OVERLOOKING OTHERS: DEHUMANIZATION BY COMISSION AND OMISSION

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Dehumanization, the denial of fundamentally human capacities to others, has contributed to large-scale intergroup conflict and violence, ranging from the Holocaust, to American slavery, to Rwandan warfare between the Hutus and Tutsis. The type of dehumanization that emerges in these contexts typically stems from the motives to represent others actively and overtly as subhuman (e.g., Jews as vermin, African Americans as apelike, Tutsis as cockroaches) and to justify and facilitate aggression toward that group. Representing others as subhuman denies them fundamental human rights for freedom and protection from harm. Although psychology has primarily focused on this active, aggressive, and intergroup-oriented form of dehumanization, which we call dehumanization by commission, a more common form of dehumanization exists in everyday life. We call this form dehumanization by omission, a passive process whereby people overlook, or fail to recognize, others’ fundamentally human mental capacities, as opposed to denying them these capacities actively. Here, we document the two forms of dehumanization — by commission and by omission — and describe their antecedents, psychological importance, and consequences.

Key words: Dehumanization; Mind perception; Theory of mind; Social cognition; Person perception.

In distinguishing between hate and indifference, Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel suggests that indifference, a passive disregard for others, best captures what it means to deem someone unworthy of love. The related phenomenon of dehumanization, the denial of distinctively human capacities to others, also stems largely from indifference toward others, although much of the psychological treatment has focused on animosity as a root cause. The present article distinguishes between dehumanization rooted in active animosity, what we term dehumanization by commission, and dehumanization rooted in passive apathy, what we term dehumanization by omission. We suggest that, although the former predominates instances of dehumanization in the context of violence and intergroup conflict, the latter is more common in everyday life and thereby no less consequential.

It is important to note that we conceptualize the process of dehumanization the same in both cases, and that we only distinguish between the ultimate causes of the process. As we have noted elsewhere (Epley, Schroeder, & Waytz, 2013; Waytz, Schroeder, & Epley, 2013), the essence of dehumanization is the representation of others as lacking a fully human mind including the ca-

The opposite of love is not hate, it's indifference
(Elie Wiesel)
pacities for conscious experience and rational thought. Both dehumanization by commission and omission involve this denial of mind. We distinguish between these two forms by distinguishing between their underlying ultimate antecedents. Dehumanization by commission stems from active desires to distinguish oneself and one’s own group from outgroups, stigmatized groups, subjugated groups, or disliked targets, or from an active desire to justify and license harm toward others. Although these active motives may not be salient at the moment that dehumanization occurs, dehumanization in intergroup contexts or in the context of aggression often (but not always) stems ultimately from active causes. By contrast, dehumanization by omission stems ultimately from indifference, and proximally from factors that contribute to feelings of independence that free people from considering others’ mental states. Both forms of dehumanization can occur consciously or unconsciously, and differ only in being rooted in one of two processes: (1) the active processes of suppressing or denying consideration of others’ minds; or (2) a passive failure to consider others’ minds.

Just as people judge harms of commission to be worse than harms of omission (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov & Baron, 1999; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991), the history of psychology has largely focused on dehumanization by commission and its negative consequences and only in recent years has devoted greater theoretical and empirical treatment to dehumanization by omission (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Here, we summarize evidence for both forms of dehumanization, demonstrating the prevalence of dehumanization by omission in everyday life and suggesting that although dehumanization by omission may be less noticeable than dehumanization by commission, it is no less consequential.

DEHUMANIZATION BY COMMISSION

The clearest examples of dehumanization by commission come from atrocities throughout human history. Considering the Mỹ Lai massacre (Kelman, 1973), the Holocaust (Bandura, 1990; Levi, 1987; Lifton, 1986), and the Vietnam War (Bar-Tal, 1990; Boyle, 1972), among other wars and genocides, led psychologists to ask the question: how do people justify committing such reprehensible acts of violence against fellow humans? A number of productive streams of research derived from this question (e.g., on topics including obedience, Milgram, 1963; and diffusion of responsibility, Diener, 1977; Zimbardo, 1970), not the least of which was on the phenomenon of dehumanization by commission.

