

FORMATION OF THE MODERN MIND

Part II

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF
COMMUNISM

by

James A. Weisheipl, O.P.
S.T.Lr., D.Phil.(Oxon.)

Lectures
to the
Thomist Association
1961- 1962

CHICAGO

Formation of the Modern Mind
Part II
THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

I

Introductory Lecture

I. Complexity of the Modern Mind

1. It is extremely difficult to recognize all the elements which go to make up the so-called "modern mind" because we are too close to it ourselves. The "modern mind" is a highly complex meddle of ideologies, attitudes, conscious and unconscious emotional reactions. It is not even a single Weltanschauung; rather it is a number of contradictory Weltanschauungen.

a. We can easily recognize the influential roles of such men as Martin Luther, John Calvin, Rene Descartes, Isaac Newton, Immanuel Kant, Charles Darwin, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. But each one of these influences gives us only a segment of the modern mentality. We could even go on to Albert Einstein, Atomic Physics, Existentialism and Mickey Spillane, but that still would not give us a satisfactory picture.

It is like the jingle school children sometimes learn:

It was six men of Indostan
To learning much inclined
Who went to see the Elephant
(Though all of them were blind).
That each by observation
Might satisfy his mind.

The jingle goes on to say that each man took hold of the elephant at a different place, using this to determine the kind of animal an elephant was.

one against the side - "the elephant is very like a wall"
one took hold of the tusk - "very like a spear"
one grabbed the trunk - "similar to a snake"
one clasped it by the knee - "very like a tree"
one felt the ear - "thought it like a fan"
one grabbed its tail - "very like a rope"

And so the men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong
Though each was partly in the right
And all were in the wrong!

Each one of these influential men did help to form the modern mind but the whole picture is impossible for us to grasp. We are too much a part of its history.

- b. Besides understanding the fragmentary elements, or influences constituting the modern mentality, there is the more difficult task of evaluating the principles, the assumptions, the presuppositions and the consequences of an influence such as Marx or Freud or of Existentialism. In ordinary courses of philosophy, such an evaluation is practically impossible. Every evaluation presupposes a philosophy from which to evaluate. Unless one already has a very clearly worked out philosophy or wisdom, one can only fall back on common sense or personal preference - which is quite unsatisfactory for an intelligent adult.

We, in the Thomist Association, are in a particularly fortunate position:

- i) We have the Catholic Faith, which is the most certain of all norms of evaluation. We in the Thomist Association have made it our task to study truths of the faith in a serious, intelligent, adult manner with the help of St. Thomas.
- ii) Further, we have taken for our guide in matters purely philosophic, the sound principles, method and fundamental doctrines of St. Thomas. These principles belong to human reason, they can be examined by pure reason and they can serve as an intelligent basis for evaluating the efforts of other philosophers.

Evaluation and criticism is a very difficult task, for we must keep in mind not only the truths of faith and sound philosophy, but we must also appreciate sympathetically the problem a particular philosopher, particularly an "influential" philosopher, was trying to face.

2. The Problem of Influence

- a. I have always been fascinated by the problem of "influence". What makes a particular thinker, rhetorician, writer or producer popular? What makes him influential? Who influences whom?
- i) All the thinkers discussed last year were almost always influential, because they said what the world wanted to hear at the time they spoke. Freud is popular and influential today, because modern man wants to explain away his psychoses. Freud would never have been influential in the less neurotic medieval world. On the other hand, he would never have been produced.
- Darwin is influential today, not because modern man thinks of himself as "not much better than an animal", but rather because he likes to think of how much he has progressed. In the

Christian Middle Ages, Darwin would have been passed off as "a possible opinion" with qualifications. But, then, it is hard to conceive of Darwinianism in its full extent as having originated in the Middle Ages.

- ii) All the thinkers discussed last year were almost always influential, because they reflected in a startling way an existing spirit at the time they spoke. It is extraordinary how the personal life of, let us say, Sigmund Freud or Havellock Ellis or J. P. Sartre reflect a large portion of the people they influence.
- b. From this it follows that one who does not say what the world wants to hear cannot expect to be "popular" in the sense explained no more than Christ was in His day or Savonarola was in his. However, if such men strike a sympathetic chord in the human heart, as did Christ and Savonarola, they will always have a following of some sort.
 - c. Despite the fact that we are so close to the modern world, we can, perhaps, detach ourselves sufficiently to see some of the characteristics of the modern mind. Considering the philosophers discussed last year, there are perhaps 4 characteristics which seem to be typical, 4 characteristics which seem to intensify with the passing of the generations. These characteristics are progress, tolerance (except for Karl Marx), secular and scientific. A modern philosopher who did not claim to be progressive, tolerant, secular and scientific can hardly expect to be respectable or popular.
 - i) Since the time of Descartes and the 17th century scientific revolution, there is scarcely a philosopher who has not assumed that mankind is making continual progress. The medieval idea of Paradise, original sin, the need for personal regeneration is gone.
 - a) Instead of looking back to the sages of antiquity, each philosopher feels he must start a new system all by himself. Hence the multiple and diverse systems of modern and contemporary philosophy.
 - b) Each philosopher, except Rousseau, assumes that mankind is progressing. Actually, long before Darwin's theory of biological evolution, philosophers had assumed that every new age is so much superior to the old.
 - c) This progress is thought to be due largely to specialization, a specialization now respectable not only in science and medicine, but also in philosophy, history, literature and art. But unfortunately in the process of specialization, we have to sacrifice wisdom for learning.
 - ii) At least in this country tolerance of almost every opinion has become a mark of democratic thinking and an ideal in itself.

Oct. 1, 1961

This tolerance, of course, has been won at great sacrifice, but it contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction:

- a) Tolerance, unless guarded rationally, can tolerate its own destruction. It can even tolerate intolerance for toleration.
- b) In actual fact, tolerance of almost every opinion has lead many to an intellectual indifference, so that they are not even concerned about whether there is any truth. "What is truth?" is the scepticism which denies the possibility of knowing objective truth.

Of all modern philosophies Communism alone stands out as the arch-enemy of scepticism and intellectual indifference. There is no room in the philosophy of dialectical materialism for scepticism or toleration.

- 111) Many factors have contributed to making the modern mind thoroughly secular (by secular I mean leaving God out of the picture). The blame has frequently been put on the Renaissance, Calvinism, capitalism, materialist philosophies and the like. But I wonder if the largest factor may not be tolerance itself. The question of God's existence has become a matter of personal opinion, and we must tolerate a man's opinion even in this. Consequently, God is left out of the modern Weltanschauung lest we appear to impose a personal opinion on others.

But unfortunately it is impossible to leave God out of our view of life without running the risk of dehumanizing man himself. Man was made to the image and likeness of God. And without God, there is nothing for man to image.

- a) In the name of humanism and humanitarianism, dogs and cats are fast occupying a place of greater dignity than man. The English Canine Defense League, for example, protested against the use of "innocent animals" in the Bikini atom bomb tests. They requested President Truman to save animals by using convicted war criminals in the place of the animals. Almost daily there are press reports of dogs and cats receiving large bequests from persons unmoved by the human poverty of their neighborhoods, or of people opposed to sending relief to children in underdeveloped countries but enthusiastic about feeding under-nourished kittens at home.
- b) In the name of directing men's minds from an other-worldly paradise to constructing a paradise on this earth, leaders are turning this earth ever nearer to a veritable hell. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are insignificant compared to the present possibilities.

Oct. 1, 1961

- c) Karl Marx and Nicolai Lenin were particularly concerned with spreading a humanism bent on giving each worker a common paradise on earth at some distant date. In the meantime, individual human beings must be sacrificed for the good of the humanitarian party of the people.
- iv) Finally, a modern philosophy must be scientific. The charge of being "unscientific" is generally considered quite devastating. Perhaps the only modern exception to this characteristic is Existentialism, and this is a deliberate reaction to "scientism".

Since the scientific revolution of the 17th century mathematical physics has become the apotheosis of human knowledge. Chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology and the like are "scientific" to the extent in which the data are quantified and expressed in mathematical formulas. Relativity and especially "quantum" physics has helped considerably to bring the so-called life sciences closer to the ideal of physics. The mathematical ideal of Descartes is brought to its logical conclusion in the current view among many scientists, viz. that whatever cannot be measured and formalized in mathematics does not exist!

The big difficulty with this extreme view is that it is inhuman and myopic. The anti-scientific reaction of Existentialism is perfectly understandable, even though it is irrational. Not all human values are mathematical. In fact, the most important values cannot be touched by mathematics - values such as God, the soul, happiness, peace of mind and heart, freedom and love.

- d. Today more than ever there is need for a serious study of modern thought, an accurate evaluation of this thought in the light of sound principles, and an actual attempt to solve the intellectual problems of the day. Whatever Americans may pretend, the fundamental problems are intellectual; they must be studied with the mind, and not brushed off with a financial contribution.

