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> Iraq: The War, Its Consequences & the Future

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Dr. James Zogby Elizabeth Zogby Sarah Hope Zogby

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Jon Zogby Chad Bohnert Joe Mazloom Karen Scott Mike Calogero @~2011

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JZ Analytics, LLC

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Summary Observations

uring the month of September 2011, we conducted surveys in Iraq, six other Arab countries, the United States, and Iran in an effort to measure attitudes toward: the impact of the war in Iraq; concerns about the future of the country and the region in the aftermath of a U.S. withdrawal; and how Iraqis see the world, their country, and their future. After analyzing and comparing the data several important observations come through quite clearly from these results.

First and foremost are the often divergent attitudes attitudes of Iraq's three major demographic groupings: Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds. In the United States there is the deep partisan divide that separates the attitudes of Democrats and Republicans. Finally, there are the reactions of the respondents from the other six Arab countries covered in our surveys. For the most part, their attitudes toward Iraq are more negative about the war and more positive about Iraq's post-withdrawal prospects than Iraqis themselves. The only exception is Tunisia which is somewhat disengaged from external issues, most probably due to the fact that the poll was conducted during the lead-up to that country's first post-Arab Spring election.

All these patterns play out in response to the question about whether or not Iraqis today are "better off" or "worse off" than they were before American forces entered the country.

Iraqis are conflicted, with about one-half of both Shia and Sunni Arabs saying that they are "worse off," while 60% of Kurds say they are "better off." Overall, about one-quarter of all Iraqis say their situation is "the same." On the U.S. side, 58% of Republicans say Iraqis are "better off" compared with only 24% of Democrats who hold this view. A striking 44% of all Americans either are "not sure" or say things are "the same."

Meanwhile, about six in ten Jordanians, Saudis, and Lebanese see Iraqis "worse off," as do almost one-half of Arabs in the Emirates. Tunisians

Iraqis are divided and deeply conflicted

and Egyptians are outliers here, with Egyptians divided in their views as to whether or not Iraqis are "better off," and almost one-half of Tunisians saying that they believe that things are "the same" or that they are "not sure."

When we drilled down and looked more closely at how the war has impacted many areas of life in Iraq, this pattern of disconnect between the groups in Iraq and the political parties in the United States once again comes through quite clearly. Kurds, for example, say their lives have improved in every area considered. Ninety percent say "personal safety and security" has improved; 71% say education has improved; and even 53% say they are "freer." At the same time, 88% and 81% of Sunni and Shia Arabs, respectively, say "personal safety and security" has worsened; and more than one-half in each of the

two communities agree that education and political freedom have also been negatively impacted.

Judging from their respective views, it would appear that Republicans and Democrats are looking at two different wars, with Republicans tending to see the war's impact as positive in every area, while Democrats largely judge the war as having made life worse for Iraqis in most areas. And this leads to three-quarters of Democrats concluding that the "war was not worth it," as opposed to a plurality of Republicans who say that it was worth it.

Looking forward, Americans and Iragis seem to agree, at least on the surface, that the departure of American forces from Iraq is a "good thing." By a margin of two to one Iraqis say the withdrawal is positive. Their numbers are identical to the views of U.S. Republicans. Eighty-seven percent of Democrats say that the anticipated withdrawal is positive. But when we ask what emotion is felt most when contemplating the departure of U.S. forces, this consensus breaks down. The U.S. numbers favoring withdrawal remain just as high, with almost three-quarters of Americans saying they are "happy" at the prospect. But this emotion is shared by only 22% of Iraqis. On this matter, Iraqi views can again be described as conflicted: 22% saying they are happy; 35% saying they are worried; and 30% saying they feel both emotions.

The reasons for this mixed Iraqi mood can be seen when we look more closely at a range of concerns as to what might unfold following an American withdrawal from Iraq. Almost six in ten Iraqis say they are concerned about the possibility that the following might occur: "civil war." "the country will split into parts," "increased terrorism," "economic deterioration," and the fear that Iraq "may be dominated by a neighboring country."


U.S. attitudes toward each of these concerns might best be described as ambivalent, with only "increased terrorism" registering. And on the

Iraqis have legitimate concerns about their future

Arab side, only Jordan shares Iraqi concerns with the same degree of intensity as their neighbor.

Given all of this, we then asked in Iraq and the United States "if the internal security situation in Iraq were to require it and the Iraqi government agreed...should U.S. forces stay..."? What we found was that one-half of Americans say, "No. The troops should leave as soon as possible"with 63% of Democrats holding this view. In Iraq, one-half want U.S. forces to stay "as long as was needed" with Shia, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds all concurring. And despite this Iraqi sense of foreboding, substantial majorities in all of the Arab countries polled, except Tunisia, declare that they are "optimistic" about Iraq's post-withdrawal future.

When Iraqis look at the world and assess their attitudes toward other countries and their expectations as to the contribution that these countries can make to Iraq's development, we find that only UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and China consistently receive high grades from all of Iraq's communal groups. Iran and Kuwait receive negative ratings from all groups, while other countries



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in the region are viewed favorably by one or two groups and not trusted or feared by the others. For example, while the Kurds feel quite positively about the U.S. role, Arabs in Iraq do not. And while Turkey's role and contribution is supported by the Arab side in Iraq, the Kurds give Turkey quite low favorable ratings.

