

Executive Summary



- Despite the persistence of negative attitudes toward several U.S. policies in the Arab World, there has been an uptick in U.S. favorable ratings in some Arab countries and an increase in Arab support for President Obama in all countries. While both remain well below the 50% level, the increase is, nevertheless, noteworthy. In most Arab countries, attitudes toward the United States are back to where they were in 2009, and are higher than the Bush-era lows.
- Arabs judge the Obama Administration to have been most effective in "ending the U.S. presence in Iraq" and "working to end Iran's nuclear program" and least effective in "improving relations with the Arab/ Muslim Worlds" and handling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Arab Spring.
- Strong majorities (from 60% to 83%) say it is important for their countries to have "good relations with the United States." And majorities say that the Obama Administration is at least "trying" though has not yet been effective in maintaining those good relations with Saudis, Emiratis, and Egyptians giving the Administration the highest scores.
- Note that while there has been an uptick in overall favorable ratings toward the United States in some
 Arab countries, Iran and Turkey continue their downward slide in Arab opinion. Iran's began after 2008;
 Turkey's slide began in 2012. Saudi Arabia, followed by China, continue to enjoy strong support in most
 Arab countries.
- Far and away, Arabs view Bill Clinton as the most positive U.S. president in recent history and George W. Bush as the most negative. Opinion on Barack Obama is divided.
- On Syria: Strong majorities in every country favor U.S. policies that support a negotiated solution to the conflict, coupled with more support for Syrian refugees. Majorities in all countries oppose any form of U.S. military engagement (i.e., "no-fly zone," air strikes, or supplying advanced weapons to the opposition).
- On Egypt: Majorities in most of the Arab countries covered in the study say the United States was too
 supportive of Hosni Mubarak and not supportive enough of Mohammed Morsi. Opinion is divided on
 whether the United States has shown too much or not enough support for the current interim government.
- On Iran: There appears to be strong Arab support for the U.S.-led negotiations to limit Iran's nuclear
 program, but little confidence that these negotiations will succeed or that they will be of benefit to Arab
 countries.
- On Palestine and Democracy: Strong majorities in every Arab country believe that the United States is not even-handed in its approach to Israeli-Palestinian peace-making and have very little confidence that the United States is committed to an independent Palestinian state. There is a sharp decline in confidence that the United States is committed to democracy across the Middle East.

•	Obstacles to peace and stability in the Arab World: Far and away, Arabs view the greatest obstacles they face to be the continued occupation of Palestinian lands and U.S. interference in the region.



1. LOOKING BACK

1. In June of 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered a speech at Cairo University to mark a "new beginning" in U.S. relations with the Muslim World. Which of the following best describes your reaction after the speech was delivered?

	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE
Hopeful	31	55	47	55	62	35	56
Not hopeful	38	26	26	25	32	27	28
Do not recall	25	12	24	14	6	27	12

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.

Looking back to the Cairo speech, majorities in Lebanon, Jordan, UAE, and Morocco recall being "hopeful" that there might be a positive change in relations between the United States and the Muslim World. In addition, almost half of Egyptians also recall being hopeful in 2009. Only Saudis and Palestinians claim their expectations were much lower – with only about one-third saying they were hopeful and one-quarter saying they "do not recall." Palestinians are the only group of respondents among whom a plurality (38%) say they were not hopeful after Obama's Cairo speech.

2. CHALLENGES AND THE U.S. RESPONSE

2a. The Obama Administration has faced many challenges in dealing with the Arab World. In your opinion, which two of the following challenges are the most important for U.S.-Arab relations?

	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE
Ending U.S. presence in Iraq	25	12	30	14	41	19	21
Resolving Israeli-Palestinian conflict	47	76	53	71	49	45	28
Improving relations with Arab/Muslim Worlds	23	10	38	17	40	27	27
Ending conflict in Syria	26	68	31	63	21	43	34
Meeting humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees	13	8	16	8	21	21	32
Dealing with transformations brought on by "Arab Spring"	20	12	18	12	22	21	28
Working to end Iran's nuclear program	15	13	14	12	4	23	28

Respondents were asked to select the two most important challenges faced by the Obama Administration in the Arab World. In every country but the UAE, the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict is seen as the most significant challenge; more than seven in ten respondents in Morocco (76%) and Jordan (71%) identify this conflict as one of the most important. In five of the seven countries surveyed, ending the conflict in Syria is seen as one of the two most significant challenges for the Obama Administration (Morocco: 68%, Jordan: 63%, KSA: 43%, UAE: 34%, and Palestine: 26%). Ending the U.S. presence in Iraq is seen as an important challenge only in Lebanon (41%). And the Iranian nuclear issue only registered as a major challenge in Saudi Arabia (23%) and the UAE (28%).