Considering the 4 characteristics of modern Western philosophy, viz. progressive, tolerant, secular and scientific, one is somewhat startled to notice that the Communist philosophy has all the same characteristics, except tolerance.

- i) Communism presupposes the progressive evolution of mankind and society.
- ii) It is thoroughly secular in its dialectical materialism.
- iii) It claims to be established by modern science, particularly by quantum physics.

Western thought is scarcely in a position to refute the Communist philosophy ideologically. Our characteristic

II. The Thomist Association and the Church in America

1. This brings me to the importance of the Thomist Association.

- a. The importance of the layman in the Church's apostolic mission should be clear to all who read the encyclicals of the recent popes. Pope Benedict XV saw clearly the great need for Catholic laymen today to share with the hierarchy and the clergy the task of bringing the Gospel to all nations. But he warned against novelties. He insisted that what is needed is not new doctrines or theories, but a new method of bringing the one true doctrine of Christ to all men. Not new things, but a new way: Non nova sed noviter. (Ad beatissimi, Nov. 1, 1914)

The great Pontiff Pius XI looked for this new way in Catholic Action. In 1928, he defined his new organization as:

"...the participation of the Catholic laity in the hierarchic apostolate, for the defense of religious and moral principles, for the development of a beneficent and wholesome social action, under the guidance of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, outside and above political parties, with the intention of restoring Catholic life in the family and society."

The late Pope Pius XII widened the call to all laymen to aid in the restoration of the world to Christ. He was convinced that:

"the relations between the Church and the world require the intervention of lay apostles. The consecratio mundi is essentially the work of the laymen themselves, who are intimately a part of economic and social life and who participate in the government and in legislative assemblies." (Guiding principles of the lay apostolate, October, 1957)

In his encyclical On the Mystical Body (June 29, 1943) Pius XII called upon everyone by reason of his baptism, confirmation and the urgency of charity to share actively in the lay apostolate to the degree in which his providential vocation allows.

- b. Today in the U.S., there are all kinds of clubs, societies and associations for Catholics. In his talk to the Archdioc. Council of Catholic Men on Aug. 27, Cardinal Meyer again pointed out the great danger of considering mere membership in Catholic organizations a passport to salvation. There are some who think that the more organizations they belong to, the better Catholics they are. By far the great majority of those organizations are social clubs. What is needed today are not social clubs. There are too many of them as it is. They fail in the one great need of the Church today - the intellectual and spiritual formation of the Catholic adult for the apostolate at hand.

2. The Thomist Association is not a social club. It is not even a mere series of lectures. First and foremost this is an association organized by Catholic laymen for laymen. It is adult and serious, intent upon acquiring that spiritual and intellectual formation necessary in modern professional life, whatever that profession may be.
 - a. The spiritual formation rests heavily on the dialogue Mass, Holy Communion, the personal efforts of the individual and the conference type sermon, i.e. one directed to those seriously striving for perfection and presented as a unified series of truths for spiritual development. The conferences are somewhat similar to retreat talks or meditations for religious, but they are geared to the needs of adults in the world.
 - b. The intellectual formation rests heavily on a series of systematic, serious and adult expositions of Catholic doctrine for the adult mind, generally following the Thomistic order of philosophy, the Summa theologiae of St. Thomas, or a systematic analysis of modern problems. The lectures are intended to stimulate serious questions and discussion among Catholic leaders.

When we speak of the spiritual and intellectual formation of the laity, we naturally include Sisters in this classification. In ecclesiastical terminology not even religious Sisters can be called "clerics". Sisters too need to join in the new apostolate in an adult way. Of course, their sphere of influence is somewhat different than the layman in the world.

3. The great advantage of the Thomist Association is that it combines the spiritual formation with the intellectual, and all of this under the inspiring authority of St. Thomas and the protection of our Blessed Mother.

FORMATION OF THE MODERN MIND

II

The Left-Wing Hegelian

Introduction

1. If you ever have the opportunity to visit the British Museum in London, you should try to visit the large reading room for printed books. There you will probably be shown the chair and desk used by Karl Marx for his painstaking researches which went into his Das Kapital.

There are at least two sides to his complex personality:

- a. the revolutionary pamphleteer who called himself the prophet of the proletariat.
 - b. There is another side, not commonly recognized by Americans today - he was a philosopher, a research scholar in the German tradition, a theoretician.
2. Communism is not just an economic or social theory; at the present day it is not simply Russian imperialism. It is a whole way of life, a complete philosophy, a Weltanschauung. In Greek and Roman antiquity "philosophy" was not a course to be taken at school, but a way of life devoted to understanding the whole of reality. For the Fathers of the Church, Christianity was the true philosophy devoted to understanding and serving Christ. Marx, however, claimed that Communism, not Christianity, is the true way of life.
- a. Today this way of life is the official philosophy of almost half of the world.
 - b. We must not underestimate its intellectual content. Many Americans are deluded into thinking that the present tension is between two countries, two world powers, and nothing more; they fail to realize that Communism is a real philosophy, taught as such in every university, college and high school under Soviet control.
 - c. We must try to understand the philosophical and historical roots of Marx's doctrine, if we are to appreciate the subtleties of Communist philosophy. As Aristotle said, "He who considers things in their growth and origin will obtain the clearest view of them."

I. Marx the young student

A. Early life:

On May 5, 1818, just three years after the Congress of Vienna, Karl Marx was born at Trier in the Rhineland, which after the breakup of the Napoleonic Empire was given to Prussia by the Congress of 1815. His parents, Hirschel

and Henriette, belonged to the respectable Jewish middle class.

Hirschel Marx was a lawyer by profession and a descendant of a long line of Jewish Rabbis.

Henriette was a descendant of a Jewish family which originally came from Holland.

Nevertheless the Marx family never seems to have been very religious, for when Karl was 6, the family embraced a form of Lutheranism for what appears to be social reasons; Karl received baptism in 1824.

Karl was a rather determined, though not a brilliant student. After completing the Gymnasium at Trier, he was sent by his father to the university of Bonn when he was 17. His father wanted him to study law, but Karl was more interested in philosophy and history. So after one unsuccessful year at Bonn, he went to the center of all German learning, the University of Berlin, in the autumn of 1836.

B. Philosophy:

We do not know how old Marx was when he became an atheist, but we do know that he was not only a thorough-going atheist before he entered the University of Berlin, but a passionate materialist. Marx read much materialist literature to justify his atheism, but he did not like the current "mechanistic materialism."

1. 18th and 19th century materialism was mechanistic, i.e., since the time of Galileo, Descartes and Newton, all movement was explained by inert matter having to be mechanically moved by an outside force. Actually this is the fundamental objection Marx has to the "old" materialism: it is not "consistent" and self-sufficient, for it leaves the door open for an outside "spirit" to initiate the motion.
2. The materialism of Newton, Boyle and the rest was atomistic, having to deny the real unity of things, the real continuity of matter.
3. Finally, it denied the reality of fundamental changes, i.e. what he called "qualitative changes". Mechanism, being atomistic by necessity, admits only local motion and the reorganization of atomic units.

Thus Marx began his studies at the University of Berlin passionately desiring to be a convinced materialist to support his atheism, but tortured by the absence of philosophical conviction. Berlin was the intellectual center of Germany, but it was hardly the place for a materialist. The official philosophy at the University was the idealism of Hegel, the corner-stone of Prussian absolutism and Lutheranism. Hegel was dead only 5 years when Marx matriculated, but Hegelianism still dominated the scene.

II. Hegel and Hegelianism

- A. The very year in which Karl Marx was born, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (born, 1770) assumed his professorship at Berlin, and there he expounded an all embracing idealism until his death in 1831. He was without doubt the most eminent philosopher of the day. His own university training was theological. He passed his theological examination in 1793 at the famous theological school of Tübingen, and all of his early writings were theological (Life of Jesus, 1795; The Positivity of the Christian Religion, 1795-99; The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, 1800).

During the next 18 years, Hegel obtained better and better positions successively at Bern, Frankfurt, Jena (where he taught with Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling). Napoleon's invasion of Jena brought on an economic crisis, and Hegel was forced to work as the editor of a newspaper in Hamburg, then as rector and professor of philosophy at the Gymnasium in Nuremberg. At Nuremberg, Hegel composed his main work in systematic philosophy: Science of Logic (1812-16), in which the traditional formal logic and Kantian logic were subordinated to the comprehensive, speculative logic of absolute spirit. For the next two years, he was professor of philosophy at Heidelberg (1816-18), at which time he wrote the first edition of his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817), in which he provided a conspectus of his entire system in its three main divisions: logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. It was then that he was invited to the University of Berlin to be the safeguard of the Prussian State and Lutheranism. Even after his death, devoted students published dozens of volumes consisting of notes they had taken in his courses on the philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, esthetics, and the philosophy of history.