Looking forward, Iraqis appear quite conflicted about what role they see for the United States. About 44% see either the United States as a future "source of foreign interference" or want it to have "no role at all" in their country. But about 54% see the United States as a future "investor in development," "a security presence," or a country with whom Iraq has either a "normal' or "special relationship."

Examining how Iraqis view issues close to home can be quite instructive. About one in five Iraqis want a democracy and believe a democracy "will work" in their country. Another two in five say that they would like a democracy but they don't "believe it will work." At the same time, one in five "do not want a democracy" because they believe "it won't work" in Iraq. Depending on how you add up these responses, it can either be said that six in ten Iraqis want their country to be a democracy, or six in ten Iraqis don't believe that democracy will work in Iraq. This is the definition of being conflicted. Most interesting is the virtual consensus on these views that exists among all of Iraq's ethnic and sect groups.

What are the main concerns of Iraqis? After all they have been through in the past several decades, it should be of no surprise that the top three are "expanding employment opportunities," "combating extremism and terrorism" and "ending corruption and nepotism," followed by "improving the educational system." We asked Iraqis to evaluate their leaders and found that most are polarizing figures. Iraqi List coalition Iyad Allawi has the best overall rating of any Iraqi political figure receiving strong support from Sunni Arabs and Kurds. He, however, is not viewed favorably by Shia Arabs. The current Prime Minister, Nuri al Maliki, is more polarizing with quite limited support from Sunni Iraqis. In fact his numbers across the board are strikingly similar to those received by cleric, Moqtada al Sadr, except that al Sadr does better among Shia, and receives approximately the same ratings as al Maliki among Sunni Arabs and only slightly worse among Kurds.

Iraqis are a conflicted and divided people, but who can blame them? After decades of ruthless rule, they endured an invasion and occupation, suffered from terror and ethnic cleansing, and while the trappings of a democracy have been setup, it remains in a gestational state. Iraqis appear to both want the occupation to end, but have great concerns about what will follow. The problem for them is that the American public wants an end to this war, and, it appears, most of Iraq's neighbors are neither equipped to help, nor would their help be welcomed. An additional problem, of course, was the troubled outcome of the last election, which left Iraq with a leader who is not supported by many in the country.

Despite the optimism expressed by some of Iraq's neighbors, Iraqis have legitimate concerns about the post-withdrawal period.

I. Iraq: 8 Years Later

1. Better Off/Worse Off?

Question: Do you think that the Iraqi people are better off/worse off than they were before the American forces entered their country?

	Iraq	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	US	Iran
Better Off	30	37	25	16	22	31	30	39	25
Worse Off	42	41	61	66	57	20	48	18	52
Same/Not Sure	23/6	13/9	14/-	16/2	3/18	49/-	17/6	30/14	20/3

		Ira	aq		United States			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican	
Better Off	30	29	15	60	39	24	58	
Worse Off	42	46	55	4	18	26	10	
Same	23	24	24	14	30	36	23	
Not sure	6	1	7	22	14	14	9	

In assessing and comparing Iraqi, American, and regional attitudes toward the impact of the war in Iraq and expectations about what will transpire following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country, we can observe a few rather consistent patterns that emerge from the data. In the first place, Iraqi attitudes are deeply divided between Arabs and Kurds and between Shia and Sunni Arabs. U.S. attitudes toward the war and its impact are also divided with wide gaps between Democrats and Republicans. Finally, we can note that broader Arab opinion, while fairly uniform in opposition to the U.S. involvement in Iraq, in some instances reflects even greater pessimism about the consequences of the war than among the Iraqi people themselves.

When asked if their situation is better, worse, or the same as it was before the United States entered their country, Iraqis are more likely to say that they are worse off today. Among Sunni respondents 55% say Iraqis are worse off, with only 15% saying they are better off. Sixty percent of Kurds, on the other hand, say that Iraqis are better off and only 4% that they are worse off. Shia respondents mirror the overall national figures, with 29% saying that Iraqis are better off and 46% saying worse off.



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Across the region, respondents in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon have a dimmer view than Iraqis as a whole, with 66%, 61%, and 57% respectively finding Iraq's situation worse today than it was before the United States entered. In Egypt and UAE, the opinions are slightly more tempered, but pluralities still think Iraq is worse off. Iran's respondents mirror Iraqis' views.

Only among Tunisian and U.S. respondents do you find pluralities that feel Iraq is better off (30%; 39%), while only about 20% of the respondents in these countries think Iraq is worse off. Most striking, however, is the number of people in Tunisia and the United States who think Iraq's situation is the same as it was before United States entered the country or are unsure about the situation (49%; 44%). The partisan divide among U.S. respondents is very much in evidence here as 58% of Republicans think Iraq is better off, while less half that number of Democrats agree (24%); and only one in ten Republicans think Iraq is worse off, while 26% of Democrats believe this to be the case.

2. Better/Worse Since the 2006 Surge

Question: When you compare the situation in Iraq today with the situation before the surge of U.S. forces, is it doing better off, worse off or the same?

	Iraq	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	Iran
Better Off	34	5	30	25	28	26	33	26
Worse Off	16	76	48	42	42	9	51	53
Same	43	20	22	23	10	65	16	21

	Iraq								
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd					
Better Off	34	38	15	50					
Worse Off	16	13	30	3					
Same	43	44	48	25					

Twice as many Iraqis think that their country is better off now than it was before the surge of U.S. forces in 2006 (34% vs. 16%), but a plurality think the situation is the same (43%). The Shia respondents basically mirror the overall respondent pool in their opinions, while the minority Kurdish and Sunni communities hold divergent views. The Kurds in Iraq believe the situation is improved by a wide margin, with 50% saying Iraq is better off, 25% saying it is the same, and only 3% saying it is worse off. Among Sunnis, however, twice as many believe that Iraq is worse off now than it was before the 2006 surge (30% worse vs. 15% better), and almost half think there is no change.