	2b. The Obama Administration has faced many challenges in dealing with the Arab World. In your opinion, which two of the following challenges has the Obama Administration been most effective in addressing?												
	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE						
Ending U.S. presence in Iraq	27	82	59	80	28	54	30						
Resolving Israeli-Palestinian conflict	15	2	5	3	30	11	20						
Improving relations with Arab/ Muslim Worlds	20	8	23	10	39	15	20						
Ending conflict in Syria	15	3	18	5	3	21	31						
Meeting humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees	17	1	21	4	38	19	29						
Dealing with transformations brought on by "Arab Spring"	26	19	31	23	38	24	27						
Working to end Iran's nuclear program	17	68	38	61	7	44	34						
Not sure	23	-	-	-	-	-	-						

	2c. The Obama Administration has faced many challenges in dealing with the Arab World. In your opinion, which two of the following challenges has the Obama Administration been least effective in addressing?													
	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE							
Ending U.S. presence in Iraq	14	5	3	3	13	6	23							
Resolving Israeli-Palestinian conflict	51	24	53	29	25	28	34							
Improving relations with Arab/ Muslim Worlds	15	64	26	59	21	40	33							
Ending conflict in Syria	29	29	41	30	39	28	27							
Meeting humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees	23	12	29	16	28	22	18							
Dealing with transformations brought on by "Arab Spring"	13	56	22	49	30	29	31							
Working to end Iran's nuclear program	16	3	21	6	7	19	13							
Not sure	13	1	-	1	2	2	2							

When asked how effective the Obama Administration has been in addressing these same challenges, it gets its highest scores in five of the seven countries surveyed for ending the U.S. presence in Iraq, with more than eight in ten respondents in Morocco (82%) and Jordan (80%) and majorities in Egypt (59%) and Saudi Arabia (54%) noting the effectiveness of the U.S. administration. Its next highest scores are earned for the negotiations with Iran to limit its nuclear program; again, the strongest ratings come from Morocco (68%) and Jordan (61%), while Saudi Arabia (44%), Egypt (38%), and UAE (34%) also deem the U.S. administration effective on this issue. Lebanon is the only outlier, with 40% judging "improving relations with the Arab and Muslim Worlds" as the most important challenge and as the area where the Obama Administration was most effective (39%). Lebanese respondents also give the administration high marks for effectiveness in meeting the humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees (38%) and dealing with the transformations brought on by the "Arab Spring" (38%).

Opinion is divided as to where the United States has been least effective. Respondents in Morocco (64%), Jordan (59%), and Saudi Arabia (40%) say the Obama Administration has been least effective in improving relations with the Arab and Muslim Worlds, while those in Egypt (53%), Palestine (51%), and the UAE (34%) identify solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the area of least U.S. effectiveness. There is also dissatisfaction with respect to U.S. effectiveness in dealing with the Arab Spring transformations (e.g., Morocco: 56%, Jordan: 49%) and ending the conflict in Syria (e.g., deemed least effective in Lebanon: 39%). In no country is the Obama Administration judged as particularly ineffective for ending the U.S. presence in Iraq or negotiations with Iran.

3. U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS

3a. How important is it t	hat your coun	try have good	relations wit	h the United	States?									
	Palestine Morocco Egypt Jordan Lebanon KSA nationals only)													
Important	64	80	83	79	61	80	60							
Not important	28	20	15	20	39	19	39							
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.														

In every country surveyed, majorities agree that it is important to have good relations with the United States, with at least eight in ten respondents in Egypt (83%), Morocco (80%), and Saudi Arabia (80%) affirming the importance of this relationship.