Researchers noticed that one common aspect of these atrocities was a tendency to blame or devalue the victims. Anecdotes from perpetrators highlighted this tendency: “When you go into basic training you are taught that the Vietnamese are not people. You are taught they are gooks, and all you hear is ‘gook, gook, gook, gook’… and once the military has got the idea implanted in your mind that these people are not humans, they are subhuman, it makes it a little bit easier to kill ‘em” (Boyle, 1972, p. 141). Similarly, a Nazi camp commandant explained the extreme lengths to which Nazis went to degrade victims in order to make it easier to put them in gas chambers (Levi, 1987). Other examples of both perceiving and treating outgroup members as subhuman have emerged historically in the treatment of slaves, females, religious and racial minorities, and rape victims (Ball-Rokeach, 1972; Briere & Malamuth, 1983). These anecdotes point to a process by which dehumanization of victims can be functional because it makes perpe-
trators’ reprehensible behavior seem personally and socially acceptable, and hence easier to enact (Bandura, 1990).

This functional value of dehumanization, as a means to facilitate aggressive acts is a key aspect of dehumanization by commission, commonly featured in theories explaining aggression including the social learning theory of aggression (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975), in-group bias (Struch & Schwarz, 1989), delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1990), and moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990). Although these theories diverge in their exact definition of dehumanization, they are alike in that they consider dehumanization an active process to reduce moral guilt or concern regarding aggression.

The social learning theory of aggression (Bandura et al., 1975) suggests dehumanization occurs when internal moral control is disengaged from detrimental conduct. Dehumanization of victims serves to reduce self-censure and thereby perpetrate greater aggression (Bandura, 1990). “Inflicting harm upon individuals who are regarded as subhuman or debased is less apt to arouse self-reproof than if they are seen as human beings with dignifying qualities. The reason for this is that people are reduced to base creatures” (Bandura et al., 1975, p. 255). Experiments also showed that individuals administered higher intensity electric shocks to someone characterized in dehumanized terms — as “animalistic, rotten” — than to someone characterized in neutral or humanized, mentalistic terms (e.g., “perceptive, understanding”; Bandura et al., 1975).

Causes of dehumanization by commission include strength of conflict with the outgroup (Struch & Schwarz, 1989), feelings of disconnection from the outgroup (Opotow, 1990), and perceived threat to the ingroup (Bar-Tal, 1990) and to the ingroup’s goals (Kelman, 1973). These causes highlight the active nature of dehumanization by commission, suggesting the intensity of this type of dehumanization depends on the nature of the relationship between the ingroup and outgroup.

Struch and Schwarz (1989), for instance, explicitly state that dehumanization stems from a motive to harm outgroups. According to their hypothesis, the stronger the conflict and hence the motivation to harm, the more ingroup members will perpetrate outgroup dehumanization. They suggest that greater dehumanization will result in greater aggression. In one study of Israeli Jews’ evaluations of a threatening, ultraorthodox Jewish subgroup, perceptions of conflict predicted dehumanization (operationalized as decreased perceptions of the subgroup’s consideration and compassion for others, and acceptance of basic human values), which further predicted willingness to aggress (e.g., willingness to disallow voting rights to the subgroup).

