according to reason, charity itself is not acquired in this way, nor does its being rely, directly, on a particular condition of the passions or reason, but rather it is infused into the will by God, and remains fixed as long as the will itself does not posit a contrary end. The unlikeness between the two cases is also obvious: the certainty of first principles can never be destroyed, whereas charity can be destroyed by mortal sin.

119. That is, if per impossibile one could have the gift of charity without having the Holy Spirit, this would not be enough in order meritoriously to fulfill the commandments or to love Christ. But in reality, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit follows upon the infusion of the habit of charity, so that it is possible, by means of the habit as well as the personal presence of the Spirit, to do these things.

120. Lombard’s attempted response relies on an equivocation in the preposition ab. The Holy Spirit is given by himself, but not from himself (for the latter would mean that he comes from himself, which is inadmissible).

121. Since he holds that charity is a habit that perfects the will, Thomas is speaking of lumen not as a specifically intellectual perfection but as a way of referring to a divine gift in general; cf. the comparable phrasing in the Paris version, d. 17, q. 1, a. 4, obj. 5: Caritas est quoddam lumen spiritualis, ut habetur I Ioan. 2, 10: «Qui diliget fratrem, in lumen manet»), or in the same article, ad 5, caritas creat vel increata est lux. The scriptural background is certainly 1 Jn. 2:10 (‘he who loves his brother remains in the light [in lumen],” on which Thomas comments in the exposito textus at the end of d. 17, q. 1 [Paris version]; cf. p. 29), but probably also Jas. 1:17: “Every good giving and every perfect gift is from above, descending from the Father of lights [a Patre lumi- nium], with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.” A few lines below, Thomas speaks simply of aliquid supernaturale.

122. One may restate the argument this way. The will has a natural appetite for or inclination to the good as such, the bonum universale. God is this good. Because of what he is, he naturally moves the will.
there is no need to posit an additional perfection in the will by which it would be moved to him as its good.

123. A slightly odd argument, inasmuch as it seems to imply that the only reason or the main reason for the virtue of charity is to remove impediments to the will’s natural activity, whereas Thomas consistently teaches that charity superelevates the will to an end that is not its own by nature. In other words, the question of impediments is quite irrelevant to the question of the end as such. Man does not have the sharing of God’s own beatitude as his natural end, period; hence, a fortiori, there is one great impediment: its natural impossibility. Perhaps, then, this is what Thomas means: our will is held back from tending to God by many impediments—the greatest being the very difference in nature between God and the creature, the least being something like disordered concupiscence—and so a virtue is given through which the way to God, shown in faith, is cleared for appetite.

124. That is, when charity is defined, it is defined in tandem with the other theological virtues. Hence it ought to be the same kind of thing they are.

125. That is, it is not unfitting that a created finite power should join us to God in regard to activity (“act” here includes its principle, the infused habit) rather than by nature. God does not become what you are, but rather the object of your acting. If charity’s purpose was (somehow) to make one identical to God, then it would have to be an infinite power—but this is impossible anyhow.

126. The important point seems to be the distinction between formal and agent causality and the corresponding distinction of means. Anything “by which” a thing is (or comes to be or is done) can be called a means, and thus, anything by which something is, as by a form, can be a formal means. Hence, because charity is that by which formally the soul is made holy or just, it can be called a means of sanctification or justification. Similarly, substantial form, as well as esse (which is most formal of all), as that by which formally a thing is, can be called a “means of creation.” Thus, for example, that which makes a horse to be a horse, its quiddity, would be a medium formale in the work of creation, to which grace or charity—that which makes a soul pleasing to God—would be an analogous medium formale in the work of redemption. Another point is also thereby made: while the formal means by which God justifies man is an accidental form infused into the soul as subject, there is no means on the side of the agent: even as God creates by himself, he justifies by himself.

127. The editors of the critical text note that this argument is reproduced nearly verbatim in De uirt. in comm., a. 11, arg. 8. As this set of questions was disputed at the end of Thomas’s second period of teaching in Paris (i.e., 1271–72), perhaps we can see in this a (conscious or unconscious) “recycling” of material from the abandoned Roman version of the Sentences, which was undertaken in 1265–66.

128. Cf. Jn. 3:34–35 (RSV): “For he whom God has sent utters the words of God, for it is not by measure that he gives the Spirit; the Father loves the Son, and has given all things into his hand.”

129. A deft phrase: quod non facit magis album sed maius album—the addition does not make it more white, but gives you more of white. Thomas has in mind putting two white surfaces next to each other: you get a larger amount of white, but the whiteness in each part remains what it was. The issue is handled in a quite similar way at De uirt. in comm., a. 11, ad 10.

130. Thomas’s argument depends on a close reading of the message to Ephesus in Rev. 2:1–7. Although this church is reproved—“But I have this against you, that you have abandoned the love you had at first. Remember then from what you have fallen, repent and do the works you did at first” (2:4–5a, RSV)—she is also, indeed first of all, praised: “I know your works, your toil and your patient endurance, and how you cannot bear evil men . . . ; I know you are enduring patiently and bearing up for my name’s sake, and you have not grown weary” (2:2–3; v. 6 mentions a second time, with approval, the Ephesians’ hatred for heresy). Thus, from the tenor of the passage, one must conclude that the Ephesian church is still “in a state of grace,” still possessed of charity, but deficient in comparison with an earlier state; she has lost something she had before.

131. In the Book of Numbers, chapter 11, Moses has cried out in distress to the Lord about the wearisome complaints and demands of the Israelites, admitting that he is unable to carry the burden of governing them by himself. The Lord answers: “Gather for me seventy men of the elders of Israel . . . . And I will take some of the spirit which is upon you and put it upon them; and they shall bear the burden of the people with you, that you may not bear it yourself alone” (Num. 11:16–17, RSV). The sharing out of authority then takes place (cf. Num. 11:24–25).

132. Since the responses to these objections are lacking in the MS, it may be valuable to note that Thom-
as offers an interpretation of Num. 11:17 in the \textit{expositio textus} at the end of \textit{In I Sent. d. 18} (Mandonnet, 448), which reads thus: “I will take of your spirit’ (Num. 11:17). This is not said because the grace had by Moses himself was lessened as regards the status of the habit; it was lessened rather as regards its care-burdened use, when others [viz., the seventy] were deputed to give aid to him. ‘Of his spirit,’ moreover, it [viz., the Holy Spirit] is said to be bestowed on them, not because the person of the Holy Spirit is divisible, or because the habit of grace can be divided and transferred from one subject to another subject, but because they received a lesser grace than Moses had, and for the purpose of performing similar tasks, and as if their grace were propagated from that of Moses, insofar as he had imperated such a grace for them by his prayers.”

133. This is a subtly phrased line. Thomas is not, of course, describing the venial sinner as one who treats something that ought simply to be a “means” as if it were the ultimate end, since that is precisely the definition of a mortal sinner; but rather, that such a person is too much attached to something insofar as it is a \textit{true} but \textit{intermediate} end. That is, every choice-worthy object is something good in itself, but only God is the supreme and perfect good from whom, and for whom, all other (finite) goods exist. Hence, it is impossible to will anything without willing it as a good in some sense, but it is possible to will it as a partial good ordered to a more complete good; and this is to will it virtuously. If, however, one “lingers” over its share of goodness, its end-character, such that one is negligent about moving ahead to the definitive goal of life, one has committed a venial sin. Consider this text from \textit{In IV Sent. d. 16, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 2} (Moos, 789, §119): “Venial sin does not consist in a man’s \textit{habitually} loving God less, because venial sin does not lessen charity [as such], otherwise at some time it would take it away altogether; but it consists rather in this, that the love of God is not shown in every single human act, with some inordinateness \textit{[deordinatione]} existing in them.” But if one actually \textit{takes} the partial good as the total good, one commits a mortal sin. See the text from \textit{In II Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 4} (translated in webnote 114).

\textit{WEBNOTES FOR BOOK II}

134. That is, without the help of a supernatural gift of grace to elevate them above their natural powers, would the angels still have loved God above themselves, etc.?


136. On God as the liberal giver (and, furthermore, the Holy Spirit as the \textit{ratio} of all gifts), see \textit{In I Sent. d. 18, a. 3} (Mandonnet, 441–42): “It should be said that something is said to be ‘given’ in many ways. Sometimes it is given from that which is proper to nature, as we say that fire gives its heat and sun its splendor; and will is not the principle of this giving. At other times, a thing is given from the will as the principle of giving, and this happens in two ways. For sometimes through the giving some utility of the one giving is intended, either with respect to the removal of evil (as when something is given out of fear, and such a giving is called ‘redeeming’) or with respect to the acquisition of some good (and such a giving is properly a ‘seeking’ or ‘selling’). But sometimes no utility is intended for the giver, and this kind of giving is called ‘liberal,’ and is properly called ‘donation.’ Now, it is evident that the kind of giving in which the utility of the giver
is intended never belongs to God; accordingly he is called 'liberal' in a singular way. For in all other givers some utility for the one giving is intended, whether a temporal or a spiritual good; hence, as Avicenna says, no giving is purely liberal except for God’s giving and activity. But the ratio of liberal giving is love, which, as Dionysius says, moves superior things to provide for those having less; and since the Holy Spirit is love, he himself is the ratio of all of those gifts of which the principle is the divine will—as are all things given to creatures."

In the same article, ad 4: “Although all gifts both natural and gratuitous are given to us by God through love, which is the first gift, nevertheless love itself is not given in all gifts, but only in the gift that is the likeness of that love, namely, in the gift of charity. For when it is said that other gifts are given through the gift of love that is the Holy Spirit, the preposition ‘through’ does not refer to a cause on the part of the recipient, so that the sense would be: Through this (viz., that he receives the gift of love) he receives the other gifts; but refers to the manner of causing on the part of the Giver, who through this (viz., that he loves his creature) gives all gifts.”

137. In other words, the ultimate term of their love would be not the divine good but rather themselves, and in this way their love, going out to the divine good, would return back to themselves as the term. The argument is couched in terms of pleasure because pleasure is not a result of the good in itself, but of the good’s being acquired by us.

138. If we follow the text of the Leonine ed., a text that makes more sense, Thomas is saying that only between virtuous persons can there be true friendship; if we follow the text of the Mandonnet ed., he would be saying that although a virtuous man loves another because that other is like something he loves in himself, nevertheless there is still a true friendship (the principle of similitudo does not cancel out the lover’s extasis).

139. That is, the created spirit is moved to loving God by virtue of the likeness to God that comes about through grace.

140. It can be challenging to find just the right words in English for the important concept of honestas or the honestum. Honestas is the kind of goodness that deserves honor or appreciation just because of what it is; the honestum is the worthy, the noble, the spiritually beautiful or decorous. See ST II-II, q. 145 for a full treatment. Thomas’s point here is that the better the friendship, the more each friend concerns himself with the other and with doing noble things together, and the less each one looks to (in the sense of focusing on or being motivated by) the benefits the relationship brings to him, such as growth in virtue. Gallagher argues that the distinction between actual and habitual willing is decisive in the solution to the problem of love (“Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love,” 43); source texts for this last point include ST II-II, q. 19, a. 10; I-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3; De veritate, q. 22, a. 5, ad 11. Massoulié drives home the same point: “A soul in the transports and ardors of love does not actually think of the possession of the good under the aspect of its own good; but by simply following love’s inclination it tends toward the beloved” (cited by Garrigou-Lagrange, The Love of God, 1:81).

141. Cf. ST I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.

142. There are certain ends that have their existence only in a person, as accidents perfecting him. These can be loved only with love of concupiscence. Other goods, while perfective when attained, subsist in themselves and are always superior to their participants, insomuch as participation involves acquiring a likeness to such a good. These goods can be loved on account of themselves, even as they exist in and of themselves.

143. In other words, a natural good such as knowledge, justice, or beauty does not, in and of itself, become less good after sin. It is not harmed as far as its integrity is concerned: the knowledge is still knowledge, and so on. However, the manner in which such goods are obtained and used in the state of sin becomes perverted because they lack the ordering influence of grace and the virtues.

144. Paul continues (1 Cor. 9:11–14): “If we have sown spiritual good among you, is it too much if we reap your material benefits? If others share this rightful claim upon you, do not we still more? Nevertheless, we have not made use of this right, but we endure anything rather than put an obstacle in the way of the gospel of Christ. Do you not know that those who are employed in the temple service get their food from the temple, and those who serve at the altar share in the sacrificial offerings? In the same way, the Lord commanded that those who proclaim the gospel should get their living by the gospel. But I have made no use of any of these rights, nor am I writing this to secure any such provision.”

145. The exact reference is not clear. It may be to the following statement: “The divine being [esse] is proper and determinate, not owing to the addition of something constricting it [as matter individuates material things], but by the negation of all potency of addition [omni addibilitatis]; hence it is said in the Book of
Causes that pure goodness is its own individuation” (In II Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, end of resp.; Mandonnet, 90–91).

146. In other words, as stated in the first paragraph, each thing has its own proper end, through which it participates in the last end. The will participates in the last end by loving it, and therefore love is the proper end of the will, through which the will participates in the last end.

147. It is not enough to first think about and intend the end, or even intend that the following actions be for the sake of the end; the consequent actions have to be objectively appropriate means to the end. The point being made in this reply is fleshed out at In II Sent. d. 40, a. 5, ad 6 (Mandonnet, 1027): “It should be said that a merely [omnino] habitual ordering of an act to God does not suffice; for one merits, not by what is [merely] in habit, but by what one actually does. Nevertheless it is not necessary that an actual intention ordering an act to the last end always be united to any action that is directed to a proximate end; it suffices that at some time all those ends be actually referred to the last end, as happens when someone thinks to direct his whole self to the love of God [se totum ad Dei dilectionem]; for then whatever he [afterwards] orders to himself will be ordered to God. And if one asks when an act must be referred to the last end, one is asking nothing other than when the habit of charity must go out into act. For whenever the habit of charity goes out into act, it effects the ordering of the whole man to the last end, and consequently [the ordering] of all those things that are ordered to him as goods for him.”

Helpful, too, is the same article’s reply ad 3 (Mandonnet, 1026–27): “Not only is the act of charity meritorious, but so are the acts of other virtues too, insofar as they are informed by grace—although they cannot be meritorious except insofar as they are led back to charity’s end. It is not necessary, however, for acts always to be led back [directly] to that end; it suffices for the efficacy of meriting if they are actually led back to the ends of the other virtues. For it is certain that the one who intends to preserve chastity, even if he is not thinking at all about charity, merits if he has grace. But every act tending to some good, if it does not tend inordinately to that good, has as its end the good of some virtue, since virtues sufficiently perfect man in regard to all the things that can be goods for man [bona hominis]. And so it is evident that the argument [according to which acts not explicitly directed toward or against love’s end are morally indifferent] does not follow.”

148. Obviously, Thomas is referring to those who, like St. Paul, seek or would seek temporal goods only with a view to carrying out better the spiritual tasks entrusted to them. He is well aware of, and often castigates, the sin of seeking temporal goods under cover of piety or social status.

149. See the more detailed discussion of charity as the form, end, and mover of all virtues (In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 3, at p. 165), as well as the contrast between the way in which obedience can be called ma-
ter omnium virtutum and the way in which charity is so named (In II Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6, translated in webnote 279). Thomas maintains that a Christian merits by a virtuous act even when it is ordered only to its originating virtue, with charity functioning, as it were, in the background (In II Sent. d. 40, a. 5, ad 3, translated in webnote 147).

150. Operationem perfectam here has to be taken in the sense of accomplished, completed, finished, not in the moral sense of an activity that ought to have been done. So, a perverse action brought to completion brings its perpetrator some pleasure, though it is a morally disordered one, while a good action interrupted fails to deliver its full measure of delight, though it may be salutary due to the intention. Indeed, it is clear that the structure of action, which involves a relationship between the end and things done with a view to the end, is weighted in such a way that the agent wants the latter precisely as leading to the former, which he most of all loves and in the possession of which he delights.

WEBNOTES FOR BOOK III

151. Thomas has in mind the diversification of habits by their formal objects; this is why we have several sciences for the several kinds of objects that can be known. Similarly, differences in the objects of the will diversify virtues, e.g., commutative justice with respect to other men, religion with respect to God.

152. He does not need a virtue for the (naturally given) end, felicity, but only for those activities that are undertaken with a view to attaining this end—namely, all voluntary actions, according to their diverse species.

153. Both the affinity and the contrast between acquired virtues and theological virtues is brought out in
an earlier text, *In II Sent.* d. 41, q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet, 1035), which directly addresses the question of the ultimate end of man and how the virtues make that to be an end in which someone really participates: “*To* order something to an end happens in two ways: either by presenting the end, or by inclining to the end. To present the end is the work of reason, while to incline to the end is the work of the will—for love, in which the act of the will is expressed, is like a certain weight of the soul, according to Augustine. But reason cannot present the end perfectly except insomuch as it is perfected by a habit; likewise the will cannot incline perfectly to the end except insomuch as it is perfected by a habit. Now the ‘end’ of human acts can be taken in two ways: either the proper and proximate end [of a given act], or the common and last end [of all acting]; and the latter end is twofold. (1) For it may exceed nature’s ability [*facilitatem naturae*], as the future happiness in the fatherland [so exceeds it]. And faith directs to this end by presenting it, while charity directs to this end by inclining to it (as any natural form inclines to its end); for natural power [*naturalis potentia*], either by itself or perfected by a natural or acquired habit, is not sufficient to direct [a man] to this end. And since this end is [really] the last end, all other ends are ordered to it; and, therefore faith and charity are said to direct the intention universally in all things. (2) Whereas [if we consider the ordering] to the common end proportioned to human ability, it is reason that gives direction by presenting the end. [And this occurs] when reason is perfected by the habit of acquired wisdom (the act of which is contemplative happiness, as is said in *Ethics* X) or [when reason is] perfected by the habit of prudence (the act of which is civic happiness); while the appetitive power, insomuch as it is perfected by the habits of the moral virtues, directs [a man] to this end by inclining to it.”

154. A helpful clarification of why there must be more than one virtue bearing directly upon God, and in particular why two (faith and charity) are complemented by a third (hope), comes in *In III Sent.* d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 1 (Moos, 839, §117): “The object of all the theological virtues is the same in reality, but differs in ratio. It is the object of faith insomuch as it is the first truth; the object of charity insomuch as it is the supreme good; and the object of hope insomuch as it is the highest arduous [good]. And since beatitude names most of all the arduous (for it is a state complete with the aggregation of all good things, as Boethius says), beatitude is placed especially in the definition of hope. Now virtues and powers do not differ according to the real difference of their objects, but according to diverse *rationes* of them—indeed, these *rationes* formally complete the object itself.” Thus, while God is absolutely one and simple in himself, he is for us an object in different ways: we act toward him under different aspects. This testifies not to his complexity but to ours.

155. Note that in this reply *sapientia* refers to the supreme intellectual virtue, first defined by the philosophers and then applied to the summit of knowledge, theology (for this usage, see, e.g., *In I Sent.* Prol., q. 1, a. 3; *ST* I, q. 1, a. 6 and I-II, q. 57, a. 2), and not to the gift of the Holy Spirit called by the same name, since this latter involves judging and ordering all things in light of an intimate acquaintance with God himself (cf. *In III Sent.* d. 34, q. 1, a. 2; *ST* I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3; II-II, q. 46).

156. Distinguishing between that about which (the material) and that for the sake of which (the purpose), as Thomas teaches, religion and all the virtues annexed to it (cf. *ST* II-II, qq. 81–100) do not have God himself as their object, but various created things that man uses with a view to honoring, petitioning, or obeying God. Though God (or better, God’s being God) is the reason why man prays, adores, offers sacrifice, and so on, the proper *matter* of these activities is something done or given by man (cf. II-II, q. 81, a. 1, ad 1; ibid., aa. 5–7).

157. Although there are many divine attributes according to our lowly way of knowing the simple divine being, the only attributes that are “relevant” to the wayfarer are those in regard to which he must be properly ordered so as to be able to attain God himself in beatitude. These are, in brief, God’s truth, God’s goodness, and God’s mercy.

158. The argument here is fleshed out at *In III Sent.* d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 1 (Moos, 838–39, §115–§116): “As was said above [in d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 5], the theological virtues are [given to us] to order us to the last end. Now for someone to begin to act for an end, he must first know that end, and second desire it. But since the will inclines to both possible and impossible things, and someone does not act for the sake of that which cannot be attained (even if he desires it), in order for the will to begin to act it must tend to that thing as possible; and this inclination of the will tending to the eternal good as possible to it by grace is the act of hope. And therefore hope is something distinct from faith and from charity; for faith gives knowledge of the end inasmuch as it shows that the end is *good*, and in that way arises the movement of charity, while inasmuch as it shows the end to be *possible*, in that way arises the movement of hope. For faith is the foundation of all the virtues, preceding them all according to the natural order of acts.”

159. In the phrase *caritas coniungit quodammodo realiter Deo*, the *quodammodo* is to be taken with *realiter*, the
point being that while each theological virtue joins us to God—faith by unifying our intellect to his proper truth, hope by filling our will with confidence of his immediate help—there is a sense in which charity alone “really” unites us to his very goodness as belonging to us (and so, as constituting our beatitude). To have supernatural knowledge of God is to have faith, but this does not imply the close affective union of charity— one can have knowledge “at a distance,” but one can be a friend only when there is a “mutual inherence” (cf. ST I-II, q. 28, a. 2, on *mutua inhaesio*). Thomas repeats this point in d. 23, q. 2, a. 5, ad 3: “Hope and charity are closer to the end as regards the obtaining of it, because charity, in a certain way, attains the end [in itself]. Hence from this fact it cannot be deduced that they are prior to faith according to [their] nature, but rather they follow after it, because it shows the end to them.” For fuller discussion, see ST II-II, q. 23, a. 6; cf. I-II, q. 66, a. 6; II-II, q. 30, a. 4; *Super Col.* 3, lec. 3.

160. The idea of “receiving consummation” seems to include both being perfected in relation to a last or comprehensive good, and coming into possession of this last end, in the manner appropriate to the power in question.


162. The various virtues differ in ratio due to their subjects and their objects, not due to their common ordering to the last end. Hence, the virtue (charity) that functions as a generic form to all the virtues is not the form that can give a specific identity to any of the other virtues, and in that sense neither can it function as the formative principle of a power with regard to an object other than charity’s proper object. Thus, the intellect is made to assent to divine truth by a perfection specifically of the intellect, i.e., faith. There is something about this perfection of intellect that is irreducible to, and indeed prior to, the perfection of the will known as charity. The latter’s formative role is exercised on a power already well-equipped for its own proper act. (Thus, there can be no charity without faith, though there can be faith without charity.)

163. In other words, to the vice of rashness there is opposed either the virtue of bravery or the opposite vice of cowardice. The argument depends on knowing already that faith in divine truth, regardless of any other circumstances, can never be a vice, and so, since there is a vice opposed to it, it must be a virtue.

164. For example, by believing that mortal sin is an offense that cuts one off from God, but then failing to seek to get out of the state of unformed faith and into the state of formed faith through sacramental confession. Such a person would have accurate knowledge about what is to be done, but would not be doing that which is in the power of his free will to do.

165. The exact distinction between *credere Deum*, *credere in Deum*, and *credere Deo* is discussed in d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2, response (Moos, p. 727, §148–§149; see webnote 167). There, the second phrase is explained thus: “Due to the fact that the intellect [in believing] is determined by the will, under this aspect the act of faith is ‘to believe unto God,’ that is, to stretch out to him by loving; for to love belongs to the will.”

166. A distinction often invoked by St. Thomas; see, for example, ST I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3; II-II, q. 141, a. 1, ad 1; *In IV Sent.* d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5. “Natural species” is not to be taken, of course, in the modern sense of a biological species, but in the sense of an external or physical description of an act—“what happened,” in contrast to “what was freely done.” Hence, the examples are clear. If both a criminal and an innocent man were hanged, objectively the same thing has been done to each, but the hanging of the criminal is (or could be) morally good while the hanging of the innocent was (and can only be) morally bad. If, on the other hand, the hanging of a thief and giving him lashes are objectively different punishments, yet both are (or could be) morally good.

167. The reference is to d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2, response (Moos, p. 727, §148–§149), where St. Thomas explains how one and the same act of faith admits of three descriptions—*credere Deum, credere in Deum*, and *credere Deo*—in reference to the three powers on which it depends. As he writes in the response: “The act of believing depends on three things: on the intellect, which is terminated in one; on the will, which through its command determines the intellect; on reason, which inclines the will. And according to this [dependency], three acts are assigned to faith,” etc. To the first objection there he replies: “Through all the aforesaid, only one complete act of faith is named, but owing to different things found in faith, it is named in different ways. For by that act by which it believes *God*, it believes in *God* and *unto God*.”

168. In other words, a Christian who still has the gift of faith, even if he has lost charity, has this gift more firmly than any acquired habit. When he is restored to charity through repentance, those acquired habits are not thereby obliterated; much less, then, the unformed faith he had.
169. Both the power (intellect) and the object (the first truth) determine the species of this habit.

170. That is, just as the same habit of faith remains at the coming of charity while its defect of uniformedness is taken away because the habit is properly directed to the divine goodness loved, so the habit of fear also remains in the believer, but its defect—namely, the servility by which God was feared in the way that a master is feared by a slave—is taken away because the master is now the friend, the beloved (see ST I-II, q. 67, a. 4, ad 2; II-II, q. 7, a. 1). As Thomas will write a little later, In III Sent. d. 34, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3, sc. 2 (Moos, 1148, §215): “Freedom is incompatible with slavery. But when charity comes, it brings freedom, for ‘where the Spirit of the Lord is’—the Spirit who cannot be apart from charity—‘there is freedom’ (2 Cor 3:17). Therefore servile fear is driven out when charity comes.”