3b. How effective has the Obar	3b. How effective has the Obama Administration been in maintaining good relations with your country?														
	Palestine Morocco Egypt Jordan Lebanon KSA UAE (Emirati nationals only)														
Effective	9	19	26	22	10	37	25								
Trying, but not yet effective	51	35	41	35	46	51	44								
Not effective at all 34 35 31 34 44 12 28															

While 37% of Saudis and one-quarter of Emiratis and Egyptians say the Obama Administration has been effective in maintaining good ties with their country, in every country substantial groups give the administration credit for trying to maintain good relations; majorities in Palestine (51%) and Saudi Arabia (51%) note this effort. Only in Lebanon do we find more than four in ten respondents who say that the administration has not been effective at all in maintaining a good relationship with their country (44%).

3c. In your opinion, which	3c. In your opinion, which of the following U.S. presidents has had the most positive relationship with your country?													
	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	UAE (Emirati nationals only)							
George H.W. Bush 3 15 12 21 31 25 20														
Clinton	48	43	61	48	60	47	35							
George W. Bush	5	1	1	2	-	2	16							
Obama	11	28	22	19	7	19	26							
Not sure 34 13 5 11 3 8														
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.														

3d. In your opinion, which	n of the follov	ving U.S. pres	idents has	had the m	ost negative	e relationship	with your country?							
	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	UAE (Emirati nationals only)							
George H.W. Bush 19 6 7 5 13 10 23														
Clinton	12	1	4	1	3	5	22							
George W. Bush	32	86	59	81	61	57	26							
Obama	20	7	25	11	18	22	25							
Not sure 17 <1 5 2 5 7 4														
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.														

Far and away, Bill Clinton is seen as having had the most positive relationships across the board, with majorities in Egypt (61%) and Lebanon (60%) selecting him. On the other hand, George W. Bush is seen as having had the most negative relationships in all seven countries, with particularly negative views in Morocco (86%) and Jordan (81%) and more muted opinion among Emiratis (26%) and Palestinians (32%). President Obama's relationships are viewed more positively than negatively in Morocco (28% vs. 7%) and Jordan (19% vs. 11%), split between positively and negatively in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and more negatively than positively in Palestine (20% vs. 11%) and Lebanon (18% vs. 7%).


4. ATTITUDES TOWARD COUNTRIES AND LEADERS

4a. Plea	4a. Please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each of the following countries:													
	Pal	estine	Morocco		Egypt		Jo	Jordan		anon	K	SA	UAE (Emirati nationals only)	
	Fav Unfav		Fav	Unfav	Fav	Unfav	Fav	Unfav	Fav	Unfav	Fav	Unfav	Fav	Unfav
Russia	58	35	22	77	24	72	25	73	53	46	11	80	37	62
Turkey	72	24	40	52	60	38	64	33	29	72	59	38	54	45
KSA	75	23	59	41	77	23	92	7	22	78	-	-	79	19
Iran	50	44	23	76	11	86	10	86	81	16	1	94	19	79
U.S.	27	70	21	77	30	67	18	75	14	86	22	74	44	54
China	55	37	31	68	60	36	63	34	69	31	50	46	49	47
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.														

Saudi Arabia scores the highest favorable ratings in every country except Lebanon; at least three-quarters of Jordanians (92%), Emiratis (79%), Egyptians (77%), and Palestinians (75%) view the Kingdom favorably.


Though Turkey is viewed favorably by majorities in all countries except Morocco (40%) and Lebanon (29%), its favorable numbers are still in decline across the board from their peak in 2011. (See graph below.)

TURKEY'S FAVORABLE RATINGS



China also enjoys widespread favorability, with about half to two-thirds of respondents in all countries saying they have favorable view of China, except Moroccans among whom only 31% hold this positive opinion.


A majority of respondents in Lebanon (81%) and Palestine (50%) view Iran favorably. However, it continues a steady decline in favorability ratings since 2006 in all other countries surveyed, with fewer than one-quarter of respondents in any country saying they have a favorable opinion of Iran (Morocco: 23%, UAE: 19%, Egypt: 11%, Jordan: 10%, and Saudi Arabia: 1%). (See graph below.)



A similar pattern emerges for Russia, with majorities of Palestinians (58%) and Lebanese (53%) holding favorable opinions and far fewer holding such positive views in the five other countries surveyed (UAE: 37%, Jordan: 25%, Egypt: 24%, Morocco: 22%, and Saudi Arabia: 11%).