Concurrently, Opotow (1990) theorized that the severity of conflict predicts moral exclusion (Staub, 1989), of which dehumanization is one instance. Moral exclusion inherently involves representing others as nonentities: expendable, undeserving. In addition to conflict severity, Opotow (1990, p. 6) suggested that “feelings of unconnectedness” can incite dehumanization. Specifically, perceiving personal disconnection from an outgroup member can trigger negative attitudes, destructive competition (Deutsch, 1973), discriminatory responses (Tajfel, 1978), and aggressive behavior (Bandura et al., 1975). Opotow (1990) further hypothesized that feelings of disconnection can make one’s morality more flexible. For instance, individuals can create a dual self (what Deutsch, 1990, termed “moral splitting”) in which they avoid conscious awareness of inflicting harm. In such fashion, a Nazi doctor might maintain both an “ordinary self” and an “Auschwitz self” in which he views his victims in a dehumanizing fashion to avoid considering himself a killer (Lifton, 1986).
Kelman (1973) proposed a related cause of dehumanization, the conversion of victims into means to an end, making them merely instrumental tools for a purpose. The phenomenon of using someone as a tool to fulfill one’s goals has emerged in recent research on objectification (Gray, Knobe, Sheskin, Bloom, & Barrett, 2011; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008). According to Kelman, dehumanization was one of three interrelated processes (including authorization and routinization) that weaken moral restraints against violence. Kelman was the first to define dehumanization as failing to attribute identity and community to another person, setting the stage for future conceptualizations of the two dimensions of mental capacities, agency and experience, that people perceive in fully functioning humans (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007).

A fourth cause of dehumanization by commission, again closely related to severity of conflict, is threat to the ingroup. Bar-Tal (1990) considered severity of perceived threat to facilitate delegitimization, when a group is excluded from the realm of acceptable norms and/or values (Bar-Tal, 1988, 1989). Just as dehumanization is considered one example of moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), it is likewise one example of delegitimization. Denial of humanity is a prominent feature of delegitimization, but other features include extremely negative and salient bases for categorization, accompanied by intense, negative emotions of rejection and justification for harm. Bar-Tal (1990) proposed that when a group perceives that an outgroup’s goals are far-reaching, unjustified, and threatening to the basic goals of the ingroup, then the ingroup engages in delegitimization. This process is particularly likely to occur in a zero-sum conflict, in which the outgroup’s goals are seemingly at odds with the ingroup’s goals (e.g., the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in which both groups want possession of common land).

Around the turn of the 21st century, a “new look” perspective on dehumanization emerged (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014) that sought to support prior theories of dehumanization with empirical data. What resulted was an outpouring of research on dehumanization by commission toward outgroups, stigmatized groups, subjugated groups, or disliked targets. This research was led by a novel conceptualization of dehumanization called infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2000), whereby people preferentially attribute uniquely human emotions to their ingroup and deny uniquely human emotions to their outgroup. Since the initial establishment of this phenomenon, numerous studies have demonstrated that infrahumanization indeed occurs between groups of various types. Initial research on this topic validated and established two basic categories of emotions — secondary emotions such as nostalgia and humiliation that people believe to be unique to humans and primary emotions such as anger and fear that people believe to be shared between humans and other animals (Demoulin et al., 2004). Studies that asked people to make comparisons as to whether ingroups and outgroups possess these emotions then established a consistent pattern of infrahumanization.

For example, using an implicit association test, one study showed that French and Spanish Europeans more readily associated typically Spanish and French names with secondary emotions (versus primary emotions) compared to typically Arab and Flemish names (Paladino et al., 2002). A similar study showed that Belgians were better able to recall in memory associations between ingroups (Belgians) and secondary emotions than outgroups (Arabs) and secondary emotions (Gaunt, Leyens, & Demoulin, 2002). A more explicit early demonstration of infrahumanization asked members of various social groups from Spain to identify emotions that were typical of their ingroup and outgroup, revealing that people attributed more secondary emotions to their ingroups (Leyens et al., 2001). Other studies showed that people were quicker to identify ingroup
versus outgroup members after being primed with secondary emotions (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007). These studies support the existence of infrahumanization, suggesting that the association of secondary versus primary emotions with ingroup versus outgroup members can emerge automatically.

Other studies have found that infrahumanization is stronger toward “relevant” outgroups: that is, outgroups that threaten or affect the ingroup’s values (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005; Demoulin et al., 2009). In one such study (Cortes et al., 2005), Belgian Walloons attributed less secondary emotion to the Flemish inhabitants of Belgium but not to inhabitants of Paris or Prague, presumably because the Flemish represent a greater and more proximal threat to the Walloons. In another (Demoulin et al., 2009), the meaningfulness of one’s ingroup was manipulated by either randomly assigning participants into groups or allowing them to choose groups based on their favorite color. Participants exhibited greater infrahumanization to more meaningful outgroups (i.e., outgroups based on color) compared to less meaningful ones (i.e., randomly assigned groups).