171. For clarification of this idea, see In I Sent. d. 17 (Paris version), q. 2, a. 1, ad 3 (p. 36) and especially De uestitate q. 14, a. 7, ad 3.

172. The entire article, taking its bearings from the definition of Pseudo-Dionysius, focuses on union or unification as the most distinctive “trait” of love, as does ST I-II, q. 28, a. 1, where a phrase from the same definition functions as the sed contra. Other texts on love and union: ST I, q. 20, a. 1, ad 3; I-II, q. 25, a. 2, ad 2.

173. St. Thomas has already touched on this definition back at In I Sent. d. 10, on the Holy Spirit as love (ut amor). In article 3, on whether the Holy Spirit may be called the union of Father and Son (unio Patris et Filii), he gives as the sed contra argument: “Against this is what Dionysius says: ‘When we speak of love, whether divine, angelic, intellectual, animal, or natural, we mean a unitive and concretive power.’ But the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father of the Father and of the Son; therefore he is their union. This is also seen from the authority of the Apostle in Eph. 4:3: ‘solicitous to preserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace’; and so, love has the ratio of a bond and a connection [vinceli et nexae]” (Mandonnet, 265). The elaboration of this idea in the response of the same article is crucial background for the present discussion: “It should be said that love always signifies ponit [a complacencia of the lover in the loved. But whenever someone takes pleasure in something, he transports himself into that other and joins himself to it as much as he can, so that the other might become his own; and it is for this reason that love has the ratio of uniting the lover and the loved. Thus, because of the way in which the Holy Spirit proceeds, namely as love, he is the union of the Father and the Son. For the Father and the Son can be considered either insofar as they have the same essence, and from that vantage, they are united in essence; or insofar as they are distinguished in Person, and from that vantage, they are united by the consonance of love. For if it were posited per impossibile that they were not one by essence, it would be necessary for their perfect joy that a union of love be understood to be in them” (In I Sent. d. 10, a. 3: Mandonnet, 266). For comments on this text and the conceptual limitations of its approach as Thomas came to see them over time, see Torrell, Spiritual Master, 183–88.

174. Thomas uses the word transformatio with exactness, for he has just analyzed the manner in which a passive power is shaped, determined, by a form received into it; thus any process in which something unformed becomes formed can be conceived of as the passing over of a form into a subject as yet unformed, with the result that the formed can be said to be transformed into the agent of this process—gaining in some way the agent’s own form. For discussion of the language of “appetitive formation” so dominant in this article and throughout the Distinctions on love, see Durand, “Au principe de l’amour: formatio ou propterio?” and Michael S. Sherwin, By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 64–81, where the problematic aspects of this early approach are carefully discussed.

175. Usually rendered “one spirit with him,” though St. Paul simply writes “one spirit.” A text worth considering in connection with this citation of 1 Cor. 6:17 is found at the beginning of the response of In I Sent. d. 10, a. 4 (Mandonnet, 267) on the reasons for the proper name of the third divine Person: “It should be said that ‘spirit’ is a name imposed to signify the subtility of a nature; hence, it is said of both bodily and non-bodily things. For air is called ‘spirit’ on account of its subtility, whence an animal’s taking in and expulsion of air is called ‘inspiration’ and ‘respiration’; wind, too, is called ‘spirit’, and even those most subtle vapors through which the soul’s powers are diffused throughout the parts of the body are called ‘spirits’. Likewise, non-bodily things, owing to their subtility, are called ‘spirits’, as we call God and an angel and a soul each a ‘spirit’. And from this, moreover, comes our manner of saying that two human beings who love each other and are of one heart [concordes] are ‘of one spirit’ or ‘together in spirit’ [conspiratos], just as we also say that they are one heart and one soul, for, as is said in Ethicus IX, ‘it is proper to friends to be one soul in two bodies.’”
176. Implicit in this analysis of love is a conclusion reached explicitly in ST I-II, q. 28, a. 6, namely, that love is the cause of all that the lover does.

177. The contrast drawn between a union of thing to affection and a union of thing to thing—sometimes styled “affective union” and “real union” respectively—is similar to a contrast Thomas draws at the beginning of Book I (In I Sent. d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, ad 5; Mandonnet, 44) between the resting of desire in a union of wills with God and the resting of one’s whole appetite motion in the union of possession: “Rest is of two sorts, namely the rest of desire and the rest of motion [i.e., desire at rest and motion at rest]. Desire is at rest when desire makes a stand in something for the sake of which it does and seeks all things, and desires nothing further; and it is in this way that the just man’s will rests in God, even while he is a wayfarer. Motion is at rest when the destination one seeks after is reached; and the will’s rest in the fatherland will be of this kind. Now this rest brings about perfect enjoyment, but the first rest brings about imperfect enjoyment.”

178. That is, if he hates his own intemperance, this implies some love and longing for the opposite condition. Hence he will be attracted to a temperate person and put off by others who are like himself as he presently is. What he is and what he wants to be are at odds.

179. An example of this last point would be the relationship of soul and body according to Thomas’s understanding: the soul “comes to the innermost” of the body, being wholly present to the whole and to each part, giving rise to each power (cf. SCG II, ch. 72; ST I, q. 76, a. 8); indeed, it would be truer to say that the body is present to the soul and even “contained” by it (cf. ST I, q. 8, a. 1; ST I, q. 76, a. 3; above all, In IV Sent. d. 44, a. 2, qa. 1, resp.). In this way the formed is present in or to the form.

180. See Giles Forcellini, Totius Latinitatis Lexicon, ed. Joseph Furlanetto and Vincent De Vit (Prati: Alberguettus, 1865), s.v. iecur, 3:353–54. The entry says: “nomen visceris maximi in animalibus latentis originis . . . proprie est viscus animalium maximum in dextra parte sub praecordiis situm,” and quotes Isidore of Seville: “nomen habet eo quod ignis ibi habeat sedem,” and Cicero: “cerebrum, cor, pulmones, iecur: haec enim sunt domicilia vitae.” It would seem to make little difference for the point Thomas is making whether one identifies the liver, the heart, or the innards (viscera), as the seat of the passions, inasmuch as medieval physiology often attributed to these organs or this region the same set of functions. Thomas holds that blood is generated in the liver and that the heart is the instrumentum passionum animae (ST I-II, q. 48, a. 2 and ad 1); the heart is also at the center of the blood system: per sanguinem in corde generatum vitalis operatio in omnia membra diffunditur (In IV Sent. d. 11, exp. text.; Moos, 489, §325). In the Prologue of Super Ieremiam (Busa 5:96b), he states that viscera and iecur symbolize the compassionis pietas of a true prophet; cf. Super Threnos 2 (Busa 5:124c, §11).

181. This language describes an act of total love, where attention, desire, and effort are focused on the beloved; one forgets oneself as if vanishing into thin air. Thomas finds the image of fire invaluable in discussions of appetite, love, and desire, which are also bound up with the worship of God. Thus, for example, at ST I-II, q. 102, a. 3, ad 8, on the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, we read of the kind of sacrifice “in which the whole [offering] was consumed by fire, and this was called a ‘holocaust’, that is, ‘all burnt’. For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God especially out of reverence for his majesty and love for his goodness, and was suitable to the state of perfection in the fulfillment of the [ecclesiastical] counsels. And thus the whole was consumed by fire, so that as the whole animal, being dissolved into vapor, soared aloft, so too it might be signified that the whole man, and everything that is his, are subject to God’s lordship, and should be offered to him.” Or Super Rom. 12, lec. 2, n. 988: “Burning [fervor] comes from an abundance of heat; hence the Spirit is called ‘burning’, because, owing to an abundance of divine love, the whole man burns up into God” (Super Epistolias S. Pauli Lectura, ed. R. Cai [Turin/Rome: Marietti, 1953], 1:183). For further discussion of the fire imagery, see Peter A. Kwasniewski, “The Ecstasy of Love in Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences,” Angelicum 83 (2006): 51–93, at 69–72.

182. The coherence of the physical analogy deserves notice: the heart begins as frozen prior to love’s activity; it begins to be melted, going from hard and cold to liquid and warm; as the heat increases, it gets closer to boiling and then actually boils; just at this point it begins to evaporate, rising up into the air and suffering dispersion—the absolute contrary of the solid, immobile lump of ice at the start. For a detailed analysis of this reply and its role in the Thomistic doctrine of love, see Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy in Aquinas’s Sentences.”

183. Thomas is likely to have been familiar with an interesting text in Albert’s commentary on the Sentences where the latter lays out a subtle understanding of various forms of union and touching: “(1) ‘Vision’ means a turning toward a thing’s presence alone, whereas (2) ‘comprehension’, which fulfills hope, means a cleaving [adhaerentium] to it. But (3) ‘love’, since it is a tight band and a piercing mover, penetrating the
beloved, as Dionysius says, means an inherence [\textit{inhaerentium}]. . . . For there is a twofold union, namely through merit and through a sort of contact. For all virtue unites one to God through merit, but union through contact comes about in three ways. (1) [The first union is] according to presence; and this is when the intellect reaches a thing in its essence, but does not necessarily \textit{hold and possess} it. Hence, this is likened to a mathematical touching, in which the ends that touch are merely together. (2) The second union is through a sort of cleaving and holding and possessing, and this touching is of that which fulfills hope, and is likened to a sort of touching of things conjoined. (3) The third is by inherence, when one thing, so to speak, enters into the other, and takes on impressions and affections from its nature; and this is the touching of love, and it is likened to the natural touching in which the touching things act upon and suffer from each other and mutually impress their properties upon one another. And the first mode of union is like a material disposition for enjoying, while the second and third verge [on enjoyment], but (4) the fourth is perfective, and this is evident from its name, which is ‘fruition’, because this is the taste of calming sweetness, and that taste is elicited only from a thing’s interior parts that are of the nature and character of that which we enjoy” ([\textit{In I Sent.} d. 1, B, a. 12, ad qa. 1 [ed. Borgnet, 35:29–30]). This text is cited in Latin (with a different English translation) in Rousselot, \textit{The Problem of Love}, 206–7.

184. For example, all members of a political community are human beings equal in their origin, nature, and end, but for the sake of the common good some few have authority over the many, in order to secure goods that would otherwise remain insecure (cf. \textit{ST} I, q. 96, a. 4). Therefore, according to the one consideration (that of nature), no person is greater than another; according to the other consideration (that of office, to which that of virtue ought to be conjoined), the many need and depend upon the few, and owe them obedience and honor, in that precise respect in which they are superior.

185. In other words, the object of this power is not something that is good for itself or for some other part in isolation from the rest, but is aimed at as (in some way) the good of the whole organism. For example, if I desire an ice cream cone on a hot summer day, I desire a sensible good to which a certain sense-pleasure attaches, but I desire this particular good as something that will be good for me “on the whole” and “as a whole”—I regard \textit{myself} as better off for eating this ice cream than I \textit{would} be without it.

186. Strictly speaking, as Aristotle says in \textit{On the Soul}, one cannot see oneself seeing, since the particular senses do not sense themselves; it is through the \textit{sensus communis}, an interior sense-power, that awareness of the activities and relationships of the particular senses and their objects is attained (see webnote 53). However, the example Thomas gives is meant more to illustrate briefly a general truth—a person first \textit{sees} before he reflects on the fact that he is seeing—than to make a claim about sight.

187. On the handwritten corrections made to this fourth \textit{contra} argument in the autograph manuscript, see Gils, “Textes inédits,” 609–10.

188. In other words, since the archer knows the target as an end for himself as archer (he knows the end \textit{as end}), and he knows the relationship between the arrow, the shooting of the arrow, and the hitting of the target, he is \textit{therefore} able to direct the arrow to the target. He can direct not only himself to the goal (“I want to hit the target”) but also his instruments on his behalf (“I will hit that target with my arrow”). As we see also in the better-known Fifth Way (\textit{ST} I, q. 2, a. 3), it is impossible that an agent lacking intelligence, and hence lacking knowledge of the end \textit{as end} and the relationship of means to end, can consistently attain, by complex activity, definite goals suited to its flourishing, unless it has been expressly designed to do so by an intelligent agent who \textit{does} have the prerequisites in mind. Indeed, it is obvious that a man who acts unintelligently will consistently fail to attain goals suited to his flourishing, which implies the converse: success demands intelligence. How, then, does a bird or spider know how to do what it does so well, when it gives no evidence of \textit{knowing}—by means of the kind of self-awareness or capacity for reflection found in a human agent—the end \textit{as end} and the \textit{relationship} of means to end? (For a nicely-turned statement of this point, see \textit{Comp. theol.} I, ch. 76.)

189. That is to say, in more familiar terms, they are moved “by instinct”—by behavioral patterns written into their nature by a higher agent who fashioned them. See \textit{In I Sent.} d. 39, q. 2, a. 2 (Mandonnet, 932): “Hence he fashions such a nature [i.e., generable and corruptible] foreknowing the defectiveness that accompanies it, which is an evil of nature, but not intending it [directly]. But he so provides that if evil occurs owing to some defectiveness of nature, it is ordered to good, as we see that one thing’s corruption is another’s generation; and \textit{that} type of providence extends all the way to brute animals, which are rather urged on by an instinct of nature than [guided] by a choice of will. And thus the evil that occurs in them is com-
pensated for by a good of nature, not by the good of reward, as a fly’s death is a spider’s living [mors muscae est victus aranea]. See also In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 2 (Mandonnet, 605): “Now this ratio of fittingness and of the good is perceived in one way by man, in another by brute—for the brute knows a thing to be fitting or harmful to itself not by a process of reasoning [conferendo], but by a certain natural instinct, whereas man considers the rationes thereof through a certain process of investigation and comparison.” There is a fine discussion of instinct in Sent. II De anima, ch. 13 (ed. Leon. 45.1:120–122, lines 175–222).

190. These “things” or goods naturally willed include, for example, existence itself, which means life in all its grades, and whatever is understood to be preservative of life. See ST I, q. 82, aa. 1–2; I-II, q. 10, a. 1.

191. For the argument to make sense, the “nature” mentioned here has to be the nature of each power of soul and each bodily part, so that the point would be: While each and every “component” of an animal has a natural (in a sense, “automatic”) orientation to something suitable for that component, the good of the whole animal, as such, is not adequately secured by the mere ensemble of such orientations. Since the whole is essentially different from the parts and is not their mere sum, so too the good of the whole as one is essentially different from the good of the parts separately. Thus, if there is a state or condition in which it is good for the animal as a whole to be, there must be both some knowledge of that in which this state or condition consists, and a specific directedness toward it. The latter, of course, requires a specific power having just this good for its province, since the good of a complex whole could never be consistently achieved without such a power.

192. Thomas seems to be saying that even as an organism has a basic appetite for the good proportioned to it as a whole, the good to which it is directed by its Creator, so too, love can be seen as the most basic act of this basic appetite for the good. The act of love is that in which all appetitive activity “terminates,” in the sense of leading back to it and proceeding forth from it: “While many acts seem to pertain to will, such as desiring, delighting, hating, and suchlike, nevertheless love is found to be the one principle and common root of them all” (SCG IV, ch. 19), or more briefly, “every act of will is rooted in love” (ibid.). Or ST I, q. 20, a. 1: “Every other appetitive motion presupposes love, as a sort of first root. For no one desires anything except a good that is loved, nor does anyone rejoice except in a good that is loved. Even hatred arises solely in regard to things that run contrary to a good that is loved. And likewise sorrow and all the other [passions] are manifestly to be referred back to love as to a first principle. Hence, in whatever there is will or appetite, there must be love; for take away this first, and all the others are taken away.” Thomas is not arguing that every appetitive motion has for its end an act of love; this would make no sense, since the object of appetite is precisely a good that the lover desires or rests in. Rather, the act of love is the abiding source of appetitive motion.

193. Thomas mentions three powers to which animal appetite pertains, but he narrows this to two powers for animal love. The reason is that while the irascible is an appetitive power, it is concerned not primarily and simply with the good, but rather with the arduous or difficult good. This complexity of object already makes it a faculty derivative of something prior and more basic, namely the concupiscible. See the response to the fifth objection.

194. gradus, which here should be taken to mean specifically different levels or steps of appetitive activity. God’s is the simplest in the upward direction of spirituality: he has will alone, whereby he directs all things actively—indeed, his will is his very nature. Plants, and especially inanimate things, are simplest in the downward direction of materiality: they have merely nature, no will or knowing inclination.

195. This last category would include plants, inanimate substances, elements, and parts of elements. In plants, the principle is a soul, working from within. In the others, all are directed toward suitable ends or states of being by tendencies inscribed within their constitution. Their being moved comes from without, but how they move when moved, and what they naturally move toward, is from an internal principle, their substantial form (cf. Thomas’s opusculum De occultis operibus naturae). This conclusion is not invalidated by modern physics, Newtonian or otherwise. The theory of gravitation, for example, could not account for the regular, predictable behavior of bodies in gravitational fields if such bodies were affected at random or if they then moved at random. The very fact that a body tends toward the dominant center of gravity suggests a “readiness” on its own part to be so drawn.

196. Cf. Aristotle, Ethics VII, ch. 11 (1152b13), who reports the opinion, but without attributing it to Plato: “Now in general pleasure is thought to be not good, because every pleasure is a perceptible genesis to nature, and no genesis is akin to the ends, for example, no housebuilding to a house” (trans. Seth Benardete, in The Tragedy and Comedy of Life: Plato’s Philebus [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993], 66, n. 122).
The opinion is a matter for discussion in the *Philebus*, 53C–54E. Having said to Protarchus: “What about the following kind of thing? Haven’t we actually heard this about pleasure, ‘It is always a becoming, but there is altogether no being (ousia) of pleasure?’” (53C), Socrates then distinguishes between “genesis” and “being” (the former always for the sake of the latter), and concludes: “Isn’t it the case, then, that pleasure, provided it is a genesis, must of necessity become for the sake of some being?” (54C).

197. That is, there is pleasure both because the inclination attains a suitable object and because the animal is aware of having so attained it.

198. On the difference between pleasure or delight (*delectatio*) and joy (*gaudium*), see *In III Sent.* d. 26, q. 1, a. 3; *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, qa. 4; *ST* I-II, q. 31, a. 3 and q. 35, a. 2; *De iveritate*, q. 26, a. 4, ad 5; *SCG* I, ch. 90.

199. In other words, the irascible, too, presupposes the concupiscible; every motion of the irascible appetite originates and terminates in an act of the concupiscible appetite. For a full presentation of the reason for positing these two different sensitive appetites in animals, see *In III Sent.* d. 26, q. 1, aa. 2–4; *ST* I, q. 81, a. 2.

200. The objection plays upon an ambiguity so palpable (“precedes the terminus”) that it is hard to make it convincing. That one has to commute to a city before reaching the office makes it clear that some motion precedes the attainment of the desired terminus. On the other hand, if the terminus were not first present in the intention of the driver, the motion would never be initiated. The statement is begging for a distinction: *intention* of the end precedes motion toward it; but motion toward it precedes the *attainment* of the end.

201. One loves a means to an end inasmuch as it is ordered to that end, giving some access to it, having something of the end already present in it. If I happen to like vacationing in Croatia, I will like nice photographs or advertisements of Croatia, plane tickets to Croatia, or reminiscing about a past vacation, etc., all of which bring me closer, in some sense, to the thing I like most of all in this particular sphere of life, viz., *actually being there*. Moreover, as Thomas points out, the affection of desire, which moves me toward an absent good, is activated only by an affection that takes the good to be *desirable* in the first place; love of the end is the *principium*, the starting-point, of the affective *processio*. If someone happens to dislike Croatia, don’t show him the photographs, advertisements, tickets, etc.; they are steps toward an end he has no interest in attaining, even from afar.

202. Given that it has to be a desire for *something*, desire can be moved only if the appetite is already shaped by and stamped with the form of the object to be pursued through the motion of desire. Desire is thus understood here as a consequence or extension of a more basic correspondence between appetite and appetible object.

203. This is a statement of something metaphysically true about being pleased, not a moral evaluation of what is in fact fitting for (say) a rational agent at a given moment. Speaking formally, what is really fitting for the one being pleased is whatever befits, as a matter of fact, the nature or custom of the power(s) engaged in the activity. Thus, one might say, the eye is delighted in the very seeing of beautiful colors, the palate in the very tasting of fine flavors, but the thing beheld is not necessarily a thing suited to the beholder, nor the food physically healthy for the body. To a lover of physical exercise, running is pleasant when the runner is actually running, because something suited to that person’s habits has been “joined” to him. A lover of just acts experiences delight in *doing* just acts, for at that time these acts are, as it were, “joined” to his being.

204. If a love of something originates from the pleasure experienced in connection with it, in this case the pleasure seems to be the reason for the love, not the love for the pleasure.

205. Love goes deeper than pleasure, because love makes a difference to the way the appetite itself is disposed to objects, whereas pleasure is the result of the joining of the lover to what is already loved. Pleasure is an experience of welcome presence (of “something suitable and near at hand”), love is a change at the deepest springs of action (“the informing of the appetite by the one desired”).

206. Compare the language here to that of Albert the Great’s discussion of the union of love (cited in webnote 183).

207. Gils speaks of the “réduction laborieuse” to which this reply was subjected, a process that extended to everything from choice of phrase to order of premises. The draft version from the autograph manuscript is reproduced in Gils, “Textes inédits,” 610. Here is a translation of that version, noting the author’s cancellations: “To the second it should be said that the good is the perfection of the one who has appetite for it inasmuch as it [the good] is fitting for him according to any part whatsoever of him, and is also the appetite’s perfection inasmuch as it is its object. Hence the good both informs the one who has appetite for it ac-
And so love in some way always lingers. The anger has to be powerful enough to drive out those feelings, by way of stoking hatred. Thomas also makes the astute observation that no one is inclined to revenge in so far as feelings of love still linger. The anger does not really destroy love, but sets up an impediment to the return of love that was already lost. It could also be that an object of love comes to be seen as injurious to one’s own good or the good of another, and this would then provoke hatred against it, from which anger could arise that then banishes any lingering feelings of love or liking toward it. In either way, anger itself is not more powerful than love. By the argument of the reply to the third objection, we know that hatred for the injurious object as well as an lingering feelings of love or liking toward it. In either way, anger itself is not more powerful than love. By the argument of the reply to the third objection, we know that hatred for the injurious object as well as anger against it stems solely from love of the injured good. Hence, anger is stronger than love only per accidens. Thomas also makes the astute observation that no one is inclined to revenge in so far as feelings of love still linger. The anger has to be powerful enough to drive out those feelings, by way of stoking hatred.

This is an elegant structure: love is the transformation of the appetite, the formal union of lover and loved; peace is the resting of the appetite in that formal union; desire is the (further) motion toward real union or possession. One has a vivid sense here of the spiritual dimension: the peace of which St. Thomas speaks is not that permanent and definitive peace of eternal life, but the interior peace that results from communion of wills in the good, however much desire remains for the vision—the manifest presence—of the supreme good.

Without a doubt, while this early treatment of a subject to which the author would many times return contains a number of interesting points, it lacks the decisiveness and clarity characteristic of the more mature discussions. The replies to the arguments on behalf of the superiority of knowledge are noteworthy, for they show Thomas striving to correct an exalation of the intellect on specious grounds. In the article as a whole, he refrains from attributing a simple priority and primacy to intellect or of acknowledging the will’s thoroughgoing derivation from and dependency upon it—positions he was later to formulate. In this regard there was certainly a development in his thought. For a presentation of the view he would eventually de-

213. That is, if love takes its origin from knowledge, knowledge must be more perfect, since among creatures an origin, as such, is superior to that which originates from it (a thing functions as origin precisely by having some perfection, and another thing has to be originated precisely because it lacks some perfection). This is not true, of course, in the Trinity, where the Father is the unoriginated origin of the Son, yet the Son is in no way inferior to the Father.

214. At *ST* I-II, q. 3, a. 4, asking whether happiness is an operation of the intellect or of the will, Thomas cites a clearer text from the same Gospel (Jn. 17:3): “This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.”

215. Of course, this has to be understood not in reference to the total set of “all things,” as if the will is pleased or displeased by all things at once, but in regard to each member of the set: the will is, or can be, pleased or displeased with anything of all the things that are.

216. On the immaterial reception of sensible forms by sense powers, cf. *Sent. II De anima*, ch. 24 (ed. Leon. 45.1:169): “At times form is received into a patient according to a different mode of being than it has in the agent, because the material disposition of the patient with a view to receiving is not like the material disposition that is in the agent. And so the form is received into the patient without matter, inasmuch as the patient is likened to the agent in form but not in matter. And in this manner, sensation [sensus] receives form without matter, since the form has being [esse] in different modes in sensation and in the sensible thing. For in the sensible thing it has natural being [esse naturale], whereas in sensation it has intentional and spiritual being [esse intentionale et spirituale].” One is accustomed to reading texts in which sense and intellect are contrasted, but Aquinas also emphasizes their similarity, as we read at *In De sensu et sensato*, lec. 19: “A natural body receives forms according to natural and material being, according to which they have in themselves contrariety, and so one and the same body cannot at the same time receive whiteness and blackness; but sense and intellect receive the forms of things spiritually and immaterially according to a certain intentional being [spiritualiter et immaterialiter secundum esse quodam intentionale], according to which they have no contrariety. Hence sense and intellect can receive the species of contrary sensibles at the same time.” On esse intentionale, see H.-D. Simonin, “‘La notion d’intention dans l’oeuvre de saint Thomas,’” *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 19 (1930): 445–63; André Hayen, *L’intentionnel selon saint Thomas*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1954).