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Only Tunisia, among other nations in the region surveyed, has more respondents who feel that Iraq is better off now than worse off before the surge (26% vs. 9%), but almost two-thirds of Tunisians think the situation is the same. The strongest opinion about the aftermath of the surge is found in Egypt where three-quarters of respondents think Iraq is worse off and only 5% think it is better off. Majorities in UAE and Iran agree that Iraq is worse off, while less than half of respondents in Jordan (48%), Saudi Arabia (42%), and Lebanon (42%) concur. In all of these countries, between one-quarter and one-third of respondents think Iraq is better off.

3. What Has Improved, What Has Not


		Ir	aq		United States			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican	
Political freedom	33/48/16	30/ 53 /15	29/54/14	53 /12/20	50/18/11	37/26/16	67 /10/6	
Economic development and employment	17/66/13	14/ 74 /10	4/80/10	52 /7/30	29/30/18	19/41/20	43/19/17	
Education	25/47/20	20/53/23	12/58/17	71/1/16	35/20/20	29/28/24	48/10/17	
Healthcare	20/48/28	18/49/29	9/63/25	46/23/25	27/21/19	19/30/22	39/9/17	
Personal safety and security	18/72/8	7/ 81 /10	1/88/9	90 /6/2	33/35/13	22/ 46 /16	51/21/9	
Relations with neighboring countries	21/54/19	12/55/25	4/77/14	87/5/5	21/32/30	18/39/18	27/26/18	
Government	16/59/17	14/64/18	3/69/18	48/22/22	34/26/14	25/36/15	46/16/14	
Women's rights	26/37/26	28/41/25	9/42/34	48/17/10	38/16/22	31/24/23	52/8/21	
Religious freedom	39/36/14	47/35/12	24/47/17	36/20/16	29/19/26	24/25/28	39/14/21	
						* Positive/neg	ative/no impact	

Question: Since U.S. forces entered Iraq, how do you feel the following areas of life have been impacted?

Overall, Iraqis do not identify any area of life has been positively impacted since the United States entered Iraq. In every area measured in this survey, the patterns outlined at the outset hold true. Sunni Arabs are the most negative about the impact of the war. Kurds are the most positive. In fact, in most instances, Kurds have the only positive assessment of developments in Iraq. The only area where Shia judge the impact of the war to have been positive is with regard to religious freedom. Largely as a result of these Shia numbers in this one area, a slight plurality of Iraqis say that the

Majorities of Iraqi respondents say that the impact of the war has been negative with respect to their personal safety and security (72%), economic development and employment (66%),

war has contributed to religious freedom (39% positive vs. 36% negative vs. 14% no impact).



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administration of government services (59%), and relations with neighboring countries (54%). Onehalf feel there has been a negative impact on political freedom (as opposed to one-third who say that political freedom has advanced). Similarly almost one-half of Iraqis feel the impact on education has been negative. The results are more mixed in terms of women's rights (26% positive, 37% negative, 26% no impact).

Among the majority Shia and the minority Sunni and Kurds, opinions are quite varied. Not surprisingly, Sunni respondents are most likely to see the impacts to life in Iraq since the United States entered as negative, particularly in the areas of personal safety and security (88%), economic development and employment (80%), and relations with neighboring countries (77%). Kurds in Iraq, on the other hand, tend to see positive impacts in every area, especially with respect to personal security (90%), relations with neighboring countries (87%), and education (71%). Among the Shia majority, respondents mirror the overall Iraqi responses, with one exception: almost half of Shia respondents see a positive impact on religious freedom (47% positive vs. 35% negative).

In comparison, the opinions of U.S. respondents are generally mixed, largely because of a partisan divide, with Democrats tending to see the war as having had a more negative impact and Republicans still hoping to see this long and costly war in a positive light.

This dichotomy is particularly evident with respect to economic development and employment, health care, personal safety and security, and administration of government services. Respondents from both parties find more positive than negative impact on political freedom (Dems: 37% vs. 26%; Reps: 67% vs. 10%) and women's rights (Dems: 31% vs. 24%; Reps: 52% vs. 8%). Democrats are evenly split on the impact on education and religious freedom, but Republicans definitively see positive impacts in both of these areas (39% vs. 9%; 39% vs. 14%). Republicans are evenly split on the impact on relations with neighboring countries, while Democrats are twice as likely to see the impact on this area as negative (18% vs. 39%).

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4. Who Benefited Most?

	Iraq	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	US	Iran
Iraqi people	4	2	2	16	8	-	35	39	21
U.S.	48	88	66	58	86	81	47	22	50
Iran	54	35	28	27	10	54	25	5	-
Israel	18	56	30	37	72	23	35	12	46
Al-Qaeda	27	11	44	28	6	10	12	17	11
Iraqi elites	40	5	15	21	8	32	25	-	22
No one	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-
KSA	4	2	5	6	3	-	8	3	27
Turkey	6	1	10	11	2	-	12	1	21
			· · · · · ·		Note: Resp	ondents could	l select up to	two groups o	r countries.

Question: Who benefited the most from the war in Iraq?