Finally, the majority view of the United States is unfavorable in every country, with at least three-quarters holding a negative opinion in Lebanon (86%), Morocco (77%), and Jordan (75%). However, U.S. favorability ratings have actually risen in four of the seven countries, including UAE (28% to 44%), Egypt (10% to 30%), Morocco (13% to 21%), and Palestine (2% to 27%). (See graph below.)

U.S.'S FAVORABLE RATINGS



	Palestine		Morocco		Egypt		Jordan		Lebanon		KSA		UAE (Emirati nationals only)	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Russia	59	35	14	81	25	72	16	77	53	46	20	72	34	64
Turkey	71	25	42	49	58	39	62	36	16	84	56	38	52	48
KSA	69	27	56	41	82	18	90	7	22	78			79	18
Iran	48	48	24	75	7	91	11	88	80	17	13	86	42	54
U.S.	33	63	10	90	30	67	14	86	13	88	1	98	14	86
China	49	42	20	74	53	45	41	54	61	38	29	66	38	56

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.

Opinions regarding the extent to which these countries contribute to peace and stability in the Arab World closely track opinions regarding favorability. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are widely seen as contributors to peace and stability, except by the Lebanese. Iran is largely viewed as antithetical to peace and stability except by the Lebanese (80% vs. 17%), while opinion is split among Palestinians (48% vs. 48%) and somewhat muted among Emiratis (42% vs. 54%). Russia is not seen as contributing to peace and stability in the region except among Palestinians (59%) and Lebanese (53%). Views of China are similar with majorities in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Jordan saying it does not contribute to peace and stability, while 61% in Lebanon, 53% in Egypt, and 49% in Palestine saying it does. Finally, there is widespread agreement that the United States does not contribute to peace and stability in the Arab World; more than eight in ten respondents in Saudi Arabia (98%), Morocco (90%), Lebanon (88%), Jordan (86%), and the UAE (86%), as well as 67% of Egyptians and 63% of Palestinians share this negative view.

4c. How muc	4c. How much do you agree with the policies of the following leaders?													
	Palestine		Morocco		Egypt		Jord	Jordan		Lebanon		SA	UAE (Emirati nationals only)	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Putin	33	49	19	77	27	68	18	77	53	34	23	72	37	61
Obama	29	66	28	65	34	63	25	71	17	83	34	61	38	56
Erdogan	62	32	58	37	60	38	56	43	12	88	56	40	51	47
Abdullah	67	29	54	46	79	19	88	10	18	80			81	17
Rouhani	44	44	22	74	10	87	14	86	82	14	12	85	19	76
Note: Percent	Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.													

Again, agreement with the policies of world leaders tend to track with responses regarding their countries' favorability and their countries' contribution to peace and stability in the Arab World. The policies of Saudi Arabia's Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan are viewed positively by majorities everywhere but Lebanon, where just 18% agree with King Abdullah's policies and 12% agree with Prime Minister Erdogan's.

Vladimir Putin's policies are viewed negatively by majorities in five of the seven countries surveyed. Only a majority of Lebanese respondents agree with his policies; and, despite Palestinians' more favorable view of Russia and its contributions to peace in the region, only one-third of these respondents agree with Putin's policies.

Less than one-quarter of respondents in Morocco (22%), UAE (19%), Jordan (14%), Saudi Arabia (12%), and Egypt (10%) agree with the policies of Iran's Hassan Rouhani. Palestinians are evenly split (44% vs. 44%) on President Rouhani's policies, while the Lebanese overwhelmingly support them (82%).

Support for Barack Obama's policies is slightly higher across the board than U.S. favorability ratings and opinions regarding U.S. contributions to peace and stability in the region, though the highest levels of support are still only about one-third of respondents (e.g., UAE: 38%, Egypt: 34%, Saudi Arabia: 34%). But this support represents considerable growth since we asked the same question in 2011.

4d. Sup	4d. Support for Obama's Policies: 2011 and 2014													
	Palestine Morocco		оссо	Egypt		Jordan		Lebanon		KSA		UAE (Emirati nationals only)		
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
2011			10	81	3	86	3	89	10	87	10	73	8	59
2014	29	66	28	65	34	63	25	71	17	83	34	61	38	56
Note: P	Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.													

In Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, agreement with Obama's policies in 2011 were in the single digits and all have grown exponentially (Egypt: 3% to 34%, Jordan: 3% to 25%, UAE: 8% to 38%), as has support among Saudis (10% in 2011 to 34% in 2014) and Morocco (10% in 2011 to 28% in 2014). Even Lebanese agreement with Obama has seen an uptick, from 10% in 2011 to 17% today.

