

Zogby Research Services  
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# AFTER TAHRIR:

**Egyptians Assess Their Government,  
Their Institutions, and Their Future**





## Executive Summary

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Two and a half years after demonstrations erupted in Tahrir Square leading to the downfall of the Mubarak government and one year into the presidency of Mohamed Morsi, we polled 5,029 Egyptians nationwide to assess: the public's mood; their confidence in the country's institutions; their satisfaction with the performance of the Morsi government; and their hopes for the future.

What our findings reveal is a deeply divided society fractured not along demographic lines, but on the basis of ideology and religion. The two main Islamic parties (the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the Nour Party) appear to have the confidence of just under 30% of all Egyptian adults.

The major opposition groups (the National Salvation Front and the April 6th Movement) combined have a somewhat larger support base claiming the confidence of almost 35% of the adult population, while the remaining almost 40% of the population appear to have no confidence in either the government or any of the political parties. They are a "disaffected plurality."

These three groups define the deep divide that manifests itself on most issues. For example, more than 90% of those who identify with the Islamic parties say they are "better off" today than they were five years ago, while more than 80% of those associated with the opposition and the "disaffected plurality" claim that they are "worse off." And while the overwhelming majority of those associated with the Islamic parties retain hope in the promise of the Arab Spring, the rest of the society now says they are disappointed.

The very same gap between these groups can be found in response to most other questions: support for the constitution; confidence in the Morsi government; the performance of the government in providing economic opportunity and needed services, guaranteeing freedom, and keeping the country safe. In almost every one of these areas, only about one-quarter of the electorate expresses some degree of approval with the actions of the government, while almost three-quarters disapprove—with the support for the government coming almost exclusively from those who express some confidence in the Islamic parties and the rest of the population nearly unanimous in their disapproval.

What also comes through quite clearly is a crisis in leadership. Of the nine living Egyptian figures covered in our poll (including all those who ran for president and/or who lead important groups in the country), none are viewed as credible by more than a third of the electorate, with most seen as credible by only a quarter. In fact, only Bassem Yousef, a popular TV satirist, is seen as credible by a majority of all Egyptians

At the same time, none of the four major political parties can claim to have the confidence of more than 29% of the population. And a disturbing one in five appear to have fallen into despair, now saying "it makes no difference, because little will change in Egypt."

What emerges from our findings is a portrait of a post-Tahrir Egypt in crisis. Despite having been elected by a minority of the overall electorate, our poll shows that one year ago Mohamed Morsi was being given the benefit of the doubt by a majority of all Egyptians—with 57% saying his victory was either “a positive development” or “the result of a democratic election and the results need to be respected.” Today, that support has dropped to only 28%—almost all of it coming from those who support his Muslim Brotherhood party. And yet despite only claiming minority support, the president and his party now hold most of the levers of executive and legislative decision-making. In addition, there is growing concern of still more over-reach by the presidency with a strong majority expressing the concern that “the Muslim Brotherhood intends to Islamize the state and control its executive powers.”

The opposition to the president, representing more than 70% of the overall society though uniformly dissatisfied with Morsi’s policies and his performance, still does not appear to have either the organizational capacity or the unity necessary to make change—this, despite the fact that a strong majority of mainly oppositionists and “disaffecteds” believe that they would be “able to provide a better political alternative than the current government.”

While division defines much of the poll’s findings, there were a few areas where consensus could be found. The late presidents Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdul Nasser receive extraordinarily high ratings from all groups. More importantly, the army also receives strong approval ratings from all sectors and parties, with the judiciary following closely behind. These two institutions can act as buffers muting the presidency’s tendency to over-reach, but while a majority of supporters of the opposition parties and those in the camp of the “disaffected plurality” would like the army to play a larger role, there is not strong support for military intervention in civil affairs.

What to do next? Two options for moving forward receive the support of a majority of Egyptians: scrapping the constitution and holding immediate parliamentary elections. But there is deep division between the Islamic parties and the opposition in response to both. One proposal, however, achieves near consensus agreement from all the groups—an overwhelming majority across the board support convening “a real national dialogue” as the way to start the process of healing the divide and solving the country’s problems.



From April 4 to May 12, 2013, we conducted an extensive nationwide poll of 5,029 Egyptian adults. We surveyed citizens in every area of the country from its southernmost part up into the Sinai.