When asked who benefited the most from the war in Iraq, Iraqis most frequently point to Iran (54%), the United States (48%), and Iraqi elites (40%). Additionally, more than one-quarter of Iraqis see al-Qaeda as a chief beneficiary of the war. Only 4% think the Iraqi people benefited the most from the war.

A majority of respondents across the region feel that the United States was the chief beneficiary of the war in Iraq, including in Egypt (88%), Lebanon (86%), Tunisia (81%), Jordan (66%), Saudi Arabia (58%), and Iran (50%). In UAE, the United States is also the most frequently identified beneficiary, with 47% of respondents selecting it. Large proportions of respondents in Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE also see Israel as a major beneficiary of the war (72%, 56%, 46%, 37%, and 35%). Iran is often cited as having benefited by respondents in Tunisia (54%) and Egypt (35%). Al-Qaeda is seen as a chief beneficiary by 44% of Jordanians and 28% of respondents in Saudi Arabia. The only country in the region where the Iraqi people are identified by more than a quarter of respondents as benefiting from the war is UAE (35%).

In the United States, the most frequent response to this question is that "no one benefited" from the war in Iraq (40%). Slightly less than that, 39% of Americans, see the Iraqi people as a chief beneficiary of the war. Twenty-two percent of U.S. respondents identify the United States as having benefited from the war.



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5. Was It Worth It?

Question: Do you feel the war in Iraq was worth it?

	United States								
	Total	Democratic	Republican						
Yes	26	17	43						
No	56	75	32						
Not Sure	18	8	25						

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When U.S. respondents are asked if the war was worth it, they are more than twice as likely to say "no, it was not worth it" than they are to say "yes." The division between the two political parties is stark. Three-quarters of Democrats say the war in Iraq was not worth it, while only one-third of Republicans agree. Forty-three percent of Republicans say the war was worth it, and one full quarter are not sure.

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II. Opinions about Withdrawal

1. Is Withdrawal a Positive or Negative?

Question: American forces are scheduled to leave your country at the end of this year. In your opinion is this withdrawal a positive or negative thing for your country?

		Ira	aq		United States			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican	
Positive	60	68	48	45	74	87	59	
Negative	30	24	39	35	13	4	29	
Not Sure	10	7	11	20	14	7	19	

All groups surveyed agree that the U.S. withdrawal scheduled for the end of the year is a positive thing. Overall, Iraqis are twice as likely to see the withdrawal as positive rather than negative, though this opinion is strongest among Shia respondents (68% positive vs. 24% negative). Among Sunnis and Kurds attitudes are more conflicted, with more than one-third in each group seeing the withdrawal as negative (39%, 35%), and two in ten Kurdish respondents saying that they are "not sure."

In the United States, almost three-quarters of respondents see the withdrawal as a positive, though this opinion is far stronger among Democrats (87%) than among Republicans (59%). Almost two in ten Republicans are not sure if the withdrawal is a positive or a negative.

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2. What Emotion Do You Feel about Withdrawal?

		lr	aq		United States			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican	
Happiness	22	26	14	20	72	86	57	
Worry	35	29	45	37	20	9	36	
Both	30	32	31	20	-	-	-	

Question: When you think of this withdrawal, which emotion do you feel most?

Despite the strong tendency to see the U.S. withdrawal as a positive thing, many Iraqis are worried about it as well, with all three Iraqi communal groups displaying conflicted emotions. Overall, thirty-five percent of Iraqi respondents say they are worried about the impending withdrawal, only 22% are happy, and 30% are both worried and happy. Shia respondents are in equal measure happy (26%) and worried (29%), with one-third of this group saying they feel both emotions. Sunnis are three times more likely to be worried (45%) than to be happy (14%); Kurds are almost twice as likely to be worried (37%) as happy (20%).

In the United States, 72% of respondents overall are happy about the withdrawal, while only 20% express worry. Again, Democrats are more likely to Republicans to express these views (Dems: 86% happy vs. 9% worried; Reps: 57% happy vs. 36% worried).

3. Post Withdrawal Concerns

Question: How great is your concern with each of the following once the United States leaves Iraq?

	Iraq	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	US	Iran
Civil War	65 /20	30/43	68 /7	47/29	46/34	18/34	22/67	38/32	44/45
Split into part	60 /21	27/52	49 /13	52 /27	43/39	20/36	14/75	27/44	41/43
Terrorism	58 /19	25/50	62 /9	41/35	44/37	19/63	18/63	48 /24	39/45
Economic deterioration	57 /19	27/38	48 /14	39/33	46/32	12/54	27/54	28/38	38/48
Lose religious freedom	47 /24	27/44	36/28	25/49	33/44	19/36	19/62	34/34	42/41
Dominated by neigh- boring country	60 /30	21/59	52 /20	49/19	29/50	7/75	25/55	25/44	42/45

Note: Respondents were asked to rate their concern on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "very concerned" and 5 is "not concerned." "Concerned" here is the aggregation of "1" and "2" responses, while "unconcerned" is the aggregation of "4" and "5" responses. Percentages do not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding "3" has not been included. * Concerned/unconcerned The people of Iraq tend to be quite concerned about the post-U.S.-withdrawal period. Strong majorities of Iraqi respondents are concerned about the following possible consequences in the aftermath of a U.S. withdrawal from their country: civil war (65%), the country splitting into parts (60%), being dominated by a neighboring country (60%), terrorism (58%), and economic deterioration and employment (57%). The potential for a loss of religious freedom is the only issue rating concern from less than a majority of Iraqi (47%).