4e. Would the economic and political future of your country be better served by looking East to China and India, looking West to the United States and the European Union, or through building ties with both East and West?											
Palestine Morocco Egypt Jordan Lebanon KSA UAE (Emirati nationals only)											
Looking East	16	20	9	18	34	19	26				
Looking West	23	20	8	19	27	22	33				
Building ties with both	Building ties with both 41 43 81 47 39 51 40										
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.											

In each country surveyed, almost equally sized minorities support looking East to China and India or looking West to the United States and the European Union for the good of their country's economic and political future. Pluralities in every country say their country's future would be better served by building ties with both East and West; respondents in Egypt stand out as the most strongly in favor of this strategy (81%).

5. Syria

- 5a. Of the policy recommendations in this list, which, in your opinion, are the two most important policies the United States should pursue?
 - Press all parties to enter serious negotiations based on the Geneva process leading to a transitional government for Syria
 - Initiate air strikes to degrade the Assad regime's military capability
 - Provide more advanced weapons to the moderate Syrian opposition
 - Give greater attention to the humanitarian crisis of the Syrian refugees
 - Become directly involved in the conflict by initiating air strikes in order to create a no-fly zone
 - Leave Syria alone, because it is none of the U.S.'s business

	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE
Negotiations	56	26	76	41	44	49	46
Air strikes	19	6	7	8	4	13	17
Weapons to opposition	19	10	6	12	8	16	24
Humanitarian crisis of refugees	60	82	70	79	63	57	51
Direct involvement	9	5	5	3	6	9	14
Leave Syria alone	12	70	25	54	70	43	41

The most consistently recommended policy option for the United States to pursue with respect to Syria is to "give greater attention to the humanitarian crisis of the Syrian refugees." In almost every country, this support for the refugees is coupled with strong support for "negotiations based on the Geneva process leading to a transitional government for Syria." For example, among Egyptians, 76% say negotiations and 70% identify attention to the refugees as the most important policies for the United States to pursue. Palestinians (60% refugees, 56% negotiations), Saudis (57% refugees, 49% negotiations), and Emiratis (51% refugees, 46% negotiations) choose the same two policies as their strongest recommendations for the United States to pursue.

In the cases of Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon, however, support for negotiations is weaker than an alternative policy recommendation: "leave Syria alone because it is none of the U.S.'s business." For example, among Moroccans, 82% say attention to the refugees and 70% say leaving Syria alone are the most important policies for the United States to pursue, while only 26% identify negotiations as an important U.S. policy recommendation. In Jordan, 79% want the United States to pursue attending to the refugees and 54% urge the United States to leave Syria alone, while 41% do recommend the pursuit of negotiations as an important U.S. policy. And in Lebanon, leaving Syria alone is the number one policy recommendation, supported by 70% of respondents, followed by 63% who want the United States to focus on refugees' needs, and 44% who support the U.S. pursuing negotiations.

There is almost no support in any country surveyed for direct U.S. involvement in the conflict, air strikes to degrade Assad's military capability, and even providing more advanced weapons to the moderate Syrian opposition.

5b. Of the policy recommendations in this list, which, in your opinion, are the two most important for the United States to reject?

- Press all parties to enter serious negotiations based on the Geneva process leading to a transitional government for Syria
- Initiate air strikes to degrade the Assad regime's military capability
- Provide more advanced weapons to the moderate Syrian opposition
- Give greater attention to the humanitarian crisis of the Syrian refugees
- Become directly involved in the conflict by initiating air strikes in order to create a no-fly zone
- Leave Syria alone, because it is none of the U.S.'s business

	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE
Negotiations	12	12	2	9	9	8	21
Air strikes	49	44	66	45	51	42	39
Weapons to opposition	31	47	45	46	42	34	37
Humanitarian crisis of refugees	9	1	2	2	9	5	11
Direct involvement	32	65	53	62	36	46	40
Leave Syria alone	38	15	21	22	13	18	37

When asked which policy options the United States should reject, opinion is remarkably consistent in the surveyed countries. With respect to direct U.S. involvement, air strikes, and providing weapons to the opposition, there is not just little support (as noted above), there is real opposition to these policies. Majorities in Morocco (65%), Jordan (62%), and Egypt (53%) recommend rejecting direct U.S. involvement in the conflict, as do pluralities of respondents in Saudi Arabia (46%) and the UAE (40%). Majorities in Egypt (66%) and Lebanon (51%), as well as substantial numbers in every other country, urge the United States to reject air strikes to degrade Assad's military capability. And between one-third and one-half of all respondents also say the United States should reject providing more advanced weapons to the Syrian opposition.