With more than two years having passed since the downfall of the Mubarak government and almost one year into the presidency of Mohamed Morsi, we sought to learn how Egyptians assess their current situation, and the level of confidence they have in the current government and the country's main political groupings and major institutions.

What emerged is a portrait of a deeply divided public with a minority strongly supporting a government that has virtually no support among Egyptians not affiliated with the President's party.

A review of the data reveals that despite the existence of many political parties, there are actually three distinct groupings defining the attitudinal map of the country.

1. The Islamic Tendency (IT) which includes supporters of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP - Muslim Brotherhood) and the Nour Party
2. The Organized Oppositionists (OO) which includes the supporters of the National Salvation Front (NSF) and the April 6th Movement (A6M)
3. The Silent Disaffected Plurality (SDP)


Before discussing the different attitudes of each of these tendencies, it is important to note that we did not ask respondents whether they were members of any group. Because, with the exception of the Brotherhood, the other parties or groupings are relatively new and/or are loosely structured, we simply asked respondents to indicate the "level of confidence" they have in each of the groups. A review of the responses reveals a stark contrast in the attitudes and the confidence levels of those who say they have confidence in the FJP or the Nour Party and those who indicate confidence in either the NSF or A6M.

On closer examination we discovered that the near identical responses to all questions given by those who have confidence in the FJP and Nour is no accident. There is a significant overlap. Of the 1,488 individuals who express confidence in either the FJP or Nour, 1,272 are the same people who have some degree of confidence in both!

The situation is somewhat different in the case of supporters of the NSF and the A6M. Of the 1,693 who express some degree of confidence in either of these two groups only 668 are the same respondents. Nevertheless, the responses of these 1,693 are quite similar – in most cases, within a few percentage points of one another.



The Silent Disaffected Plurality is the largest and most interesting grouping to emerge from the data. Numbering 1,944 individual respondents, they express no confidence in any of the four major political groups. Nevertheless, their attitudes, in most cases, closely track the attitudes of the Organized Oppositionists.



## 1. Better Off/Worse Off?

Situation now as compared to 5 years ago <sup>1</sup>			
	2009	2011	2013
Better	39	36	28
Worse	24	46	61

Situation now as compared to 5 years ago <sup>1</sup>						
	Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
		FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
Better	28	98	90	4	6	1
Worse	61	1	8	81	81	83
About the same	11	0	2	14	13	15

Situation now as compared to 5 years ago <sup>1</sup>							
	Total	Region				Religion	
		Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
Better	28	15	37	36	16	30	9
Worse	61	72	59	50	73	59	81
About the same	11	12	5	13	11	11	10

Respondents were asked if they are better off or worse off now than they were five years ago, a measure of life satisfaction. Overall, Egyptians are more than twice as likely to say they are worse off now compared to five years ago (61%) than to say they are better off (28%). There has been a significant decline in satisfaction compared to 2009 and 2011 (from 39% in 2009 to 28% in 2013), and a steep and steady ascent in dissatisfaction, with just one-quarter of respondents in 2009 saying they were worse off, 46% in 2011, and now 61% in 2013.

Those who have confidence in the FJP and the Nour Party are overwhelmingly satisfied with the situation today compared to five years ago (98% and 90%, respectively). Conversely, more than eight in ten respondents who have confidence in the NSF and the A6M say they are worse off now as compared to five years ago, a view shared by those with no confidence in any of the major political parties (i.e., the Silent Disaffected Plurality, or SDP).

There are also regional variations as respondents in Egypt's major cities and those in tourist areas are the least likely to see themselves as better off (just 15% and 16%, respectively), while those in agricultural areas and in Upper Egypt are slightly more positive (36% and 37%, respectively). In addition, Muslims are more

than three times as likely as Christians to see themselves as better off now (30% vs. 9%), with more than eight in ten Christian respondents saying they are worse off (81%).

Expected situation 5 years from now <sup>1</sup>			
	2009	2011	2013
Better	39	85	46
Worse	20	7	34

Expected situation 5 years from now <sup>1</sup>						
	Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
		FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
Better	46	93	88	30	28	30
Worse	34	2	6	45	46	46
About the same	18	4	6	24	25	22

Expected situation 5 years from now <sup>1</sup>							
	Total	Region				Religion	
		Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
Better	46	37	56	52	33	48	34
Worse	34	42	29	29	34	33	43
About the same	18	20	13	18	33	18	22

Respondents were then asked if they expect to be better off or worse off five years from now, a measure of optimism about the future. A plurality of Egyptians expect the situation to improve in the next five years, with 47% saying they expect to be better off in five years and 34% saying they expect to be worse off. However, these numbers demonstrate a precipitous decline in optimism, which had climbed to extreme highs (85%) in June of 2011 after the change in government.