217. This oft-cited text implies a point of great importance for Thomas, namely that it is quite a different thing to “have” something by way of knowledge than to have it in its proper being—to be united to it as it is in itself, whether to transform it into oneself (as with ordinary food), or to be in its bodily and spiritual presence (as with friends), or even to be transformed by it (as with the food of the Eucharist). Possession by knowledge is compatible with distance, whereas possession by appetite aims at nearness, contact, intimacy, assimilation. (For a fine text on this point from earlier in the *Scriptum*, see *In II Sent.*, d. 39, q. 1, a. 2, translated in webnote 219.) The contrast is crisply stated in *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 3, where, to the fourth objection (“Appetite is for a thing that is not had, according to Augustine. But in animals the good is already had through knowledge. Therefore, in animals, an appetite that would require a special power does not follow upon knowledge of the good”), the following reply is made: “One who has appetite for good seeks to have it through knowledge. Therefore, in animals, an appetite that would require a special power does not follow upon knowledge of the good.” (Cf. *ST* I, q. 78, a. 1, ad 3.) For such comparisons of cognition and apperception, see, e.g., *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 2; *In De div. nom.*, 4, lec. 10, n. 427; *ST* I, q. 16, a. 1; *ST* I-II, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2; *Comp. theol.* I, ch. 46. For commentary and further citations, see M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, “Le désir du bonheur et l’existence de Dieu,” *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 13 (1924): 163–64; H.-D. Simonin, “Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l’amour,” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 6 (1931): 247–51; Joseph de Finance, *Être et agir* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1945), 183–207; Raymond R. Mcginnis, *The Wisdom of Love: A Study in the Psycho-metaphysics of Love according to the Principles of St. Thomas* (Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1951), 56–69.

218. The axiom invokes a priority of metaphysical dependency: it is only by some “perfection” already possessed—a nature or form—that a thing is ordered to, and can actively order itself to, another as its perfec-
tion. Were it not for human nature, were it not for the innate capacity to be conformed to intelligible reality, the human being could not in fact have God as an end to be loved. In this sense, a higher perfection, union with the good, presupposes a lesser perfection of "unitability" with the good. If the priority were taken as a moral one, the axiom would be saying that for any being whatsoever, its inherent perfection as knower exceeds its derivative perfection as subordinate. This is clearly false for the rational creature, which can be perfect "in itself" only when it is well-ordered to God precisely as its (and the entire universe's) common good, not as its own proper good. For full argumentation, see Charles De Koninck, On the Primacy of the Common Good: Against the Personalists; The Principle of the New Order; In Defense of Saint Thomas, trans. Sean Collins and published as a special issue of The Aquinas Review 4.1 (1997).

219. "Knowing" here must be taken strictly to mean simply knowing about or knowing of them, not the kind of knowledge gained through experience or acquaintance, which would, of course, involve love (for no one can "get into" something unless he likes it or loves it). As preacher and confessor, St. Thomas knows that it is desirable to be "informed about" bad things, like sins or heresies or the devil, the better to avoid them or to liberate their victims. The statement here is phrased as a universal rule. If there were an object of knowledge that could not be known without causing corruption in the appetites, then to know it would be bad—but only because one could not merely know it.

Important nuances to the present discussion can be found in a text back in Book II (In II Sent. d. 39, q. 1, a. 2; Mandonnet, 988-89) in which St. Thomas explains the difference between sins of intellect and sins of will, underlining the radical difference between how the intellect proportions things to itself and how the will goes out to things in their own nature. "It should be said that in sin there is the ratio of evil, and beyond this, the ratio of guilt. And each one is found in a different way in the [sinner's] act of intellect and his act of will, since in the will's act, there is evil from the object, but the same is not so in the intellect's act, since to will an evil is itself evil, but to understand an evil is not evil. The reason for this difference can be taken from the object of each. For the will's object is the good, while the intellect's object is the true. Now, good and evil are in things, as is said in Metaphysics VI, whereas true and false are in the soul. Thus, the will, in its own act, tends to its object just as the object is in itself [secundum quod se habet in re], and therefore the will's act is good or evil directly from the goodness or evil of the thing willed. In contrast, the intellect in its act tends to a thing according to its being in the soul [secundum quod est in anima]; but the ratio both of goods and of evils in the soul is itself good, and thus to know good and evil is, in itself, a good thing; hence Boethius says that knowledge of evil cannot be lacking to the good. But evil attaches to the intellect's act owing to an undue proportion of intellect to thing, namely, because it apprehends a thing to be other than it really is. For to understand a thing by a falsehood is an evil in the intellect's act, just as the true is this act's good, as is said in Ethics VI.

"Accordingly, an act of intellect that is bad in this way does not have the ratio of guilt in the same way as a [bad] act of will, in which evil is found in a manner peculiar to it; because the ratio of guilt is found primarily in the will's act, whereas in acts of intellect and of the other powers it is found only inasmuch as they are commanded by the will. For a deformed act has the ratio of guilt only because it proceeds from one who has dominion over his acts. Now this is in man according to that power which [first] stands open to many things, not being determined to any one of them except by itself; and this description fits the will alone. For the powers affixed to bodily organs are compelled to perform some act through the organ undergoing change, without which they cannot proceed into act; and the intellect, too, although it is a power not affixed to a bodily organ, is still compelled to something by reason or argumentation, or it fails to attain something, lacking the ability to attain it owing to a defect in demonstration or [a dimness] of intellectual light; whereas the will has power, of itself, [to go] for anything whatsoever that shall have been apprehended, nor by any consideration can it be violently prevented from going after it. The reason is this: since intellect is borne to a thing inasmuch as it exists in the soul (whereby it has the ratio of the true), in order to understand a thing intellect requires some middle light or demonstration through which it makes the thing proportionate to being understood by it; hence, too, through reasoning one can be with necessity torn away from consenting to something. But the will, as was said, is borne to the will's object as it is in itself; and so the will need not have any activity on the object to make it proportioned to the will, whether withdrawing it from matter, or something of that sort, as the intellect does; but the will is borne straightaway to the apprehended thing, just as it really is [directe in rem apprehensam, secundum quod est, fertur]; and therefore it cannot fail to be borne to whatsoever it wills [non potest defecere quin feratur in quodcumque voluerit], either by something preventing it, or by any failure of its own."
220. The response seems to be saying that the necessary priority of knowledge to love need not be construed as an absolute priority, though unavoidably there is some kind of precedence. Why it only in the "way of generation": without knowledge, love cannot get started and grow toward maturity. The response leaves undetermined, however, the exact positions of knowledge and love at the end of the process. Again, as Gils records ("Textes inédits," 610–11), the autograph manuscript of Book III contains a different version of the response, which is worth translating for its fuller argument: "To the second, it should be said that perfect and imperfect may be considered in two ways: either in regard to a single thing, and from this vantage, with respect to nature a perfect individual comes before [the same individual as] imperfect, whereas the imperfect individual comes before [the same individual as perfect] in time or in the process of generation; or they may be considered simply, and from this vantage something perfect comes before, even in the process of generation or in time, because everything imperfect takes its origin from something perfect. Therefore, to consider will and intellect insofar as they are certain properties of the one in whom they are is to consider them according to their being, and here, too, what is attended to is the order of nature; hence, according to such a consideration, intellect is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, will. But to consider them according to their order to acts is to consider them as if in the process of generation; and from this vantage, the human intellect is prior to the human will, but follows upon the divine will ordaining it to its natural act through a natural appetite placed in it."

221. That is, one cannot compare intellectual knowledge, which is proper to man, to the love operative in animals as animals, concerning which one must be speaking of sensitive love based on sense-knowledge. The comparison must be carried out between knowledge and love within the same being and at the same level.

222. While the reward is for the sake of the one who is rewarded (for it benefits him, not another), the very same person sought to earn this reward out of love for the rewarder, stretching out to him so as to be united with him. And since charity or union with God is the root of merit, meriting is seen as the result of acting for and from union with God in this life. Indeed, this union of love was not only the precondition for earning the reward, but also the reason the reward was sought, and the only reason the reward can be eternally pleasing and perfective.

223. This is true, ceteris paribus and in hac lacrymarum valle. Loving God, as such, is always better than knowing him, as such; but loving and knowing him is better than merely loving him, and knowing him perfectly so as to love him perfectly is better than loving perfectly yet lacking perfect knowledge, if such were possible. See F. Russell Hittinger, "When It Is More Excellent to Love than to Know: The Other Side of Thomistic 'Realism'." Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 57 (1983): 171–79.

224. The draft version of this response, as found in the autograph manuscript, is reproduced in Gils, "Textes inédits," 611. Here is a translation of that version, noting the author’s cancellations: "To the xii. it should be said that will’s not being subject to compulsion occurs because...it holds the ultimate the first...it has a certain infinity in [its] inclination toward other things, whence its activity is not [de]termined by another (which is [what it means] to be compelled), but it itself determines the activities of other things, which is [what it means] to move all the other powers; and according to this consideration it is said that will surpasses intellect."

225. That is, a knower in some way orders itself to something as to an end, and in so doing could be said to be ordered ab interiori (as the spider, without further prompting, directs its activities toward making a web, trapping insects, eating and reproducing, or a bird in like manner picks up sticks to build its nest), but all things—lifeless things, too—can be put to use, applied to an end, by an outside agent, ab exteriori, as when a chef places a certain order into eggs, milk, vegetables, herbs, and butter in order to produce an omelette. At another level, the non-intelligent spider or bird is also ordered from without, by the knower who implanted its instincts in it.

226. For example, plants, which are alive and function with a natural appetite for vital goods such as life itself and its activities of feeding, self-repair, reproduction. Still, such a thing cannot be called a knower, however much it may be said to give evidence of a natural “love” for its own good and the good of its species (cf. Aristotle’s statement that the vegetative soul, as such, strives for imitation of divine immortality in the only way possible to corruptible things, namely by reproduction: On the Soul II, ch. 4).

227. The draft version of this response, as found in the autograph manuscript, is reproduced in Gils, "Textes inédits," 611. Here is a translation of that version, noting the author’s cancellations: "To the xiii. it should be said that love, properly speaking, exists only in things that are knowers, yet it [the term] is ex-
228. Note that the objection concludes cautiously: *videtur esse, not est* as in all the other objections. Other candidates are more confidently put *forward* as definitions (*Ergo caritas est idem quod concordia, etc.*), whereas the point here is: Whether beneficence really is the same as charity, surely charity, in the final analysis, "amounts to" what we actually do for others; and this pertains to beneficence. Hence "the charity that counts" is beneficence.

229. Liz Carmichael comments on Thomas’s breakthrough-cum-blunder at this point: "By formally making *amicitia* a definition of *cartae*, Thomas broke new ground. It is remarkable, but fortunately not fatal to his argument, that at this crucial moment he depends on what appears to be a misquotation of Aristotle, one that he never repeats!" (*Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love* [London: T&T Clark, 2004], 105–6). In n. 21 on p. 231 of her study, Carmichael explains how the misquotation was likely to have arisen from a mixture of Albert, Grosseteste, and Michael of Ephesus.

230. This argument calls to mind a verse at the end of the Song of Songs: "Deep waters cannot quench love, nor floods sweep it away. Were one to offer all he owns to purchase love, he would be roundly mocked" (8:7). Earlier in the *Scriptum*, Thomas took occasion to expound the statement "The Holy Spirit is the love, or charity, or dilection, of the Father and the Son," as follows: "These three things are related by way of addition to one another. For ‘love’ bespeaks a simple inclination of the affection toward the loved object; hence it sometimes also bespeaks passion, insofar as it is in the sensitive part, and in this way love is found even in irrational things. ‘Dilection’ [*dilectio*], however, presupposes choice [*electio*], as the very word shows; hence it belongs only to rational beings. But ‘charity’ signifies a certain vehemence of dilection, insofar as the beloved [*dilectum*] is held at an inestimable price, according to which things of great worth [*res multi pretii*] are called ‘dear’ [*charae*]" (*In I Sent.* d. 10, exp. text.; Mandonnet, 272). Thomas alludes to the same etymology at *ST* I-II, q. 26, a. 3: *Cartas autem addit supra amorem perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.*

231. It should be clear that Thomas, with the concept *consuiuere*, is thinking primarily not about just living in the same house (for even enemies can share bed and board, at least for a time), but about being together in a way worthy of rational beings, sharing their life together, and in this way really *living* together.

232. That is, as the next paragraph will show, there are some terms that are “included” in the meaning of love by being various elements that constitute its complete essence, though “love” refers specifically to a resting of the appetite in the beloved, from which all these elements flow.

233. On Thomas’s view that “love begins at home,” i.e., with love of one’s true self, and is thence expanded or extended to include another created person who is loved as “another self,” see the superb analyses of Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love” and “Desire for Beatitude and Love of Friendship.”

234. Speculative matters such as demonstrations in mathematics or well-grounded political opinions are not moral issues; they are questions of argumentation that is either true or false, probable or improbable, etc. Friendship is based on a common *love* of certain goods with all that is implied in such love (as Thomas is describing in this passage). Hence, strictly speaking, disagreement, *discordia*, concerning speculative issues is not, *per se*, a cause of the parting of ways, unless and until it becomes a moral issue—as can easily happen if a difference in view becomes an occasion for anger, sadness, hatred, or some other passion. Though it is evident that like-minded people more readily associate and form friendships, intellectual history and often our own experience provide many examples of intimate friendships between thinkers of utterly different perspectives on fundamental issues, just as we see that friendships between those who are utterly like-minded can fall to pieces as a result of discord introduced by *moral* problems (envy of success, betrayal of confidences, sexual transgression, etc.). All this goes to confirm Aristotle’s insight. For an extended discussion, see Daniel Schwartz Porzecanski, “Aquinas on Concord: ‘Concord Is a Union of Wills, Not of Opinions,’” *Review of Metaphysics* 57 (2003): 25–42.

235. A remarkable difference can be observed between this paragraph in Thomas’s final version of Book III and the draft paragraph preserved in the autograph manuscript. Gils speaks of the latter version as a “réduction foncièrement différente”; the draft is given in “Textes inédits,” 611–12. Here is a translation of that
draft, noting the author’s cancellations: “It should be known that love is of a thing in two ways: in one way, it is of some inherent thing to which [the intellect] the affection draws itself so that it participates in it; in this way one loves sweetness in wine and pleasure in a woman, and this love is called the love of concupiscence properly speaking. For love as uniting affections [to things] informs appetite with the very thing loved, and appetite is ordered to the thing’s presence [or: the thing itself]. Now in any kind of love [ab amore sive dilectione] is included whatever things follow of necessity from love. And since love makes the thing loved as though the form of the lover’s appetite, as was said previously, there must be the same proportion between the thing loved and the lover’s appetite, as there is of a natural form to natural appetite. But the form in natural things is (1) the term of motion inasmuch as before obtaining the form nature does all things for the sake of [the form], and (2) the natural appetite rests in it once it is possessed, and (3) it is the principle of the activity of the thing that now has the form, since a thing acts according to the condition and requirements [exigentian] of its form. Now the lover’s love sometimes has its term in the lover himself, and turns other things that are outside of him back to himself, as happens whenever those things that as those things that one is said to love on account of delight or gain. Whence one does not properly love them, but rather oneself, while one desires the other things for oneself; and owing to this, it is called ‘concupiscence of the things loved.’ Hence love of self includes concupiscence of the things that someone loves on account of himself. But sometimes love has its term in something outside oneself, and then love other things the lover turns other things back to the one loved—both according to affection (inasmuch as he desires goods for the [beloved] which [the beloved] does not have and rejoices with him over the things he has, and in that way, benevolence toward a friend is included in love) and again, according to effect (inasmuch as he does good things for him, and shares with him his own self and what he has [et et ipsum et sua ei communicat], and in that way, beneficence is included [in love]). It is also necessary that the loved become the appetite’s rule in the things the lover chooses, as the form is [the appetite’s rule] for a natural thing; and from this vantage, included in love is concord, according to which someone wills and does the same things as a friend in things that are subject to the will ([since] love binds [friends together] by means of the will), [but] not in opinions, which precede the will, since they are in the intellect. Hence having diverse the same opinions about the heavens and about speculative matters is not important to friendship [non pertinent ad amicitiam], as is said in Ethics IX [ch. 6 (1167a 24-25)].”

236. Thomas had originally written a much longer response, as preserved in the autograph manuscript (cf. Gils, “Textes inédits,” 612): “To the first, therefore, it should be said that any friendship includes concupiscence or desire; because, on the one hand, in the kind of friendship in which the love with which someone loves a friend curves back [retorquacter] to the lover, there is concupiscence for that thing according to which the loved one is curved back to the lover, such as money or pleasure; on the other hand, in the kind of friendship in which the lover’s love is fixed upon the one loved, there is concupiscence for the very one loved, such that the lover draws himself toward him, and not conversely. And so, the friend desires [concupisci] to see his friend and to live life together with him, and although from this there follows the greatest delight, nevertheless the friend does not chiefly have his eye on this delight, but rather on the one loved. Augustine, therefore, in the definition mentioned above, defines charity according to the wayfarer’s state, in which God is absent to us; hence by charity we desire [concupiscimus] to become present to him, which occurs through vision. Hence he puts the vision of God in first place, as the chief desideratum, and he subjoins enjoyment as if it were secondary.”


238. God’s activity of loving us comes before, takes precedence over, and has the primacy in our activity of loving him. Charity is our participation in God’s eternally simple act of love; it is not something we do that God, as it were, “supports,” but something he does in us, freely seconded by the soul.


240. The point Thomas is making is subtle but important, for it is the precise distinction between true and false friendship. True friendship is directed toward friends really sharing certain activities together, but that does not mean the seeing, conversing, enjoying, or whatever is done together are the goal each friend seeks,
as if they might be chosen (were it possible) independently of the person beheld, spoken with, or enjoyed; rather, the persons who love each other are, for one another, the goal of their friendship, and these activities are the fullest way of attaining that goal. In contrast, false friendship is directed only toward what can be obtained from the other, not toward the “person” of the other, and in this way there is no other end of the relationship beyond the activities or their results; in principle, the other person need not exist at all, if what he or she provides could be more readily obtained in other ways. This is why such relationships tend to dissolve when the pleasures or honors or gifts of money dry up, or when an alternative and superior source appears on the scene. Needless to say, in life the lines are often drawn more ambiguously, with friendships mingling or oscillating between aspects of the true and the false; but the distinction itself remains clear, true, and applicable, as is evident from everyday opinions we form about people. “You can tell by the way he treats her that he is using her for his own ends.” “Look at how devotedly and patiently she takes care of her crippled, unemployed husband; she must really love him.”

241. Is it implicit in this view that the “friends” will include Christ, too, who is the chief friend of the Christian? Jerome’s point seems to be directed against a concupiscient approach to other Christians (a fortiori, to Christ himself). We are not eager to see each other and to have that pleasure, but to be joined together in the spirit of charity that emanates from Christ. The response seems meant to set aside an obvious misrepresentation rather than to address the deeper question of how exactly love of friendship and love of concupiscence are related.

242. Namely, God, and the blessed who are perfectly conformed to him, who (as Thomas’s response implies) are “few” in comparison with the human race.


244. The argument is that loving God and having friendship with him is irrelevant to doing well with respect to the end, and therefore such love is not a virtue by which we do well.

245. Esse spirituale refers not to a created spirit’s mere existence, its esse naturale, but to the perfect actuality an angel or a soul ought to have, when its capacity for spiritual goods is realized. For St. Thomas, we receive our natural spiritual being through moral and intellectual virtues, and our supernatural spiritual being through theological virtues, infused moral virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. These are poured into the soul at baptism, which is the spiritual regeneration that corresponds to the natural generation by which natural being is first acquired.

246. The context: “Why then should we not say that he is happy who is active in conformity with complete excellence and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add ‘and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his life’? Certainly the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in every way final. If so, we shall call blessed those among living men in whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled—but blessed men.” There is a fascinating text in Thomas’s unfinished commentary on the Psalms in which he contrasts different philosophical conceptions of beatitude, rejecting them as inadequate for man: “Different ones have thought in different ways about beatitude; and according to the different opinions concerning it, there are different sects of philosophers. For some placed it in bodily goods, as did Epicurus; some, in the works of the active life, as did the Stoics; while still others, in the contemplation of truth, as did the Peripatetics. [Yet] to seek beatitude in what is beneath us is vain, because beatitude is something above us. But the one above us is God. Therefore man’s beatitude is to cleave to God. For anything whatsoever is perfect when it cleaves to its proper good, and man’s proper good is God. Ps. 72: ‘It is good for me to cleave to God.’ Now, one can cleave to God both by mind (i.e., intellect) and by will, not by sensation, because this is something brute animals have in common with us. Man therefore cleaves to God in two ways: through intellect by means of contemplating and knowing, and through affection by loving. And because these [activities] are imperfect in the wayfaring state but perfect in the fatherland, it follows that here our beatitude is imperfect, but there it is perfect” (Super Ps. 32, n. 11). On the importance of such ideas in St. Thomas, see Peter A. Kwasniewski, “Divine Drunkenness: The Secret Life of Thomistic Reason,” The Modern Schoolman 82 (2004): 1–31, esp. 3–7, 12–15.

247. “For in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like angels in heaven.”

248. This phrase echoes 2 Peter 1:3–4: “His divine power has granted to us all things that pertain to life and godliness, through the knowledge of him who called us to his own glory and excellence, by which he
has granted to us his precious and very great promises, that through these you may escape from the corruption that is in the world because of passion, and become partakers of the divine nature.” For Thomas’s treatment in the *Scriptum* of the angel’s need of grace in order to attain ultimate beatitude, see *In II Sent.* d. 4, a. 1; d. 5, q. 2, a. 1.

249. See also *In II Sent.* d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, translated in webnote 153.

250. The connection in English between the adjective “like” and the verb “to like” strongly indicates Aristotle’s (and Thomas’s) point. Two people who are alike tend to like one another. A parallel connection can be seen between “kind,” meaning those who are similar (“my kind of person”; compare “kin”) and “kind,” meaning friendly. See Lewis, *Studies in Words*, 26–33.

251. Acts of the virtues must in some sense originate with (or within) us, a sign of which is that we are praised for these acts, and praise is deserved only for something we have done, something that came from us. At the same time, a virtue need not be exclusively a power of ours, as in the present case where the virtue in question, charity, is infused and held by divine gift.

252. *Dos*, an aspect of the reward bestowed on the blessed. On the “dowries” of the blessed, see *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 4, where St. Thomas explains: “Without a doubt, when they are transferred into glory, the blessed are given certain gifts by God for their adornment—adornments that the masters have named ‘dowries.’ Hence, a dowry, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is defined as follows: ‘A dowry is a perpetual adornment of soul and body, sufficient for life, enduring continually in eternal blessedness.’ And this description was taken by way of likeness to a bodily dowry, through which a bride is adorned and the man is furnished with the means by which he may adequately sustain the bride and children.” There are two kinds of dowries: those of the soul, viz., vision, enjoyment, and love, which correspond to the theological virtues (d. 49, q. 4, a. 5, qa. 1), and those of the body, viz., sublimeness, agility, brightness, and impassibility, which correspond to the cardinal virtues (ibid., qa. 3; on the same bodily properties, cf. *In IV Sent.* d. 44, q. 2).

253. Thomas here underlines that the natural desire for God is not a natural desire for heavenly beatitude, although in fact only such beatitude could fully satisfy the intellectual creature’s desire, but rather a desire to share as much as possible in God’s nature, by way of attaining the maximum creaturely perfections that reflect God’s perfections. In other words, apart from revelation and grace, it is not a direct participation in God’s very life but rather a lively acquisition of a created likeness of his perfections that man is capable of discovering as goal and desiring. Thomas here summarizes Aristotle’s view of human perfection. Needless to say, on this complex issue of the “natural desire for God/beatitude” the saint has much to say in the *Scriptum* (cf. *In II Sent.* d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, translated in webnote 153) and elsewhere, and debate still continues as to his exact doctrine. The controversial thesis of Henri de Lubac has become a point of departure in recent times: see his *The Mystery of the Supernatural*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Crossroad, 1998), and his *Augustinianism and Modern Theology*, trans. Lancelot Sheppard (New York: Crossroad, 2000); for a brief rejoinder, see Garrigou-Lagrange, *Beatitude*, 95–107, 125–29. The most comprehensive treatment of the subject to date is Lawrence Feingold’s *The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters* (Rome: Apollinare Studi/Edizioni Università della Santa Croce, 2001), a book unfortunately almost impossible to get hold of, at least at the time of this writing. Other valuable items include Denis J. M. Bradley’s *Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), as well as two recent journal issues dedicated to the theme: *Revue thomiste* 101 (2001) and *Nova et Vetera* [English] 5:1 (2007).

254. Charity first makes one love God in himself, as highest good loved for his own sake, and second makes one desire a share in that good by being admitted to the vision of his glory. Notice that according to Thomas’s precise wording, one is not even able to desire God as a good to be shared in unless gifted by him to do so. By nature (in both senses: by his nature and by ours), God is simply inaccessible and cannot be directly desired. By the gift of charity, he is made ours to love and to desire. A precision might be added: we are really able to share God’s happiness on the basis of the ordering of the friendship of charity to its perfection in glory; we can desire such a participation itself through unformed hope, but only imperfectly, since hope without charity does not have the wherewithal to achieve its aim.