Additional research demonstrated consequences of infrahumanization. In one set of studies, Portuguese participants’ degree of infrahumanization toward an outgroup country (e.g., Turkey) predicted perceptions of that country as a symbolic threat, and increased opposition to Turkey’s membership in the European Union (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009). Another study showed that the denial of secondary emotions to others is associated with unwillingness to help outgroup victims of a hurricane (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007). In addition, one experiment documented infrahumanization as a mechanism through which violent video game play increases aggression (Greitemeyer & McLatchie, 2011). Specifically, playing violent versus nonviolent videogames decreased the attribution of secondary emotions to immigrants, and increased antisocial behavior toward these individuals. These findings suggest the aggressive and potentially harmful nature of infrahumanization.

Following the development of infrahumanization theory, Haslam (2006) developed the Dual Model of Dehumanization that established two basic forms of dehumanization by commission — one in which individuals are considered as animals (as in infrahumanization) and one in which individuals are considered as mechanistic entities, or objects. Animalistic dehumanization involves denial of cognitive capacity, civility, and refinement, whereas mechanistic dehumanization involves denial of warmth and emotional openness. Most studies measure these forms of dehumanization using the denial of traits (e.g., polite vs. curious) that capture these respective capacities (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), and initial studies using this operationalization demonstrated people’s tendency to see others as more mechanistic than the self (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam & Bain, 2007).

Additional work has also demonstrated that — similar to infrahumanization — people engage in both mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization toward outgroups relative to ingroups. One set of studies showed that Australians dehumanized Chinese people by viewing them mechanistically whereas Chinese dehumanized Australian people by viewing them animalistically (Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009). Interestingly, one line of research showed that people tend to dehumanize individuals from their outgroup countries even in terms of denying them flaws that are considered to be uniquely human (Koval, Laham, Haslam, Bastian, & Whelan, 2012). Other studies have shown that people dehumanize immigrants, indigenous and traditional people, as well as lower class people (e.g., “white trash” or “bogans”) animalistically (Hodson &
Costello, 2007; Loughnan, Haslam, Sutton, & Spencer, 2014; Saminaden, Loughnan, & Haslam, 2010). Heterosexual people also dehumanize asexuals in mechanistic and animalistic terms (MacInnis & Hodson, 2012).

These animalistic and mechanistic forms of dehumanization by commission have behavioral consequences as well. One set of studies showed that people dehumanized criminals who committed violence or sexual molestation relative to white-collar criminals, and this dehumanization predicted desire for punishment (Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013). The Dual Model forms of dehumanization also predict Christian individuals’ willingness to torture Muslim prisoners of war (Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013). They further contribute to the effects of violent video game play on aggression as well (Greitemeyer & McLatchie, 2011).

In addition to studies of dehumanization by commission that use the infrahumanization and Dual Model frameworks, numerous studies have assessed people’s associations with particular social targets and nonhuman stimuli such as animals or objects. For example, several studies have shown that people dehumanize racial outgroups by associating them with animals or objects, such as in the case of Whites’ perceptions of Blacks. In one set of studies, people associated Black people with images of apes, and this dehumanization reduced sensitivity to police brutality toward Blacks (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). More recent work has used a similar paradigm and has shown that this Black-ape association increases perceptions of Black juveniles as less childlike than Whites and predicts police willingness to use violence toward them (Goff, Jackson, Di Leone, Culotta, & DiTomasso, 2014). Similar studies have measured dehumanization using an IAT that employs using human and animal-related words and have shown that people associate words related to animals (versus humans) with outgroup names more quickly than with ingroup names (Viki et al., 2006). Furthermore, one set of studies showed that this association between animals and sex offenders reduces support for rehabilitating these offenders (Viki, Fullerton, Raggett, Tait, & Wilshire, 2012). An analogous set of studies found that men’s associations between women and animals is related to sexual aggression and rape proclivity (Rudman & Mescher, 2012).