B. Hegelianism:

1. It is extremely difficult to summarize Hegel's all-embracing philosophy. He was a masticative thinker, considering all human history and previous systems of philosophy as culminating in the Imperial German State and in his own massive synthesis. Like Aristotle, he considered all earlier thinkers as groping toward his crowning synthesis. Although Hegel was full of admiration for Plato and Aristotle, he considered Kant, Fichte and Schelling as the penultimate phase in the growth of philosophical consciousness. His acknowledge debt to these three thinkers was a deep one, but Hegel felt obliged to criticize them in order to bring the imminent dialectic of philosophical development to completion.
2. Kant (1724-1804) for many the undisputed master of German philosophy, spent his life trying to analyze human experience in order to justify human knowledge, particularly of metaphysics.
 - a. David Hume had shaken Kant out of his "dogmatic slumber" when he denied the objective reality of causality. For Hume "causality" involves only two things (1) mere succession of events, (2) an habitual

association of one event as the "cause" of the posterior "effect". Hence the so-called "necessary connection" between C and E is no more than a mental habit. Such a view is the ruination of all true scientific knowledge (physics, chemistry, etc.) and abolishes metaphysics.

b. Kant set about to analyze all the factors necessarily found in experience. This is the Critique of Pure Reason.

- i. phenomena - reality as it appears to consciousness.
- ii. numena (Ding an sich) - the unknown reality of the thing itself.
- iii. categories - the necessary, subjective conditions which give structure and form to our actual experiences.

c. As Hegel saw it, there were at least two things wrong with Kant:

- i. the numena - if we cannot know it in itself, then how do we know that it exists; to say that it exists, is already to make it a phenomenon of experience.
 - ii. Kant cannot resolve the dualism between form and content of experience. Moreover, Kant never did establish metaphysics speculatively.
3. Hegel, therefore, proposed to transcend every dualism of subject knowing and object known in a higher synthesis: not only the form, but also the content is from the spirit.
- a. The form and content progress according to the absolute laws of metaphysical logic. This logic is a dialectical process, identical with reality itself and the historical unfolding of the Absolute Spirit itself.
- i. Kant had recognized a formal and transcendental logic; Hegel now sought to complete the advance of logic, by adding the third and ultimate phase: dialectics. This logic embraces the entire content of reality and hence is identical with metaphysics. "Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts." (Science of Logic, I, 74-75)
 - ii. This dialectics has three phases in its development: thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Fichte referred to them as position, op-position and com-position. Hegel's technical designations are: An-sich-sein (being-in-itself), Ausser-sich-sein or Fur-sich-sein (being-external-to-itself or being-for-itself), and An-und-fur-sich-sein (being-in-and-for-itself). Every idea, statement or thesis contains within itself its denial; this denial or negation is brought out, as in the Platonic dialogue, by Criticism. The tension between thesis and antithesis reaches a

breaking point, and a new phase, a synthesis, is produced, but this again contains its own denial in an ever growing unfolding or manifestation. METHOD, or LOGIC.

- iii. The very content of this dialectic is the object of metaphysics. Note that the content is no longer BEING, but BECOMING. The idea of BEING is only one phase, which is negated in the principle of contradiction. The absolute reality is the BECOMING.
- b. The Absolute which is being continually unfolded in the universe is the SPIRIT (Geist). Even Nature (matter) is a manifestation of Spirit; the whole of human and philosophical history is a progressive manifestation of the Absolute.
 - i. For Hegel the highest manifestation of human history is the ethical life of the State, which is most perfectly found in the Prussian monarchy of his own day.
 - ii. For Hegel the highest manifestation of philosophy is his own which not only synthesizes all that went before, but which has discovered the laws of Absolute Spirit.
 - iii. For Hegel the highest manifestation of religion is the ethical life of Christianity (Lutheranism). The task of the philosopher is to give a rationalistic interpretation of Christian dogma - directed against those who would separate knowledge and faith, whether in the name of clerical orthodoxy or rationalistic enlightenment.
- c. Thus there are three main parts to the Hegelian system:
 - i. The Logic which describes the self-development of the Absolute.
 - ii. The Philosophy of Nature, which depicts the Idea as unfolding in three stages:
 - a. The doctrine of subjective (individual) Spirit - psychology and anthropology.
 - b. The doctrine of objective (universal) Spirit - law, morality and the State.
 - c. The doctrine of Absolute Spirit, which depicts the Idea in its progressive stages of self consciousness:
 1. Art, giving rise to aesthetics.
 2. Religion, giving rise to the philosophy of religion.
 3. Philosophy, giving rise to the philosophy of history.

The main point about all this is that Hegelianism is final; it is an idealism which makes further development impossible: not only is the form (logic) subjective, but the content (reality) as well. The second main point is that it is dynamic, progressing according to the inexorable laws of dialectics. (Nov. 18, 1827). "I got to know Hegel from beginning to end, and most of his disciples likewise." In the following year, he began

III. The Left-Wing Hegelians - Differenz der philosophischen und

A. Soon after Hegel's death in 1831, his disciples split into two groups, mainly in the field of philosophy and religion. The "Right" remained faithful to the master, devotedly publishing their notes of his courses.

B. The "Left" were dissatisfied with Prussian absolutism and the state religion. The "Hegelian Left" was led by David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Count August von Cieszkowski and Mikhail Bakunin. All of these men deeply influenced Karl Marx who joined them in 1836.

1. Cieszkowski - there is nothing left for post-Hegelians to do in speculative philosophy; there is only practical philosophy. He divides history into the triad of feeling (antiquity), thought (Christ to Hegel),

2. and will. His hatred for all religions in the Foreword, where he quotes Archbishop of Bonn: "In one word - I hate all the gods."

2. Bakunin - the whole present status must be negated to beget an entirely new reality: democracy. had just published his Historical Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels, encouraged Marx to apply for a position at the

3. Bauer - engaged in philosophical Criticism to ensure that the irrational element is eliminated from the historical unfolding of reality. (His Historical Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels appeared in 1840).

4. Strauss - likewise engaged in philosophical Criticism. In 1835 he published his Life of Jesus, which startled Europe by its violent attack on the authenticity of certain parts of the Gospel narrative.

5. Feuerbach - saw the biggest weakness in Hegel's philosophy of nature, which was able to provide an account of Nature in general, as outward embodiment of the Idea, but it had not succeeded in deducing a priori the infinite multiplicity and diversity of individual concrete instances.

He reversed the situation and considered the Idea an inadequate embodiment of the concrete. For him, true reality is the individual, the singular, Nature; the universal, the Idea, Spirit, are correlative illusions. Thus the concept of God is constructed by man after his own nature. (The true god is man himself: Homo Homini Deus est.)

that God does not exist. Finally, he had no knowledge of practical affairs, and he was with

"The aim of my writings and lectures is this: to turn men from theologians into anthropologists, from lovers of God into lovers of humanity, from candidates for the hereafter into students of the here-and-now, from lackeys of a heavenly and earthly monarchy and aristocracy into free, self-respecting citizens of the world." (Lectures on the Nature of Religion, Stuttgart 1908, pp. 28-29).

C. Many of these ideas were being circulated when Karl Marx arrived at the University of Berlin. At the beginning of his second year of study, he wrote to his father (Nov. 10, 1837), "I got to know Hegel from beginning to end, and most of his disciples likewise." In the following year, he began work on his Ph.D. dissertation, Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie. His friends suggested that it would be unwise to submit such a dissertation at the strong hold of idealism, so in April, 1841, he presented the thesis to the University of Jena, which granted him the Ph.D.

There are certain points to note about this dissertation:

1. Marx was thoroughly convinced of the Hegelian dialectic, and the work was written on an idealist basis.
2. He preferred the materialism of Epicurus to that of Democritus, because the former admitted an "energizing principle".
3. He shows his hatred for all religions in the Foreward, where he quotes Aeschylus' Prometheus: "In one word - I hate all the gods."

Just then, Bruno Bauer, who had just published his Historical Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels, encouraged Marx to apply for a position at the University of Bonn, which he obtained. Together they planned to publish a Journal of Atheism, but this did not materialize. They did collaborate on an anonymous pamphlet The Trump of the Last Judgment on Hegel.

The Prussian officials discovered the identity of the authors, confiscated the pamphlet, removed Bauer from his professorship, and closed the doors to Marx's lectureship.

This was the end of Marx's academic possibilities. He was 23 years old.

Conclusion:

At this stage of Marx's development, he was in an awkward intellectual position. He was convinced of Hegel's inexorable dialectics; he liked the internal consistency and self-sufficiency of a philosophy which identified BEING and BECOMING: it was dynamic. However, he wanted to be a materialist and an atheist. He still found no convincing refutation of idealism, and no assurance that God does not exist. Finally, he had no knowledge of practical affairs, and he was without a job.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

III

Dialectical MaterialismIntroduction

1. In our last lecture we followed the formation of young Dr. Karl Marx to the age of 23, i.e. to 1841, when the doors of an academic career were finally closed to him. We saw: (1) that he was intellectually convinced of Hegel's dialectics; he was sold on the inner dynamism of this dialectic and the inevitability of events arising from the tension between thesis and antithesis. (2) Although the general structure of Hegel's philosophy was accepted by him as true, he was repelled by the idealism of Hegel, i.e., he wanted to be a convinced materialist, but he lacked philosophical assurance. The traditional materialism was unacceptable because it was "mechanical" and "inert". (3) Like many of his companions in the Young Hegelians, he felt that Hegel had reached the summit in speculative philosophy, and there remained only the practical order -- the will to change events in accord with the inevitable dialectical evolution (Cf. Cieszkowski, above).
2. Before we can examine critically the fundamental doctrine of Communism known as Dialectical Materialism, we must consider 4 more events in the life of Marx. These four elements account for the "materialistic" foundation of Communism.