255. That is, for a temperate man, even in the fallen condition, it is not difficult to remain temperate in eating and drinking, because the acquired virtue extends at least that far in its power; but for a man in the fallen condition who lacks this virtue, moderation and sobriety can be extremely difficult, the more so as certain foods or drinks are more pleasant or appealing to him. So, too, loving God above all and all others for
his sake is not only difficult but impossible for man unaided by grace; but once aided, it becomes sweet (cf. Mt. 11:30), though only in proportion to the removal of any contrary habits and always with some difficulty owing to the lingering effects of original sin.

256. The power by which an act is executed, i.e., actually accomplished, is the power from which that act primarily emanates, and to which it must accordingly be attributed. The general who directs the soldier to fight at the front is responsible for placing a certain order into the soldier’s activity (when and where and how to fight), but the fighting is done by the soldier, not the general, and if the soldier does a great deed, he, not the general, is rewarded for it. No matter what powers contribute to a given act, it is the power that finally acts upon the contribution that deserves to be identified as the source of a given act—for example, although sense and imagination furnish phantasms and the agent intellect abstracts their intelligible content, it is the possible intellect that does the thinking. Thinking, therefore, is not a function of sense, imagination, or agent intellect, but only of possible intellect.

257. This response offers an incomplete categorization of virtue, which could vitiate the argument. Not all moral virtues are about the passions; as Thomas recognizes everywhere, the virtue of justice has the will for its subject, but it is precisely not about passions but about things owed to their possessors or rightful claimants. For this reason, someone who wishes to reduce charity to a moral virtue could easily point to the likeness it has to the justice-virtue of religion, whereby one gives to God something accepted by him as due homage, in the form of internal and external acts of adoration, devotion, prayer, sacrifice, etc. It is precisely in this area of morality that charity might mistakenly be placed.

258. As in sins of excessive anger or sins of lust or gluttony, respectively, Thomas appears to say the opposite at ST I-II, q. 74, a. 4, namely that reason alone can be the subject of mortal sin, not sensuality.

259. Hence, charity cannot exist without a theological virtue perfecting reason, viz., the virtue of faith. Cf. ST I-II, q. 62, a. 4 and q. 65, a. 5.

260. Prudence is, of course, an intellectual virtue strictly speaking, since its subject is the (practical) intellect, but it is often grouped with moral virtues because of its inseparable connection to them, both in that it stands in need of them, and in that they stand in need of it. Cf. ST I-II, q. 58, a. 2, ad 4, and aa. 3–5; q. 65, aa. 1–2; II-II, q. 47.

261. *determinentur ad bonum.* A circumlocution has been avoided, but the reader should bear in mind that *determinare* has the sense of setting bounds to, limiting. A virtue functions by making sure a good or right end is aimed at, focused on, consistently tended toward. A loose translation: “virtues are necessary in order that powers open to going many ways should, as a rule, go the right way.” A gun can be fired in many directions and in many ways, good and bad; the mark of a responsible marksman is that he fires well at the right targets. So, too, a morally mature person uses his capacities in the manner most appropriate to the capacities themselves, to himself as a whole, and to other people he lives with, and since these three levels are not identical, it also belongs to the virtues to establish and follow priorities.

262. Here, in the draft version of the autograph manuscript, Thomas has added the comment: “But a defect [of willing] can occur because reason [sometimes] does not rightly show forth the good, since the will has for its object the good or the *apparent* good; or because the sense-appetite is drawn to that which is good according to sense, but not according to reason” (cf. Gils, “Textes inédits de S. Thomas,” 613).

263. The draft version reads: “And so, the philosophers did not posit any virtue in the will as in a subject, but either in reason (as prudence), or in the concupiscible and irascible appetites (as temperance and fortitude). But the end considered by theologians is beyond the power of nature, and therefore the will, according to its nature, is not determined to it. For this reason, it must be determined to that end by some virtue. And therefore they [the theologians] posit some virtue in the will as in a subject” (Gils, “Textes inédits,” 613).

264. A particularly forceful statement of this conclusion was made earlier, at In III Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3 (Moos, 304, §31): “The virtues properly called theological are those that have God as their object and end. Hence, properly speaking, no theological virtue has an act that regards a created thing; for charity loves nothing in man except God *[caritas enim nihil in homine diligit nisi Deum].”

265. With charity one loves “means” to an end, not according to the specific notes or natures *[rationes proprias]* of the means taken in isolation (e.g., a prudent choice, a just transaction, a moderate use of food and drink, a brave deed, which are specifically posited by one or another cardinal virtue), but rather according to the nature of the end *[ratio finit] which is virtually contained in all of them, inasmuch as a “means” is, by
definition and in the process of willing, precisely ordered to an end that gives it its ultimate meaning. Charity does not posit the prudent choice, but it posits the end for which the prudent choice is made; indeed, the end of that prudent act, as fixed by charity, is more determinative of the virtuousness of the act than the act’s individual qualities viewed in abstraction from the end, i.e., in reference to immediate circumstances.

266. Although faith is about and toward God under the aspect of “first Truth,” it nevertheless causes belief in certain truths about creation, truths revealed by God and therefore belonging to the selfsame object (the first Truth), e.g., that creation has a beginning and an end in time.

267. Later, at In III Sent. d. 34, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 3 (Moos, 1154, §250), Thomas reiterates this point using a slightly different example: “That which is the ratio of another as formally completing its object does not pertain to a different habit or power, as [seeing] light and color [do not pertain to different powers but to the very same]. And this is the way that God is the ratio of loving a neighbor by charity.”

268. That is, if the object of charity is the human neighbor, the commandment to love him will have a mode (measure, manner) appropriate to such an object—namely, to love him infinitely, for he is a finite creature, and only insular as he is potentially or actually ordered to God as his end, from which all the creature’s dignity derives. Whereas if the object is God himself, the commandment will have a measure corresponding to such an “object”—namely, it will have no measure, because God himself, infinite goodness, has no measure.

269. “Special” here simply means “specific, particular,” something distinct in its definition and function from others of the same class. To ask whether charity is a virtue distinct from other virtues is precisely to ask whether it is a special virtue of its own, or whether it is a generic condition or element of all virtues, or something reducible to other virtues.

270. All virtues aim at the good appropriate to them, and what is good in reality is either God or of God, an aspect of his creation like him in some way. Each of the virtues aims at a good which, in its own way, imitates or participates in the divine good, e.g., justice aims at the just (and God is most just), temperance at self-control (and none is more sovereignly self-possessed, so to speak, than God), etc. There is, in other words, a common and singular good toward which all the virtues (and indeed, all of creation—things of nature, of instinct, of intelligence) strive; yet this divine good is tended toward as such by a special virtue, namely charity, whereas it is tended toward under diverse particular aspects in the case of the other virtues.

271. A further helpful commentary on the Augustinian dictum is furnished at In III Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 1 (Moos, 1020, §23–§24): “As was said above, there are two sorts of love. One is natural, and it is found in all the powers [virtus; Parma: virtutibus]; hence such love does not belong especially to charity but is common to all the virtues. And if Augustine is talking about this love, it is evident that there is proved to be not only one virtue. But another love is ‘animal’ love, and inasmuch as this love is in the higher appetite, and is the result of grace [gratuitatis], it pertains to the virtue of charity. And this love is indeed found in all the virtues—not as though being essentially the same as they, but inasmuch as they, commanded by charity, participate in it.”

272. The commandment to love God and neighbor is not a “generic” commandment which is then “realized” in the form of specific commandments, as a genus embraces a variety of species (e.g., mammal, containing man, horse, dog, cat, whale, etc.). Rather, this greatest commandment is itself specific, for it tends to a definite object under a definite aspect, and is the highest of its kind; toward the fulfillment of this greatest commandment all other specific commandments are directed.

273. The meaning of this question will become clearer, of course, as one proceeds through the objections, response, and replies to objections, but briefly the question is this: Is charity that which makes the other virtues to be virtues, as the soul is the principle of the body’s life, the form of its matter? The soul is not the body, but the soul makes the body to be a living body capable of activity. By analogy, does charity perform a formative, animating, activating function vis-à-vis all the other virtues?

274. An exemplar form is the form or pattern preexistent in the mind of an intelligent agent, in reference to which it produces a certain effect. It is spoken of as an extrinsic formal cause because it does not become part of the being of the effect. By contrast, an intrinsic form is that which makes a thing to be what it is either simply or in a certain respect—in natural things, the substantial form correlative to prime matter or the accidental forms of quantity, quality, relation, etc.; in artifacts, the various determinations (shape, size, pattern, color, etc.) given by the artist to the artifact. See De veritate, q. 3, a. 1; In Metaphys. V, lec. 2. At De veritate, q. 3, a. 2, Thomas discusses three different senses of “form”: forma ad quam, forma a qua, and forma secundum quam. An exemplar is a forma ad quam, which may be translated as “form in regard to which.”
275. If charity were the original pattern according to which all the virtues are “designed,” they would all simply be copies of charity, and hence only numerically, not formally, distinct.

276. As the human soul makes the bodily matter a human body, and so brings it into one species (humanity), so charity would assimilate the matter of the other virtues and make them one in species with itself. This would abolish their specific distinctness altogether, even if they retained material distinctness.

277. In other words, a virtue already has what it takes to produce the right act in the right way; the virtue of justice, precisely as a virtue, shapes and measures out acts of justice. It would therefore be redundant to posit an additional virtue for any activity already subject to the control of a definite virtue.

278. Every power elicits its own act, meaning that it has the ability to act, and does act, of itself, concerning an object proportioned to it. But if there is a power of the soul that not only elicits some act of its own in this way, but has power over the activities of other powers, then it is said to command the acts elicited by those other powers, in so far as it is responsible for those acts being posited. To put it in terms of Thomas’s initial comparison, the blacksmith would “elicit” (so to speak) the activity of making swords and horseshoes; the rider would elicit the activity of riding the horse and swinging the sword, but would command the blacksmith to make the equipment he needs; the leader would elicit the activity of planning a battle and organizing his soldiers, but would command the soldiers themselves to fight, ride, retreat, etc.

279. One can see very clearly the point Thomas is making by considering a text from Book II in which the universality of obedience is contrasted with the universality of charity. At In II Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 1 (Mandonnet, 1124), the sixth objection runs: “In Morals on the Book of Job XXXV, ch. 14, Gregory says that obedience is not so much a virtue as the mother of all virtues. But to be the mother of all virtues is the characteristic of charity. Therefore obedience seems to be the same thing as charity, and so it does not seem distinct from the other virtues.” The reply (Mandonnet, 1127): “One virtue can arise from another in two ways. In one way, according to the manner of a final cause; and in this way a virtue is said to arise from another when its act is ordered to that other virtue’s end. And in this way charity, the object of which is the last end, is called the mother of all virtues. In another way, [a virtue arises from another] inasmuch as by the acts of one virtue another virtue is either caused or preserved. And in this way obedience is called the mother of virtues, for the commands given by superiors are ordered to inducing virtues by commanding the very acts of virtues, which cause political virtues by bringing about habits, and which dispose toward infused virtues. [When I say this] I am calling an ‘act of virtue’ not only that which is from virtue, but also that which is toward virtue, either as disposing to it or as causing it—even as someone in the state of mortal sin can have an act of obedience, although he lacks obedience and the other virtues.”

280. “A military end,” e.g., that the people be secure from attack or victorious in resisting foes, is ordered to “a civic end,” e.g., that the people be well-governed, possessing tranquillity of order. This relationship is given its classic formulation by St. Augustine in On the City of God XIX, chs. 13–14.

281. This point is developed especially at In II Sent. d. 40, a. 5 (see webnote 409). Cf. In III Sent. d. 18, a. 5 (Moos, 573, §102): “Now the act by which one merit is that of which the doer is the master, as was said above, and which is proportioned to the reward. Now man is master of his acts through his will; and since charity perfects the will in its order to the last end, it makes an act proportioned to the end, namely to beatitude, which is the proper reward of our merits. And therefore every voluntary act informed by charity is meritorious. Therefore since Christ underwent his Passion voluntarily (for ‘he was offered because he willed it,’ as is said in Is. 53:7), and his will was informed by charity, there is no doubt that he merited through his Passion.”

282. Though the paintbrush does not contain a conception of the painting it executes, it shares in the intelligent motion of the artist’s arm. The artist conveys something of his manner of acting to the instrument, albeit, in keeping with the axiom Quod recipitur in aliquo est in eo per modum recipientis, the instrument has it in a poorer manner.

283. This remark can be taken to mean that it is precisely because of the notion or nature of the end (ratio finis) pre-possessed by an agent that various things can be identified as “means,” can be compared, evaluated, put in order, and finally acted upon. Thus, charity is here being presented as having charge of the ratio finis, which enables charity to put order into the acts of all the other virtues that preside over the “means” to reaching or sustaining charity’s activity.

284. Such a qualification shows us that Thomas’s argument here—namely, that prudence, temperance, or any other moral virtue depends for its very being on charity—concerns infused prudence, infused temperance, etc., not their naturally acquired cousins. Good habits acquired through repeated good acts can exist,
or at least begin to exist, without charity, though whether they can achieve an “optimal” existence is another matter. For some discussion and references, see Kwasniewski, “Divine Drunkenness,” 15–18.

285. In II Sent. d. 26, a. 4 (Mandonnet, 676–79), on whether grace is a virtue. The reply to the fifth objection in this earlier article (ibid., 679) is very important as background to the present reply: “Charity is called the form of the virtues in a different way than grace is so called. For charity is the form of the virtues on the part of act, inasmuch as it draws together all acts of virtues toward its own end, since its object is the ultimate end. For in all powers and acts that have an order, the following obtains: that which looks to a higher end grants form to the art that is under it, [and] the act of this lower [power or art] is ordered to the end envisaged by the higher, as it is clear that a pilot shows a shipbuilder what ought to be the rudder’s form [for the ship’s intended purpose]. Therefore, a sinful use of a virtue as one virtue informs another, whereas as grace informs them in the manner of a point of origin, because it is from grace itself that there formally arise, in a certain way, the habits of the virtues diffused throughout the various powers. Now that which arises from another derives form and species from it and stands established in its vigor only as long as it remains joined to its origin; and therefore, although charity can never exist without grace, the two need not be identical.”

286. That is, the philosophers did not maintain (posuerunt) that there was an end for the will to tend toward beyond the natural end of participating in a human manner in the ultimate good (in contrast to the beatific vision, which is a supernatural end of participating in God in a divine manner), nor that there could be a habit in the soul’s essence that conformed it to the very nature of the ultimate good (deification by grace).

287. The ordering of the will to the good is a natural principle of all human virtues; at a natural level the virtues participate in this ordering of the will. The will is naturally ordered to the good proportioned to nature, whereas charity orders the will to a good essentially beyond human nature, and so it does not proceed from the principles of nature.

288. The exemplar cause, efficient cause, and final cause can be one and the same thing, as when an artist, from a conception in his mind, executes a work according to it, for the sake of earning his living. Here, the maker, the pattern, and the goal are the artist himself or something pertaining to him (verified most sublimely in God, who, as intelligent first mover or maker, precontains all effects as ideas in his intellect, and orders them to himself as ultimate end). On the other hand, the exemplar form (the artist’s conception) is not the intrinsic form (the form as instantiated in the materials), nor can the intrinsic form, which belongs to the effect, be identical in number with the cause that produced it or the end toward which the effect is ordered. Obviously, the agent, the end, and the effect can be identical in species, as when a horse generates a horse for the sake of perpetuating the species (so-called “univocal causality”).

289. The question is: Is it possible to have the virtue of charity, that is, the habit of loving God for his own sake, without having sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), which is what makes charity living and meritorious? The question parallels the question of the possibility of unformed or “dead” faith: Can a person really accept the truth of the Triune God, the Incarnation, redemption, the Church, the sacraments, etc., and yet be lacking supernatural hope and charity? To which Thomas’s answer is: Most definitely yes, he can believe, but the belief will do him no good unless he recovers sanctifying grace and with it, charity. As the response to this sub-question will show, charity is quite different from faith in this regard. It is not possible to have charity but lack grace; if one has charity, then one has the grace that makes the soul pleasing to God.

290. See ST II-II, q. 7, a. 1: “Through faith there arises in us a grasp of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear by which one is afraid of being punished by God; and this is servile fear. It is also the cause of filial fear, by which one is afraid of being separated from God or shrinks back from comparing oneself to God due to reverence for him, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an immeasurable and highest good, separation from which is the greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of the first (namely, servile) fear, unformed faith is the cause, while of the second (namely, filial) fear the cause is formed faith, which, through charity, makes man cleave to God and be subject to him.” For a full treatment, see ST II-II, q. 19. The contrast is briefly mentioned at In III Sent. d. 23, q. 3, a. 4, qa. 1, obj. 2 & ad 2 (on pp. 112–13).

291. Cf. In II Sent. d. 26, a. 4, part of which is translated in webnote 285.

292. That is, if charity moves all the virtues, a gravely sinful use of a power is not possible so long as charity’s motivity is being exercised. Therefore, a sinful use ipso facto negates the exercise of charity. But since charity is likewise the form, such an abuse negates charity formally, and this is nothing other than for char-
ity to perish, even as death occurs in living things when separation occurs between substantial form and the matter corresponding to it.

293. Up to “two such reasons can be gathered” there is no difference between the final redaction and the draft preserved in the autograph. At this point, however, the draft contains a more pointed response to this subquestion (Gils, “Textes inédits, 613–14”): “The first is from the manner of its [charity’s] formation, because it is not formed except through a reflux from the soul’s essence into the will, which is not due to man’s activity, but occurs through a certain natural consequence, even as the soul’s powers proceed from the soul’s essence. Hence no virtue can lose this formation as long as it [i.e., the virtue] remains. And since this is the only formation that charity has, charity is always formed.] But other virtues are formed by the mediation of charity, in whose form the other virtues participate through the act of the will. And since the act of the will is variable, therefore the formation of other virtues can be impeded, but not charity’s; whenever it exists, it is formed.” The text then continues with the other two reasons, which are labeled in the draft “second” and “third,” in spite of the earlier duplex (“two such reasons . . .”).

294. The point is that charity, precisely because of what it is, cannot be found in a formless state (i.e., lacking its essential perfection), whereas other virtues, such as faith and hope, can exist either as formed by charity or as lacking that formation, in a crippled condition. The aspect of similarity is that faith, to exist at all, has to be faith in all that it is necessary to believe, and so a single culpable error in matters of faith takes away the entire habit, even as one grave sin contrary to charity makes it impossible for charity, as such, to remain.

295. The phrases mediante creaturis and mediante creatura underline created things in their capacity as distant likenesses of the divine nature, functioning as steps on the cognitive ladder reaching up to their origin. It is a recurrent point in Thomas’s theology: in this life, we can gain knowledge of God only through observing his created effects and reasoning backwards to what their cause must be, or rather, cannot be. This is why the cognitio viae is made up of puzzles and images, and why, being impoverished, it deserves to be supplanted by a “positive,” non-enigmatic knowledge. Love, on the other hand, will never be supplanted, but only intensified. Thus (the argument goes) we have a sign that love cannot be essentially bound up with creatures, as our earthly knowledge is: love must be able to reach God directly and immediately, for otherwise it, too, would deserve to be banished in patria.

296. Note that this is not a denial of the intellect’s performing the role of presenting to the will its object, which makes the concept a means (medium), of a sort, through which the will inclines directly toward the good in reality. But this is not the sort of means or middle term that Thomas has in view in this article.

297. You need many middle terms to prove the existence of God from motion, for example, but you do not need to love these middle terms as distinct goals in order to arrive at loving the God whose existence you have proved. Thomas is not arguing that we will not love the world God has made; rather, he is explaining that our love of the God we discover through his creation is an immediate love of God himself, unlike our knowledge of him in this life, which is never other than mediated by knowledge of creatures. As wayfarers, we can know God only indirectly, by a detour that never reaches the sight of his face: whereas when we love him, our love reaches his very being, there is no detour. In fact, any significant detour away from the divine goodness would be a sin against charity, whereas the lack of the beatific vision is unavoidable and enters into the merit of faith and hope. From this contrast it also becomes clear that there is no essential difference between the charity of holy men and women in this life and the charity of the blessed in heaven, just as there is no essential difference between sanctifying grace and heavenly glory, whereas the difference between faith and vision, or that between hope and possession, is such that the latter specifically cancels out the former, leaving at best a generic continuity: faith is a kind of knowledge, vision is a kind of knowledge—but two different kinds. On this last point, see In III Sent. d. 31, q. 2, a. 1 (p. 285); ST I-II, q. 67, aa. 3 & 5.

298. The mode belonging to the activity of seeing is determined by the object of sight. In other words, that I am seeing blue rather than green is determined by the blue or green of the object acting upon the actualized transparent medium, which in turn acts upon the eye; that I see crisp blue or fuzzy blue may depend also on how much light is actualizing the transparent. In any case, the measure of an act of sight is the object seen.

299. Since God is simple, a simple “whole,” one beholds either all of him or none of him; one cannot behold him partially.

300. Since in God his being (what he is) and his be-ing (that he is), his essence and his existence, are
identical, if one sees the divine nature one sees “also” its manner of existing, which is of itself necessary, unlimited, simple, timeless, etc. In other words, one does not see God but not his immutability, infinity, eternity, etc.; one sees the God who is none other than perfect Immutability, Infinity, Eternity, etc. So, too, one cannot love God without loving both what and how he is, or in other words, one can only love the Limitless limitlessly.

301. Thomas is not saying that justice, for instance, should not always be on the increase in a soul that is not yet perfected, but rather, that that concerning which justice exists and has its function, namely, temporal goods, ought to have a certain measure in one’s affections. Since the goods in question are finite and the human response to them should be correspondingly finite, the virtues that deal with them are not susceptible of infinite increase. In this life, one can become and be perfectly just or perfectly brave, but not so with charity, of which there can always be an increase, since its principal object is God, the infinite good. See replies to the third and fourth objections.

A key text for understanding the present reply (as well as the objection that gives rise to it) is found much earlier, at In I Sent. d. 3, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5 (Mandonnet, 105). The fifth objection reads, in part: “Bernard says: ‘the measure of charity is not to have a measure.’ Therefore charity, which is a creature, does not have mode, species, and measure.” The reply: “It should be said that charity can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to the being that it has in its subject; and in this way it has a measure [modo] according to the measure [mensuram] of the recipient’s capacity, either from nature or from effort. In a second way, according to the inclination toward its object, and thus it is understood not to have a measure [modo]: for the object, since it is infinite, is not proportioned to our will; hence one can never love God so much that he would not be deserving of being more loved, or that one would not want to love him even more.”

302. In other words, each of the various virtues subordinate to charity has its own delimited object toward which a measured response is appropriate, even though the habit of charity from which that virtuous act may spring is itself unlimited in its proper object. The act of charity I elicit toward God, or toward God as present in the neighbor, is modeless, whereas an act of justice or of temperance, though commanded by charity and so meritorious, is on its own terms concerned with a commutation or distribution or use of a worldly good, and such an object determines the mode of that particular act.

303. That is, by all who are in the state of grace.

304. The objection is raised against Aristotle’s statement that the evil man does not love himself. A nice handling of this problem elsewhere in the Scriptum deserves our attention. At In II Sent. d. 42, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2 (Mandonnet, 1071), the second objection reads: “One cannot have hatred for that which is the ratio of loving. But a man is the ratio of loving as far as love for himself is concerned; for a man loves nothing except insofar as it is a good for him. Therefore no one can have hatred for himself. But we sin against him for whom we have hatred. Therefore no one sins against himself.” In reply, Thomas writes (Mandonnet, 1074): “Anyone naturally loves himself; and therefore each one loves that which he reckons himself to be. Now certain ones reckon themselves (and rightly) to be that which they are according to intellect, because it is owing to intellect that man is man; and thus they seek for themselves [appetunt sibi] things that are good [ea quae sunt bona; the Mandonnet ed. mistakenly has ea suae sunt bona] according to intellect and reason, whether directly or indirectly. But certain ones reckon themselves (and falsely) to be what they are not, on account of the sensitive nature, which is more outwardly apparent; and therefore they love in themselves the sensitive nature, having appetite for things that [merely] give pleasure to the senses; and since such things are bad for them and harmful from the vantage of what they truly are [as men], they therefore do themselves harm, and [thus] they hate themselves in act, though not in affection [se odiunt actu, sed non affectu].” The last phrase means: by really opposing or impeding the perfection of their nature, they are doing the sort of thing that one does to someone one hates—one harms an enemy, not a friend; yet they think and feel that they are doing what is good for themselves, and the affection of love for their own good, however badly they may understand this good, cannot be eradicated. Parallel treatments: ST I-II, q. 29, a. 4; II-II, q. 25, a. 7; De caritate, a. 12, ad 6; Super Ephes. 5, lec. 9; Super Ps. 10.

305. Questions 3 to 5 of In I Sent. d. 3 discuss the imago Dei, with special reference to mens, memoria, and other powers in their relation to the soul’s essence.

306. That is, because the God who is love is the exemplar and effective cause of our love of neighbor, thus in loving our neighbor we really love “love” (i.e., God) more. Cf. In I Sent. d. 17 (Paris version), q. 1, a. 1, as well as the first of the Notes on the Text of Lombard following that question, where Thomas discusses the exemplarity of God’s love (p. 10; p. 29).
307. That is, beatitude as an “accident” of the rational creature cannot be an ultimate end for love any more than virtue or the honestum can be (see the preceding responses). Such beatitude is that by which the creature is rendered blessed (i.e., a quasi-formal cause), not the efficient or the final cause of this beatitude, which is none other than God himself, beatitudo increata.