As noted in our introduction, we consider the essence of these different conceptualizations of dehumanization to be the denial of mind — capacities for agency (e.g., intentionality and free will) and experience (e.g., feeling and emotion) (Gray et al., 2007). Having a mind with high capacity for agency and experience appears to be the essence of humanness. People attribute these capacities in full exclusively to adult humans similar to the self (Gray et al., 2007), and as we have argued elsewhere, the qualities that infrahumanization theory and the dual models theory identify as distinctively human tend to require agency and experience (Epley et al., 2013; Waytz et al., 2013). Studies that operationalize dehumanization in terms of the denial of mind show similar patterns to studies detailed above examining dehumanization by omission. For example, studies have shown that people deny mental capacities to disliked individuals (Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006), use fewer mental state terms when describing targets low in warmth and competence (e.g., homeless people; Harris & Fiske, 2011), and show a reduced response in brain regions involved in mentalizing toward these targets (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Similarly, others studies have shown that Canadians depict refugees as barbaric in terms of lacking basic mental sophistication and values (Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008), and this sort of dehumanization — reduced attribution of mental sophistication — mediates the relationship between ingroup glorification and acceptance of torturing outgroup members (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-
Sorolla, 2010). People also show a reduction in mental state attribution toward sexualized women (Gray et al., 2011; Loughnan et al., 2010), consistent with men’s tendency to represent such women as objects (Bernard, Gervais, Allen, Compomizzi, & Klein, 2012; Cikara, Eberhardt, & Fiske, 2011; Rudman & Mesercher, 2012) (as we describe below, sexual objectification may have a passive component as well). In sum, studies that operationalize dehumanization as the denial of mind show considerable evidence of dehumanization toward stigmatized, subjugated, or disliked targets.

To this point, we have discussed research that seems to represent dehumanization by commission, which occurs in response to prospective or retrospective harm, or dehumanization toward enemy groups, stigmatized groups, subjugated groups, or otherwise disliked targets. We consider these forms of dehumanization to be active, in the sense that even when they emerge unintentionally or unconsciously, they serve some ultimate purpose, either to reduce moral angst over harming others, or to reinforce superiority over outgroups. In the case of dehumanization toward outgroup members (enemy groups, stigmatized groups, subjugated groups, or otherwise disliked targets) dehumanization can also occur for another more passive reason. These targets may simply fail to trigger people’s tendency to see other minds. Given that these targets are inherently dissimilar to the self, and people consider the self to be prototypically human (Karniol, 2003), people simply do not consider these targets to be human to the same degree as oneself. This form of passive dehumanization, or what we term dehumanization by omission, is most evident in studies that do not confound the dissimilarity of the target to the self and the target’s status as an outgroup member. In the subsequent section, we review research that provides evidence for dehumanization by omission.

DEHUMANIZATION BY OMISSION

Dehumanization by omission occurs not when people actively choose to suppress the triggers to perceive other minds, but when these triggers are simply suppressed by contextual and individual factors. Broadly speaking, the primary trigger to perceiving other minds is interdependence (Epley & Waytz, 2010), and numerous psychological factors reduce dependence on others, thereby suppressing these triggers and fostering dehumanization. Chief among these factors are outcome irrelevance, social connection, goal instrumentality, and possession of resources such as status, power, and money. Below, we detail how each of these factors causes dehumanization in a passive, rather than active, manner.

Outcome Irrelevance

When people encounter individuals who are irrelevant to one’s personal outcomes they devote fewer social and cognitive resources to these individuals than to outcome-relevant individuals. For instance, people are less capable of recalling photographs of strangers than people who are naturally relevant to their lives (Rodin, 1987) and people tend not to distinguish between members of an outgroup unless the outgroup member conveys a facial expression that is goal-relevant to the perceiver (Ackerman et al., 2006). In addition, when perceivers identify other tar-
gets as outcome-dependent, they attend less when these targets display behavior that is consistent (versus inconsistent) with the perceivers’ expectations (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990) — consistent behavior is not as socially relevant as inconsistent behavior, and thus people devote more cognitive resources to the latter. In addition, people seek out less social information about individuals with whom they do not expect future interaction compared with individuals they expect to meet and are thus goal-relevant (Berger & Douglas, 1981; Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Kellerman & Reynolds, 1990).