Again, those who identify with the IT are markedly optimistic (FJP: 93% and Nour: 88% say “better off”), while pluralities of those who identify with the OO and the SDP are pessimistic (NSF: 45%, A6M: 46%, and SDP: 46% say “worse off”).

Majorities in Upper Egypt and in agricultural areas say they expect to be better off in five years (56% and 52%, respectively), while those in Egypt’s major cities (37% better vs. 42% worse) and tourist areas (33% vs. 34%) are more pessimistic.

Finally, Muslim respondents overall lean toward optimism (48% better off vs. 33% worse off), while Christian respondents lean the other way, with a plurality saying they expect to be worse off (43% vs. 34% who say better off).



## 2. Arab Spring

### A.

When the Arab Spring began over two years ago, how hopeful were you that it would bring about positive change in Egypt <sup>2a</sup>						
	Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
		FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
Hopeful	82	97	95	78	75	79
Not hopeful	17	3	5	22	25	21

When the Arab Spring began over two years ago, how hopeful were you that it would bring about positive change in Egypt <sup>2a</sup>							
	Total	Region				Religion	
		Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
Hopeful	82	79	86	84	84	83	79
Not hopeful	17	21	13	16	16	17	20

### B.

Your attitude today when you look at how the Arab Spring has played out in Egypt <sup>2b</sup>						
	Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
		FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
I am still hopeful	36	97	90	16	16	14
Neither hopeful nor disappointed	22	1	3	28	26	32
I am disappointed	41	2	7	55	57	53

Your attitude today when you look at how the Arab Spring has played out in Egypt <sup>2b</sup>							
	Total	Region				Religion	
		Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
I am still hopeful	36	24	46	44	28	38	19
Neither hopeful nor disappointed	22	27	18	19	26	22	27
I am disappointed	41	49	35	36	46	40	53

Once again we see an overall steep decline in the optimism of 2011. While 82% say that they were hopeful two years ago when the Arab Spring began, that number declines to just 36% who say they are still

hopeful today, with 41% disappointed and 22% apparently resigned to how the Arab Spring has played out in Egypt. It is worth noting that the numbers of those who say they were hopeful two years ago (82% vs. 17% who say they were not hopeful) mirror the polling done in 2011, when 85% of Egyptians said they expected to be better off in five years and just 7% said worse off.

Overwhelmingly, those who identify with the IT are still hopeful (FJP: 97% and Nour: 90%). This is in sharp contrast to those who identify with the OO and the SDP, among whom about one in seven say they are still hopeful when they look at how the Arab Spring has played out in Egypt. On the other hand, majorities of these respondents say they are disappointed today (NSF: 55%, A6M: 57%, SDP: 53%). There is also a significant regional difference in opinion, with pluralities in Upper Egypt (46%) and in agricultural areas (44%) saying they are still hopeful while just 24% in the major cities and 28% in tourist areas agree (compared to pluralities who are disappointed: 49% and 46%, respectively). Muslims are split on this question (38% hopeful vs. 40% disappointed), while a majority of Christians are disappointed (53%) and just 19% say they are still hopeful.

### 3. Reaction to Morsi Victory

#### A.

Your reaction to the fact that Mohamed Morsi won the election for the Presidency <sup>3</sup>						
	Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
		FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
It was a positive development	22	67	62	6	7	7
It was a democratic election, and I respect the result	35	30	31	34	32	38
I was concerned that it was a set-back for Egypt	33	1	4	46	46	42
It made no difference, because little will change in Egypt	10	1	3	14	14	13

Your reaction to the fact that Mohamed Morsi won the election for the Presidency <sup>3</sup>							
	Total	Region				Religion	
		Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
It was a positive development	22	14	29	28	19	24	9
It was a democratic election, and I respect the result	35	37	31	34	30	35	32
I was concerned that it was a set-back for Egypt	33	38	29	29	37	31	46
It made no difference, because little will change in Egypt	10	11	10	9	14	10	12