308. This category should be taken as broadly as possible, so as to include not only animals, but also plants, minerals, elements, even artifacts—indeed, anything and everything non-rational. For an essay that develops the argument of this article further, see L.-B. Gillon, “Charité et amour universel de l’être,” Angeli- cum 59 (1982): 37–44.

309. Obviously, they can perform a “common” work, as when a farmer plows a field using an ox; but this activity is not the same for the ox and for the man. The ox may do it out of fear or desire for food or mere routine, but the farmer guides the ox out of an intelligent and freely executed plan for his farm, a plan into which the ox fits in a way not much different from the way in which plow, harness, or barn fits into it, namely as tools or instruments for achieving certain goals, including some that are rather distant from the present. Thus, farmer and ox are “acting together” secundum quid; the ox is like an animate instrument of the farmer’s will. Thomas’s point is that brute animals cannot share with us the sort of works that friends do together.

310. Compare the saying: “Any friend of yours is a friend of mine.”

311. That is, if a good man and a bad man were friendly with each other, the bad one would have to be loving himself, since per hypothesis he loves the good one who loves him, and it is characteristic of friends to love the same.

312. This is the metaphysical foundation of the Catholic teaching that “while error has no rights, the erring person does” (cf. the now-classic formulation of John XXIII in the encyclical letter Pacem in Terris [1963], nn. 158–160).

313. When St. Thomas writes that we should hate whatever makes evil people unlike us, he is referring to those unlikelihoods that are morally or spiritually relevant, viz., vice and sin. It is not, as it were, a cry for total uniformity; the “us” rather refers to those who are striving to be faithful Christians and who, accordingly, are focused on goods essential for human flourishing and for salvation.

314. Or more familiarly: “Hate the sin, love the sinner.” On self-hatred, see In III Sent. d. 27, Notes on the Text (p. 181) and the references given in webnote 304.

315. The point seems to be this: something can be loved from charity directly, as that which is the very object of the virtue; and something can be loved from charity peripherally, with a view to this principal object. The peripheral object is an object of some lesser love (amor) that is included within charity. When I love a person from charity, I love his pets or his house, not as if they were objects of charity, but because they and their use have a certain relationship or order to his perfection and thus can be willed as goods for him whom I love.

316. Cf. Thomas’s remarks at In II Sent. d. 7, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2 (Mandonnet, 197; the objection had been that since we are evidently permitted to accept help such as alms from sinful human beings, we are also permitted to receive help from demons): “Sinners, as long as they are living in this life, are able to become members of Christ, no matter how much they seem obstinate in malice; and therefore they should be loved out of charity, and benefits can be received from and expended on them, provided that these benefits not be contrary to charity; but after they depart from the body into damnation, the same evaluation is to be made of them as of the demons [namely, that under no circumstances would cooperation be permissible].”

317. We cannot say that we love the demons, but we can say that we love all the natures God has created (indirect object), including the natures of the demons, because we love the Creator himself (direct object).

318. Charity is based on the possible or actual possession of the divine life, or grace.

319. The reader who comes to this question wishing to understand how Thomas relates love of self to love of God will be disappointed. Thomas contents himself with proving that love, in a certain sense, always begins with oneself; he does not here address the more interesting question of how, if this is true, a man not only can but must love God more than himself. That question is taken up in several other places translated in this volume: In II Sent. d. 3, q. 4 (at p. 81), In II Sent. d. 38, aa. 1–2 (at p. 87), and especially In III Sent. d. 29, aa. 3–5 (at p. 210), not to mention a host of lesser texts. There exist several studies of the question, among them Richard Völkl’s Die Selbstliebe in der Heiligen Schrift und bei Thomas von Aquin (Munich: EOS Verlag, 1956) and more recently, Thomas M. Osborne’s Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).
320. The context: “But understand this, that in the last days there will come times of stress. For men will be lovers of self, lovers of money, proud, arrogant, abusive, disobedient to their parents, ungrateful, unholy, inhuman, implacable, slanderers, profligates, fierce, haters of good, treacherous, reckless, swollen with conceit, lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God, holding the form of religion but denying the power of it. Avoid such people” (2 Tim. 3:1–5, RSV).

321. This text does not specify exactly what it is that exists first in the lover with regard to himself and is then carried over to his friend, but it is usually interpreted as a claim that one’s positive affective disposition toward oneself is the basis of a positive affective disposition toward another person, whom he takes as “another self.” On the friend as “another self,” see Gallagher’s “Desire for Beatitude and Love of Friendship” and “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love”; cf. Klaus Hedwig, “Alter ipse. Über die Rezeption eines Aristotelischen Begriffes bei Thomas von Aquin,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 72 (1990): 253–74.

322. This passage is one place among many where Thomas teaches that the love of persons for their own sake deserves to be called amor amicitiae, regardless of whether the person is oneself or another person. The phrase means: “the kind of love one has for a true friend, in contrast to the kind of love one has for an instrument or condition or element of the friend’s own good.” The latter would be amor concupiscientiae.

323. That is, the first meaning given to a term, according to a convention that has its roots in something extra-linguistic, usually in everyday experience. (For good examples of the importance of distinguishing the meaning first given to a word from subsequent and derivative meanings, see ST I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2, on the meaning of “action,” and ST I, q. 67, a. 1, on the meaning of “seeing” and “light”; for other examples, see ST II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2; De malo, q. 13, a. 1.) As Thomas explains in the response, charity first bespeaks a love that extends to others; but, he implies, it need not include this meaning. A very interesting text is In I Sent. d. 32, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (Mandonnet, 747): “Freely given love [amor gratis] is not a kind of private love that [as it so happens] tends to another [in addition to oneself]. Nevertheless, it also turns back upon the lover himself, for not only is a neighbor to be loved out of charity, but a man should love also himself out of charity, with respect to both his soul and his body; and so, too, does the Father love [not only the Son but also himself] by the Holy Spirit.” Here Thomas first states that charity is essentially bound up with other lovable persons, but then observes that its ratio is such as to include even the person of the lover himself, not only that of the beloved.

324. One can make a distinction in oneself between the one who loves and the one who is loved—a distinction of reason, but still true (see the next reply as well). The basis for self-love is the reflective power of the mind, which can view the self as an object of love for itself, even as it is an object of love for others. Consciousness introduces a bifurcation between the act of loving and the term of the act: self-consciousness transfers this bifurcation inwards. This is the only explanation of how it is possible for a person to love himself in one respect (e.g., that he is a Christian) and hate himself in another (e.g., that he is avaricious). It is also the explanation of how it is possible for God to will things other than himself while only willing himself: he can view his infinite singular perfection—he can, as it were, objectify or exemplarize himself—in different ways, as able to be participated or imitated by created beings in different ways. Speaking strictly, of course, God is not an object to himself, which would imply otherness. But we understand his exemplar causality of creatures by comparison to the analogous exemplar causality of a human artist, or by reference to the self-reflective moral agent.

325. Thomas speaks here of the power of collation, by which many objects are gathered into one object by a common aspect, and the power of reflection, by which the self is diversified through a consideration of different aspects.

326. That is, to love the good of the “spiritual man,” a good that is none other than God himself. To love oneself rightly is to love God more than self and to order everything else to him—a point succinctly expressed at In II Sent. d. 42, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2, ad 3 (Mandonnet, 1074): “A man’s loving himself is nothing other than wanting to be united to God, since a man ought to love himself for God’s sake. And for this reason love of oneself is included in the love of God.” For further discussion, see Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love.” The notion of the homo interior is discussed in a number of texts, which include ST I, q. 75, a. 4, ad 1; Super II ad Cor. 4, lec. 5; and In III Sent. d. 29, a. 5, at the end of the response (at p. 220).

327. For example, to commit fornication or to rob a bank involves loving one’s exterior nature more than, and in opposition to, the demands of one’s interior nature, and so such things are blameworthy; whereas to rest when tired, to exercise or eat moderately, etc., are activities of the exterior man which harmonize with the needs of the interior man, and so are praiseworthy.
328. The text is arguing that revelation fittingly gives no commandment of love of oneself or of one's body, but fittingly commands love of God and neighbor. The counterobjection is twofold: a perfect law should order all our loves, otherwise we cannot attain perfect virtue (and so commandments ought to have been given regarding the second and fourth objects of charity). And if one says that no commandment is necessary in regard to these objects because we naturally love them, the objector notes that a natural love of God above all things was implanted in all creatures, yet a commandment was still given; hence the same conclusion follows. Thomas proceeds to answer these arguments.


330. No virtue “plays favorites,” says the objector; one should not be more or less just to different people, but simply give what one objectively owes; one should not believe one truth of faith more than another truth of faith, but simply accept them all for true; one should not be more temperate with regard to main meals than with regard to desserts. As phrased, the principle is a little simplistic; after all, the kind of debt we ought to render will truly change as the status of the person involved changes; truths do form a hierarchy in which one is prior and more weighty in its credentials; what counts as temperance can differ for different kinds of beverages. Still, as the reply will indicate, charity has far more title to such differentiation than any other virtue.

331. That is, the order in which one loves different objects of love is not a morally relevant circumstance. It is, in this sense, not debita; one is not obliged to take order into consideration.

332. In other words, that which determines the moral species of an act—the moral object—is also the principle for determining the mode or manner in which that act ought to be posited. For example, while an act of sexual intercourse has its natural species from the simple conjunction of male and female, its moral species is derived from rationally known aspects such as married or unmarried, one’s own spouse or another’s spouse, procreation impeded or not impeded, etc. The very fact that a person is duly ordered to his or her own spouse and to no other—ordered, moreover, with a view to offspring—makes sexual intercourse another, or with fertility blocked, ipso facto disordered; and so on for other relevant aspects. A morally virtuous marriage act is, in the technical language employed here, commensurate with its proper object. This is why Thomas says it is not enough to do a just act, but one must do it justly. It is not enough to perform an act that is generically good; one must do that which is good well.

333. The effect produced by the virtue of charity differs (and should differ) depending on the condition of its object, but the uniform interior affection radiates outward into unequal works and brings even the manifestly unequal lover and beloved into union. While charity does not give the same “thing” to superiors and to inferiors (i.e., the lover does not behave in the same way toward them—to the former he shows honor, obedience, docility, etc., to the latter he imparts commands, instruction, etc.), still charity works toward a kind of equality in that it makes superiors more companionable with inferiors, and inferiors more confident and trusting with superiors. It banishes the familiar signs of distance, such as haughtiness and coldness, fear and false humility.

334. It is important to see the structure of this argument. Some virtues order a man only within himself, by giving a due mode to the exercise of his powers with respect to their proper objects. Other virtues—justice and its parts—have to do with a man’s relationship to another person, but in regard to some goods owed to that person. But charity has to do precisely with the other person not as an owner of goods but as a person with whom a friendship, a union of lover and beloved, can be established. This means that charity’s specific object will be diversified by different grades of rational nature, so that a higher rational nature will, given other relevant conditions, deserve a greater love, a more devoted friendship, than a lesser; and within the same rational nature, those who are superior in virtue will deserve a greater love than those who are inferior. We shall see, of course, that there are other factors involved, but this is the metaphysical framework within which those other factors play out. Thus, because of his unique uncreated goodness, God’s primacy can never be relativized by some other factor; whereas the goodness of an angel—much superior to ours,
but still created—is relativized by the fact of his distance from our human life, and so we are not expected to
love an angel, as such, more than we love (say) a father, brother, or son. St. Thomas will soon enter into
these questions (cf. aa. 6–7).

335. It is not only God who can be deprived of his due, but any person who is to be loved, if I were to
love him or her less than I ought. If I fail to love my parents or my spouse or children appropriately, I would
not be giving them the whole of the love that is owed to them, according to their level or gradus. This qual-
ification is important because it is also possible to err by excess, giving to some creature a love greater than is
warranted, or even giving to some creature a love that is due to God alone.

336. That is, if the visible works of love have an order, and these works are signs of an inward love, the
source of the order without must be an order within. It would be impossible to have a consistent diversity of
deeds without some underlying diversity of affection.

337. Just as the same object can be seen more or less clearly, so the same good can be willed more or less
intensely. The reason is that the intensity of an act is determined not solely by the magnitude of its object but
also by the agent’s capacity as well as by the effort he puts into the act. So, although the good willed for all is
the same (indeed, it is an infinite good), my willing of it can be more or less intense depending on how deep-
ly charity has taken hold of my will and how great is the effort behind the willing (one would tend to will
the same good more fervently for one’s spouse or children than for a stranger or an enemy).

338. For commentary see especially Völkli, Selbstliebe, and Osborne, Love of Self and Love of God.

339. In his article “Duplex amor and the Structure of Love in Aquinas” (in Thomistica, ed. E. Manning, Re-
cherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, vol. 1 [Leuven: Peeters, 1995]: 137–96), Guy Mansini first in-
vestigates the coining of this terminology in thirteenth-century discussions of the angels’ natural love for
God, and afterwards examines the variety of ways Thomas puts it to use, providing a collection and interpre-
tation of Thomistic texts in which the distinction is employed. One weakness of his study is that he does not
pay sufficient attention to the difference between Thomas’s more incidental or occasional employments of
the terms and his more formalized, systematic use of them. When Thomas is speaking formally of the struc-
ture of the act of love, he identifies two inseparable aspects or targets: the one for whom good is willed and
the good willed for him. Cf. SGG I, ch. 91: “It should be known that while other activities of the soul have to
do with only a single object, love alone seems to be borne to two objects . . . . Love wants something for some-
one, for we are said to love him for whom we want some good.” For excellent treatments of the distinction,
see David M. Gallagher, “Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas,” Acta Philosophica 4 (1995), 56–62; idem,

340. This illustration of the part-whole relationship, much employed by St. Thomas, has been the sub-
ject of considerable discussion among commentators. There are some who bristle with reservations about its
value (cf. Gilson, Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, 284), but one of the most sensitive interpreters, Gregory Stevens,
evaluating a number of parallel texts, finds the argument beautifully cogent (cf. “Disinterested Love
of God,” 515–32; see 316–17 for a criticism of Gilson). See also Louis B. Gillon, “L’argument du tout et de la
fact, arguably the chief point of contention between Eschmann and De Koninck was none other than how
to understand the part-whole argument (cf. the latter’s On the Primacy of the Common Good).

341. A distinction implicit in this response is that between the motive posited by the act of love, which
is the same as its object, and the motive of positing the act of love, in the order of generation (cf. In III Sent.
d. 23, q. 2, a. 5, ad 4 and ad 5, not translated in this volume). In other words, there are two valid answers
to the question “Why am I loving?”—the more fundamental: “Because of the object, which is good and lov-
able; the other, derivative from the first: “Because it is good for me to love this good.” This distinction has evi-
cident consequences for an analysis of friendship. The loving of a friend is something good for the lover him-
self, but what the lover wants in the context of that friendship is precisely his friend’s good. “Even if nothing
might come of it to us”: the love of the friend has its term simply in the friend, and hence is not measured by
whether or not we benefit from this or that act of friendship. However, Thomas would not pretend that
there is no such thing as a benefit, even in the case of an unselfish friendship; indeed, the unselfishness of it
is precisely the greatest benefit to the lover, inasmuch as it draws upon and deepens his virtues. Once again,
there is no getting around the paradox: if the lover were to “love” his friend only as a means for increasing
his own virtue, the friendship would instantly become one of utility, and the nobility (honestas) of it would
disappear; consequently, the opportunity for increasing (at least some) moral virtues would also disappear.
Again making a similar point to that of the preceding reply: cultivating amicabilia toward another person does not have for its purpose cultivating amicabilia toward oneself (which is what it would mean to speak of final cause), but rather, the self that we are first acquainted with and whose good we first seek is prior in the manner of a starting point from which knowledge and love of others come to be generated, by a gradual enlargement and extension of one’s horizons. Love of self is a point of departure; the point of arrival is love of others, above all God. This process of growth, like any organic sequence, does not negate the earlier stages but emerges out of them and gathers them up into something greater and more complete. It is important to see why Thomas speaks of the sia generationis, a process of growth from potency to act. As he explains in the main response, according to the sia perfectionis (the absolute order in which some perfect actuality is prior to any given potency), the root of man’s love of himself is in fact his prior natural love of God as perfect good—whether he has come to be aware of this or not. Cf. Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love.”

That is, God is present simply and wholly everywhere, though creatures themselves are not always equally present to him. Wherever there is being, there is the author of being, yet not all beings are equal, and only their origin is infinite and perfect.

At In III Sent. d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, in a discussion of the theological virtue of hope (which is defined as the virtue that strives to gain possession, for oneself, of the supremely enjoyable divine good), the fifth objection plays upon the seeming incongruity of there being any virtue to which there pertains the seeking of a reward. The answer given there is highly relevant to the present article on charity. The objection (Moos, 831): “No virtue has a wage-seeking [mercenarium] act, since virtue does good for its own sake. But hope has a wage-seeking act, since it looks to a reward. Therefore hope is not a virtue.”

The reply (Moos, 833): “It should be said that to do something for the sake of a temporal benefit [commodum temporale] makes an act wage-seeking, but to do something for the sake of an eternal reward does not make an act wage-seeking; for continence, of itself, does not suffice for salvation if it is kept only out of love for chastity [pudicitiae], as is said in On Dogmas of the Church, and the same account applies to other human acts. Or it should be said that the description ‘wage-seeking’ suits an act that is done for the sake of a reward [propter mercedem], but not an act that simply regards the reward itself [circum ipsam mercedem]. And although the act of hope is to look for beatitude, which is the reward, it does not look for it for the sake of that reward, but from the habit’s inclination, as occurs also with the other virtues. Furthermore, it looks for it not insofar as it is a reward, but insofar as it is a certain arduous good, namely the supreme one; for it has God as its chief object.”

Similarly, Thomas will argue that, while charity does not love God precisely as reward or for the sake of reward, neither does charity exclude that a reward should follow upon its essential activity (and should even be wanted as something that follows from that activity).

Someone is rewarded when the good owed to him for some work is given to him. In this sense, the wage or reward already belongs to the one who has earned it, it is his to claim even when it is still in the hands of someone else; this is why the giving of it is a matter of justice and not of charity.

St. Thomas might have in mind the words of Jesus when giving advice to his disciples about to embark on a preaching mission: “Remain in the same house, eating and drinking what they provide, for the laborer deserves his wages” (Lk. 10:7; cf. Mt. 10:10 and 1 Tim. 5:18). There are many scriptural texts about the earning and receiving of wages by those who do good works; presumably such people are put forward as examples not because they seek payment but because they intend and execute good works (cf. Prov. 11:18; Wis. 2:22; Mt. 20:1–16; Jn. 4:31–38; 1 Cor. 3:8). It bears recalling that, while Socrates refused to take money from youths and regarded with contempt the sophists who collect payment for their “wisdom,” he observed that it might be otherwise: “If a man were really able to instruct mankind, to receive money for giving instruction would, in my opinion, be an honor to him” (Apology 19e, Jowett trans.; cf. Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, ch. 1, 165a20–25). At In III Sent. d. 18, a. 5, ad 1, a contrast is drawn between a purchaser and a lover (Moos, 573, §103): “Buying [emptio] is principally for the sake of having the thing that one buys, and therefore after it has been bought once, it is not bought again. Action by which one merits, however, is not chiefly for the sake of obtaining a reward, but for the sake of the good of charity. Hence a man who has charity would act even if no recompense were to follow, and so he continues to act even after he has merited; and that which was already due to him in one way becomes due to him in another way.” The one who buys something is interested only in getting, owning, and using that thing, and so his relationship with the seller, as such, simply comes to an end; whereas the one who acts for another because he loves another will
be happy to receive love and benefits in return, but only as a byproduct, so to speak, of the activity to which he orders himself. For Thomas it is always an absurdity to imagine loving the good and not being rewarded for loving it, since man is made good by a good God for the sake of union with the good; but conceptually the reward (or the being-rewarded, the activity of beatitude) is always distinct from the person of the rewarder, and is valued only because of the latter. The reply makes a further point: because eternal life is merited by a free act proceeding from the divinely infused habit of charity, by another such free act the same reward is merited again, under a different title, so to speak. Taken together with earlier precisions about the intensity of the act of charity (cf. In I Sent. d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, at p. 43), this explains why there are degrees of blessedness, degrees of participation in the beatifying vision of God in heaven (cf. In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 1, a. 4, qaa. 2–4, at p. 381).

347. That is, of noble or virtuous friendship, the only kind that merits the name without qualification. It would rather be a “friendship” of utility.

348. Thomas is saying: If I love “justice” or practice just acts because I love the private property that is preserved or that accrues to me by the observance of justice, or if I love “temperance” because it enables me to enjoy more the delicacies of a gourmet table, I am not really virtuous. When genuine, justice or temperance, as moral perfections, are worth more than all the property or pleasures in the world; they cannot be subordinated to any lesser goods without being destroyed.

349. The argument of the foregoing three paragraphs may be summarized as follows. There are two ways of viewing the end of love: on the part of the one loved (ex parte amati) and on the part of the lover (ex parte amantis). The question: “Why—for the sake of what—do you love the beloved?” admits therefore of two answers. Ex parte amati, the end is the beloved, for it is he whom I seek, for whom I will the good, in whom I rejoice. Ex parte amantis, the end is my full flowering as a lover, as the worthy friend of my friend—one can say: my happiness in this relationship, which involves the activity of loving (an accidental perfection of the lover). Thomas’s point is that both answers are right and neither contradicts the other, provided that the two levels of analysis be kept distinct and the order of goods be preserved. Thus, since God is not only infinitely good but the source of all the goodness I have, I love him and myself and all other goods rightly only if I love him as absolutely first in my affection, and myself as ordered to him, and all other goods as ordered to increasing my love of him. This analysis enables Thomas to conclude that looking to a wage ex parte amati directly contradicts charity, because that would mean the wage, not God, is the object one loves; that looking to a wage ex parte amantis can have a place if it is not the most important end the lover seeks; that we should understand the “wage” here as the attainment of the “immanent” goal of charity (the subject’s perfection as lover) rather than its “extrinsic” goal (the divine friend who is loved more than self).

It is extremely interesting to compare St. Thomas’s first draft of this article, which we are fortunate to possess (the text is given in Gils, “Textes inédits,” 614–15), against the final version that the author released for circulation. Indeed, in this instance, we have a double draft: Thomas started a response that he cancelled out after a few sentences, and then he started—and completed—a second response, and in due course he cancelled this one, too, replacing it with the final version translated above in the main text. I shall here translate both drafts.

DRAFT I: “Response. It should be said that the ratio of a wage consists in this, that something is paid back to a worker; hence the consideration of a wage pertains to the love by which someone desires good for himself and turns it back to himself [ad se retorquet], which is the love of concupiscence. Now, this love, with which someone loves something by turning it back to himself, is ordered to the love with which someone loves himself; for from this, that someone loves himself, it happens that he wills good for himself and turns other things back to himself. But the benevolence that someone has toward himself is not excluded from that benevolence that he has toward God, but takes its place beneath it and is ordered to it. And therefore the charity that someone has for God does not altogether exclude regard for a wage, provided that it does not chiefly have regard for that.” This paragraph Thomas cancels out. On the same manuscript page we find a crucial marginal note in Thomas’s hand: “corrigendum. de hoc quod potest esse concupiscientia etiam ad alterum” “A correction to be made: concerning this [matter], there can be [love of] concupiscence even as regards another [person]”—that is, not only may I love goods for myself, I may love goods also for another person (cf. Gils, “Textes inédits,” 613; 615). This is perhaps the earliest indication that he wanted to break out of the convention of limiting amor concupiscientiae to self-regarding love and amor amicitiae to other-regarding love. Aquinas will use the pair of terms more precisely to mean love of goods for persons (whether myself or another), and love of persons for themselves (whether myself or another).
DRAFT 2: “Response. It should be said that love of benevolence does not curve back from the one loved into something else, but it has its term in the very one loved. However, the love of something as an end does [in one sense] curve back to the lover, because it is loved insolar as the lover is perfected by it; and thus the love of something as an end, whether as a wage or as a reward, does not pertain to love of benevolence, but to love of concupiscence. And so the order of benevolences is not evaluated according to the ratio of the end but according to the ratio of the lovable [simply]. Now the ratio of the lovable is one’s proper good, which is found more in God than even in the lover himself, as is clear from what has been said; hence God is more loved with a love of benevolence than the very lover loves himself, as was said above. The love of concupiscence, however, is ordered to the love of benevolence that each one has for himself, and the degree of these loves is taken according to the ratio of the end, because that which is desired as something to be obtained as an end is most of all longed for [concupiscitur], while that which is desired as pertaining to the end [ut ad finem] is all the more longed for the nearer it is to the end, either through the [greater] likeness it has to that end, or insolar as it leads [more] immediately to that end. Hence, in this order of love, too, God, insolar as he is the end to be participated in (according to which he is called our wage, our reward, and our happiness), is most of all longed for, and other things insolar as they are ordered to him, unless the love be errant. Now, every accident [i.e., any good that accrues to a substance as an accident], as was said above, is loved only by a love of concupiscence. From the aforesaid, therefore, it can be made clear that the love of charity that we have for God does not totally exclude the love of a wage, because concupiscence for a wage is referred back to the love of benevolence that someone has for himself, which charity-love [caritas dilectionis] for God does not exclude but rather allows beneath itself [sed eam sub se compatitur]. But if love of a wage is set up as the end of the benevolence that someone has for God, in a certain way charity allows this, but in another way it does not allow it, for to set up a wage as an end of the love of benevolence that we have for God may occur in two different ways. In one way, such that a wage is set up as love’s end as regards the very object of love; that is to say, to wish the divine good to exist and to be preserved in order that God may grant me a wage; and this charity does not allow, because under those conditions the love that we have for God would be placed outside of the ratio of benevolence, insolar as it would be ordered to a different object of love [ad aliud ipsum amatum]. In another way, on the side of the love itself; and since love itself is a certain activity and accident, and thus something to be loved with a love of concupiscence, that activity can be referred to a wage as to an end—not, however, to a temporal wage, but to the wage which is God himself, otherwise a good [spiritual] activity would be loved less than a temporal good. Thus it is clear that charity for God is compatible with love of a wage, not when a wage is set up as the end of the one loved, but when a wage is set up as the end of the love and of all that is loved for the sake of a lover. And although it is not compatible with a temporal wage as an end of spiritual goods, it is nevertheless compatible with such a wage as an end of other goods, according as one temporal good is the end of another.”