Given that people devote less social attention to those who are irrelevant to their goals, or who do not convey goal-relevant behavior, people consider the minds of these others to a lesser degree as well. For example, one study asked South American, Israeli, and Arab participants to undergo neuroimaging while evaluating South American, Israeli, and Arab targets. When Arab and Israeli evaluated Arab and Israeli targets — targets that are clearly relevant to the current conflict between Israel and neighboring Arab countries — brain regions involved in considering others’ minds (mentalizing) were responsive, but this activity reduced significantly when these individuals evaluated South American targets, who were irrelevant to the current conflict (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012). Although little research has examined the effect of outcome irrelevance directly on dehumanization, the sum of research showing that people devote less social attention to goal-irrelevant individuals suggest a form of disengagement consistent with dehumanization by omission.

Social Connection

Related to outcome irrelevance is social irrelevance whereby others are not perceived as relevant social targets for affiliation and connection. Although humans are undeniably social animals, they also have limits to their sociality (Hill & Dunbar, 2003). People construe others as socially relevant only when their motivation for connection is unfulfilled. In other words, when people feel socially connected, they devote fewer social and attentional resources toward others. Conversely, when people lack social connection, they become attentive to the minds around them, even the minds of nonhumans such as pets, supernatural agents, and technology (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008; Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008). Considering the minds of others is likely a critical step toward establishing affiliation with others, when people feel that social connection is lacking. Socially connected (versus socially isolated) individuals display poorer ability to recall social information and display poorer performance on tasks assessing the ability to decode others’ mental states from facial and vocal cues (Gardner, Pickett, Jefferis, & Knowles, 2005; Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004). Similarly, people who are experimentally induced to experience social acceptance display less interest in getting to know others (compared to individuals induced to experience social rejection) (DeWall, Baumeister, & Vohs, 2008).

In the clearest demonstration of the effect of social connection on dehumanization, one set of studies demonstrated that heightening people’s feelings of social connection by asking them to recall close friends and family members, or by asking them to sit next to close friends, increased dehumanization (Waytz & Epley, 2012). People made to experience social connection (compared to comparable baseline conditions) attributed fewer mental states to others and reported that others were less worthy of moral concern because these others lacked feelings and...
emotions. Feeling socially connected makes people less dependent on others, and thus more prone to overlook others’ mental states.

Goal Instrumentality

Whereas people are often afforded little attention because they are outcome irrelevant or socially irrelevant, people who are necessary to fulfill a goal may be afforded a great deal of attention — only not to their intrinsic value as humans, but instead to their extrinsic utility to complete the goal (Gruenfeld et al., 2008). Although this process might seem more active than passive, the active component only emerges in attention and consideration directed toward others’ instrumentality. Because attention is finite, this very same active focus on instrumentality can lead to a more passive neglect and overlooking of people’s essential humanity outside the scope of the focal goal. In other words, people who are instrumental for goals are treated like tools only, used to fulfill a purpose. Philosophically, using someone to achieve a goal is the very definition of objectification — people consider the instrumental individual like an object (Nussbaum, 1999). Empirical findings support this philosophical proposition. Instrumental others tend to be socially categorized based on their ability to fulfill a goal: they are more easily confused with equally instrumental others in memory tests (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2009) and are judged more in terms of the characteristics that make them instrumental (Maner, Miller, Moss, Leo, & Plan, 2012) compared with non-instrumental others. These data suggest that because instrumental others are valued primarily for their ability to fulfill the goal, people may tend to remember and judge them based on their utility. An instrumental person may therefore seem substitutable with equally instrumental others.