#### B.

Opinion (at this point) regarding Mohamed Morsi's victory as President <sup>3</sup>						
	Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
		FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
It is still a positive development	16	60	54	2	2	0
It was a democratic election, and I respect the result	12	38	35	3	3	3
I am concerned that it was a set-back for Egypt	50	1	7	67	67	67
It makes no difference, because little will change in Egypt	21	0	3	28	28	28

Opinion (at this point) regarding Mohamed Morsi's victory as President <sup>3</sup>							
	Total	Region				Religion	
		Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
It is still a positive development	16	9	22	21	9	17	5
It was a democratic election, and I respect the result	12	8	14	16	8	13	5
I am concerned that it was a set-back for Egypt	50	58	43	46	58	48	64
It makes no difference, because little will change in Egypt	21	25	21	17	24	20	26

When asked to consider their reaction one year ago when Morsi won the presidential election, a majority (57%) say they either saw it as a positive development (22%) or could respect the result as it was a democratic election (35%). From today's vantage point, however, that number has declined to 28%, with half of all respondents seeing Morsi's election as a setback for Egypt. The number of those who say they are resigned to the fact that nothing will change in Egypt doubles (from 10% to 21%) when perspective shifts from the time of the election to today—an especially worrisome sign.

There is real division in today's attitudes toward Morsi's election between respondents who identify with the IT and those who side with the OO and the SDP. Those with confidence in the FJP and Nour Party overwhelmingly view Morsi's election as either positive (60% and 54%, respectively) or respect the result of the democratic election (38% and 35%, respectively), while two-thirds of the OO supporters and the SDP see Morsi's victory as a setback (67%).

In the major cities and in the tourist areas, concern that Morsi's election was a set-back is also quite high (58%), while fewer than one in ten respondents in these areas say it was a positive development. Among Christians, just 5% view Morsi's election as a positive development and another 5% respect the election result, while 64% are concerned that it was a set-back for Egypt.

## 4. Confidence in Institutions

Level of confidence in ... <sup>4</sup>							
		Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
			FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
The army	Confident	94	97	96	95	94	93
	Not confident	6	3	4	5	6	7
The police	Confident	52	58	59	57	50	49
	Not confident	48	42	41	43	50	51
The judiciary	Confident	67	61	62	77	74	65
	Not confident	31	38	37	20	24	34
The Presidency	Confident	27	99	90	3	4	1
	Not confident	71	1	10	95	94	96
The Freedom and Justice Party and The Muslim Brotherhood	Confident	26	100	88	2	3	
	Not confident	74		12	98	97	100
The National Salvation Fund	Confident	22	2	3	100	53	
	Not confident	78	98	96		46	100
The Nour Party	Confident	29	97	100	5	7	
	Not confident	71	3		95	93	100
The April 6th Movement	Confident	25	3	6	60	100	
	Not confident	75	97	93	40		100

Level of confidence in . . . <sup>4</sup>								
		Total	Region				Religion	
			Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
The army	Confident	94	94	93	95	93	94	94
	Not confident	6	5	7	5	7	6	6
The police	Confident	52	52	51	53	50	52	50
	Not confident	48	48	49	47	50	48	50
The judiciary	Confident	67	66	66	69	67	67	67
	Not confident	31	30	34	31	33	32	30
The Presidency	Confident	27	16	35	35	16	29	9
	Not confident	71	83	63	63	81	69	86
The Freedom and Justice Party and The Muslim Brotherhood	Confident	26	14	34	34	16	28	8
	Not confident	74	85	66	66	84	72	92
The National Salvation Fund	Confident	22	24	19	22	28	21	34
	Not confident	78	76	81	78	72	79	66
The Nour Party	Confident	29	17	37	37	18	31	12
	Not confident	71	83	63	63	81	69	88
The April 6th Movement	Confident	25	29	22	22	29	24	36
	Not confident	75	71	78	77	70	76	63

Among Egyptians, there is near universal confidence in the army (94%). The judiciary also receives high marks from all groups (67% overall), though confidence is about 10-15 points higher among those who express confidence in the OO than among those who identify with the IT and the SDP.

Opinion is split on the public's confidence in the police (52% vs. 48%), though majorities of subgroups tend to have confidence. Interestingly, those who identify with the IT and those who have confidence in the National Salvation Front have similar opinions about the police (57-59% confidence vs. 41-43% no confidence), while those who have confidence in the April 6th Movement and the Silent Disaffected Plurality display more ambivalence toward the police (about 50-50).