6. Egypt

6. Was U.S. policy too su	pportive, not suppo	ortive enou	gh, or just r	ight tow	ard each	of these Egy _l	otian gov	vernments?
		Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE
	Too supportive	37	60	75	64	85	60	51
U.S. policy during presidency of Hosni Mubarak	Not supportive enough	40	21	15	15	13	26	38
	Just right	11	12	6	11	2	9	9
TTO 1: 1 :	Too supportive	16	18	30	18	67	41	73
U.S. policy during presidency of Moham- med Morsi	Not supportive enough	55	59	61	61	25	44	20
1100111	Just right	16	13	5	11	8	8	5
0 11	Too supportive	30	22	51	29	66	22	5
Current U.S. policy toward Egypt's interim government	Not supportive enough	43	40	37	33	22	53	76
Soveriment	Just right	12	22	5	21	12	16	16
Note: Percentages may not	add up to 100% bed	cause of rou	nding and/o	r because	response	s of "not sure	" are not	included.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the level of U.S. support for Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Mohammed Morsi, and the current interim government. In all surveyed countries except Palestine, majorities say U.S. policy was "too supportive" of Mubarak; this sentiment is strongest in Lebanon (85%) and Egypt itself (75%). Palestinians are split on this question with 37% saying the United States was too supportive and 40% saying it was not supportive enough.

With respect to Mohammed Morsi, however, majorities in Egypt (61%), Jordan (61%), Morocco (59%), and Palestine (55%) say U.S. policy was not supportive enough. At least two-thirds of those in the UAE (73%) and Lebanon (67%) disagree, saying that the United States was too supportive of Morsi. Respondents in Saudi Arabia are divided on this question, with 41% saying "too supportive" and 44% saying "not supportive enough."

Evaluations of U.S. policy toward the interim government are more varied. Only in Egypt (51%) and Lebanon (66%) do majorities say the United States has been too supportive, while majorities in the UAE (76%) and Saudi Arabia (53%) feel U.S. policy has not been supportive enough. Among Jordanians, Moroccans, and Palestinians, opinion is mixed, though decidedly leaning toward the view that U.S. policy has not been supportive enough.

7. IRAN NEGOTIATIONS

7a. Are you mainly supportive of or opposed to the effort to achieve a negotiated solution limiting Iran's nuclear program?											
	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	UAE (Emirati nationals only)				
Support	50	50	81	57	14	59	71				
Oppose	31	40	16	31	86	36	28				
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.											

7b. How confident are you that these negotiations between the United States and Iran will succeed in limiting Iran's nuclear program?											
	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	UAE (Emirati nationals only)				
Confident	39	7	72	22	11	38	50				
Not confident	Not confident 44 88 25 71 87 58 47										
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.											

7c. Are you confident that your country's interests will be served by these negotiations between the United States and Iran?											
	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	UAE (Emirati nationals only)				
Confident	29	4	63	18	13	35	45				
Not confident	54	88	34	73	86	61	53				
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.											

Majorities in all countries surveyed, except Lebanon, are supportive of the U.S. effort to achieve a negotiated solution to limiting Iran's nuclear program. The strongest support comes from Egypt (81%), while levels of support elsewhere hover around 50-60%. Among the Lebanese, 86% oppose this effort to limit Iran's nuclear program.

Despite supporting the effort, however, Egypt stands alone in feeling confident that these negotiations will succeed (72%). Respondents in Palestine and the UAE are basically split on this question, but leaning toward no confidence (Palestine: 39% vs. 44%, UAE: 46% vs. 52%). But the lack of confidence in success elsewhere is far more intense (Morocco: 88%, Lebanon: 87%, Jordan: 71%, Saudi Arabia: 58%).

And Egypt also stands alone in its confidence that its own interests will be served by these negotiations between the United States and Iran (63%). In all other countries, majorities lack confidence that the negotiations will benefit them, with particularly strong numbers expressing no confidence in Morocco (88%), Lebanon (86%), and Jordan (73%).