I. The Introduction of MaterialismA. The Rheinische Zeitung

1. Left without a job, Marx began contributing philosophical articles dealing with politics to the Hallesche Jahrbucher, which had been founded in 1838 by Arnold Ruge and Theodor Echtermeyer as the organ of the Young Hegelians. Their aim was to apply philosophical "criticism" to the political sphere, much as Bruno Bauer was doing in theology. Hegel, it must be remembered, had little or nothing to say about the concrete affairs of politics or about individual nature. However, in 1840 Frederick William IV ascended the throne of Prussia and stronger censorship laws were passed. The Jahrbucher was finally suppressed as harmful to the German State.
2. In Jan. of 1842 a new journal was founded in Cologne, called the Rheinische Zeitung. The founders were Georg Jung, a young barrister, and Dagobert Oppenheim, a young assessor, both of whom were enthusiastic Young Hegelians, very much influenced by Moses Hess, who had not only studied Hegelian philosophy, but also French socialism. Karl Marx contributed heavily to the new journal. By October of that year, Marx had become chief editor. In this position he took an active part in philosophical "Criticism" of political issues. He protested most violently against censorship of the press; he even protested against the illegal arrest of the Catholic Archbishop of Cologne, and he denounced the penalties imposed on the poor for pilfering sticks from the forests, poaching, trespassing, etc. (Out of 207,478 penal proceedings begun in Pruss'an courts in 1836, no less than 150,000 dealt with such crimes.)

October 29, 1961

At this time Marx still had an Hegelian respect for the ideal State, and he criticised the existing Prussian state as an Hegelian. In those days he was an advocate of justice, rather than a revolutionary.

3. However, a rival paper, the Allgemeine Zeitung of Augsburg, began violent attacks on Marx' editorials for advocating French socialism and communism. Marx had to admit that he was trying to deal with political and sociological problems without sufficient background. He determined to study sociology and French socialism. But by this time, March 1843, the Rheinische Zeitung was suppressed by the government, and Marx decided to go to Paris, the center of French socialism and communism.

The importance of Marx' work on the paper was that it convinced him of the need to study sociology and to acquire actual facts.

B. Influence of Ludwig Feuerbach.

1. That same month, March 1843, Marx received in the mail the first two volumes of the Anekdoten zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publizistik, published in Zurich by exiled Left-Wing Hegelians. In one of the volumes was an article by Feuerbach entitled "Preliminary theses on the reform of philosophy." This came as a complete revelation to Marx, who then read The essence of Christianity, which had been published in 1841. It has been said that one can learn more about Communism by reading the latter book, than by reading Das Kapital. In the words of Engels, who antedates the event:

"Then came Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity. With one blow it...placed materialism on the throne again. The spell was broken. The (Hegelian) system was exploded and cast aside.... One must have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much -- in spite of critical reservations -- he was influenced by it one may read in The Holy Family." (Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, N.Y. 1934, p.28).

The Holy Family was originally entitled A Critique of Critical Criticism, and it was directed against Bruno Bauer's family of followers, because they had created out of Spirit and consciousness a transcendent entity, called "Criticism", which had been made incarnate in the members of the group.

2. Feuerbach was the one who gave Marx the materialistic basis for his philosophy. For Feuerbach Hegelianism was nothing but a disguised theology, and the whole system lacked foundation because it was upside down:
 - a. Idea and Spirit are projections of nature, rather than vice versa. It is the individual, historical, material entity which is the basic reality.

- b. Ideas such as God, religion, etc. are projections of man's needs, desires, fears, etc. conceptualized as an alienation of self. For Hegel it had been Nature which was conceived as an alienation (anti-thesis) of Spirit.
 - c. The true god is man, who because of his material needs, has made for himself an alien "God." This doctrine becomes an "humanitarianism" devoid of a transcendent God. The task of this doctrine is to serve "humanity" and dethrone all religions, esp. Christianity.
3. Marx had never thought of this possibility of overthrowing idealism, and Feuerbach's "humanitarianism" appealed to Marx. However, by 1845, Marx had formulated two fundamental objections:
- a. It lacked an "energizing principle", and so was little better than the "old materialism";
 - b. It made man's role in nature one of passive contemplation, rather than "practice", i.e. personal activity in trying to change the world. Marx concludes, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

These criticisms were formulated in a critique of the whole of post-Hegelian philosophy; The German Ideology: A Criticism of Recent German Philosophy as Represented by Feuerbach, Bauer and Stirner, and of German Socialism in the Works of its Various Prophets (in collaboration with Engels).

C. Paris (1843-45) and the Influence of Proudhon

Marx' real doctrine developed during his exile in Paris while he was studying socialism; during these years he likewise began taking an active part in subversive activities of communists and anarchists.

- 1. Hegelianism had become the fad of many Parisian intellectuals, much the same as Teilhard de Chardin has become among us. Marx found himself a welcome guest at intellectual soirees.
- 2. It was the French Socialists, Pierre Proudhon, who gave Marx the first insight into the dialectic at work in society. Proudhon himself had tried to interpret society in terms of the imperfect Hegelianism he picked up. In the course of conversation with Marx, he charged that Hegelian dialectics is useless unless it can be applied to real life. Proudhon then told Marx that if he wanted to see real dialectics, the real conflict of opposites, to look at the classes in society -- the higher (bourgeois) and lower (proletariat) classes. For the first time Marx had what he wanted -- Hegelian dialectics plus material humanity. Marx then studied the French Revolution to prove his case.
- 3. In Paris, too, began the intimate friendship between Marx and Friedrich Engels. In August and Sept. 1844, Engels spent 10 days with Marx discussing previous publications and mutual interests. Of the two, Marx was the greater and clearer thinker, but Engels was able to contribute needed economic facts -- and needed economic support -- for his only friend.

D. London (1849-1883) and the Influence of Darwin

Only one element is needed for the complete picture. This came with the publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species (Nov. 24, 1859).

By this date Marx had already worked out his social and economic doctrines, had published the Communist Manifesto (Nov. 1847) and had taken an active part in revolutionary activities in France, Germany and other parts of the continent. For these activities he was expelled from Paris (1845 and 1849) and from Brussels (1849). However, his system was incomplete. It had no support from science, the intellectual goddess of the 19th century. This supposed support came in Darwin's evolutionary theory:

(Letter to Engels) "During...the past four weeks I have read all sorts of things. Among others Darwin's work on Natural Selection. And though it is written in the crude English style, this is the book which contains the basis in natural science for our view."

(Letter to Lassale) "Darwin's volume is very important and provides me with the basis in natural science for the class struggle in history."

II. Nature of Dialectical Materialism

- A. "Dialectical materialism is the world outlook (Weltanschauung) of the Marxist-Leninist party. It is called dialectical materialism because of its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is dialectical, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is materialistic." (Stalin, Hist. of the C.P.S.U., Moscow 1948, p. 128).
- B. As Hegel before him, Marx could consider his philosophy the culmination of all previous thought. First came the "vulgar" materialism of earlier centuries -- a materialism which was inert, static, mechanical. Then came its antithesis, Idealism of Hegel, with its dynamic dialectical movement inherent in it. Finally comes Marx' synthesis of a new materialism with its inherent dialectical, progressive movement. The doors to a Spirit, a Creator, a First Mover, are finally closed! There remains only the practical task of hastening the inevitable dialectic in society. Marx has his "energizing principle"; all he needs is humanity (the Communist party) to help it along.
- C. The Three Laws of Nature

1. Law of opposites:

Just as Hegel explained BECOMING by claiming that every idea contained within itself its own contradiction, so Marx explains MOTION by claiming that every particle of matter contains within itself opposites. This eliminates the need for a First Mover, God.

"Throughout the universe, development proceeds not as the result of any external cause (God), not because of any purpose inherent in events (final causality), but because of the inherent contradictions

October 29, 1961

In other words, the original inherent contradiction necessarily produces that are contained in all things and in all phenomena. "Contradiction is the root of all motion and of all life," Hegel wrote. "It is only because a thing contains a contradiction within itself that it moves and acquires impulse and activity." (Adoratsky, Dial. Mat., London 1934, pp.26-7) *maine a 1834. A 1834 change.*

3. "All nature from the smallest thing to the biggest, from a grain of sand to the sun, from the protista (primary living cells) to man, is in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and change." (Engels, Dialectics of Nature, quoted in Hist. of the CPSU, p.130). *ibid in nature and history; the seed-grain falls into the soil and*
- "The real connection between matter and motion... is simple enough. Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. Motion in cosmic space, mechanical motion of smaller masses on the various celestial bodies, the motion of molecules as heat or as electrical or magnetic currents, chemical combination or disintegration, organic life -- at each given moment each individual atom of matter in the world is in one or other of these forms of motion, or in several forms of them at once. All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, and only has meaning in relation to one or other definite form of motion.... Matter without motion is just as unthinkable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself." (Engels, Anti-Duhring, N.Y. 1935, p.71) *clarity of evolutionary development is listed under items 13 and 14 in his list of dialectical aspects:*

"Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it." (ibid.)