However, major political parties and groups as well as the presidency itself are not trusted by the Egyptian public, with more than seven in ten respondents saying they are not confident in the presidency (71%), the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood (74%), the National Salvation Front (78%), the Nour Party (71%), and the April 6th Movement (75%).

Those who live in Upper Egypt and in agricultural areas are about twice as likely as those in the major cities and in tourist areas to express confidence in the presidency (approx. 35% vs. 16%), in the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood (approx. 34% vs. 15%), and in the Nour Party (approx. 37% vs. 17%).



Religion is also a factor here, with Christian respondents less likely to have confidence in the presidency (9% vs. 29% of Muslims), in the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood (8% vs. 28% of Muslims), and the Nour Party (12% vs. 31% of Muslims), and Christians more likely to have confidence in the National Salvation Front (34% vs. 21% of Muslims) and in the April 6th Movement (36% vs. 24% of Muslims).

## 5. Level of Satisfaction in Morsi Performance

Level of satisfaction with the performance of the Morsi government in ... <sup>5</sup>							
		Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
			FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
Guaranteeing my rights and freedoms	Satisfied	27	96	88	4	5	1
	Not satisfied	72	4	12	94	94	98
Creating economic opportunity	Satisfied	25	93	84	3	4	1
	Not satisfied	74	7	16	96	96	99
Keeping me safe and maintaining order	Satisfied	26	94	85	3	3	1
	Not satisfied	74	6	14	96	96	98
Supporting services that help provide for my family's health care, education, etc.	Satisfied	26	93	85	4	5	1
	Not satisfied	74	7	15	95	95	98

Level of satisfaction with the performance of the Morsi government in ... <sup>5</sup>								
		Total	Region				Religion	
			Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
Guaranteeing my rights and freedoms	Satisfied	27	16	35	35	16	29	8
	Not satisfied	72	84	64	64	84	71	86
Creating economic opportunity	Satisfied	25	14	33	33	16	27	8
	Not satisfied	74	85	67	66	84	72	91
Keeping me safe and maintaining order	Satisfied	26	14	33	34	16	28	9
	Not satisfied	74	85	66	66	83	72	90
Supporting services that help provide for my family's health care, education, etc.	Satisfied	26	14	33	34	16	28	8
	Not satisfied	74	85	65	66	84	72	91

Overall, only about one-quarter of Egyptian respondents are satisfied and almost three-quarters are dissatisfied with the performance of the Morsi government with respect to guaranteeing rights and freedoms, creating economic opportunity, maintaining safety and order, and providing social services (e.g., health care, education, etc.). Amongst the political groupings, the IT and OO/SDP are stark opposites. On one side stand those with confidence in the FJP giving the Morsi government 91-95% positive ratings in all areas, and those with confidence in the Nour recording slightly less but still strong 84-88% ratings. On the

other side, at least 94% of those who have confidence in the NSF or the A6M, and the SDP are dissatisfied with the performance of the Morsi government in all areas.

Again, we see slightly more support for Morsi's government in Upper Egypt and in the agricultural areas, where about one-third of respondents are satisfied with all four areas of performance, compared to 14-16% positive ratings by respondents in the major cities and tourist areas.

Finally, 27-29% of Muslim respondents are satisfied with the Morsi government's performance, while just 8 or 9% of Christian respondents say they are satisfied, and nine in ten say they are dissatisfied with the current government's protection of rights, the economy, maintaining order, and social services.

## 6. Credible Leaders

Credibility <sup>6</sup>							
		Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
			FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
Gamal Abdul Nasser	Credible	73	16	22	92	91	94
	Not credible	27	84	78	8	8	6
Anwar al Sadat	Credible	93	91	91	95	94	93
	Not credible	7	9	9	5	6	7
Hosni Mubarak	Credible	23	1	4	32	29	30
	Not credible	77	99	96	68	71	70
Mohamed Morsi	Credible	27	95	87	4	4	3
	Not credible	71	4	12	94	94	95
Ahmad Shafiq	Credible	30	2	5	40	40	38
	Not credible	70	97	94	60	59	61
Hamdeen Subhi	Credible	28	2	5	41	42	35
	Not credible	71	98	95	59	58	65
Mohamed El Baradei	Credible	19	2	4	29	28	23
	Not credible	81	98	96	70	72	77
Abdul Monem Abdul Fatooh	Credible	33	30	31	36	34	33
	Not credible	67	70	69	64	66	67
Amre Moussa	Credible	27	3	6	39	40	32
	Not credible	73	97	94	61	59	67
Wael Ghoneim	Credible	23	14	15	30	32	23
	Not credible	76	85	84	69	68	76
Bassem Yousef	Credible	60	7	13	77	76	80
	Not credible	39	92	86	21	22	19