Among those surveyed throughout the region, deep concern for the future of Iraq following a withdrawal of U.S. forces appears to be felt only in Jordan, and to somewhat lesser degree in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. In Egypt, Tunisia, and UAE respondents largely say they are not concerned about post-withdrawal Iraq. And in Iran, attitudes are split right down the middle between being concerned and being unconcerned.

Pluralities of U.S. respondents are concerned about terrorism (48 vs. 24%) and about Iraq falling into civil war (38% vs. 32%). They are evenly divided between concerned and not concerned with respect to the potential for Iraqis to lose religious freedom (34% vs. 34%). Finally, U.S. respondents tend to be less concerned about Iraq being dominated by a neighboring country (25% vs. 44%), Iraq being split into parts (27% vs. 44%), and economic deterioration (28% vs. 38%). In each of these three cases, Iraqis are at least twice as likely to be concerned as Americans.

4. U.S. View

Question: If the internal security situation in Iraq were to require it and the Iraqi government agreed, in your opinion should U.S. forces stay one more year, as long as possible or leave as soon as possible?

		United Sta	tes			
	Total	Democratic	Republican			
1 Year	13	11	19			
Stay as long as needed	22	12	33			
Leave ASAP 47 63 30						
Note: Percentages do not add u the percentag	1		vere rounded, and not been included.			

Overall, almost half of U.S. respondents think that even if the internal Iraqi security situation required it and the Iraqi government requested it, U.S. forces should still leave immediately. Democrats are twice as likely to assert this opinion as Republicans (63% vs. 30%). Only 22% of Americans say U.S. forces should "stay as long as needed," with Republicans almost three times as likely to say this as Democrats (33% vs. 12%).

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5. Iraqi View

Question: How long should the U.S. forces stay?

			Iraq						
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd					
1 year	10	9	9	19					
As long as needed	47	42	56	51					
Leave ASAP	29	34	24	20					
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding "not sure" has not been included.									

In contrast to the view of Americans, when Iraqis are asked how long U.S. forces should remain in their country, almost one-half of Iraqis say that they would want the United States to "stay as long as needed." On this matter, all of Iraq's communal groups agree with 56% of Sunnis, 42% of Shia and 51% of Kurds all sharing this view.

6. Optimism/Pessimism about Next 2 Years

	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	Iran
Optimistic	66	67	75	55	20	76	60
Pessimistic	23	18	11	24	80	14	29
Not Sure	11	15	12	21	-	8	11

Note: "Optimistic" is the aggregation of "very optimistic" and "somewhat optimistic." "Pessimistic" is the aggregation of "somewhat pessimistic" and "very pessimistic." Percentages do not add to 100% because numbers were rounded.

Despite the worry felt by Iraqis about the post-withdrawal period, their concern with the unrest that may occur, and the feeling of nearly one-half that the United States should "stay as long as is needed," strong majorities in six of the seven Middle East countries covered in this survey indicate that they are optimistic about Iraq's future following the departure of U.S. forces from that country. In all countries across the region, except Tunisia, respondents are quite optimistic about the first two years after U.S. forces leave. At least two-thirds of respondents in UAE (76%), Saudi Arabia (75%), Jordan (67%), and Egypt (66%) say they are optimistic. In Lebanon and Iran, respondents are twice as likely to say they are optimistic as to say they are pessimistic (55% vs. 24%, 60% vs. 29%). Respondents in Tunisia, however, are four times more likely to be pessimistic (80%) than optimistic (20%).

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III. Looking at the United States & the World

1. What Contribution Will Other Countries Make?

Question: Did the following make a positive or negative contribution to Iraq?


	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	Iran
U.S.	4/89	5/ 92	14/82	15/ 73	12/55	25/ 70	10/80
Iran	8/49	17/66	3/82	31/40	2/56	31/59	37/4
KSA	31/13	23/44	39/5	21/43	26/7	33/41	27/54
Turkey	37/8	7/70	13/64	26/25	14/9	28/44	28/58
China	6/14	20/4	31/7	14/11	5/3	43/12	30/43
UAE	18/10	11/21	40/8	27/13	34/-	55/3	26/56
N					1.1		

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding "not sure" has not been included. * Positive/negative

When given a list of countries and asked whether each has made a positive or negative contribution to Iraq, the overwhelming majority of respondents in every country around the region agrees that the United States has made a negative contribution. This is particularly true in Jordan (92%), Egypt (89%), Saudi Arabia (82%), and Iran (80%). One-quarter of respondents in UAE see the United States as making a positive contribution to Iraq, the highest of any country polled, but 70% in the Emirates view the U.S. role as negative.

Iran is also seen as having made a negative contribution by at least a plurality in all nations polled, except, of course, in Iran itself where 37% of respondents see their country as having played a positive role in Iraq. Only 4% in Iran see their contribution to Iraq as having been negative. Among other nations, Saudi Arabia (82%) and Jordan (66%) are the most critical of Iran. Almost one-third of respondents in Lebanon and UAE see Iran as making a positive contribution, though 40% and 59% of respondents respectively find Iran a negative contributor.