This is nothing more than to assert that coming-to-be involves being (in act) and non-being (in act) plus the assertion that matter itself is essentially motion, or in motion. Lenin was ecstatic over this *law* (cf. Wetter, p.336). *negation of negation, which is concrete and absolute negativity, while the first is only abstract negativity.*

2. Law of Transformation: 129)

In Hegel's dialectics the thesis (idea) is negated by its contrary, the antithesis. This struggle between the opposites increases up to a certain point, when suddenly this quantitative increase begets a qualitatively new thing, a synthesis. This explains the emergence of qualitatively new realities, such as is required by every evolutionary theory. *ing developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away*

"In the natural sciences we find confirmation of the law discovered by Hegel in his Logic that at a certain point, what have been purely quantitative changes become qualitative." (Marx, Capital, London 1930, p.319). *Marx, p.123*

4. "Under given conditions mechanical motion, i.e. mechanical force, is changed into heat, heat into light, light into chemical affinity, chemical affinity into electricity, electricity into magnetism... It has now been proved... that the transformation of these forces into one another takes place under quite definite quantitative conditions." (Marx, Let. to Engels).

In other words, the original inherent contradictions necessarily produce their proper motion, in which they themselves are constantly changed by the interaction up to a point where the tension is so great that a violent rupture occurs and a third state (synthesis) is produced.

"In spite of all intermediate steps, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change."

(Engels, Anti-During, p.78)

3. Law of the Negation of the Negation

This law is introduced to explain how the synthesis only apparently resembles the original thesis. Engels cites many examples of this triad in nature and history; the seed-grain falls into the soil and passes away, bringing forth the plant (negation) which in turn produces new seed-grains (negation of the negation). Similarly the original state of common ownership (thesis) is negated by private property (anti-thesis), which is again negated under communism (synthesis). The "vulgar" materialism of the Greeks (thesis) is negated by Idealism (anti-thesis), which is again negated by Dialectical materialism (synthesis).

This also explains the apparent similarity between colonies and satellite countries: Colonies oppressed by imperialism are negated by the proletariat (antithesis) in revolution, which is again negated by the Peoples's Democracy subject to Russia.

This peculiarity of evolutionary development is listed under items 13 and 14 in his list of dialectical aspects:

B. Even "Recapitulation of specific traits, features, etc. on the lower level at the higher one, and... apparent reversion to the old every-thing form (negation of the negation)."

This law is likewise taken from Hegel: "for when the contradictions in an argument have been brought to light, the old form is re-created."

C. "Here the first negation (antithesis) must carefully be distinguished from the second, the negation of negation, which is concrete and absolute negativity, while the first is only abstract negativity."

(Hegel, Logic, I, p.128)

All of this is summarized by J. Stalin: "He is understanding of what He is... can understand much of our knowledge of God and the Hereafter."

"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes." (History, p.133)

III. Logic of Dialectical Materialism (Diamat)

A. To grasp the doctrine of Diamat one must argue as follows: God does not and cannot exist (Feuerbach), therefore nature is self-moving. Atheism is not the conclusion of Diamat, but the starting point. We say that

whatever activity is in nature is caused by God. Diamat looks at the same activity and says that it is caused by itself according to the three laws of nature.

1. But the first law is no cause at all; it merely says, when all the obfuscation is cleared away, that motion is. When Diamat asks why does development occur, it answers because of internal opposites (1st law). But these opposites are nothing but the past and future of change itself. Thus there is no question of "causes" or even of "self-movement." In other words, the movement of nature (assumed to be a mode of matter) is itself a process, and no process as such is self-explanatory, but very much needs to be explained. The introduction of "contradictions" "struggles" and "opposites" merely hides the fact that there is no explanation, but mere dogmatic assertion.
2. The 2nd and 3rd laws dealing with synthesis express a naive evolutionary theory based on three erroneous assumptions, which Diamat makes no attempt to prove:
 - a. change is progress; things are getting better and better. Even where some change might be admittedly progressive, Diamat denies any intelligence or final cause as responsible!
 - b. it assumes that the more perfect (synthesis) can be produced by the less, and this within the whole of nature.
 - c. it assumes the fallacy, "post hoc, ergo propter hoc."
- B. Even the Hegelian dialectic taken over in Diamat was not established by Hegel or anyone else as a universal law. It is merely assumed and everything is fitted into this a priori category. Dialectics may be admitted, in part, as a method of reasoning, discussing, or arguing, but it is an extrapolation to say this is universal (as when the antithesis in an argument happens to be wrong) or in nature.
- C. Finally, Feuerbach's rejection of God and Spirit is invalid; therefore, Diamat has not proved the non-existence of the immaterial, but has merely assumed it. Feuerbach argues that the idea of God is anthropomorphic, therefore He does not exist. He fails to distinguish our knowledge of an sit (fact of existence) and quid sit (understanding of what He is). We can admit that much of our knowledge of God and the Hereafter is anthropomorphic; this is inevitable, since all our knowledge is from our senses. But this does not prove that we have no absolute certainty of the fact.

Conclusion

1. Diamat explains absolutely nothing; the maze of terminology, equivocations and pseudo-scientific examples camouflage the fact that no explanation is given for natural processes.
2. The mysticism of Diamat elicits an act of zealous faith in (a) the non-existence of God, (b) matter and motion as the sole self-sufficient reality, and (c) inevitable progress.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

IV

Dialectical Materialism and Modern Science

Introduction

1. In the last lecture we tried to explain briefly the basic Weltanschauung, or world outlook of Communism, known as Dialectical Materialism. It may be well to summarize this as best we can.
 - a. By Materialism we mean the assertion that everything that exists or can exist is material, and that nothing immaterial (God, human soul) can possibly exist. For a materialist there are many forms of matter; these varieties are taken to be various modes of matter. By Dialectical we mean the assertion that all matter spontaneously evolves according to the Hegelian dialectics of thesis, antithesis and resulting synthesis. By implanting the autodynamic dialectic within the very heart of the matter, indeed identifying it with matter, Marx and Engels believed that the last vestige of a Creator external to the world had been obliterated.
 - b. Dialectical Materialism must be seen as violently opposed to two 19th century philosophies:
 - i. Idealism, e.g. Kant and Hegel, not only admits the reality of immaterial entities, e.g. God, Idea, Mind or Soul, but gives them primacy in the order of reality; from this follows the primacy of thought and the unknowability of things in themselves.
 - ii. Vulgar Materialism, e.g. Cartesian mechanism, British empiricism and Newtonian mechanics, admits only material reality in the world, but explains their motions by mechanical agencies; Marx sees this as leaving the door open for a First Mover external to the world.
 - c. By conceiving matter itself as a process, i.e. by identifying matter and dialectical movement forward, Communism closes the door to any First Mover. The dialectical movement, as we have seen, are governed by Hegel's three laws of motion:
 - i. Unity of opposites, which states that all matter is made up of opposites (thesis and antithesis) struggling in opposition; this unity of contradictions is another term for process, or motion.
 - ii. Law of transformation, which states that when this opposition reaches a certain critical point, the entire situation is transformed into a qualitatively new reality.
 - iii. Law of the negation of the negation, which states that the original negative element in the opposition is really negated in the transformation, and the synthesis stage does in fact superficially resemble the original thesis, while in reality it is the beginning of a new dialectical process.
2. This morning we must see how this abstract theory accords with the facts of physical science. To understand the relation between the theory of dialectical materialism and science, we must discuss three points: (i) Marxism and 19th century science, (ii) recent developments in modern science, and (iii) utilization of these developments by Soviet philosophers today.

I. Marxism and 19th century science

A. Preliminary observations

1. Marx always prided himself in being 'scientific'; he insisted that his socialist philosophy was 'scientific', not utopian, and that his philosophy was proved in nature. Like Feuerbach, Marx rejected Hegel's universal Spirit, and concentrated exclusively on universal Nature. Similarly we have already seen how highly Marx regarded Darwin's Origin of Species, because it gave him "the basis in natural science for the class struggle in history." Nevertheless, it was not Marx, but Engels who established a philosophy of Nature on the basis of Dialectical Materialism, mainly in his unfinished sketches and notes which were later published under the title of Dialectics of Nature.
2. The main difficulty in establishing a Communist philosophy of nature was the mechanistic character of 19th century science. Darwin's theory of evolution came to Marx as a scientific blessing.
3. For Marxists, as for all 19th century philosophers, there is a real distinction between philosophy and physical science. However, for them more than for other philosophers, there is an intimate connection between philosophy and science:
 - a. philosophy represents a generalization of results from the individual sciences; dialectical materialism claims to be "the scientific world view," and it claims to find "brilliant corroboration" of its doctrines in the modern natural sciences.
 - b. philosophy, in particular dialectical materialism, is a method of scientific research; consequently it must be used for fruitful discoveries in science.