Credibility <sup>6</sup>								
		Total	Region				Religion	
			Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
Gamal Abdul Nasser	Credible	73	84	64	66	81	71	85
	Not credible	27	16	36	34	19	28	15
Anwar al Sadat	Credible	93	93	93	94	95	93	91
	Not credible	7	7	7	6	5	6	9
Hosni Mubarak	Credible	23	25	21	21	31	22	28
	Not credible	77	75	78	79	69	78	72
Mohamed Morsi	Credible	27	15	35	35	17	29	10
	Not credible	71	83	62	63	80	69	87
Ahmad Shafiq	Credible	30	36	24	26	38	29	35
	Not credible	70	64	75	74	62	70	64
Hamdeen Subhi	Credible	28	36	21	24	40	27	37
	Not credible	71	64	79	76	60	72	63
Mohamed El Baradei	Credible	19	25	14	17	19	19	24
	Not credible	81	75	86	83	81	81	76
Abdul Monem Abdul Fatooh	Credible	33	32	35	33	33	33	32
	Not credible	67	68	65	67	67	67	68
Amre Moussa	Credible	27	31	22	24	40	27	30
	Not credible	73	69	78	75	59	73	70
Wael Ghoneim	Credible	23	27	18	23	22	23	28
	Not credible	76	72	81	77	77	77	72
Bassem Yousef	Credible	60	72	52	53	61	59	70
	Not credible	39	27	46	45	37	40	28

The Egyptian leader who fares best in the survey is Anwar al Sadat, for whom there appears to be a resurgence of support; he is seen as a credible leader by more than 90% of every group.

More than seven in ten respondents overall see Gamal Abdul Nasser as credible, second only to Sadat. Nasser's support is at least 91% among those who identify with the OO and the SDP, but is less than one-quarter among those who identify with the IT (FJP: 16% and Nour: 22%). Nasser is seen as credible by about two-thirds of those in Upper Egypt and the agricultural areas, but his positive ratings are about 20 points higher in the major cities and tourist areas.

Bassem Yousef, the popular TV satirist who was recently charged with insulting the presidency and Islam by the Morsi government, is viewed as the most credible living Egyptian leader of the names included in

the survey, with 60% of respondents overall finding him credible. Among those with confidence in the NSF and A6M, more than three-quarters say Yousef is a credible leader, as do 80% of the SDP. Among those who identify with IT, however, he is held in much lower esteem (FJP: 7% and Nour: 13%).

None of the other current leaders receive a net positive credibility rating from any group – including those leaders associated with the NSF who at best are seen as credible by about 40% (e.g., Subhi and Shafiq).

Former President Mubarak is seen as credible by 23%, slightly behind current President Morsi who is seen as credible by 27%. Predictably, Mubarak's positive numbers are in the low single digits among those who identify with the IT and hover around 30% for those who side with the OO and the SDP, while Morsi's positive numbers are in the low single digits for those with confidence in the OO and the SDP, and are quite high among those with confidence in the IT (FJP: 95% and Nour: 87%). Morsi is seen as credible by about three times as many Muslims as Christians (29% vs. 10%), and by about twice as many respondents in Upper Egypt and the agricultural areas (35%) as in the major cities and tourist areas (15-17%).



## 7. Constitution

Do you support or oppose the Constitution passed in the last referendum? <sup>7</sup>						
	Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
		FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
Support	30	93	85	8	9	8
Oppose	63	6	14	82	82	84

Do you support or oppose the Constitution passed in the last referendum? <sup>7</sup>							
	Total	Region				Religion	
		Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
Support	30	19	37	38	24	32	13
Oppose	63	68	62	58	75	62	73

Just three in ten respondents support the Constitution passed in the last referendum, while 63% say they oppose it. The IT group strongly supports the Constitution, with 93% of those with confidence in the FJP and 85% of those with confidence in the Nour saying they support the Constitution. On the other hand, fewer than one in ten OO supporters and the SDP believe in the Constitution (NSF: 8%, A6M: 9%, SDP: 8%). Support for the Constitution is also somewhat stronger in Upper Egypt (37%) and the agricultural areas (38%), as well as by Muslims (32%), compared to 24% of those in tourist areas, 19% of those in major cities, and 13% of Christians.