350. The strictly logical conclusion would be that we should love some of our neighbors, those who are spiritually superior to us, more than ourselves.

351. For the argument of the objection to be complete, a premise like the following ought to be added: This statement of the Philosopher implies that we should spare others pains more than we spare ourselves pains, and be more eager to spread out our good things than to seek good things from another. Therefore, etc. It may be pointed out that Aristotle actually says one should bear oneself slowly to share a friend’s prosperity; a view common sense readily supports. If a friend wins the lottery, one should not be quick to knock on his door looking for benefits; if he wrecks his car or a tree falls on his house, one should come as quickly as one can.

352. Thomas is careful to phrase his claim as a comparison: more than. I am not allowed to prevent my friend from sinning by committing a sin myself; in all cases, I must refrain from sinning, because that is in my power, while my friend’s actions are not. Of course, a man ought so to love his own soul that he also actively seeks the salvation of other souls.

353. The phrase used here is reminiscent of another, voluntas ut ratio, by which Thomas distinguishes free will or liberum arbitrium from the fixed inclination of the will as a nature, voluntas ut natura. On these two types of voluntas, see In III Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3, ad 1 and ST III, q. 18, aa. 3–5.

354. Again it is crucial not to misunderstand the argument. The point is simply that, since spiritual goods are more perfective of the person and are goods over which each man has a certain freedom in his own regard (especially under the reign of grace), these are the goods to be maximally cultivated in oneself—to will...
them more for another or even equally would already mean that a man is not willing them as much as he could for himself. Take an example: I should want to be perfectly just independently of whether or not the people around me are just; I cannot make them want to be just or act justly, though I can do much to inspire and help them to acquire justice. The other side of the argument concerns external goods: since these are less perfective of myself, I should not be as eager to hold onto them, but should use them rather as instruments of virtue to help others. I will gain spiritually by generously giving away my possessions, and in this way I can really come to the aid of individuals as well as benefit the whole community. A disordered scenario would be the opposite: a man who wants to gather as many exterior goods as possible (which would mean not only property but also a good such as bodily health, which is “exterior” vis-à-vis the “inner man”), while caring little about whether or not he is virtuous. Indeed, a really greedy person would want all his neighbors to be as generous and long-suffering as possible so that he could amass more wealth from them and raise fewer protests.

355. God and the neighbor differ crucially in regard to the relationship between their good and mine. Metaphysically speaking, my neighbor’s good is his and his only; I myself do not participate in the superior virtue of a saint. That is another person’s perfection. If I am virtuous, too, then he and I are like each other because each of us happens to have the same qualities. On the other hand, all the good that I am or have is a participated likeness of the good that God himself is, and I receive this good directly from him at every moment. Therefore, since whatever good I am or have is more properly said to be his and is mine by his causality within me, one may validly conclude that God’s good is mine, in a way that my neighbor’s good could never be mine. This is why Thomas never attempts to articulate a generic account of “love of others.” There is one account for love of God, in whom all my good preexists with maximal perfection and who is therefore to be preferred to myself in every respect, and another account for love of neighbor, in whom a partial good is found and who can never be absolutely preferred to oneself. If the “other” is God, a person both naturally and supernaturally loves this other more than self; if the “other” is a fellow creature, a person naturally and supernaturally loves this other with a love dependent upon, subsequent to, and (to some extent) measured by, legitimate love of self. For these reasons, Thomas would regard the question whose answer determines the separate paths of modern altruism and egoism—“Should I love others more than I love myself?”—as a question poorly formulated.

356. In this response we are given a hierarchy of goods that implies a moral criterion for sacrifice: (a) love of one’s own virtue—interior good of self; (b) love of the friend—another self; (c) love of one’s own bodily life—exterior good of self. Thus one should be prepared to give up (c) for the sake of (b) because it is more in accord with (a) to do so.

357. Thomas expands on this idea at In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 1, ad 1 (Moos, 692, §298): “If someone were to take from himself a necessity without which he could in no way exist or live fittingly [decetere], and give it to another, he would pervert the order of charity that ought to be observed in doing good [ordinem caritatis perverteret in beneficis observandis]. But as regards other things, without which the aforesaid [fitting manner of life] can exist, he does not pervert the order of charity if he grants more of them to others than he grants to himself. For it is a characteristic of the virtuous man to grant more of such bodily goods to others than to himself, as the Philosopher says in Ethics IX.”

358. The word amuseratia need not be limited to the idea of “exchanging ideas by means of talking,” as its English derivative does. Aristotle and Thomas are not envisioning a man engaged in animated dialogue with himself, which sounds like insanity; they are picturing the contemplative soul that is filled with noble, beautiful things to think about, and ponders them with delight. But there is also a sense in which it is true that a person has to “live with himself”; and, if Aristotle is right, the virtuous man finds it easy and pleasant to be alone with himself, whereas the wicked man finds his own company burdensome and seeks refuge in distractions. See the first of the Notes on the Text after Distinction 27 (p. 181).

359. Thomas is arguing that in fact, in this life, all the different grounds for friendship—the various communicaciones spoken of—coexist and together determine the appropriate response of charity, which does not destroy the prior human friendships but gathers them up into itself and gives them a divine orientation. And this is true also for evil people, since they, too, are members in potentia of the mystical body of Christ, the Church (cf. ST III, q. 8, a. 3). If such potency is not actualized at the time of death, however, the departed soul no longer enjoys any kind of fellowship with Christians in the definitive society or polity, that of the heavenly Jerusalem. Because such a soul is cut off from the possibility of the friendship of charity, he lacks
the decisive basis of all friendship from the point of view of eternal life, regardless of whatever nature or family or polity he may share in common with me. This is why one should love a Christian neighbor more than a dead infidel, even if that infidel happens to have been one’s father. It hardly needs to be pointed out that, apart from receiving a special revelation from God, one cannot know whether or not one’s father was in fact an infidel at the moment of death. Thus, Thomas’s comparison here has to be taken as a hypothetical one: if my father were both an infidel and dead, I could have no reason to love him more than the lowliest, most remote Christian in the universe.

360. The last point being that, as grace does truly build upon nature and perfect it, so the common origin, way of life, and goals of citizens in a city forges an affective bond that is taken up into the friendship of charity and gives it an additional strength.

361. It is tempting to read these remarks about how one should love more the non-relatives who join in noble deeds than one’s own father as a muted reflection of Thomas’s own feelings about his family members, who, as is well known, did not view with benign acquiescence his friendship with members of the Order of Preachers (“familiar acquaintances who undertake noble works”) and his entrance into their ranks. In the end, Thomas showed by his actions that the order of charity was: God first; the religious brethren second; his blood relatives third. For further details on the family background (including some of Thomas’s unmistakable written confidences about his early domestic struggles), see Torrell, *Person and Work*, 1–17.

362. How does a man “share something in common with himself”? This is a roundabout way of referring to the unity that a man enjoys with himself. I share in common with myself being myself, and that is an immeasurably greater “commonness” than the likeness I could share with anyone else as regards human nature, family or racial origin, language or learning, etc. This is not true with respect to God, however, because he is nearer to me than I am to myself; he has, so to speak, more in common with me than I have with myself. Thus, precisely because I am to love what is nearest myself, I am to love God more than myself viewed as distinct from him.

363. The point is that in regard to one’s own property, money, business, etc., one’s relatives are to be employed, endowed, and generally preferred to non-relatives, unless there is an overriding reason for doing otherwise, such as poverty outside the family or a decisive advantage to be gained from supporting (say) a subcontractor outside the family in preference to one who is within the family. It goes without saying that St. Thomas does not understand *utilitas* in a reductionist way, as if we should not hesitate to subordinate the good of our family members to the increase of personal profit. This would be a capitalist attitude entirely foreign to St. Thomas.

Incidentally, this response contains more than a little autobiographical resonance. Friar Thomas’s well-connected parents had both expected and made arrangements for him to be appointed abbot of Monte-cassino at an appropriate age, an office that brought with it lordship of vast domains with numerous privileges—a clear case of ecclesiastical benefices being distributed according to natural family preference. The young man’s decision to persevere in an order of mendicant preachers in spite of his family’s bitter opposition underlined that, in his mind, there were definite limits to the scope of the friendship based upon natural *communicatio*. Cf. webnote 361.

364. As Thomas teaches, parents are not the cause of human nature as such—indeed, no natural thing is the cause of form as being or being as being—but they are the cause of this human nature coming to be in this matter. They are therefore true causes of their children, even though God is (1) the first cause of the operations of secondary causes and (2) the creator of the human soul, which, since it is a *per se* subsistent form, must be created *ex nihilo*. Nevertheless, it is the act of human generation through which the (God-given) form comes to be joined to the (parent-supplied) matter and which, for Thomas, explains the inheritance not only of particular family and racial characteristics but also of original sin. On the larger metaphysical questions, see John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on Creatures as Causes of *Esse*,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 40 (2000): 197–213; Gregory T. Doolan, “The Causality of the Divine Ideas in Relation to Natural Agents in Thomas Aquinas,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 44 (2004): 393–409, esp. 398.

365. Even if a stranger were such a good man that he would deliver you from death, were you in danger thereof, you cannot allow this to hold more weight than the intimate natural connection that binds you to your father. So, if that stranger had actually saved your life, and later on both the stranger and your father were in peril, you should save your father’s life before the stranger’s. It is important to grasp the reason: we are dealing with a life or death situation, hence with the most fundamental natural good. Therefore
it is in reference to *this* good that a decision is to be made about whom to rescue. I have in common with the stranger what I have in common with any human being—human nature. It is, as it were, a parallel likeness: we are all human side by side. But I have this nature *from* my father; my likeness to him is in some sense *derived* from him. Hence, he is to be preferred, even if he be vicious, to a non-relative who is perfectly virtuous. On the other hand, as Thomas has explained, if we are dealing with something like public works or religious exercises, we are permitted to (and we may even have an obligation to) assist a fellow citizen or a fellow religious more than a parent or sibling, in proportion to the importance of the goods at stake. It may also follow from the reply to the third objection that there might be a situation in which a non-relative, due to his eminence, should be preferred to a relative—for example, if a bishop and one’s father were in prison, one should do more for the release of the bishop because he occupies an office intimately tied to the common good of the Christian people. He is, one could say, a father of a higher order, in a family more profoundly one’s own.

366. In this article, while *propinquus* refers specifically to “relatives” (seeing that Lombard’s discussion centers on the order of charity among family members), Thomas’s argument can easily be adapted analogously to other sets of relationships, such as fellow citizens of a town or country, fellow members of a guild or a team, members of a religious order, and so on: wherever there is a figure analogous to a father or mother, and others analogous to brothers or sisters, the same basic structure is present (see textual note a on p. 204). Thus, within a town all of whose inhabitants are “close to us” (certainly closer than the inhabitants of another town or another land), a mayor or a police chief would take precedence in receiving services at the civic level, for the same reason a father takes precedence in the family. The treatise on justice in the *Summa theologiae* (II-II, qqs. 57–122), concerned throughout with the basic relationship of giving and receiving the *bonum debitum*, contains valuable resources for working out such details; a good example would be q. 101, on *pietas*.

367. That is, among all of those who are close to us, and from the vantage of natural relationships, the father holds pride of place. This statement cannot be taken as exceptionless, as Thomas has already explained in the preceding article.

368. That is, all other family relationships are traced back to this one.

369. What it is to be animal (the genus) is logically causative of what it is to be man (the species, which includes the genus and something more), so that you cannot have “man” unless there is also “animal”; whereas positing the genus “animal” does not necessarily posit the species “man,” since it is possible for animals to exist even if man does not exist. Similarly, if a cause exists, there need not be any particular effect (so far as the being of the cause is concerned); the relationship of cause to effect is *accidental* to the cause’s being. The effect, on the other hand, depends upon the cause for its being or at least for its having come to be, and in this respect it has an *essential* relationship to the cause.

370. The child, inasmuch as he has his origin in the father, is derived from him and is “his own” child. Obviously Thomas would not be asserting a theory of persons-as-property and fathers-as-kings such as one can find in Roman law. He himself readily disobeyed his parents’ wishes when it came to religious life. Thomas is drawing attention to the metaphysical principle that an effect is always the effect of its cause, as the temperature of the heated water is something “of” the heat source, whereas the heat source is not anything “of” the heated water, or better, as a benefactor is, in a sense, the “maker” of the one benefitted, who is his “creation”: “I made you what you are.” The child “belongs” to the father, he is *his* child. (Thus on tax forms children are noted as “dependents” of their parents.) This kind of language has obvious limitations, since, however much a child depends on a parent in coming-to-be and in being nourished, it does not receive its being (*esse*), simply speaking, from the parent, and *esse* is what is most perfect, most formal, and most intimate in a thing. The child is most like a bodily member when it is growing in the womb of the mother, but even then it is a substance unto itself, with its own genetic signature, blood type, developing consciousness, etc.; and after it is born and grows, its primordial status as a rational substance with its own dignity, rights, and duties becomes ever more manifest. So the argument given by Aristotle is accepted by Thomas as valid at a certain level or from a certain angle, but not as a comprehensive account of the father-child (or parent-child) relationship.

371. Everything in this discussion turns on the two ways of considering things: as distinct entities or one as part of another. The child can be considered in either of two ways. If the outlook is on things as distinct entities, then the child naturally loves the parent more than the parent loves the child. If the outlook is on
one thing as part of another, then the parent loves the child more than the child loves the parent. An effect, in general, can be taken in either of two ways. Inasmuch as it is taken as a distinct entity, it has less intrinsic lovability than a cause. Inasmuch as it is taken as an extension of and manifestation of the cause, it is loved as part of the cause. Now, charity has more to do with the love that looks at things as distinct entities, since such an outlook pertains to benevolence and so to friendship. One is thus more of a friend to one's father than to one's son.

372. The first sentence seems to be specifying what it is that makes a woman a wife: “one who is received/taken up/taken to oneself for the act of generation.” The argument concludes that because the act of generation is what distinguishes a man’s wife, as such, from any other woman, therefore the love to be given to a wife as such is comparable to that which is given to children as such, since they, too, are children by their connection to the same act (the wife as participating in it, the children as originated from it). However, since a woman is something more than a wife and a child something more than a child—each is a human being, and could be a fellow Christian, fellow citizen, eventual member of a religious order or town official, etc.—there are other aspects that could and would affect the love that is appropriately given to them by the husband or father. The argument also implies that the wife comes after the husband’s own father in the ordo amoris, yet, since she is “something of the husband,” he would love her more than his father in the same way that he loves his children more. This implication is borne out in ST I, q. 92, a. 2, on why the first woman was made from the first man (de viro), and in II-II, q. 26, a. 11, where the parents are said to be loved by their son with greater reverence but the wife with greater intensity, as being more united to him.

373. Given that the features of Aristotelian embryology out of which this last claim emerges (e.g., the discussion in Generation of Animals IV, ch. 3, of why some offspring do not perfectly resemble their fathers) have long since been shown false, Thomas’s argument concerning paternal primacy has to be in part rejected, in part modified. The father’s primacy may have another basis, but it does not have the biological basis provided by the Aristotelian theory of generation. For discussion of the theory itself, see Kevin L. Flannery, “Applying Aristotle in Contemporary Embryology,” The Thomist 67 (2003): 249–78; David Albert Jones, The Soul of the Embryo: An Inquiry into the Status of the Human Embryo in the Christian Tradition (London: Continuum, 2004), 18–32; Robert Mayhew, The Female in Aristotle’s Biology: Reason or Rationalization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). One who wishes to update Thomas’s analysis would have to review the places in this article where he speaks of the father, and ask: Does this particular claim apply only to fathers, or also to mothers? If only to the former, exactly why? Moreover, one must entertain serious reservations about the manner in which, even granting Thomas’s embryology, a father can be said to “give the form” to his child. As Thomas consistently teaches, human parents together supply only the child’s matter, God infusing the rational soul which is the single form of man as man. This does not undermine the fact that a definite pair of human parents, one male, one female, are genuine causes in the “procreation” of a child; it is merely to reject the inequality of female and male as generative agents.

374. The judgments expressed in this reply are based on the assumption, itself rooted in Aristotelian biology as well as in a certain interpretation of scriptural passages, that the male is, as such, more intelligent, stronger, braver, and in general more endowed with perfections than the female, and hence that, insofar as a woman is perfect, she is more like her father and her brothers than she is like her mother and her sisters. The exact meaning of this view is not that a daughter’s perfections always imitate actual perfections in her father while her defects imitate actual defects in her mother, but rather that since human perfections are more a “male” thing and defects more a “female” thing, a daughter is likened to her father as male inasmuch as she is perfect, and likened to her mother as female inasmuch as she (the daughter) is imperfect. It is, in other words, purely a statement about the sexes, not about the individuals, who will have their own ensemble of physical and moral qualities, some good, some bad, regardless of sex. Indeed, this view would compel one to say—and here the oddity is palpable—that a mother who is brave is more likened to the maleness of her husband than her cowardly husband is to his own maleness, because his lack of bravery makes him in that respect more likened to the femaleness of his wife; she is (as people used to say) “manly” while he is “womanly.” It is not possible here to enter further into the many elements, scientific, cultural, and religious, that go to make up Aquinas’s complex views on man and fatherhood, woman and motherhood. In criticizing or modifying these views, an effort should be made to lay aside at least some of the more egregious misinterpretations of Aquinas’s doctrine. See Michael Nolan, Aquinas’ Philosophy of Man and Woman (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998); idem, “The Aristotelian Background to Aquinas’s Denial That ‘Woman is a Defective Male,’” The Thomist 64 (2000): 21–69.
375. Thomas writes that charity *relinquit* these notable effects, it “leaves them behind” as evidences of its presence. The first point made in this response is that we are dealing with a difference not in *kind* but in *degree*: all the grades are grades of just the same thing, charity, but just as light can be more or less bright, and heat more or less warming, so charity can be more or less ardent in its effects. Hence, the grade at which I actually *am* discerned not in any absolute way but from the effect that predominates. Similarly, when a man’s hair is only partially gray, we say he has gray *hairs*; but when the gray predominates, we say he has gray *hair*.

376. Advancing charity can be looked at in two ways: with respect to what comes before it and with respect to what comes after it. From the latter vantage, the salient feature is that the person more and more rests in the good things, experiencing them as connatural goods. Similarly, as Thomas goes on to say, perfect charity can be looked at in two ways: perfect with respect to good things that all Christians need to pursue; most perfect with respect to optional, more difficult goods (or, alternatively, perfection such as can be had in this life, and the utter perfection possible only in the life to come).

377. In other words, for a stage of motion to be considered significantly different from another stage, there has to be a *noteworthy* change. (One is reminded of little children asking frequently during a long trip, “Are we there yet?”) The segments of the journey are marked off by the use of significant markers of time or place, such as cities en route to the destination, the setting of the sun, or stopping for a meal.

378. The last proviso is important. For Thomas, a charity perfect with regard to objects of love would probably require embracing the evangelical counsels and would certainly require a heroic love of enemies even to the point of martyrdom. It would not be compatible with the somewhat mediocre practice of virtue that was common, as he saw it, to the majority of Christians of his own day (see typical admissions in *De malo* q. 1, a. 5, ad 16; *SCG* III, ch. 141; *ST* I-II, q. 31, a. 5, ad 1; *Sent. Eth. VII*, lec. 7, n. 1405 and IX, lec. 10, n. 1893). Nevertheless, a Christian who does no more than keep the Ten Commandments and avoid grave sin is still on the road to salvation—provided he does not despise the way of greater perfection or those who walk on it, and more importantly, does not turn personally *against* it as a way that he himself might travel. An example of a hardening of heart would be a nominal Christian who so despised the religious life that he would rather do or suffer anything than become a religious himself, even if God were calling him to that after the death of a spouse. According to the argument presented here, such a person could not be saved, regardless of any fulfillment of routine religious duties. Moreover, Aquinas notes in the last sentence of the response that there are times when any Christian, whatever his degree of maturity, is called upon to exert himself as the perfect would do—when, for example, an enemy is dying of hunger and begging him for food, he must feed him.

379. According to Thomas, not to commit venial sins does not belong to the scope of a commandment, because the lawgiver does not intend to prevent every wrong deed but only those that destroy the relationship to God or the fabric of society, and that can be avoided by everyone at all times. In this discussion, “bound” has the strongest possible sense—if one is *bound* to something, then failing to do it is a mortal sin, as is implied in the earlier *sed contra* argument about damnation.

380. In other words, above and beyond what all Christians are bound to, religious are bound to those specific things they vow to fulfill; otherwise, they remain unobliged. Though Thomas was living at a time when there was not the immense profusion of religious orders there would subsequently be, he was well-positioned to be aware of the differences between the structure of the life vowed by Benedictine monks (among whom at Montecassino he spent his childhood as an oblate) and the structure of the life vowed by mendicant friars, whether Dominican or Franciscan. The monk, *for* example, having taken a vow of *stabilitas loci*, is bound, in ordinary circumstances, to remain at the monastery he entered. The friar, on the contrary, having taken no such vow, is free to roam the world at the command of his superiors. As for prelates, they are bound to certain works of perfection, such as preaching, not from vows freely taken but from the nature of the office conferred upon them.

381. Cf. *ST* III, q. 18, aa. 3–5, on *voluntas ut natura* and *voluntas ut ratio*. The former refers to the natural inclination of the will toward the good of the whole man. Since death is the worst evil for man considered “naturally,” that is, as a body-soul composite, it is naturally feared more than any other evil. However, by the power of reason man can discern that other goods (those of the spirit) are superior even to the good of preserving this composition, and that other evils (again, those of the spirit) are more evil than the loss of this composition; hence, by his rational will (i.e., free will informed by a judgment of reason, *liberum arbitrium*), a man can, against his natural will, prefer “to be dissolved” than to remain unified.
382. Namely, the words: “Lord, if I am still needed by your people, I do not refuse the labor! Thy will be done” (see textual note a at p. 241). Thomas's point can be lost unless one sees the connection between benevolentia, “willing well,” and “desiring what is pleasing to God,” i.e., what he wills. The one who has charity loves God as his own good, the good that makes him happy; from this vantage, the lover desires to die, that he might attain the beatific vision. But at a level deeper still, charity causes a desire for unity of wills—specifically that the lover’s will be conformed to the beloved’s will (thus, Martin’s to God’s: “Thy will be done”). One has benevolence, then, and superior perfection of charity, by doing what is most pleasing in the Lord’s judgment. So, if the Lord wishes Martin to remain with his flock and serve them, Martin desires to render this service more than he desires to depart and be with the Lord. There is, of course, no comparison as regards the goods in question, for the sight of God is infinitely better for me, absolutely speaking, than any earthly service. This discrepancy of worth highlights all the more the essential issue: the good that is God’s and is identical to his will—however humble a service it demands of me here and now—is to be preferred to any good that is mine, however exalted. Yet by the same token, since doing what pleases God pertains to the perfection of charity, and that is also my good, I am ultimately more benefitted by achieving this conformity of will, for which I need to abnegate certain preferences of my will (the “concupiscence” Thomas speaks of), than I would were I to seek “my own good” independently of God’s will.

383. The argument can be put succinctly: since grace builds upon and perfects nature, the man who is an enemy of Christ is acting not only against the Christian, but also against the perfection of his own nature. To this extent, he does not love himself, either. The same is true, Thomas comments, of all sins. “Those who commit sin are the enemies of their own lives” (Tob. 12:10). As Dickens unforgettably portrays, the miser is not only a misanthrope but an obstacle to his own happiness.

384. Thus for Thomas, the Old Law already teaches that we are to love our enemies, but we are not required to do more than “be willing” that they come to possess God’s favor and eternal life: we need to have benevolence. The New Law adds that we should actively help our enemies: we need to show benevolence. “To him who strikes you on the cheek, offer the other also; and from him who takes away your coat do not withhold even your shirt”; “love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return” (Lk. 6:29, 35). Far from being an exaggerated contrast, in many ways this is the most charitable interpretation that can be given of the literal meaning of those many portions of the Old Testament that unequivocally depict or desire the wholesale destruction of the enemies of the chosen people, or deal with them on severely unequal footing (for example, one may not lend upon interest to one’s neighbors, but one may do so to foreigners: Deut. 23:20).

385. To complete the response, Thomas might have noted that a further conclusion follows: the more perfect is love of God, the more perfect (i.e., complete) is hatred of sin, and simultaneously, the more perfect is love of the neighbor as image of God, potential sharer in his grace and glory. Thus, zeal for God, zeal for helping one’s neighbor, zeal against evil, and zeal for penance are exactly coextensive; if one of them is weak, the others must also be weak.