B. In general Engels saw the verification of dialectical materialism in ordinary crude examples of popular 19th century science, viz. positive and negative electrical or magnetic currents, chemical combination or disintegration, organic development, molecular movement and ordinary transformations, such as water turning to gas. But there were three scientific discoveries of the 19th century which particularly influenced Engels: (i) the discovery of the cell as the unit from whose multiplication and differentiation the plant and animal body develops (Latour and Schwann around 1838), (ii) the discovery of the law of transformation of energy by Sadi Carnot in 1824, and (iii) Darwin's theory of evolution by means of natural selection, which was published on November 24th, 1859. Within 19th century science Marx and Engels saw the confirmation of their three laws of motion.

1. Law of opposites. Here every example of opposites available is used to prove that all matter is made up of tensions, e.g. hot and cold, positive and negative, male and female. Engels famous example is that of the grain of barley, which when planted under favorable circumstances germinates (negation of the seed), grows (synthesis), produces more grains, then dies.
2. Law of transformation. Here ordinary examples of sudden transformation in nature are used to confirm the law, e.g. heat (negation) is applied to water (thesis) up to a certain point, then water is transformed to a gaseous state (synthesis).

Particularly in chemical combination which produce qualitatively new compounds, the law is seen verified. Engels gave the example of the paraffin hydrocarbons: methane is composed of one atom of carbon and four atoms of hydrogen.



But if one more carbon atom and two more hydrogen atoms are added to methane, it becomes ethane.



This is the case for all the paraffin hydrocarbons. Ethane plus one carbon and two hydrogen atoms becomes propane; propane plus another carbon and two hydrogen atoms becomes butane, and from butane can be made pentane. (Anti-Duhring, N.Y. 1935, p. 145)

3. Law of the negation of the negation. In verification of this law the above examples are used to show that the undesirable negative element (antithesis) is itself negated and the resulting synthesis is again positive, e.g. the new barley grains from the negated seed. "As a result of this negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten, twenty or thirty fold." (Engels, op.cit., p. 154) Similarly the newly evolved man looks something like the original thesis (apes), which was negated by the forces of natural selection.

II. Recent developments in modern science

- A. After the death of Engels dialectical materialism became stagnant in its utilization of modern science. In fact, up to 1953 Communist philosophers were violently opposed to the new developments in western science, calling the theory of relativity and quantum theory "bourgeois" and "mechanistic" or "idealist". In his famous work of 1914, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin attacks Mach, Poincare, Duhem and Karl Pearson as "physical idealists" because they see in the discovery of sub-atomic particles a kind of "dematerialization of matter". Contemporary Soviet philosophers still use the expression "physical idealism" against the Copenhagen School of Bohr for minimizing the objectivity of knowledge, and against certain interpretations of relativity.

B. Quantum physics

1. In the classical physics of the 18th and 19th century it was thought the principle of causality (i.e., if C, then E) could be applied universally to all natural phenomena. It was thought that by determining the position and momentum of any given body, the future course of that body could be predicted with absolute certainty. This was easy enough for macrophysical bodies, and this was considered the essence of physical causality.

2. But the situation turns out very differently in the realm of micro-physics, where it is impossible to determine at the same time the exact position and momentum of a micro-particle. An exact determination of position interferes with determination of momentum, there is a measure of 'uncertainty' for both values. Heisenberg found that the product of both uncertainty-values is at least equivalent to the Planck's quantum of action h , which is a constant. Thus in principle the more exactly the position of a particle is measured, the more impossible is it to determine or predict its momentum. This is Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy.
 - a. This uncertainty-relation is due to the duality of wave and particle aspect of sub-atomic activity. That is, sometimes the phenomenon must be measured as though we are dealing with a wave, and sometimes the same phenomenon must be measured as though we are dealing with random particles. Instead of being mutually exclusive or simultaneously true in nature, the wave-particle relationship is described by Niels Bohr as Complementarity, which alone gives the full picture of the phenomenon. The same situation is said to exist for time and energy.
 - b. The epistemological problems created by quantum theory are considerable:
 1. the question of what is "physically real", since mutually exclusive natures cannot be ascribed to "physical reality." The Copenhagen school is inclined to restrict the concept of reality to those properties which can actually be attributed to micro-objects by way of physical description. The other characteristics are considered mental constructs, necessary in the investigation of nature.
 11. the principle of causality is now considered by many as disproved and replaced by the principle of indeterminacy. There are many who hold that the apparent cases of determined causality in the macrophysical world is only an illusion, since the larger phenomena are made up of sub-atomic particles governed by the principle of indeterminacy.

C. Relativity theory

1. In the classical physics of Newton all motions were considered as having an absolute meaning, for they took place in an absolute space and in an absolute time. The measurement of this motion required ordinary Euclidian geometry. But in this view a preferential position of the observer is required, for the measurement of all motions are relative to the position and movement of the observer.
2. In 1905 Einstein presented his "special" theory of relativity which, in effect, eliminates any preferential position of observation, and makes possible the transformation of measurements in one set of coordinates to another set without error. This transformation requires the use of non-Euclidian geometry which combines space-time in such a way that a "fourth dimension" is introduced for the description of the event. In this description the velocity of light is assumed to be constant, 300,000 km/sec., whether the light source is at rest or in motion.

3. Even before Einstein it was known that light-waves and electro-magnetic waves, on encountering a material object, produce a radiation-pressure i.e., the energy somehow manifests itself in the form of "inert mass". On the basis of the special theory of relativity, Einstein was able to generalize this individual case to the "principle of the inertia of energy": all energy possesses an inertial mass corresponding to the formula:

$$E = mc^2 \text{ (where } c \text{ is the constant velocity of light)}$$

This means that mass and energy basically are one and the same, although they have different characteristics. In this way the principle of the conservation of mass is combined with the conservation of energy into a common principle. In other words, this principle states that mass and energy are mathematically equivalent, not actually identical.

- D. It must be remembered that both quantum theory and relativity are formally mathematical theories dealing with physical phenomena. In Western presentations of these and other theories of modern physics, there are two tendencies:

1. There is the correct tendency, mainly among physicists themselves, to emphasize their mathematical character. Sometimes, though not frequently, this mathematical character is exaggerated to a point where it seems to have no relevance to the physical world. Soviet philosophers are wary of this idealist tendency, for it is contrary to their tenet of the intrinsic knowability of all nature.
2. There is a second tendency, mainly among popularizers of modern science, to materialize and over-simplify all the concepts of modern physics, as though there were no mathematical structure to modern theories. There are many concepts of modern physics which have no objective reality, e.g. photons, Psi function, etc. It would be a mistake to make the "fourth dimension", "contraction of measuring rods", "indeterminacy" and the like as real as, let us say, matter itself.

Soviet philosophers fall in this second category.

III. Current use of modern scientific theories by Soviet philosophers

- A. We have already mentioned Marx's antagonism to mechanistic or vulgar materialism, and we have already noted the opposition of Soviet philosophers, like Lenin and his followers, to the developments of bourgeois scientific theories.
- B. Since 1953 there has been a decided change in the attitude of Soviet philosophers toward western theories. Now they see these theories as confirming "in a most marvelous way" the philosophy of dialectical materialism.
 1. In August 1953 the Philosophy Institute, which used to be located in History and Philosophy Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences was transferred to the Section of Economics, Philosophy, and Law. In his 1957 Annual Report, the President of the Academy, A. N. Nesmeyanov, said:

"One of the most important tasks of science in the light of the

decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the further development of the Marx-Lenin theory.... Scientists in all branches of knowledge cannot and should not remain indifferent to the ideological struggle between Communism and Capitalism." (from R. J. Seeger, "On Teaching the Philosophy of Physics," Am.J. of Physics, 28 (1960), 386.)

That same year A. F. Ioffe published his Basic Concepts in Contemporary Physics, in which he wanted "to show that the tenets of dialectical materialism are hereby justified." (pref.)