Turkey's contribution to Iraq is more likely to be viewed as negative by respondents in Jordan (70%), Saudi Arabia (64%), Iran (58%), and UAE (44%). Egyptians, on the other hand, are more likely to view Turkey as a positive contributor (37% positive vs. 8% negative). Very few Tunisians have a strong opinion on Turkey's contribution to Iraq as only 14% see it as positive and 9% as negative. In fact, with the exception of their critical assessment of the U.S. and Iranian roles,



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Tunisians are the least inclined to hold any view on these matters among the Arabs we surveyed across the region.

The question of China's contribution does not seem to spark intense interest as fewer than one quarter of respondents view China as either positive or negative.

Saudi Arabia is only seen as a positive contributor to Iraq by pluralities in Tunisia (26%) and Egypt (31%) as well as by those within its borders (39%). The scales are tipped the other way in Iran, Jordan, and Lebanon, where respondents are twice as likely to see Saudi Arabia as a negative contributor rather than a positive one. In UAE, respondents are slightly more likely to view Saudi Arabia's contribution as negative (33% positive vs. 41% negative).

Finally, UAE's contribution to Iraq is more likely to be viewed as positive by a majority of those within its borders (55%), as well as by respondents in Saudi Arabia (40%), Tunisia (34%), Lebanon (27%), and Egypt (18%). The only exceptions are among respondents in Iran and Jordan. They are twice as likely to see UAE as a negative contributor than as a positive contributor to Iraq.

2. Favorable/Unfavorable

Question: Indicate your attitude towards the following countries.

		lra	aq	
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
U.S.	26/67	25/ 68	7/88	63 /37
KSA	39/48	30/ 62	59 /26	49/51
Iran	26/66	41/52 2/90		5/ 83
Turkey	43/48	53/40	40/47	5/81
UAE	65/29	58 /36	67 /25	88 /8
China	46/43	45/46	36/43	71/25
somew"somewha" "somewha" do not ad	avorable" is th vhat favorable t unfavorable d to 100% bec ntage respond	e." "Unfavoral " and "very un cause number ling "not sure	ole" is the agg nfavorable." H 's were round	gregation of Percentages led, and the en included.

When asked about their attitudes toward a series of countries, Iraqi respondents only view UAE and China favorably. Almost two-thirds of Iraqis see UAE favorably, including strong majorities of Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds; Kurds are the most likely to rate UAE favorably (88%). Opinions about China are more divided among subgroups with Shia evenly split in their attitudes, Sunnis more likely to view China unfavorably, but Kurds far more likely to view China favorably (71% vs. 25%).

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Two-thirds of respondents in Iraq rate the United States and Iran unfavorably, with just one-quarter rating these countries favorable.

In the case of the United States, the attitudes of the Shia majority closely mirror the overall split, while Sunnis even more overwhelmingly consider the United States unfavorably (7% vs. 88%). Kurds, on the other hand, are far more likely to have a favorable opinion of the United States (63% vs. 37%). In the case of Iran, majorities of Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds all hold unfavorable views, with Sunni and Kurdish unfavorable opinions at very high levels (90% and 83%) while Shia opinion is a bit more divided (41% favorable vs. 52% unfavorable).

Overall, Iraqis are more likely to hold unfavorable opinions of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, though there are considerable percentages of Iraqis who lean the other way. With respect to Saudi Arabia, Shia are twice as likely to hold an unfavorable view (30% vs. 62%), while Sunni opinion is exactly the opposite (59% vs. 26%). Kurds are evenly divided in their views of Saudi Arabia. With respect to Turkey, Shia are slightly more likely to hold favorable opinions (53% vs. 40%), while Sunnis are slightly more likely to lean the other way (40% vs. 47%). Kurds have very strong unfavorable opinions about Turkey (81%).

3. Countries Making Positive/Negative Impact

Question: When the U.S. leaves your country, do you feel that each of these neighboring or interested countries will make a positive or negative contribution to your country's security and economic development?

		Iraq		
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
Iran	20/ 67 /8	33/ 51 /10	1/ 87 /6	4/ 92 /2
Kuwait	16/54/21	22/55/19	3/ 68 /22	14/30/26
Turkey	38/31/22	44/27/21	42 /17/28	5/ 73 /13
Jordan	44 /17/27	36/24/31	54 /8/23	58 /4/15
Syria	28/25/30	22/34/31	40 /12/28	33/8/32
KSA	37/29/23	16/44/30	59 /8/17	82 /7/9
Qatar	36/14/39	22/20/47	49 /6/33	72 /5/14
		*	Positive/negativ	ve/no impact

Looking to the future, following the withdrawal of U.S. forces, Iraqis were asked to assess the positive or negative roles they believe regional neighbors would play in their country's security and economic development. The responses expose Iraq's sectarian and ethnic rifts, but also reveal

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a few interesting points of consensus. For example, Jordan, Iran, and Kuwait are the only three countries on which there is agreement among all of Iraq's groups. All feel that Jordan would make a positive contribution to Iraq's future, while all hold the view that Iran's and Kuwait's contributions would be negative.

Overall, Jordan receives the highest positive rating—with 44% of Iraqis saying they believe Jordan would play a positive role in their country. Iran receives the most negative assessment, followed by Kuwait—with 67% of Iraqis saying that Iran would play a negative role in their future (with around 90% of Sunni Arabs and Kurds saying this, along with 51% of Shia Arabs) and 54% of all Iraqis hold-ing the same view about Kuwait.

Iraq's divisions come through in assessing the roles of other countries. For example, while Arabs give a positive assessment to the future role they expect Turkey to play; Kurds overwhelmingly do not agree. And while Sunni Arabs and Kurds agree that they expect a positive future contribution from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Syria; Shia Iraqis do not share this view.