386. This metaphysical point is easier to grasp with examples. Thomas gives the example of being (not ens, but esse, “be-ing”) taken generically, versus situere, a specific way of be-ing. It is easier to end the life of a material thing than to end the being of its matter. In this sense, basic be-ing is more vehement. Yet living is nobler than (mere) be-ing: it is, in fact, a heightened way of be-ing. Thus it embraces more in act than (mere) be-ing. Thus, the perfection of be-ing consists in its reaching, or extending to, the kind of fullness or richness that is found in a plant, still more in an animal, incalculably more in a man. Another example: in man, what is most basic is the image of God that inheres in the faculties of the spiritual soul; this pertains to the very constitution of human nature and is most vehement in the sense that it cannot be destroyed. But being in a state of grace, though it can come and go, is a higher, more determinate way of bearing the same image; it actualizes the very potentiality of those faculties. Being in the state of glory is a yet higher way of bearing the same image that was (partially and movably) perfected in the state of grace.

387. This line has to be read carefully, lest it sound like a blanket approval of consequentialism: “You may not do evil to someone unless a greater good would follow from doing so, or a greater evil from refraining to do so.” Thomas is speaking here of temporal goods and evils, and specifically of evils of punishment meted out to criminals, which evils are not moral but “physical,” to employ a customary distinction. He has already excluded the legitimacy of desiring spiritual evil, or even temporal evil qua evil, for one’s enemy (to will in such a way would be a sin against another person). Rather, he is saying that in some circumstances—namely, where a greater good more deserving of love, or a greater evil more deserving of repulsion, is at stake—
one is permitted to desire or administer a punishment for an evildoer’s crime. In St. Thomas, a standard example of this would be civil authority’s justly punishing a criminal to redress the injustice and safeguard the society’s common good.

388. The good deeds I should be prepared to do for my enemy will equal the affection I am asked to have for him. Of necessity, I am asked to have him in my affection as an image of God and possible sharer in glory; I am therefore obliged to pray and work for his salvation. There is thus nothing “fake” about my love if I simply pray for him, not doing for him what I do for my family or friends. Nevertheless, it is clear from Thomas’s argument that the superior Christian way—the way of perfection, not of obligation—is to extend even to enemies the expressions of love that one would extend to one’s best friends. It is a more perfect way because it is Christ’s; it is not obligatory because it surpasses natural justice, which charity does not contradict, even if it goes beyond it. (An employer is free to pay out more than he agreed to give, for liberality does not contradict justice, it goes beyond it. The same is true in the present case.)

389. One is bound to do only those acts of kindness that correspond to a friendship’s foundation, the good shared in common. As this sharing grows, the acts of kindness must also grow in due proportion. The more the other is “one with me,” the more I must love him “as myself.” Thus, in the order of nature, I am obliged to do more for my family than for non-family; in the order of grace, I am obliged to do more for fellow Christians than for non-Christians; and taking the two orders together, I am obliged to do more for Christians within my family than for non-Christians within my family. Note that none of these statements implies that I should not will and do good for the latter category; quite the contrary. Thomas’s point can be seen best in situations of conflict, when one must set priorities. If, owing to circumstances, I had to choose between helping the one or helping the other, or helping the one more intensively than the other, which of them should I help first or most? Such choices, often difficult and painful, are exceedingly common in life. Far from being a scholastic subtlety, the argument Thomas advances is a reasoned reflection on the priorities of everyday Christian life—something the Apostle Paul recognized long ago (cf. 1 Tim. 5:8, “If any one does not provide for his relatives, and especially for his own family, he has disowned the faith and is worse than an unbeliever”; cf. 1 Tim. 3:12, Tit. 1:6, Eph. 5:33, and many other texts that presuppose that a special love and attention will or should be given to certain people in preference to others).

390. At ST II-II, q. 157, a. 3, ad 3, Aquinas notes that it is possible for someone to lose “the human affection according to which man is naturally a friend to every man . . . [W]hen someone takes delight in punishing a man, this is also called mental illness [insania], because in this way it is indicated that he is devoid of the [normal] human affection upon which mercy follows.”

391. The gloss could have given the impression that Christians are not obliged to do acts of kindness at all for their enemies, since going out of one’s way to pray for and help out enemies seems to belong to a special state or condition of charity. As he did in the main response, Thomas points out that it is one thing to show kindness in a general way to all, and another thing to show the special affection or attention that characterizes personal (or “particular”) friendships. The former must be shown to all, enemies included, but it is only a perfect charity that “moves ahead into the sorts of behavior that belong to other particular friendships.”

392. The warning of webnote 387 against a consequentialist misreading of Aquinas’s argument applies equally to the present reply. Here, again, war is understood to consist of physical evils meted out to real enemies of the common good. Hence in no way is Thomas implying that when “justice” or some “greater good” is at stake, “anything goes.” Nothing morally evil can ever be rightly done for any reason whatsoever, even if such an act could procure the preservation of an entire city or kingdom.

393. For a detailed study of Aquinas’s understanding of meritorious acts, see Joseph P. Wawrykow, God’s Grace and Human Action: ‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). The doctrine of merit as expounded in the Scriptum is discussed on pp. 60–137.

394. The argument: charity’s whole function is to unite men to God and to each other in friendship. Thus, to love a friend out of charity is to perform the act of charity par excellence, while to love an enemy falls less strictly under the scope of this virtue. Put differently, it belongs to the formality of charity’s object that it be “friend,” and so “loving the friend” is the virtue’s essential activity.

395. I take this complex sentence to mean that, if the will wills more intensely the ultimate end for the sake of which a particular object is willed, then regardless of how repugnant that particular object may be to the will, it is capable of performing an act of love of greater merit than an act toward a particular object much loved in and of itself. An act of love toward a person one is naturally inclined to love (say, a friend)
Aquinas's teaching on merit, see Wawrykow, which those mentioned in note c on p. 257 are some of the more notable. For a comprehensive treatment of Thomas's final remark is a way of saying that, strictly speaking, you cannot compare love of neighbor with the love of God. An act of love of God is not necessarily more meritorious, as it may be that an act of love of neighbor can well exceed, in goodness and merit, an act of love for God alone, but solely because the former other the proximate object is God immediately. Thomas's point is that an act of love directed toward one's neighbor is never less meritorious than an act of love for God, since the latter always includes (some degree of) the former, and vice versa.

396. Looking to the virtue's proper object, love of a friend is better, since a friend is a more fitting object to be loved; but since the reason for loving is God, the love of enemies, which extends further than the love of friends, is better. In the final sentence, Thomas invokes again the distinction between a general love of enemies that requires no special exhibition of the signs of friendship and a special love of enemies that goes beyond what is necessary by extending to them the same signs one would extend to a dear friend. He notes that if you take "love of enemies" to mean the latter, it is obviously superior in merit to love of friends, for it entirely presupposes the love of friends and extends this kind of love much further.

397. Just because loving only friends (and hating enemies) is not from grace or meritorious does not entail that loving friends is not from grace or meritorious. It entails only that, for a Christian, love of friends will always be accompanied by love of enemies, whether general (as a matter of necessity) or special (as a matter of perfection)—indeed, that these two loves will have a common root and a common end.

398. That is, some ways of loving one's enemies belong to the humblest degree of charity and so are incumbent on all Christians.

399. Cf. In III Sent. d. 24, a. 3, qa. 3 (Moos, 776): "Quantity of merit can be looked at from two points of view: on the side of the work, or on the side of the one who does the work. Now the work itself must be virtuous [if it is to be meritorious]. And since virtue regards what is good and difficult, that work must have difficulty and goodness, just considered in itself; therefore whatever adds to either of these characteristics adds to merit on the side of the work. On the part of the one who does the work, will is required; hence a man merits more to the extent that he does something more by his will. And the quantity of merit is always looked at according to its root, [namely] charity."

400. A necessity, namely, of paying back what one owes.

401. The more willingly one pays back the debt, the more this free act can be an act of love and hence a meritorious act. If one pays back only under constraint, then one is behaving as if manipulated by an external agent; there is here very little of the voluntary.

402. So far from lessening the goodness of an act or vitiating its supernatural purity of motive, an act's naturalness only enhances that goodness by giving it a richer basis, offering further support to the higher motion of grace.

403. That is, the object of choice stands to the end for the sake of which it is chosen as matter to form. Of course, inasmuch as the particular object is also an end, relatively speaking, it too has a formal role to play vis-à-vis free actions leading up to it.

404. When two things are related by the addition of the second to the first, something follows in the contrary (i.e., in the contrary direction: the second is added to the first), but from this addition nothing follows in the first; so that when you take away the first (animal), you take away the second (man), but when you take away the second (man), you do not take away the first (animal). Thomas had used the same example earlier to illustrate the logical relationship of genus and species: when you posit "man" you necessarily posit "animal," but when you posit "animal" you do not necessarily posit "man."

405. "in another act": in aliquo actu. We take this phrase to mean "in another act" because a comparison is being made between two separate acts of charity, either of separate persons or of the same person at different times, both of which proceed from love for God, but in one the proximate object is a neighbor and in the other the proximate object is God immediately. Thomas's point is that an act of love directed toward one's neighbor can well exceed, in goodness and merit, an act of love for God alone, but solely because the former proceeds out of a greater love for God than the latter. So, in the end, we are still comparing loves for God. Thomas's final remark is a way of saying that, strictly speaking, you cannot compare love of neighbor over against love of God, since the latter always includes (some degree of) the former, and vice versa.

406. The principle that charity is the root of meriting is invoked in a very large number of contexts, of which those mentioned in note c on p. 257 are some of the more notable. For a comprehensive treatment of Aquinas's teaching on merit, see Wawrykow, God's Grace and Human Action.

407. Recall the key distinction between two unions: the interior union of affections or wills, which is love
essentially: the personal union of presence, which is love’s supreme effect and goal. The one who loves God by God’s gift of charity is already conformed to the beloved in affection. From this affective union the lover “earns” the real union—having been made worthy of it precisely by the gift of affective union and the actions that flow from it. The unio secundum rem follows as if naturally upon the unio secundum affectum. See the discussion of affectus in the Introduction (p. xxviii).

408. In fact, the grace that makes the soul pleasing to God (gratia gratum faciens) and the virtue of charity are always infused together. One way of expressing this connection is to say that charity can never exist in an unformed state (cf. In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, qa. 4); another way is to say that grace, as perfecting the essence of the soul, is the point of origin for all the supernatural virtues, of which charity is the crown and binding force (cf. In II Sent. d. 26, a. 4, of which the reply to the fifth objection is translated above, in webnote 285).

409. This succinct observation is fully explained at In II Sent. d. 40, a. 5 (Mandonnet, 1025–26): “Now an act is capable of moral goodness insofar as it is human; but an act is human insofar as it is in some measure produced by reason. This happens only in those acts that are commanded by the will, which follows the deliberation of reason. Acts that follow the apprehension of a sudden imagination (such as the stroking of a beard and that kind of thing) will in this way [i.e., morally] be called indifferent. But none of those acts that follow a deliberate will can be indifferent; they will necessarily be either good or bad with political [civili] goodness or badness. Yet an act perfect with political goodness is not capable of the efficacy of meriting except in a man who has grace; and therefore in one who lacks grace it is indifferent with respect to merit or demerit, whereas in one who has grace it must be either meritorious or demeritorious—for as a bad act will be demeritorious, so a good act will be meritorious. For since charity commands all the virtues as the will commands all the powers, [it follows that in one who has charity] whatever is ordered to the end of any virtue must be ordered to the end of charity; and since every good act is ordered to the end of some virtue, it will remain ordered to the end of charity, and so will be meritorious; and thus to eat and to drink, keeping the measure of temperance, and to play for recreation, keeping the appropriate measure (namely that of extrapelia, which holds to the mean in playing, as is said in Ethics II), will be meritorious in him who has charity, by which virtue he has placed God as the last end of his life.” Cf. ibid., ad 3 (translated in webnote 147); In III Sent. d. 18, a. 5 (translated in webnote 281).

410. The simple fact of a work’s being difficult to perform does not, of itself, increase one’s adherence to the ultimate end, but if one braves difficulties for the love of God, the suffering this entails, depending on its quantity, can satisfy for some or all of the debt of punishment one owes on account of sins. In this way the quality of difficulty can contribute to removing obstacles to merit and so clear the path for works of higher merit. But Thomas also says that increased difficulty in the work itself can make a work more meritorious: cf. In III Sent. d. 24, a. 3, qa. 3 (translated in webnote 399).

411. Indeed, such facility or ease (facilitas) increases merit by giving freer rein to virtuous activity. Cf. In III Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4 (Moos, 700, §30): “As is said in Metaphysics II, difficulty can be from us or from things; and the same applies to ease. Therefore the kind of ease that is due to actions themselves being of no great weight, diminishes, as far as that goes, the ratio of merit, whereas the ease that is from the agent’s readiness [to act] does not diminish merit (with respect to the essential reward), but increases it; for to the extent that one does something with greater charity, so much the more easily does one endure [difficulties or obstacles], and the more one merits. And likewise, to the extent that one acts with greater delight on account of the habit of virtue, one’s act is more delightful and more meritorious.”

412. The argument is this (and the fallacy is hard to hide): Charity merits eternal life. Whatever is merited must be given. Therefore even if someone who has charity loses it, he must recover it before he dies, otherwise he could not rightly be given the eternal life owed to him. So, anyone who has had charity at some time will surely have it at the time of death.

413. In other words, as long as charity still exists, there cannot already be a sin that has expelled it. But if this is true, the only sin that could do so would be a sin yet to come, but as this is a mere possibility, charity remains unaffected.

414. This argument concerns effects proceeding from causes. For example, a stone is indifferent as to motion left or right, and therefore does not just move left or right; a person or something else has to move it that way. Much less does a stone move up, since it has an inclination downwards. Thus even an indifferent man would not do evil; much less would (or could) a man inclined by charity to good do evil. (The example
of the stone manifests the flaw in the argument: some motion or effect can proceed from the stone, not insofar as it is indifferent or for the lesser part, but due to some other cause.)

415. For St. Thomas, no creature, as such, could ever be naturally confirmed in good (cf. De veritate, q. 24, a. 7). The wills of the blessed in heaven are confirmed in good in such a way that they are unable to sin, that is, to fall away from God and their own superabundant perfection (ibid., a. 8); and wayfarers can, in a certain sense, be confirmed in good, inasmuch as they can be preserved from sinning by a gift of grace (ibid., a. 9; In II Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 1). Christ when on earth was impeccable because his human mind was already united perfectly to God in the beatific vision; the Blessed Virgin was impeccable due to a sublime gift of grace that befitted her role (cf. In III Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 2). In the blessed, confirmation in good does not remove the power of choosing this or that particular good in relation to the summum bonum, God (cf. ST III, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3).

416. Preoccupation or fascination with the particular good “sucks dry,” as it were, the universal knowledge so that it becomes, practically speaking, a non-influence. The image is one of a particular drawing all attention to itself, leaving the intellectual knowledge “high and dry.”

417. A fine analysis of the universal/particular disjunct, using the same example, may be found at In II Sent. d. 24, q. 3, a. 3, on whether there can be sin in ratione, i.e., in the power of reason or in its use.

418. In place of the passage beginning “Now the Philosopher” and ending “since charity loves God,” the autograph manuscript contains an earlier draft worth translating here (cf. Gils, “Textes inédits,” 615–16): “Now the solution of the proof is the one that the Philosopher gives there. For just as knowledge [scientia] is about something other than what the activity of sin is about, because knowledge is about universals whereas activity is about particulars, so too the proper object of charity is the unchangeable good, whereas the object of sin is a changeable good. Now, it is in the following way that knowledge is conquered in a man by sin: the affection for something plausurable to sensation (such as sexual indulgence [luxuria] or similar things that are connatural to us) surges up—accordingly, that thing looks good to him—and encounters no resisting knowledge either because he is not making use of the knowledge he has, or because his consideration of it remains at the universal, speculative level. And that he is thus conquered is not from a defect in the knowledge, but from a defect in the one who has the knowledge, insofar as he does not make use of the knowledge to the extent that he is able to do so. And since the universal ratio is not applied to the particular matter at hand [ad particulare opus], it follows that in the particular, no other ratio of good is available to him except the one produced by the affection of concupiscence. And on account of this ratio, according to that which he finds of the ratio of the good, he makes his choice and goes astray in choosing; and this is the kind of ignorance that characterizes every bad man. In a similar way, too, since charity loves God more vehemently . . .”

419. It is obvious that Thomas is speaking here of grave or mortal sin, not of venial sin. Only the former aims at an end in a way that is incompatible with aiming at God as end, whereas the latter does not touch this relationship, as Thomas has already explained: see In I Sent. (Paris version) d. 17, q. 2, a. 5 (at p. 51); In I Sent. (Lectura romana) d. 17, q. 2, a. 4 (at p. 75).

420. That is, light actualizes the transparent medium in such a way that the moment the light source is blocked, the medium ceases to be lit up. Aristotle had defended the notion of light as an instantaneous actuality of the medium, and for scholastics who held to Aristotelian physics this doctrine lent itself well to spiritual application, as when Thomas compares God’s continual giving of esse to a creature to the radiation of light from the sun (ST I, q. 104, a. 1). Needless to say, the general principle remains true—nothing can remain in being when separated from its essential cause—even if the example no longer serves as an adequate illustration.

421. That any infused virtue is actually in the soul is due to the present action of God, its only source; by definition it has no human source. In this sense, it is not caused by the creature at all. In contrast, the virtuous habits we acquire by dint of our own efforts are more stable because their cause lies in the very use to which our powers have been put. Hence one unjust act cannot destroy a firm habit of justice, or one error destroy the habit of science, whereas a single act of disbelief or heresy is enough to lose faith. It is like closing the shutters: forthwith, the sunlight is blocked.

422. For further discussion and examples, see Kwasniewski, “Modalities of Excess in Aquinas,” 158–73.

423. That which causes cupidity remains in the power of the soul, and hence, though actual cupidity be absent, yet its cause remains. Thus there is always, in the wayfaring state, the potential for cupidity to flare up again. Thomas goes on to say that charity is capable of preventing this from occurring.
424. The last phrase can be expanded: when there are two forms contrary to each other, such as hot and cold or antelope and lion (inasmuch as this implies non-antelope), as soon as the one is generated, the other is corrupted, at least to the extent that the same matter is in question. This proviso is added because accidental change can be gradual, and so one part of a body can become hot through heating while another part is not yet affected by the spreading heat. It is obvious that, in substantial change, one form cannot coexist with another form in the same substance, since each wholly actualizes the matter of that substance.

425. The principle of the many is not the principle of the few. The nature of a plant is the cause of its healthy growth. If there is a deformed plant, its deformity cannot be caused by the plant’s nature, for this nature is the intrinsic cause of the healthy formation of the matter that is open to contraries; the deformity must be caused by a cause extrinsic to the nature, determining it to an outcome which is, by definition, for the lesser part.

426. When Thomas writes that charity inclines “for the most part to what is good,” he is not saying that sometimes, in rare instances, it inclines to the opposite or inclines not at all; rather, he means that by charity the person who possesses it is himself actively inclined to do good—but not at every moment, or by necessity, but by a tendency that exhibits itself in the larger part of his actions. If such a tendency could not be discerned, or if the opposite began to be discerned, that, in itself, would be a probable sign of a lack of charity. Similarly, in this argument the inclination of sensible affection to the sensibly pleasant is a reference not to the bare nature of sense-appetite, which is good in itself and is appropriately inclined to sensible goods, but rather to the state of this appetite in the fallen human being, where the tendency to become fixed upon and satisfied with the goods of the outer man conflicts with acquiring the better goods of the inner man.

427. Cf. Rev. 13:8, which is more explicit in making the identification: “[A]nd all who dwell on earth will worship it [the beast with ten horns and seven heads], every one whose name has not been written before the foundation of the world in the book of life of the Lamb that was slain” (RSV).

428. Both the good and the wicked see Christ their judge in his humanity, i.e., they see his glorified body; but only the former see his divine nature in the beatific vision, which is their reward. Of this vision, the wicked are necessarily deprived.

429. It should be noted that St. Thomas speaks in the singular both here and in the initial objection: the Old and New Testament. He considers the two as a single book with a single author and a single message, a book that makes eternal life known to man and leads him to attain it. However, at the same time, he is careful to point out that it is about salvation in general, not about the salvation of any particular person. Hence, while those who practice its commandments attain life, nothing in the book guarantees the attainment of this life. That is why it cannot be called the Book of Life simply speaking.

430. That is, the grace that someone has lost by mortal sin, who is not predestined. The point is that a man’s past grace no longer makes glory present to him as in a cause. This is true even of the predestined man who ultimately repents: it is his grace present at the hour of death that blossoms into glory, not any grace he might have had earlier but then lost. The parallel article in the ST (I, q. 24, a. 3) is clearer.

431. Note that the metaphor of erasure applies only to those who first had grace and then lose it. A pagan who never believed or wanted to believe would not be erased, because he was never written into the book even secundum quid (“noted down”).

432. Cf. 1 Cor. 1:4–8 (RSV): “I give thanks to God always for you because of the grace of God which was given you in Christ Jesus, that in every way you were enriched in him with all speech and all knowledge—even as the testimony to Christ was confirmed among you—so that you are not lacking in any spiritual gift, as you wait for the revealing of our Lord Jesus Christ; who will sustain you to the end, guiltless in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

433. In a hypothetical state of pure nature, a man or an angel would love God above itself and all things (see In II Sent. d. 3, q. 4, at p. 81) and would be under no necessity to fall away into the sin of disordered self-love. That is, nature as such is well-ordered by its maker; disorder results only from an abuse of creaturely freedom. Hence, there is no temptation, however great, that this hypothetical man could not resist with his freedom, even if unaided by grace. All the more, therefore, can someone with grace resist any temptation whatsoever.

434. This entire response presupposes the scenario of article 1 (especially ad 1), namely the free will freed by grace from the slavery of sin. The one about whom we are asking whether he can resist temptation is the one who is equipped by grace with the weapons to resist any onslaught. Thomas takes it for granted that one
who does not have grace and charity will find it exceedingly difficult to resist many temptations and impossible to resist all of them all the time.

435. The idea seems to be that even if one experiences a greater difficulty, the essential task of resisting what opposes charity is within the inherent power of charity, since charity has a quasi-infinite power from the good to which it unites the soul. Thus, resisting any trial is not like a work that outstrips the strength of the agent, as lifting 100 pounds would be for a person whose maximum lifting strength is 50 pounds. The power is sufficient for the work.

436. This is not really a full response to the objection. Mortal sins are easier for charity to resist than venial, because charity unites a person to the ultimate end but does not, of itself, regulate and rectify all our uses of creatures, though it can so if well used, since it stirs up the desire for rightly ordering all desires.

437. A Christian is constituted a spiritual priest by having the grace of charity. Hence, just as the Levitical priests lost something of their right to perform sacred works when they fell away, so too the Christian loses something of the fullness of his spiritual priesthood. This argument is flawed in part because of the essential difference between the priesthood of the Levites and the priesthood of Christ.

438. The argument can be simplified: glory is merited by charity. Penance revives lost merit. If therefore the repentant sinner is to be duly rewarded, he must rise up from sin with at least as much charity as he had before sinning.

439. A special sign of honor in heaven, bestowed upon martyrs, doctors, and virgins. A full treatment is given at In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 5.

440. Meaning: the Apostle is not speaking of each and every sin in particular, such that where this or that sin abounded, grace must superabound, but rather of the situation of fallen human nature, where the sin that abounds in mankind is surpassed by the grace present in, and made available by, the Redeemer. The context in Romans is speaking of the contrast between the first Adam, in whom all have sinned, and the second or last Adam, Christ, in whom all are offered the opportunity to be made alive by a greater sharing in God's life than even Adam enjoyed before the fall.

441. The comparison is between two falls: one that diminishes charity and one that leaves a man wholly bereft of grace. A man who falls into a lesser sin and rises more humbled, even should he lack the same measure of charity, may have thus been preserved from a fall into a worse sin (e.g., pride over his good works) from which he may never have arisen.

442. The essential reward for merit is essential beatitude, which refers to the intensity of participation in the beatific vision. This intensity is determined by the habitual charity in which one dies. An accidental reward, which means a distinguishing mark of honor, may be obtained owing to certain acts performed or a state in which one has lived, e.g., virginity. Thus the widow who dies with more charity than a virgin occupies a higher place in heaven, but the virgin bears a sign of honor, an aureole, for her superior state.

443. On this distinction in angelic knowledge, see ST I, q. 58, aa. 6–7; De ueritate, q. 8, aa. 16–17; Quodl. IX, q. 4, a. 2.

444. Cf. Sir. 24:21 (RSV): “Those who eat me will hunger for more, and those who drink me will thirst for more.”

445. This is not an argument about the remaining of hope, as are the first two objections, but about the way it ceases. Faith is “emptied out” because the vision “fills” the eye of faith—faith and vision stand in the relation of dim to bright, obscure to clear, so that the vision of glory is fundamentally in continuity with faith—whereas the substance of hope, expectation for the good not yet had, is not “filled” in heaven but simply ceases to exist when the good is actually had. Thus, the way in which hope ceases is not by an “emptying out” of hope but by its simple cessation, since hope and possession are not in continuity but are contrary (viz., object unpossessed/object possessed).

446. The idea is that those who are hungry want to keep eating more, whereas those who are full turn away from more food with a kind of disgust. So, to convey that in heaven the appetite is never disgusted with abundance, Scripture speaks of a continual hunger.

447. Namely, the subject underlying the change, be it prime matter in substantial change, or the substance itself in accidental change.

448. Thomas does not complete the statement, but he is saying that to be irrational is, as it were, constitutive of a donkey, such that if a donkey were made rational, it would not then be an especially clever donkey, but some other animal altogether. Of course, what makes the donkey positively itself is not any lack, but a specific difference unknown to us.
449. If it is obvious that faith, which is defined by its mode of obscurity, is banished in heaven by the clarity of vision, it is even more obvious that one cannot have numerically the same habit of hope when the good is actually possessed, since the very essence of hope is the order to that good as not had.