- C. There are three basic theories of modern physics which have been adapted to the Communist interpretation of nature, viz. relativity, concept of mass, and quantum theory.
1. Relativity. Under the leadership of mathematicians such as A. D. Aleksandrov and V. A. Fok, the content of relativity is now accepted and interpreted as a physical, not merely geometrical theory. For them space and time are objective forms of the existence of matter, and the space-time unity is an example par excellence of the inseparability of matter and motion. It is a unity of opposites.
 2. Concept of mass. In 1953, the former stumbling block, $E = mc^2$, was recognized as a confirmation of the intrinsic inseparability of matter and motion. Soviet philosophers do not interpret this as a mathematical equivalence, but as a strict materialist identification.
 3. Quantum theory. Soviet philosophers still attack the Copenhagen School as idealistic. They insist that the micro-particle not only 'acts' like a wave, but simultaneously has wave properties and particle properties. This, too, they see as a confirmation of their "unity of opposites". However, despite the indeterminacy of the Heisenberg uncertainty relation, they insist on the universal validity of the principle of causality, and they defend philosophic determinism. According to dialectical materialism, necessity and chance do not represent mutually exclusive categories -- rather, the way of necessity is paved by a multitude of coincidences, and ultimately it is inevitable dialectic which directs all particles. (Wetter, "Ideology and Science in the USSR," Daedalus, 89 (1960), 583-86)

Concluding the preface of his new book, A. F. Ioffe says:

"By the whole course of its development, modern physics confirms the philosophical theories of dialectical materialism ... it does not give the slightest reasons for idealistic concepts."

IV. Concluding remarks

1. Despite the fact that Soviet scientists have been forced to interpret modern scientific theories in the light of dialectical materialism, they have not been able to come up with very much. The "unity of opposites", after all, is quite insignificant compared compared to the whole theory of dialectical materialism. Further, despite the attempt to use the Communist theory as a fruitful guide, nothing has been forthcoming. In fact, such a theory can be nothing but an obstacle to the fruitful investigation of nature, since it is descriptive, not explanatory.

November 12, 1961

2. Finally, I would suggest that in our own understanding of modern physical theories, we be careful to respect both the mathematical form (and sometimes content) and the physical world about which those theories are devised.

Not by mathematics alone will man understand, but by every word nature utters. Only a sound Thomistic philosophy of nature can counteract the Communist claim to see their own philosophy confirmed by modern science.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

V

The Communist Philosophy of Man

Introduction

1. There are two fundamental truths knowable by reason which are indispensable for sound philosophy and for human happiness. These are (a) the existence of God, and (b) the spirituality of the human soul. Both of these truths are denied by Dialectical Materialism and by crude Western materialism, but in vastly different ways.
 - a. Western materialism takes a negative attitude toward the existence of God -- from agnosticism and indifference Western materialists insist that there is no proof of a God, and the existence of evil (suffering, disease, etc.) is cited as disproof. Dialectical Materialism, as we have seen in our previous lectures, takes a more positive stand and insists that God cannot exist, since only matter is real, containing within itself all the creative dynamism necessary (the 'dialectic').
 - b. Similarly with regard to the human soul, Western materialism conceives life and consciousness as subtle activities of physical and chemical bodies, i.e. biology and psychology are governed by laws of physics and chemistry. Dialectical Materialism, on the other hand, vehemently insists that life and consciousness are 'qualitatively' different and higher than inanimate matter.
2. In the last analysis there is no real difference between Western and Soviet materialism -- both deny the existence of God and the spirituality of the human soul. But if we are to understand the Communist philosophy, we must see it in contrast with what is called 'crude' or vulgar materialism.
3. This morning we want to consider the Communist philosophy of man, its attitude toward the nature, origin and destiny of man. This is the order we will follow before giving our critique.

I. The Position of Man in Dialectical Materialism

- A. First of all we must say that man occupies the center of Marxian philosophy. It was Ludwig Feuerbach who directed Marx' attention to man -- to the universal 'man', not the individual personality. It was Feuerbach who replaced God by deifying man. Since the concept of God is, for Feuerbach, constructed by man after his own image, the true god is man himself; Homo homini Deus est. Thus religion and theology are replaced with humanitarianism and anthropology. It was the French Socialist, P. J. Proudhon, who directed this humanitarianism to sociology and the concern for social classes. Note again that it is not the individual man which occupies the center, but the universal 'man'.

Here we can see a difference between the humanism of the Renaissance and the 'humanism' of Marxism. In Renaissance humanism, it was the individual spirit which was to be liberated and cultivated by the love of

classical letter, beauty and elegance. In Marxist 'humanism' it is universal humanity which must be liberated.

Second, it is important to realize that in Communist philosophy man is truly higher than the animal; life is 'qualitatively' different from non-life. Crude materialism, according to Lenin, sees no differences in the world of nature. But the Communist dialectic requires that there be real opposites in which the thesis is negated, and the negation itself be negated by qualitative 'leaps' in the dialectics of nature.

1. According to the dialectics, every particle of matter contains an energizing principle for its negation. When the opposition reaches a quantitative maximum, a sudden change occurs and a qualitatively new form of matter emerges. Within this framework Communist philosophers must explain the emergence of animate matter (vegetation) sentient matter (animals) and conscious matter (man). Thus man is the highest form of substantial evolution.
 2. However, the nature of man is such that he is caught in the further evolution of classes, class struggle, and all kinds of super-structures such as religion and the state. -- But this is a later story.
- B. With this as a background we can look more closely at the nature, origin and destiny of man:

1. The Nature of Man.

- a. Strictly speaking Marxism and Soviet philosophy prefers not to consider the nature of man, i.e. the philosophical make-up of human nature. They prefer to concentrate on the complex interrelations affecting man's history. In other words, where Thomism would discuss the nature and characteristics of man (rational psychology) Marxism substitutes dialectical historicism. Historicism forgets that if man had no nature, he would never have a history. However, it is the history, the process, that interests dialectical materialists. Engles notes:

"When we reflect on nature, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual activity, the first picture presented to us is an endless maze of relations and interactions." (Engels, Anti-Duhring, N.Y. 1935, p.37) "The world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes." (Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, N.Y. 1935, p. 54).

- b. However, as good Thomists, we can look at the Communist conception of the nature of man.

- 1) the intellect: We will discuss Communist epistemology in the next lecture. But there are two points we can notice here:
 - a) the human mind, or consciousness, in Marxist philosophy is considered a material function. But here there is a

special difficulty, because Dialectical Materialism wishes to occupy a middle position between two extremes:

- i) all forms of 'idealism', which admit the reality of spirit
- ii) crude materialism, which reduces everything to a machine

Marxists insist that mental consciousness is "a property of the physiological form of motion in matter, or property of the brain" (N.A. Khromov) and at the same time they insist that it is a "non-material" product. Today there is considerable controversy among Soviet philosophers on this distinction between 'mind' and 'brain'.

b) The second point to note about the nature of mind in Communist philosophy is its practical function. Already in his Theses on Feuerbach, Marx had concluded (1845): "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." (Thesis X)

i) in the idealism of Hegel, speculative philosophy and contemplation was the highest manifestation of the Absolute.

ii) but Marx saw that the mind can also react on the world and so change it. Therefore, for Marx, all true thought and knowledge necessarily overflows into action, i.e., man can never merely contemplate an object, because knowledge by its very nature is destined to produce action.

Thus the criterion of truth is success in practice. As Lenin said:

"For a materialist, the "success" of human practice proves the correspondence of our representations to the objective nature of the things we perceive."
(Materialism & Empirio-Criticism, N.Y. 1927, p.111)

This is very important for understanding what the Soviet Union means by truth: whatever is successful in practice is true, no matter how outlandish. Consequently Communist philosophy is essentially a programme of action. In this sense G. F. Alexandrov declares:

"Dialectical Materialism is able to provide a theoretical generalization, not only of past facts but also of the present, and even to foresee the future in a scientific manner."

w It is like the prophet who foretold that the farmer's house would burn down, and after setting fire to it says, "See I told you so."

- 2) the will: In his Theses on Feuerbach Marx criticized the vulgar materialism of his contemporaries and predecessors for its fatalism. The real task of philosophy, as we saw, is not to

contemplate a fatalistic world, but to change it. Nevertheless Marxism denies freedom of the will. There are three steps to notice here:

a) individual men act differently for conscious ends:

"Men make their own history, whatever its outcome may be, in that each person follows his own consciously desired end, and it is precisely the result of these many wills operating in different directions and of their manifold effects upon the outer world that constitutes history."
(Marx, Thesis XI)

b) the net result of these actions is determined by law:

"The conflict of innumerable wills and individual actions in the domain of history produces a state of affairs entirely analogous to that in the realm of unconscious nature. The ends of the actions are intended, but the results which actually follow from these actions are not intended; or when they do seem to correspond to the end intended, they ultimately have consequences quite other than those intended. Historical events thus appear on the whole to be likewise governed by chance. But where on the surface accident holds sway there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws." (Engels, Feuerbach)

c) the ultimate determinate of all society is economic production which is governed by the inexorable dialectic:

"The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure." (Engels)

Marx adds: "It is superfluous to add that men are not free to choose their productive forces -- which are the basis of all their history -- for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of former activity." (Letter to Annenkov)

Thus freedom is nothing more than the recognition of necessity by cooperating with it.

- 3) individuality: From what we have already seen it is clear that the individual as such does not count in the philosophy of Communism. The individual must be sacrificed for the good of Party, the programme, the cause. Thus individual Party members can be called upon for any sacrifice, even their own lives.

Whatever may have been behind Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, the main charge was that of 'cult of personality.'