A person’s instrumentality also affects the extent to which others consider their mental capacities. For instance, as described above, experiments showed that when people considered others to be instrumental for sexual goals, they perceived these others to have more experiential but less agentic capacities compared to their less instrumental counterparts (Gray et al., 2011). This belief that sexual targets have less agency contributes to objectification in viewing others as instrumental only for sexual goals (Cikara et al., 2011; Frederickson, & Roberts, 1997; Gervais, Vescio, Förster, Maass, & Suitner, 2012). There are also behavioral consequences to perceiving someone as more experiential and less agentic. For example, people administer less intense electric shocks to those they consider to have greater experience and less agency (Gray et al., 2011) and in other cases afford these targets lower moral status (Loughnan et al., 2010). In fact, people actually see sexualized female bodies differently than males’ bodies — they more quickly recognizing an inverted female than male body, which suggests very literally that the sexualized female body is seen more like an object (Bernard et al., 2012). Hence, whereas many instances of objectification and in particular sexual objectification may be active and intentional (e.g., Rudman & Mesercher, 2012), objectification may occur more passively as well, as a byproduct of perceiving others as instrumental.

This form of dehumanization as a byproduct for goal instrumentality can emerge for non-sexual goals as well. For example, in another set of experiments using a very different manipulation of goal instrumentality, when people felt more in need of health care, they perceived their physicians to have more agentic but fewer experiential capacities, again consistent with their (in this case,
agentic but not experiential) goal for health care (Schroeder & Fishbach, in prep.). Again, this form of dehumanization has behavioral consequences: people are more likely to choose a physician showing little emotion when they have greater need for care.

Possession of Resources: Status, Power, and Money

A final factor that triggers dehumanization by omission is possession of social and financial resources. People with relatively higher status, power, and money think and behave differently than those with fewer of these resources largely because these attributes allow people independence from others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). This perceived independence then allows people high (vs. low) in resources to expend less cognitive capacity attending to and engaging with others. We review how having each type of resource can affect these disengaging attitudes and behaviors toward others, resulting in dehumanization.

People with relatively higher socioeconomic status tend to have more self-focused cognitions (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009, 2011) and display greater narcissism (Piff, 2014), resulting in various behavioral consequences that reflect a lack of concern for others (along the lines of dehumanization). These consequences included increased unethical behavior (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mandoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012), reduced prosocial behavior (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010) and greater disengagement during social interactions (Kraus & Keltner, 2009). For example, in one set of studies, upper class drivers were more likely to cut off other vehicles and pedestrians at a crosswalk and people experimentally induced to feel higher in social class (e.g., through comparisons to people with less money, less education, and less respected jobs) were also literally more likely to take candy from children and cheat in a laboratory game than people made to feel relatively lower in social class (Piff et al., 2012). In another set of studies, upper class participants were less generous to strangers in the dictator game, less willing to make charitable donations, and exhibited less trust in a trust game, compared to lower class participants (Piff et al., 2010). Even upper class individuals’ subtle, nonverbal behaviors indicate that they are less socially engaged. They display more disengagement cues (e.g., doodling) and fewer engagement cues (e.g., head nods, laughs) during their interactions with others (Kraus & Keltner, 2009). Perhaps because of this apparent inattentiveness to others, higher social class individuals are less accurate in intuiting of others’ emotions and thoughts (Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010).