4. Future Role for the United States

Question: Which of the following roles do you see the United States playing in your country's future?

			raq	
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
Investor in development	12	13	5	18
Security presence	14	13	9	27
Special alliance	15	17	11	14
Source of foreign interference	33	31	51	20
Normal relationship	13	16	11	5
No role at all	11	10	12	15

Still looking forward, Iraqis were asked what role they envisioned for the United States. Despite this being a "forced choice" among six options, the results reveal a pattern.

Overall, Iraqis are divided with 54% choosing roles for the United States that make a positive contribution to the country, while another 44% say their either see the United States as "source of foreign interference" or having "no role at all" in Iraq's future. The negative assessment is shared by Sunni (51%) and Shia (31%) Arabs. Kurds, on the other hand, seek a more positive future relationship with the United States, with almost two-thirds holding these views.

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IV. A Closer Look at Issues & Leaders

1. Democracy: Can It Work?

Question: Which of the following statements about democracy in your country best represents your own opinion?

		lra	aq	
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
I would like my country to be a democracy and it would work here	21	23	12	23
I would like my country to be a democracy but it won't work here	41	44	38	35
I do not want my country to be a democracy because it will not work here	20	19	27	14
I do not want my country to be a democracy because it is not a good form of government	5	5	9	-
None/Not sure	13	10	14	27

When asked about the prospects for democracy in their country, Iraqis are deeply conflicted. About one in five Iraqis want a democracy and believe it can work in their country. Another two in five say that they would like a democracy, but they don't believe it will work. At the same time, one in five do not want a democracy because they believe it won't work in Iraq. Depending on how you add up the numbers then, either six in ten Iraqis want their country to be a democracy, or six in ten Iraqis don't believe that democracy will work in Iraq. Most interesting is the virtual consensus that exists across the board with the notable exception of the 27% of Kurds who are "not sure."

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2. Confidence in the Future

Question: How optimistic/pessimistic are you about the long-term prospects for stability and progress in your country?

		Ira	aq				
	Total Shia Sunni						
Very optimistic	9	10	2	20			
Somewhat optimistic	46	59	27	32			
Somewhat pessimistic	23	17	34	22			
Very pessimistic	8	3	18	9			

When asked to express their confidence in the future of Iraq, Shia and Kurds tend to agree. Both of these groups (and therefore Iraqis overall) are optimistic about the long-term prospects for Iraq, but slightly more than one-half of Sunni Arabs are pessimistic. It is interesting to note that seven in ten Iraqis choose to temper this response by choosing "somewhat" optimistic or pessimistic, rather than describing their confidence more intensely as "very" optimistic or pessimistic.

3. Ba'ath Party

Question: Do you believe the Ba'ath party members should continue to be excluded from politics?

	Iraq								
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd					
All former members	29	33	6	56					
High-ranking only	36	42	31	23					
No, they should not	19	12	38	1					

On the question of whether Ba'ath Party members should continue to be excluded from politics, opinions of Arabs and Kurds differ. Fifty-four percent of Shia Arabs and 69% of Sunni Arabs would agree to a less than total ban on all Ba'ath party members. While they are not in total agreement, the differences between them are not as great as the differences between Arab opinion and that of Kurds, more than half of whom want all former Ba'athists banned.

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4. Most Important Issues

Question: How important are the following issues facing your country today?

	In order of importance among Iraqis
1	Expanding employment opportunities
2	Combating extremism and terrorism
3	Ending corruption and nepotism
4	Improving the education system
5	Political or governmental reform
6	Protecting personal and civil rights
7	Improving the health care system
8	Advancing democracy
9	Increasing rights for women
10	Lack of political debate on important issues
11	Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
e	Note: Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each issue on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "most impor- ant" and 5 is "least important." Rankings are determined based on a composite score considering all five choices.

When asked about the importance of a series of issues facing Iraq today, the most significant issue to emerge is expanding employment opportunities, followed by combating extremism and terrorism. These two issues are, by far, the most important to Shia and Sunni Arabs alike. Protecting personal and civil rights is the most important issue for Kurds, followed by improving the education system. One additional difference to note is that when looking at increasing rights for women, Shia respondents find this issue much more important than Kurds.



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5. Attitudes towards Iraqi Leaders

Question: Indicate your attitude towards these leaders.

		Ira	aq	
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
Nuri al Maliki	37/ 57	51/44	7/81	19/71
Iyad Allawi	40 /50	25/70	69 /16	49 /26
Ammar al Hakim	26/64	39/55	5/87	11/58
Moqtada al Sadr	38/50	59 /32	5/78	10/67
Jalal Talabani	23/69	23/72	5/84	57 /35

Note: "Favorable" is the aggregation of "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable." "Unfavorable" is the aggregation of "somewhat unfavorable" and "very unfavorable." Percentages do not add to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding "not sure" has not been included. * Favorable/unfavorable

Leader of the Iraqi List coalition Iyad Allawi has the best overall rating of any Iraqi figure, with four in ten Iraqis overall viewing him favorably. Allawi has strong support from Sunnis (69%) and Kurds (49%).

The Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki is a more polarizing figure with support from only Shia (51% favorable). In fact, al Maliki's numbers are strikingly similar to Moqtada al Sadr, though al Sadr does slightly better among Shia, the same among Sunni, and only slightly worse among Kurds. About one-quarter of Iraqis view Ammar al Hakim favorably, with this limited support coming primarily from Shia. President Jalal Talabani has the lowest favorability rating of the Iraqi leaders we asked about, with 23% of Iraqis overall seeing him as favorable. While 57% of Kurds view Talabani favorably, his numbers among Shia (23%) and Sunni (5%) are far lower.

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Zogby Research Services commissioned JZ Analytics to conduct surveys in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and additional online surveys in the United States, Tunisia, and Egypt. Various methodologies were utilized using trusted partners in the countries surveyed. The following methodologies were developed to most effectively contact the samples requested.

In Iraq, interviews were conducted from September 13-21, 2011, in Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Babil, Najaf, Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, Sulamaniya, and Arbil with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households from the six Iraqi governorates. The margin of error is +/-3.2 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on the 2007 projection of the 1997 general census, the most recent and comprehensive official census study conducted in the country.

In Lebanon, face-to-face interviews were conducted from September 12-29, 2011, in Beirut, Aley, Metn, Baabda, Tripoli, Tyre, Saida, and Chouf with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on a systematic random sample adopting a population proportionate weight based on the approximate estimated make-up/weight of the areas covered in each selected neighborhood.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Multi-stage stratified probability sampling was used to ensure a random, representative sample. However, broad demographic quotas were maintained at an aggregate (country) level to ensure that the sample was in line with the sample in earlier years. Interviews were conducted in Egypt from September 12-29, 2011, in Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Menia, Mansoura, and Asyut. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Tunisia, from September 12-29, 2011, in Tunis, Safaqis, Sousse, Bizerte, and Gafsa. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Jordan from September 12-29, 2011, in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, and Madaba. The margin of error is +/-4.4 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Iran from September 12-29, 2011, in Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Ahwaz. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Afghanistan from September 12-29, 2011, in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Baghlan, and Heart. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points.

In Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. Adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was broadly representative and not skewed. Broad country level demographic quotas were followed to ensure the final sample has characteristics of the population. Interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia from September 12-29, 2011, in Riyadh, Buraydah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Dammam, and Khobar. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in UAE from September 12-29, 2011, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and the North Emirates. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points.

In addition, JZ Analytics conducted online surveys of 1,054 adults in the United States on September 13-15, 2010, 602 adults in Egypt on September 15-19, 2010, and 531 adults in Tunisia, September 15- October 5, 2010. Using trusted interactive partner resources, thousands of adults were invited to participate in this survey. Each invitation is password coded and secure so that each respondent can only access the survey one time.

Based on information from census data, CIA fact books, and exit polls, complex weighting techniques are utilized to best represent the demographics of the population being surveyed. Weighted variables may include age, race, gender, region, party, education, and religion.



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	Jor	dan	Eg	pt	Leba	anon	on Tunisia KSA		SA	UA	E*	Ira	m	Egypt Online		Tunisia Online		
	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%
Total	516	100	1028	100	500	100	831	100	821	100	509	100	1017	100	602	100	531	100
Under 36	317	61	601	59	288	58	397	49	506	62	306	60	646	64	478	79	392	74
36+	199	49	427	52	212	42	434	52	315	38	203	40	371	37	124	21	139	26
Live in city	385	79	989	96	469	94	796	96	650	79	356	70	635	62	539	90	440	83
Live outside city	131	21	39	4	31	6	12	1	171	21	153	30	382	38	47	8	80	15
Less than university	408	79	874	85	343	69	464	56	643	78	290	57	637	63	85	14	107	21
University+	108	21	154	15	155	31	367	44	178	22	219	43	380	37	509	86	412	79
Sunni	390	76	939	91	110	22	784	94	722	88	486	96	47	5	503	89	496	97
Shia					175	35	-	-	40	5	16	3	969	95				
Christian	26	5	89	9	180	36									60	11	10	2
Druze	-	-	-	-	35	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Male	262	51	518	50	252	50	416	50	460	56	374	74	542	53	331	55	265	50
Female	254	49	510	50	248	50	415	50	361	44	135	27	475	47	271	45	266	50
						* Inc	cludes app	oroximate	ly 350 Em	iratis and	150 Arab	s working	in UAE. No	ote: Total	may not e	qual 100%	due to ro	unding.

	Iraq	
	freq	%
Total	1000	100
Under 25	168	17
25–36	208	21
36+	384	38
Urban	696	70
Rural	304	30
Less than university	884	88
University+	116	12
Married	660	66
Single	227	28
Divorce/widowed/ separated	63	6
Arabic	848	85
Kurdish	139	14
Assyrian	9	1
Shia	612	61
Sunni	375	38
Male	529	53
Female	471	47
Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.		

	Afghanistan	
	freq	%
Total	837	100
Under 36	530	63
36+	307	37
Live in city	837	100
Live outside city	-	-
Less than university	-	-
University+	-	-
None/ Primary	700	84
Tech/Secondary	84	10
Professional/Higher	53	6
Employed	337	40
Not employed	500	60
Sunni	661	79
Shia	176	21
Male	426	51
Female	411	49
Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.		

	U.S. Online	
	freq	%
Total	1054	100
18–29	217	22
30–49	355	36
50-64	246	25
65+	168	17
East	231	22
South	272	26
Central Great Lakes	314	30
West	231	22
No College Degree	650	62
College Degree+	399	38
Liberal	219	21
Moderate	337	32
Conservative	408	39
White	717	68
Hispanic	137	13
African American	126	12
Asian	42	4
Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.		



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