8. PALESTINE AND THE UNITED STATES

8a. The United States is currently leading efforts to negotiate a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. How confident are you that the United States has been even-handed in these negotiations?

	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE
Confident	30	8	5	8	16	16	31
Not confident	57	88	82	88	84	80	66

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.

8b. How confident are you that the United States is committed to the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem?

	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE
Confident	25	5	5	4	14	14	30
Not confident	62	94	82	95	86	84	67

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.

8c. Do you agree or disagree that the United States is committed to advancing freedom and democracy in the Greater Middle East?

	Pale	stine	Mor	оссо	Eg	ypt	Jore	dan	Leba	inon	KS	SA	All Ar UA	
	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014	2010	2014
Agree		38	51	19	64	27	63	29	37	21	65	23	32	23
Disagree		43	39	81	33	70	37	70	62	79	34	75	63	72
Note: Percent	ages ma	y not ad	ld up to	100% b	ecause o	f roundi	ing and/	or becai	ıse respo	onses of	"not sur	e" are no	ot includ	led.

When assessing the United States' efforts to negotiate a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, overwhelming majorities in every country reject the notion that the United States has been even-handed in these negotiations. It is worth noting that while more than eight in ten respondents in Jordan (88%), Morocco (88%), Lebanon (84%), and Egypt (82%) express this view, Palestinians (and Arabs in the Emirates) are less inclined to be negative. Among Palestinians 30% say the United States has been even-handed (along with 31% of those in the UAE), and 57% say they are not confident in U.S. fairness in the negotiations.

A similar pattern is seen with respect to respondents' confidence in the U.S. commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state. There is a widespread lack of confidence in the U.S. among those in Jordan (95%), Morocco (94%), Lebanon (86%), Saudi Arabia (84%), and Egypt (82%). But again we see slightly less pessimism among Palestinians and Arabs in the Emirates, among whom 25% and 30% respectively are confident in the U.S. commitment to a Palestinian state, while about two-thirds in each country are not confident in this proposition.

Finally, while Palestinians are split on whether the United States is committed to advancing freedom and democracy in the Greater Middle East (38% vs. 43%), more than 70% in every other country reject this idea. These numbers are particularly striking because they represent a precipitous drop from 2010 when we asked the same question. In 2010, majorities in Saudi Arabia (65%), Egypt (64%), Jordan (63%), and Morocco (51%) all agreed that the United States was committed to freedom and democracy in the region; but today only about one-quarter of respondents in these countries believe this is so.

9. OBSTACLES TO PEACE

9. From the list below, what would you	say is the gro	eatest obsta	cle to peac	e and stabi	lity in the M	iddle Ea	st?		
	Palestine	Morocco	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	KSA	All Arabs in UAE		
Continuing occupation of Palestinian lands	45	55	46	52	26	49	17		
U.S. interference in the Arab World	24	29	22	26	25	24	22		
Lack of democracy in Arab countries	9	6	13	8	18	9	15		
Economic inequality in the Arab World	15	2	8	3	14	5	13		
Iran's interference in Arab affairs	1	2	1	2	6	3	16		
Growing religious sectarian extremism	4	6	11	8	12	9	16		
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of "not sure" are not included.									

In every country the continuing occupation of Palestinian lands and U.S. interference in the region are seen as the two greatest obstacles to peace and security. These two concerns combined account for almost 70% of the responses (generally, about half of respondents select occupation and one-quarter select U.S. interference) in every country except Lebanon and UAE. In those two countries, the remaining choices of "greatest obstacles" are near evenly divided among "lack of democracy in Arab countries," "economic inequality in the Arab World," and "growing religious sectarian extremism." In UAE "Iran's interference" is also noted (16%).