Feeling powerful may have similar consequences as feeling high-status in that powerful people often seem inattentive to others. Powerful people tend to objectify others and consider them more in terms of extrinsic utility than intrinsic worth as humans (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; see also Slabu & Guinote, 2010). This relationship between power and objectification is moderated by the purpose of one’s power (Overbeck & Park, 2006) as well as the utility of the person being perceived (Gruenfeld et al., 2008). For instance, in one study, people assigned to the role of manager in a game but told their responsibilities were primarily “people-centered” could better remember employees’ names and otherwise individuate them compared to people whose managerial responsibilities were primarily “product-centered” (Overbeck & Park, 2006). Feeling powerful also can increase stereotyping (Fiske, 1993; Guinote & Phillips, 2010), decrease perspective-taking (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006), and decrease compassion toward another person’s
distress (Van Kleef et al., 2008). These disparate but related findings together suggest that power ultimately produces asymmetric social distance, such that higher power individuals feel more distant from others than do lower power individuals ( Magee & Smith, 2013). Therefore, highly powerful individuals (compared to less powerful individuals) will have less interest in others’ mental states (e.g., reduced empathic accuracy; Gonzaga, Keltner, & Ward, 2008; Woltin, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Förster, 2011), be more impervious to social influence (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2006; See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011), and experience fewer socially engaging emotions (e.g., compassion and gratitude). Consistent with the little evidence that exists on power and dehumanization (see Lammers & Stapel, 2011), the social distance theory of power overall predicts that more versus less powerful individuals will be less responsive to others’ needs and generally treat others with less humanity.

A final pervasive resource that seems to influence perceptions of others is money. Merely being exposed to money can lead people to endorse ideologies associated with social inequality and dehumanization. People exposed to money are more likely to believe social advantaged groups should dominate disadvantaged groups and that victims deserve their fates (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & Waytz, 2013). Therefore, although money seems to encourage individual self-sufficiency (Vohs et al., 2006), it may also encourage social distance from others, making people feel less distressed about social exclusion, for instance (Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009). In particular, exposure to “dirty” rather than clean money increases antisocial and dehumanizing behaviors such as cheating or giving less money to others in economic games (Yang et al., 2013). Overall, these findings on exposure to money are consistent with those on social class and power, suggesting that the possession (or perceived possession) of resources fundamentally increases dehumanization of others.

**CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON A SHIFT IN FOCUS**

Here we have documented and distinguished between two general forms of dehumanization: commission and omission. Whereas theory and empirical evidence supporting dehumanization by omission is relatively recent, research on dehumanization by commission has been ongoing for the past 50 years. Although examples of dehumanization by commission might be more salient in memory — as we have noted, historical examples include the Mỹ Lai massacre, the Holocaust, American slavery, and Rwandan Genocide — dehumanization by omission might be more common in daily life, and thus easier to overlook. Just as acts of omission and commission can result in the same absolute level of harm (withholding the truth versus lying; failing to save someone from drowning versus pushing someone below the water; Spranca et al., 1991), we suggest that dehumanization by omission can be just as consequential as its counterpart. We thus encourage greater empirical attention to the various ways that dehumanization may subtly damage social interactions.

One reason for this suggestion is that the two forms of dehumanization we have documented share common consequences, including willingness to torture (Viki et al., 2013; Waytz & Epley, 2012), sexual subjugation (Gervais et al., 2012; Gray et al., 2011), and decreased compassion during times of need (Cuddy et al., 2007; Van Kleef et al., 2008). Second, whereas dehumanization by commission may be more likely to contribute to massacre, dehumanization by
omission is more likely to contribute to experiences of loneliness and exclusion that have significant and grave effects on physical and mental health, and ultimately mortality (House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Luo, Hawkley, Waite, & Cacioppo, 2012; Steptoe, Shankar, Demakakos, & Wardle, 2013). For example, dehumanization by omission is more likely to result in subtle forms of failing to attend to others’ full humanity such as forgetting their names, ignoring their needs, or not considering their feelings, all of which can lead others to feel deeply isolated. Finally, whereas in dehumanization by commission the harm clearly befalls the target, harm may also befall the perpetrator in dehumanization by omission. For example, by overlooking the humanness of others toward whom one holds no prior prejudice, individuals may mistakenly forgo opportunities for affiliation, make poor choices about whom to hire, and generally fail to benefit from the social opportunities others may offer if they were seen as fully human. Dehumanization by commission has more violent and detrimental consequences for the target, but dehumanization by omission may subtly affect both the perpetrator and target, resulting in common and ultimately costly mistakes. Aggregated over a lifetime, apathy, not antipathy, might best predict detachment from fellow humans and account for a wider array of instances dehumanization.

REFERENCES