450. In other words: in changes, the subject remains the same in number, but the form remains the same only in genus, as Thomas illustrated with the color example: in the change from white to black, the surface that receives the color remains the same, whereas the colors differ in species but agree in genus.

451. The argument is that if Christ, as God, had willed it, it would come to be with the certainty of predestination; and that, since the wills of the saints are perfectly conformed to God's will and their prayers perfectly acceptable to him, it seems that if they desired and prayed for the salvation of certain enemies, those enemies would therefore be marked as saved.

452. As is often the case, the sed contra arguments go too far in the other direction. Thomas's response will, in a general way, indicate the flaws in these two arguments as well.

453. Referring to the time prior to the conversion of Saul (the Apostle Paul), of whom it is written: “Saul laid waste the church, and entering house after house, he dragged off men and women and committed them to prison” (Acts 8:3); “Saul, still breathing threats and murder against the disciples of the Lord” (Acts 9:1); “I persecuted this Way to the death, binding and delivering to prison both men and women” (Acts 22:4). The conversion of Paul is narrated in Acts 9, and retold by Paul in Acts 22 and 26.

454. The arguments in this sub-question seem to apply either exclusively or most of all to the saints. With some modifications, they could be applied to Christ. The reason is that Christ manifestly should love himself more than he loves any other, since, as very God, he is infinitely worthy of love, and as man, he is inconceivably more perfect than any other intellectual creature. However, one could still ask: In heaven, does Christ as man love an earthly relative of his who is less good more than he loves non-relatives who are better?

455. The argument presupposes that the essential reward given to souls in heaven varies according to their varied habits of charity. Hence, the saint who died with greater charity has a greater share of God's goodness in heaven, and since the wills of all the saints are conformed to God's, they will that this saint should have that particular share, which may greatly exceed their own. Hence it seems that they must love this saint more than they love themselves, inasmuch as love is indicated by the greatness of the good willed for the one loved.

456. The “other” here is, of course, not God, but a fellow Christian or member of the city of the blessed. God is never spoken of by St. Thomas as “other” simpliciter, because God is, in fact, more myself than I am, as the total origin and finality of all that I am.

457. An important point for Thomas: it is not enough to say merely that God is the highest good simply, for it could be thought that he is the first principle of some order to which I do not belong, a good that just happens to be the highest, which may or may not be relevant to me. Rather, he must be my highest good—the principle of the order of goods to which I belong, the source from which I derive all the goodness I have—in order to be loved by me above all other things, including myself. The paradox is that if God were not “pertinent” to my own perfection, there would be no metaphysical basis in me for an ecstatic love of him above and beyond my private good.

458. In one swift stroke, St. Thomas dissolves the objection that tries to make loving oneself contrary to loving God. If God the Creator has so shaped the will that it naturally seeks the good most proper to the willer—and thus, naturally seeks the supreme good that alone satisfies the same will's tendency to the bonum universale or bonum absolute—then when the will actually seeks what is truly good for itself, it is thereby fulfilling most perfectly the divine will, and hence loving God, since the love of friendship is constituted by a union of wills. If, on the contrary, one does not love what is best for oneself taken most properly (i.e., according to one’s spiritual nature), but rather something good only from a relative point of view (i.e., according to one’s sensitive nature), then this love should not be called “love of self,” simply speaking, but deserves rather to be qualified as a disordered love of self.


460. Implicit in the premise is that the more spiritual a reality, the more claim it has to preservation in the afterlife. But faith does not remain, and faith is superior in spirituality to any human knowledge. Hence no human knowledge can remain.
461. The conclusion is reached almost too quickly; the objector takes it for granted that the reader appreciates the incongruity of saying that “turning to the phantasms” will occur in heaven prior to the resurrection of the body (and with it, the brain that contains the organ of imagination by which the phantasms are produced).

462. That is, we know things by relating, conjoining, separating, terms or statements. Such an approach fits well with our natural environment: we are intellectualized bodies that assemble the elements of knowledge from sensible contact with the world around us, and derive conclusions based on what can be gleaned from such materials, with the help of careful thought and discussion. In heaven, on the contrary, where there is an immediate vision of the Word (cf. objection 4), there is no need for collecting data, studying, or disputing. Hence, it would seem that knowledge compiled or gathered in that manner can have no place at all.

463. If new knowledge is added to a soul, it can be regarded only as a perfection of its intellect. But to furnish a soul with perfections is to increase the soul’s goodness and proximity to God; hence to do so can only be in function of rewarding. Therefore the knowledge of the damned cannot be increased in this way.

464. The point being that, just as you need to have a red apple in front of your open eyes in order to see red (not just remember red, or imagine red, but actually see it), so too you need a phantasm present in order that the intellect may conceive the quiddity of a material singular. And there is no equivalent of or substitute for memory or imagination at this level; if the phantasm is lacking, intellection does not occur.

465. The argument seems to be this: the first reason for the mode of our understanding is something unchangeable, because it involves the nature of the soul as such; whereas the second reason is changeable, inasmuch as it specifies a changeable cause of the necessity of turning to phantasms, i.e., the soul as actually informing the body here and now. As Thomas goes on to say, if the soul ceases to inform the body, the limitations resulting from the body can no longer be an impediment to the actual consideration of already-possessed knowledge.

466. I take Thomas to be saying that, insofar as discursive reasoning attains certainty as its terminus, this motion is a thing of perfection (i.e., the motion is perfected in the certainty), but taken just in itself, as motion (i.e., as imperfect act), it betrays rather the imperfection of a knower who attains certainty step by step and not all at once. In heaven, where the blessed know all at once, they retain the perfection of certainty without any need for the motion by which that certainty is naturally attained.

467. Returning to his distinction between the two reasons for the human soul’s mode of understanding, Thomas asserts that the post-resurrection soul will not be under any necessity of turning to the phantasms, for it will then suffer no restriction in its active power from the limitations of body.

468. A confusion could arise from the fact that charity is love, and one can commit a sin by “love,” as when a Hollywood hero pleads that “love made him do it.” The response is that the latter love is not charity if it conflicts with charity’s nature, namely a friendship with God such that one loves God more than anything else (and thus, wills what he wills, as expressed in the divine law). But charity can never be lost due to an act of true charity; rather, like strengthens like.

469. “Confirmed in good” (confirmatis) is a technical expression referring to those whose wills have been so ordered to the divine good that there is in them no possibility of falling away from God. This happens of itself in the beatific vision, since the will is then presented by the intellect with the object that uniquely and superabundantly fulfills its innate tendency toward the bonum universale; there is simply nothing lovable that the soul then lacks and to which it could turn aside. In the wayfaring state, however, as long as God is not seen face to face, only a special grace, rarely given, can enable the will to be indefectibly ordered to the divine good in this manner.

470. For St. Thomas, anger, desire, sorrow, or other passions are predicated of God metaphorically: since the works or deeds of God correspond to the results of such passions in men, we then attribute the names of the passions to him by way of this likeness of effect. God has no passions and no possibility, but in punishing the sinner he does the same thing that a man injured by an enemy and moved by anger to vengeance would do—indeed, he does it all the more justly and thoroughly because the factors that lead men to injustice and partiality are completely absent. Hence we give him this name (“God is angry”) from the effect, without asserting that it has passion for its cause. Cf., e.g., ST I, q. 13, a. 3, ad 1; q. 13, a. 6; q. 20, a. 1, ad 2; F. J. A. de Grijs, “Thomas Aquinas on Ira as a Divine Metaphor,” in Tibi Soli Pecavi: Thomas Aquinas on Guilt and Forgiveness (Leuven: Peeters, 1996), 19–46.
471. In the context, Aristotle is arguing that a man would not want his friend to become a god, though it sounds like an appealing prospect, because this would take the friend forever beyond the human sphere of life in which their amicable communicatio or conversatio finds its natural place. In other words, so great an exaltation of the friend would dissolve their friendship, which neither one would desire. The objection also plays upon Aristotle’s observation in the same chapter that there is no possibility of friendship between man and God because the distance between their natures is too great.

472. In other words, if it is God’s love that moves him, as it were, to produce offspring, then these offspring exist precisely due to that divine love, and hence the conclusion is reached: they exist because he loves them into being.

473. The first scenario depicts the imperfect, dependent lover in a position of neediness vis-à-vis the beloved, who is full of riches to bestow on him; the second scenario depicts the perfect lover in a position of largesse vis-à-vis the beloved, who stands to benefit from his gifts. More briefly, the first is “need-love” and the second “gift-love.” As Thomas sees it, the creature’s love, even at its most perfect, will always be fundamentally of the former type, since all that the creature has is a gift from the goodness of God; whereas the Creator’s love, even at its most condescending, will always be fundamentally of the latter type, since there is no perfection he could lack, nor any he will lose, no matter how abundant the giving is. But it may be added that the more a creature is perfect in goodness, the more perfectly it will be able to imitate the divine generosity by becoming (in him and under him) a source of perfection for others.

474. Thomas interprets the extasis of God’s love for creatures to be metaphorical. God “suffers ecstasy” or “stands outside himself” in the sense that when he brings creatures into being and leads them to their perfection, he is lavishing good upon them (in the words of Dionysius in the same place) “through the abundance of his loving goodness, providing for all beings” for their sakes, that they might be perfect. Since he is altogether perfect, he does not gain from the outgoing, but only benefits the recipients of his gifts; for this reason he is “maximally generous” and in no way needly (cf. ST I, q. 44, a. 4, esp. ad 1; SCG I, ch. 93), remaining ever the same and not, in a literal sense, “going out of” or “standing outside” himself. Yet this makes him all the more deserving of the description as regards the effects of ecstatic love, which are his effects above all. See Kwasniewski, “Ecstasy in Aquinas’s Sentences,” 77–86.

475. Thomas presumably means that the agent intellect, being itself a participation in the divine light that is the source of all intelligibility, is capable of rendering intelligible that which is only potentially so (namely, the form of a material thing, immersed in particularity), and in this way, in the process of making actual the possible intellect, “places its own form” upon the object understood.

476. Faith, since it implies the defect of not-seeing God and of understanding the truth enigmatically, cannot be in God, who not only sees himself but perfectly comprehends himself; yet that reality about which and from which faith exists, namely the divine truth, is faith’s exemplar in God. Here the exemplar is essentially higher than the thing patterned after it. Wisdom, on the other hand, since its notion implies no defect whatsoever, can be said to be in God according to the same notion we have of wisdom in rational creatures, although the manner of its existence in him surpasses anything we experience or understand in this life. Thus God exemplifies temperance or faith not by being temperate or believing, but rather by “virtues” essentially higher than these; whereas he exemplifies wisdom or charity by being wise and loving. A good discussion of how the four cardinal virtues can be said to be exemplified by the divine mind is found at ST I-II, q. 61, a. 5.

477. Charity is predicated of God above, or by priority to, other virtues because it enjoys a better title to being predicated of him than they do, whether they are said rightly of him but less primordially (as “merciful,” which presupposes “loving”), or because they are said metaphorically (as “temperate” or “faithful”).

478. Thomas seems to be saying that one may speak of God exercising a “love of concupiscence” for something provided one does not mean that God is anxious to acquire an absent good for himself, but rather, that he is serenely willing a certain good for a creature that lacks it or needs it.

479. The evil due to which the wicked are condemned—the sins of which they are guilty—does not have God as its cause. In order for God to be truly a hater of such souls, he would have to be the reason why they lose beatitude, which he is not and cannot be. He is said to hate in them those privations by which they are unlike himself and therefore less than fully themselves.

480. Presupposed to this argument is the full treatment of time-related predications given in the commentary on Distinction 30 of Book I. Briefly put, a name is said of God ex tempore if the meaning of the name
involves something that is only true once creatures actually exist in their own right. Thus, whereas God
is good, wise, all-powerful, and so on whether or not there are creatures, he is “Creator” and “Lord” only
when there are creatures who are his subjects, and he is “Savior” only when there are beings in need of sal-
vation.
481. That is, in the active power of the agent, which need not go forth into act.
482. This argument requires more if it is to be a complete answer, since God is not a soul, and there is no
distinction in him between activity and habit. It might simply be said that God has it in his power as intel-
lectual being to conceive good things and to love the goods thus conceived, quite apart from the actual cre-
ation of them.
483. This argument is a bit odd, given what has just been established in the preceding article (esp. obj. 4
and ad 4); it seems the objector has been daydreaming.
484. If, that is, we are speaking of an act that is an imperfect actuality, or motion, which has different
parts. The act of my running from my house to the grocery store can be more intense at the beginning and
more remiss at the end, because this motion from term to term has (potentially infinite) diverse parts. Dur-
ing its course the mobile can speed up or slow down.
485. Thomas simply writes bonum, but the point is that one must take into account not merely God’s idea
of the creature (when, as divine idea, it has no proper being or goodness of its own but is identical to God
himself and is thus infinitely good), but also the now-created creature as really existing in the world with
its own goodness—and this created goodness, no less than a thing’s created existence, is willed by God. As
willed, it is an expression of his love.
486. The two sed contra arguments are included because each fails to grant the limited sense in which God
loves the temporarily just man more than the sinner with a better future—namely, that to the just man, be-
fore his fall from grace, he wills a certain good that is clearly better than what he allows to the sinner before
the latter’s conversion.
487. That is, since they have a greater dignity, which is a good willed to them by God.
488. In this verse from Hebrews, “took hold of” means “assumed the nature of.” See St. Thomas’s com-
mentary on the verse: Super Hebr. 2, lec. 4, nn. 147–149 (Super Epistolae S. Pauli Lectura, 2:369). Modern
translations render the verse more loosely: “For surely it is not with angels that he is concerned but with the
descendents of Abraham” (RSV).
489. If good angels are members of Christ but men are more completely members of Christ because they
conform to him in more ways, and if God loves more those who are members of Christ, it seems to follow
that he loves men more—at least men who are actually united to Christ by charity.
490. Thomas says that the angels were established “as if” in glory, because in the first moment of their
creation they were granted sanctifying grace, which is the seed of glory, and they had to perform but a sin-
gle act of charity in order to merit supernatural beatitude. So close were they to their ultimate beatitude that
it was as if God had created them blessed. However, the fact that some angels fell away indicates that they
were not simply made blessed at the moment of their creation, apart from a free act on their part. See In II
Sent. d. 4, a. 1 & a. 3.
491. See Thomas’s remarks at In II Sent. d. 9, a. 8 (Mandonnet, 249): “[A]ll the elect are taken up into the
orders of the angels, some to the higher, some to the lower, some to the ones in between, according to the
diversity of their merits; but the Blessed Virgin Mary is above them all. But whether as many men are taken
up [into the orders] as the number of angels that fell, or as many as stood firm, or as many as there were of
either, or more or less—he [alone] knows to whom alone belongs knowledge of the number of the elect that
shall have been stationed in heavenly bliss.” Also, In II Sent. d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6 (Mandonnet, 276): “Christ
did not have a guardian angel, not only because his soul was superior to all angels [and was] illuminated im-
mediately by the Word united to itself, but also because he was a true comprehensor [of the divine essence];
hence his good could be neither impeded nor furthered.” Cf. In III Sent. d. 14, a. 1, qa. 2, ad 1 (Moos, 437,
§41): “Now, Christ’s soul is superior to the angels, not on account of the soul’s very nature, for if that were
so, then any soul would be superior to any angel; just as neither is it on account of the nature of body as such
that his body is nobler than our souls; but these things are on account of the [hypostatic] union. Hence
all things that are superadded by God to Christ’s soul and to the angels are more eminent in Christ’s soul
than in the angels.”
492. Early Thomists discerned some tension between the Scriptum and the Summa on this point: “Again,
in the same place [In II Sent. d. 28], in the following article [a. 3], *in pede*, he says that a man with the habit of grace infused into him can fulfill all the precepts of the law with regard to the substance of the work, although not with respect to the manner of acting, namely from charity. In the Prima Secundae, q. 109, a. 4, *in pede*, he says the contrary [is so] in the state of corrupt nature" (Gauthier, “Les ‘Articuli in quibus frater Thomas melius in Summa quam in Scriptis’,” p. 306, no. 17).

493. The argument: (1) To make an act of charity is included in the commandment. (2) The mode of charity in the commandments is included in the act of charity, which informs them with their mode. (3) Therefore the mode of acting charitably is included in the commandment.

494. Since the Apostle speaks in the imperative mood, his statement expresses not merely a recommendation or an ideal but a command.

495. According to this opinion, the commandment to honor one’s parents includes that it be done from charity, but one is not commanded to do the impossible, because one is not always under a necessity of honoring one’s parents, and so, at least for the times when one need not give this honor, one can lack charity and yet be commanded to nothing impossible. However, inasmuch as one *must* at certain times give this honor, at those times, at least, one would (according to this theory) have to have charity. But it is taken for evident that one can give the required honor to parents, even apart from personally having charity. So this theory is rejected.

496. This is one of several texts in which Aquinas distances himself from the view, sometimes attributed to Augustine, that *any* act of a man who lacks charity is a sin, regardless of what it is, since an act that does not proceed from charity is disordered with respect to the final end. Thomas more accurately assumes that certain *kinds* of acts, viewed abstractly, are good (examples would include obedience to lawful authority, honor for parents or teachers, a chaste or a brave ordering of passions, justice with respect to repayment of debts), even if such acts concretely fail to proceed from the habit of charity. It is taken for granted here that there are many kinds of acts that are good just because of what they are, having no admixture of evil.

497. Here Aquinas rejects a position at the opposite extreme, where the act specified by a commandment has simply nothing to do with charity, so that even without charity one could fulfill the entire law simply by doing the various works specified. So it is clear that St. Thomas wishes to uphold *some* connection between commandments and charity, but in such a way that the latter is neither of the substance of, nor merely accidental to, the former.

498. The distinction is between doing *what* one is bound to do according to the “letter” of the commandment, and doing the same thing *in such a way* that one obeys also the “spirit” of the commandment—that is, one obeys the commandment out of a willing obedience to the lawgiver and so expresses the union of one’s will to his will. This is another name for love, and acting in this way obtains the *fruit* of the commandment, namely eternal life.

499. Law includes the punitive coercion of persons to the extent that they are able to obey certain prescriptions and culpably fail to do so. Strictly from the viewpoint of a “code of law,” the only thing a person can be ordered to do, or punished for not doing, is some particular act or work that is within his power. The lawgiver ultimately wants the subject to do the right thing well, i.e., in such a way that the subject will become the kind of person who, of himself, *does* and desires to do that which a good law externally requires of him. Nevertheless, by means of a particular law he does not require this interior rightness, but only that a certain thing be done. Hence, the force of that law to bind the subject extends to this alone, even if the lawgiver’s intention goes further.

500. Example: if a person in a state of mortal sin were to give alms to the poor on account of Christ’s commandment to help the poor, or to attend Mass with the intention of rightfully honoring God, these acts, in terms of their *own* species, would be good and even ordered to God as to their “due end,” *in finem debitum*. But this would not make them acts that are pleasing to God and meritorious of eternal life, for the simple reason that only charity—friendship with God, a union of the wills of lover and beloved—is capable of forming, eliciting, and guiding acts of that description.

WEBNOTES FOR BOOK IV

501. In the *ST* parallel (I-II, q. 2, aa. 1–5) St. Thomas considers riches, honors, fame or glory, power, and bodily goods in general as separate targets of inquiry, whereas in the *Scriptum* they are treated together. One
further difference in approach is that in the ST the strategy is to prove, on the one hand, that only in God, the uncreated good, does man’s beatitude consist (q. 2), and on the other hand, that man’s own attainment of this beatitude is a created activity, one of the speculative intellect (q. 3). Here Thomas’s first move is to locate beatitude in some good(s) of the soul rather than of the body (qa. 1), and then to focus on which power of the soul has this good (qaa. 2–3). However, it is obvious already in qa. 2 that Aquinas posits the source and object of beatitude to be God himself, a concern that moves to the foreground in a. 2, qa. 1.

502. Anything that is naturally desired but not by all (for example, to enjoy the pleasures of the table—a desire that is natural but not necessarily universal) or, if possible, anything desired by all but not naturally (e.g., in a globalized world it may come to the point that every man desires to own an expensive automobile, but this is an artificially induced desire), could not be the ultimate end; but the fact that something is both naturally and universally desired is the sign that it is the ultimate end.

503. Implied: And this assertion is false, because it pertains to human nature as such that a man should seek the good that is better for him simply, i.e., according to the superior part of his nature, whereas it pertains only to the immaturity of a given individual that he should mistakenly seek the goods of the inferior part as if they were the best for him.

504. For Thomas’s conception of “knowing” as, at its height, a matter of “immediate togetherness” and “intimate presence,” see Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, 70 et passim.

505. The practical intellect stands to its object as a maker or producer to a certain work to be done. By the practical intellect I ask myself, “How will I attain such-and-such a goal?” The process that leads to the intended end is therefore something I seek to bring about, to bring into being. If the object of the practical intellect is my ultimate end, that would make me the source of my own beatitude; indeed, it would mean that I am perfectly fulfilled by something that is less than, and dependent on, my thought process, which is obviously absurd.

506. Though the good envisaged by practical intellect has a greater extension (a single leader can procure the good of many), this good, being always some executable good of the practical order and standing to man as effect to cause, will always be inferior to the sovereign end, God, who is attained in himself only by the speculative intellect, for the reasons given in the response. Hence, just as God is immeasurably greater than the universe as a whole and in any of its parts, so for a single intellect to attain God is immeasurably greater than all practical goods put together. The point of the response is not, of course, to say that the good of the many in the practical order deserves to be neglected in favor of contemplation, or that there is no relationship between them. On the contrary, love for God himself leads, of necessity, to a desire to spread that knowledge to one’s neighbors, so that they, too, may be perfected in this contemplation.

507. That is, the perpetuity required for human happiness is merely to live a long and “happy” life rather than to die young, in an accident or war or by disease. In this sense, the man who lived to a ripe old age would exhibit the “perpetuity” possible to man.

508. Man’s ultimate end is so lofty, being essentially above all natural powers, that it surpasses a brute animal’s end even more than human (rational) life surpasses brute (irrational) life.

509. The full context: “For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. If it is to be life in the flesh, that means fruitful labor for me. Yet which I shall choose I cannot tell. I am hard pressed between the two. My desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better. But to remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account” (Phil. 1:21–24).

510. Thomas is careful not to say “It is the same to love God and to love the perfection that arises in us from union with God”; his point is precisely about the structure of desire or concupiscence, which has to do with being perfected by union with the source of some nature’s good. Wine, as such, is good for man only when it produces a desirable effect in man; otherwise it may be good in some other respect, but not precisely as wine. (If a fine wine is bought as an investment, it can remain a good investment only for as long as it retains its fine character. If it turns to vinegar, it ceases to have value.) Similarly, from the perspective of the creature’s neediness, to love God means to be perfected by union with God; to want God is to want to be happy with God. But there is also the perspective of God’s intrinsic goodness and hence lovableness, to which charity, as friendship, inclines the lover, such that a man is empowered to love God simply because of who and what he is, not because of what accrues to the lover from union with him.

511. The example of light with (what was thought to be) its instantaneous speed no longer works, but the point is clear: if an activity has to do with a goal of motion rather than motion as such, then the activity is
not, precisely in that respect, subject to time. Thus, the working-out of a mathematical problem is measured by time since there are various operations being performed, but the answer is a simple whole that comes to be in an instant. One sees a popular parallel in the styling of a sudden idea—especially a powerful or profound one—as an “illumination,” something that “dawned on” someone.

512. In other words, “kingdom” refers to all the blessed gathered together in union with the end, while “beatitude” refers to the activity of each of the blessed as united to the end; yet the kingdom is what it is because all of its members are blessed together. Hence there is no essential difference in the reality to which they point. It is important not to misread this line as if Thomas were equating the common good of the whole and the private good of any part.

513. The common notion of beatitude is at such a level of generality that it does not include specific information about the content, the specific notion, of beatitude. So, the common notion is familiar to all, since all want the “perfect good,” but the specific notion is familiar only to those to whom it has been revealed. (See webnote 246 for the text in Super Psalmos where Thomas says that none of the philosophers grasped the essence of beatitude.) To say that it is *per accidens* that beatitude is a matter of virtue or of seeing God could easily be misunderstood. The argument is that for one who is not already blessed (in heaven) and therefore knows with certainty where true beatitude is found, the concept of “having all good” or “having the highest good” is necessarily vague, as universals are to human beings not yet perfect in knowledge, and has to be filled out with a further identification of what, specifically, “all good” or “highest good” involves. In this sense, the content given is *per accidens* to the generic idea. In another and stricter sense, of course, beatitude is found *primum et per se* in the contemplation of God.

514. That is, appetite for beatitude is motion of the will toward the ultimate end.

515. The context: “For while we are still in this tent, we sigh with anxiety; not that we would be unclothed, but that we would be further clothed, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life. He who has prepared us for this very thing is God, who has given us the Spirit as a guarantee” (2 Cor. 5:4–5, RSV).

516. More precisely, something that is good in itself, in contrast to merely being useful.

517. This phrase “after death” means either “after the final victory over death, expressed in the resurrection of the body,” or “after the wicked have been condemned to their second death.”

518. The latter sense of ultimate might be better expressed by the word “utmost.” So, for all the blessed, the vision of God is their ultimate end; but some of the blessed have this vision to the utmost degree granted to rational creatures, while others have it to a lesser degree, in proportion to the visionary’s readiness or capacity for the light of glory.
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