APPENDIX — METHODOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Geographic Coverage

Palestine: Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jericho, Tulkarem, Tubas, Qalqilia, Salfit,

Gaza City, North Gaza, Deir El: Balah, Khan Younis & Rafah

Morocco: Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech, Fes, El Jadida, Meknes, Kenitra, Tanger, & Oujda

Egypt: Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Tanta (Urban), Tanta (Rural), Asyut (Urban), Asyut

(Rural), Mansura (Urban), Mansura (Rural), Menia (Urban), & Menia (Rural)

Jordan: Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, Madaba, Zarash, Balqa, Mafraq, & Aqaba

Lebanon: Beirut (East & West), Tripoli, El Matn, Akkar, Baalbek, Sayda, & Baabda

KSA: Riyadh, Buraidah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Shammasyah, Jeddah, Taif,

Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail, & Hufuf

UAE: Abu Dhabi: Al Ain, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, & Fujairah

Sample Sizes and MOEs

Palestine: 1,031 MOE +/- 3.1 percentage points

Morocco: 1,018 MOE +/- 3.1 percentage points

Egypt: 1,023 MOE +/- 3.1 percentage points

Jordan: 816 MOE +/- 3.5 percentage points

Lebanon: 811 MOE +/- 3.5 percentage points

KSA: 1,020 MOE +/- 3.1 percentage points

UAE: 816 MOE +/- 3.5 percentage points

Sampling Methodology

In each country, the selected study centers were stratified depending on the predominant social class/income levels of the people residing in various areas (and in case of Beirut, the religious clusters). This is because in most cities/towns, people of a specific social class/income segment/religious grouping tend to stay in clusters. These strata were further sub-divided into blocks of roughly equal size, based on available data about population. Thereafter, blocks were selected at random depending on the sample size for that center and keeping in mind the social class/religious cluster distribution. A pre-assigned number of starting points were used for each selected block and sampling within the blocks was undertaken using right hand rule method.

Within each selected household that agreed to participate, we took an inventory of all family members over 18 years of age and randomly select one adult to be interviewed in a way that ensured that both genders had an equal chance of inclusion, with no one allowed to self-select into the sample. For this, we used the Kish Grid approach.



Demographics

	Gender	Male	50.2
Palestine		Female	49.8
		Under 25	26.4
	Age	25–36	37.4
		Over 36	36.2
	Education	Elementary or less	4.2
		Inter/Sec/Tech	58.3
		University or more	37.5
	Religion	Secular	3.0
		Pious	39.5
		Traditionalist	55.0
		Religious activist	2.5
	Gender	Male	48.1
		Female	51.9
	Age	Under 25	25.9
		25–36	29.2
оээс		Over 36	44.9
Могоссо	Education	Elementary or less	58.1
		Inter/Sec/Tech	25.0
		University or more	17.0
	D. It.	Sunni	99.0
	Religion	Shia	1.0
	Gender	Male	50.6
		Female	49.4
	Age	Under 30	39.1
		30-49	37.6
		Over 50	23.3
ب	Education	Elementary or below	30.4
Egypt		Intermediate	21.2
		Secondary	31.6
		University	13.8
		Graduate studies	3.0
	Religion	Sunni	89.1
		Shia	1.9
		Christian	9.1
	Gender	Male	50.5
		Female	49.5
Jordan	Age	Under 25	29.3
		25–36	28.1
		Over 36	42.6
	Education	Elementary or below	21.2
		Intermediate	38.6
		Secondary	19.1
		University	12.6
		Graduate studies	2.5
		Technical Studies	6.0
	Religion	Sunni	92.3
		Shia	4.2
		Christian	3.6

		Male	48.8
Lebanon	Gender	Female	51.2
	Age	Under 25	21.3
		25–36	25.4
		Over 36	53.3
	Education	Elementary or below	22.6
		Intermediate	35.3
		Secondary	25.3
		University	16.4
		Graduate studies	0.5
	Religion	Sunni	30.9
		Shia	33.8
		Christian	35.3
	Gender	Male	54.5
		Female	45.5
	Age	Under 25	26.9
		25–36	35.3
		Over 36	37.8
	Education	Elementary or below	16.4
KSA		Intermediate	26.8
		Secondary	36.2
		University	13.2
		Graduate studies	3.0
		Technical Studies	4.4
	Religion	Sunni	85.7
		Shia	14.3
	Gender	Male	50.7
		Female	49.3
	Age	Under 25	17.3
UAE		25–36	44.9
		Over 36	37.9
	Education	Elementary or below	27.3
		Intermediate	17.2
		Secondary	30.4
		University	20.2
		Graduate studies	1.1
		Technical Studies	3.8
	Religion	Sunni	88.5
		Shia	11.2
		Christian	0.4



1600 K Street, NW, Suite 603 Washington, DC 20006 202-652-4977