## 8. Attitudes Toward Current Government and Muslim Brotherhood

Agree/Disagree <sup>8</sup>							
		Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
			FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
The current government is able to lead our nation out of our economic crisis	Agree	25	81	74	7	7	5
	Disagree	75	18	25	93	92	95
The Muslim Brotherhood is committed to democracy	Agree	28	93	85	6	8	3
	Disagree	72	6	14	94	92	96
The Muslim Brotherhood is capable of administering the state	Agree	26	97	88	3	4	1
	Disagree	73	3	12	96	96	99
The Egyptian opposition is able to offer a better political alternative than the current government	Agree	72	4	12	95	94	96
	Disagree	28	96	88	5	5	4
The Muslim Brotherhood intends to 'Islamize' the State and control its executive powers	Agree	71	7	15	93	91	95
	Disagree	29	92	85	7	9	5
The upcoming parliamentary elections will be fair and transparent	Agree	29	92	84	8	9	5
	Disagree	71	7	16	92	91	95

Agree/Disagree <sup>8</sup>								
		Total	Region				Religion	
			Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
The current government is able to lead our nation out of our economic crisis	Agree	25	15	32	33	14	27	13
	Disagree	75	85	68	67	86	73	87
The Muslim Brotherhood is committed to democracy	Agree	28	16	37	35	20	30	12
	Disagree	72	84	62	65	80	70	88
The Muslim Brotherhood is capable of administering the state	Agree	26	15	34	34	16	28	8
	Disagree	73	85	65	66	83	71	91
The Egyptian opposition is able to offer a better political alternative than the current government	Agree	72	82	65	64	84	70	90
	Disagree	28	18	35	36	16	30	10
The Muslim Brotherhood intends to 'Islamize' the State and control its executive powers	Agree	71	82	62	64	80	69	87
	Disagree	29	18	37	36	20	31	13
The upcoming parliamentary elections will be fair and transparent	Agree	29	17	37	36	18	30	13
	Disagree	71	83	62	64	82	69	87

Overall, only one-quarter of Egyptian respondents agree that the current government can lead the nation out of economic crisis, that the Muslim Brotherhood is capable of administering the state, and that the Muslim Brotherhood is committed to democracy. About three-quarters disagree with all these propositions.

Here again the divide is deep. While 81% of those with confidence in the FJP and 74% of those with confidence in the Nour Party think the government can deal with the economic crisis, more than 90% of those who identify with the OO and the SDP do not. Can the Muslim Brotherhood administer the state? Those who identify with the IT say yes (FJP: 97% and Nour: 88%), while those who identify with the OO (NSF: 96% and A6M: 96%) and the SDP (99%) say no.

The same is true for attitudes toward the Muslim Brotherhood's commitment to democracy, where the IT side overwhelmingly agrees (FJP: 93% and Nour: 85%) and the OO side (NSF: 94% and A6M: 92%) and the SDP (96%) disagrees.

When asked if the Muslim Brotherhood is determined to Islamize the state and control its executive powers, 71% of respondents say they agree. The IT side says no (FJP: 92% and Nour: 85%), but more than 90% of those who have confidence in the OO (NSF: 93% and A6M: 91%) and 95% of the SDP say yes. It is also noteworthy that while almost nine in ten Christians are concerned that the Muslim Brotherhood is determined to Islamize the state, seven in ten Muslims share this concern

Does the opposition present a better political alternative than the current government? Overall, 72 say yes, with only 28% saying no. Again, there is a clear split with more than nine in ten respondents who side with the OO agreeing (NSF: 95% and A6M: 94%) as well as 96% of the SDP, while those on the side of the IT disagree (FJP: 96% and Nour: 88%).

The same split is evident with regard to whether the upcoming parliamentary elections will be fair and transparent, which 29% of the respondents think is true and 71% do not. Among those with confidence in the FJP (92%) and the Nour Party (84%) there is a strong belief that the elections will be fair, while for at least 91% of those on the OO side and among 95% of the SDP the clear view is they will not be fair or transparent.

## 9. What To Do Next

What to do next <sup>9</sup>							
		Total	Islamic Tendency		Organized Opposition		Silent Disaffected Plurality
			FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	
Scrapping the constitution	Support	64	6	14	82	82	85
	Oppose	30	93	85	8	9	7
A real national dialogue	Support	87	92	92	85	85	85
	Oppose	12	8	8	15	15	14
The military temporarily assuming control	Support	44	1	7	60	60	59
	Oppose	56	98	93	40	40	41
Immediate parliamentary elections to complete the ruling institutions	Support	52	82	79	39	41	43
	Oppose	47	18	20	60	58	57

What to do next <sup>9</sup>								
		Total	Region				Religion	
			Major Cities	Upper Egypt	Agricultural	Tourist	Muslim	Christian
Scrapping the constitution	Support	64	68	62	59	74	63	73
	Oppose	30	19	36	38	24	32	13
A real national dialogue	Support	87	85	90	88	87	87	87
	Oppose	12	14	10	12	12	12	13
The military temporarily assuming control	Support	44	50	40	40	46	42	61
	Oppose	56	50	59	60	54	58	39
Immediate parliamentary elections to complete the ruling institutions	Support	52	48	56	55	43	53	46
	Oppose	47	51	44	45	57	47	53

Respondents were asked a series of questions about possible next steps for Egypt. The option that wins hands down among all groups in a rare sign of consensus is the convening of “a real national dialogue,” with 92% of those with confidence in the FJP and the Nour, 85% of those with confidence in the NSF and the A6M, and 85% of the SDP all agreeing.

A two-thirds majority supports scrapping the constitution, but the 30% who oppose such a move reflects the overwhelming support the constitution has among those who have confidence in the FJP and Nour Party, who wrote it. Among the two-thirds of respondents who would seek to scrap the constitution are more than 80% of the OO and the SDP who strongly oppose the document.

Should the military assume control? Egyptians are split: 44% in favor and 56% opposed. Predictably, 98% of those with confidence in the FJP say no, since it would mean their relinquishing of control. They are joined by 93% of those who support the Nour. However, 60% of those who identify with the OO and 59% of the SDP support the military temporarily assuming control.

There is similar overall ambivalence regarding attitudes as to whether or not the parliamentary elections ought to be held immediately to complete the ruling institutions, with 52% in favor and 47% opposed. More than eight in ten respondents who side with the IT want immediate elections, while nearly six in ten who side with the OO and the SDP disagree.

- 
1. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
  - 2a. “Hopeful” is the aggregation of “very hopeful” and “somewhat hopeful” responses, and “Not Hopeful” is the aggregation of “somewhat unhelpful” and “very unhelpful” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
  - 2b. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
  3. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
  4. “Confident” is the aggregation of “very confident” and “somewhat confident” responses, and “Not Confident” is the aggregation of “not very confident” and “not confident at all” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
  5. “Satisfied” is the aggregation of “very satisfied” and “somewhat satisfied” responses, and “Not Satisfied” is the aggregation of “somewhat dissatisfied” and “very dissatisfied” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
  6. “Credible” is the aggregation of “very credible” and “somewhat credible” responses, and “Not Credible” is the aggregation of “not very credible” and “not at all credible” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
  7. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
  8. “Agree” is the aggregation of “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” responses, and “Disagree” is the aggregation of “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
  9. “Support” is the aggregation of “strongly support” and “somewhat support” responses, and “Oppose” is the aggregation of “somewhat oppose” and “strongly oppose” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.



## **APPENDIX —METHODODOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHICS**

### **Methodology**

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face to face, in-home personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered to ensure a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and comprised adult males and females, who were 18+ years of age. The interviews were conducted across a wide geography to ensure robust data and representation of a wide cross-section of Egyptians. Coverage included urban and rural areas across Upper & Lower Egypt as well as Frontier Governorates. The centres covered were Cairo, Giza, Shubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Mansoura, Tanta, Zagazig, Damanhour, Bani Suwayf, Asyut, Menia, Fayoum, Suhag, Aswan, Luxor, Sharm Al Shaikh, and Arish. Random sampling was done door to door using a multi-stage sampling methodology.

### **Demographics**

Major Cities	36
Upper Egypt	22
Agricultural	37
Tourist	4
Illiterate	30
No formal education	12
Primary/Prep	21
Secondary/Incomplete university	3
Tech/Intermed/High	25
University or more	10
Muslim	90
Christian	10
Male	50
Female	50
Under 30	35
30-49	40
50+	25



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