The chief symptom of this personality cult was that, in flat defiance of the materialist conception of history, it forgot the Marxist axiom concerning the decisive role of the masses in history and imputed the main source of progress to the activity of a 'superhuman' personality.

- 4) personal immortality: is entirely rejected as a religious dogma, an opium of the people. With the denial of God and the spirituality of the human soul, there is no room for personal immortality.

2. The Origin of Man

a. In recent years Soviet scientists have devoted considerable time and energy in discussing the origin of life and the evolution of man. The main elements of this discussion can be found in Wetter's volume, pp. 442-487.

b. Here we wish to point out certain general features of the problem:

- 1) Marx, as you remember, saw in Darwin's theory of natural selection the proof he needed in natural science to confirm his socialist doctrine.
- 2) In Marxist theory the evolution of man from lower forms of life, and the evolution of life from non-life is an established dogma.
- 3) However, the dialectic is an obstacle to discovering the immediate causes of this evolution:
 - a) Remember that all evolution according to Dialectical Materialism takes place by leaps, sudden qualitative changes in nature.
 - b) The existence of an external cause to produce these higher forms is ruled out by denying God's existence.
 - c) The spontaneous introduction of a 'soul' or 'entelechy' is explicitly rejected by all Soviet thinkers, because this introduces an immaterial principle (as in Vitalism), contrary to all materialism.
 - d) Finally, it is opposed to all mechanistic explanations, such as are offered by Western materialists.
- 4) Dialectical Materialism again tries to maintain a middle position between the Animists, Vitalists and Idealists on the one hand, and the crude mechanistic materialists on the other. By insisting, as A. I. Oparin does, on a qualitative leap by 'natural selection' even before the appearance of life, the possibility of discovering immediate causes, in the Western sense of the term, is ruled out.
- 5) In general, Soviet philosophers, including Oparin and his critics, trace the origin of life back to protein molecules.

They rely on a passage in Engels, who wrote in his Dialectics of Nature:

"In the organic world ... all chemical investigations lead back in the last resort to a body -- protein -- which, while being the result of ordinary chemical processes, is distinguished from all others by being a self-acting, permanent chemical process." (p. 339)

6) The origin of man presents less difficulty for the Communist than for the Western philosopher. The Westerner is still trying to find the 'missing link'. For Soviet philosophers, there was a sudden 'leap' and there is no reason why we should have a missing link.

c. In the whole field of biology, as in psychology, the Dialectical Materialist is in an awkward position -- he wants to eat his cake and have it at the same time: he wants the production of higher and higher forms, e.g. life, feeling and consciousness, produced by matter, yet he cannot admit anything other than matter.

3. The Destiny of Man

a. As for man's destiny in Communist philosophy, the individual is doomed to being an insignificant cog in a dialectical machine. The individual is of no importance, except as he contributes to the dialectic. Despite the so-called humanitarianism of Soviet philosophy, the individual is worthless. Only the masses, the proletariat, the Communist Party counts.

b. But for the 'masses', the idealized humanity, a rosy future is promised -- a paradise on earth, peace and happiness for all in a classless society: a perfect sharing of all things in common.

II. Critique

The trouble with the Communist view of man is that it is the biggest insult to man every perpetrated.

A. It divinizes an ideal 'Mankind' and despises the individual:

1. by taking away his individual worth:

a. using individual human beings as means to an end;

b. considering every individual as caught in the inevitable dialectic;

c. considering the enemy (capitalists, bourgeoisie) fools to be outwitted by any means available -- successfully, of course, for in this lies the truth of the trick.

2. by denying the very things which make the individual of infinite worth, viz. his spiritual intellect and his free will.

- B. It gives man a hopelessly idealistic future, bending every mind and will to a dogmatic philosophy, while denying the real nature of man:**
- 1. man has a spiritual, immortal soul, obvious in his power to think.**
 - 2. he has a free will, which is the power to choose means to a known end. It is true that one does not always attain the end, or foresee all the consequences of an action, but this does not disprove the real consciousness of inner freedom.**
 - 3. above all, man is a person with rights and moral obligations to other persons. To deny this is to strip him of all dignity and self-respect.**
- C. Finally, it does not understand human nature as it really is. Fallen human nature tends to be selfish, greedy and self-centered. The ultimate goal of Communism, a perfect sharing of all things in common, is hopelessly unrealistic. It is diabolic to terrorize all men into sacrificing human life for an impossible goal. Everyone wants to better his condition and to work for a better world -- this is Christian and reasonable. But no philosophy has the right to destroy the minds, wills and lives of human beings for lies -- this is Communist idealism and unreasonable dogmatism.**

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

VI

Communist Epistemology

Introduction

1. In our last lecture, we examined the nature of man according to Communist philosophy and we saw that while Communism is materialistic, it insists that the human mind is superior to the mere physical and chemical ingredients of the brain. It does admit Communist philosophy is not too clear on just what this difference is. Broadly speaking, investigations into the relation between thought and reality (in this case, matter) constitute the realm of epistemology.
2. It might come as a surprise to some that Communism should have an epistemology. After all, what interest could a political party have in academic epistemological problems? In actual fact, epistemology as understood and explained in Dialectical Materialism is the corner-stone of Communist philosophy.
 - a. Engles saw epistemology as the most important part of all philosophy: "The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being." (Ludwig Feuerbach, N.Y. 1934, p. 30)
 - b. A well-known Textbook of Marxist Philosophy prepared by the Leningrad Institute of Philosophy under the direction of M. Shirokov not only for students of philosophy, but also for "engineers, doctors, chemists, teachers, in fact ... all who pass through the higher technical schools and institutes" (p. 7) devote the first 130 pages to epistemology:

Chap. I	The conflict between idealism and materialism.
Chap. II	Dialectic as a theory of knowledge.
Chap. III	Moments of knowledge of actuality.
Chap. IV	The doctrine of truth.
 - c. In fact, without an accurate understanding of Communist epistemology, there can be no proper understanding of the entire philosophy of Communism.
3. The word "epistemology" comes from two Greek words, episteme (knowledge) and logos (study, or science), meaning the study, or science of knowledge. Traditionally epistemology, already known to Plato and Aristotle, is that part of philosophy which reflects upon its own investigations to justify itself. In the Thomist view, epistemology belongs to metaphysics, the last part, which reflects on the whole philosophical endeavor, justifying not only metaphysics and the other sciences, but also the possibility of any true scientific knowledge. Since the time of Descartes, epistemology has been made the first part of philosophy.

- a. Fr. Gustav Wetter criticizes communism for placing epistemology after ontology, i.e., after the dialectics of nature. He thinks this begs the question to be proved in epistemology, namely, that there exists an external world independent of the knowing subject. (p. 489)
- b. Actually, in this regard, Communism is closer to Aristotle than are Descartes, Hume, Kant or Hegel, who start with the epistemological problem and never get beyond it. Marx was correct in accepting the physical world as given before raising the epistemological problem.

I. The Epistemological Problem for Marx and Engels

- A. "The great basic question of all philosophy" for Marx, Engels and Lenin, "is that concerning the relation of thinking and being." This is the context of the Marxian epistemological problem, which has two sides:

1. Which is primary, Spirit or Nature, thought or matter?

"The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other (i.e., recognizing the existence of God) ... comprised the camp of Idealism. The others, who regarded Nature as primary, belong to the various schools of Materialism. These two expressions, Idealism and Materialism, primarily signify nothing more than this." (Engles, Ludwig Feuerbach, N.Y. 1934, p. 31)

2. "The question of the relation of thinking and being has yet another side: in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of cognition of the real world? (ibid. p. 335)

Stalin states the answer briefly: "Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature ... is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth." (HCP, Moscow 1948, p.138)

B. Comment on the problem as posed by Marxists:

1. To a Thomist this presentation of the epistemological problem is extremely strange. In the first place, Marxists assume that there are only two philosophical camps, Idealism and Materialism. It assumes that a philosopher must be one or the other. Thomists, of course, are neither, but they would probably be classified as Idealists for recognizing the existence of God. Furthermore, Marxists assume that the choice of philosophical camp depends on accepting either Spirit or Nature, as though one could not recognize the existence of both.

2. The two questions posed by Marxists are considered to be "two sides of the same coin." At first sight these two questions appear unrelated, but if we are to understand Marx we must try to see them as constituting one problem. This can be done only by placing the Marxian epistemological problem against the background of Hegel's philosophy.
 - a. Within Hegelianism one can validly ask, Which is primary Spirit or Nature? An Hegelian would answer that Spirit is primary in the sense that Nature, or matter, is nothing but an inferior reflection or emanation of Spirit. One immediate consequence of this idealism is that we do not know things-in-themselves (Ding-an-sich), but only things as they appear to us (phenomena). In other words, Kantian and Hegelian Idealism are left with the unknowability of things in themselves.
 - b. Marx's formulation of the problem is clearly ambiguous and it is obvious that it is dictated by the answer he wants to get:
 - 1) When Marx asks, Which is primary, Spirit or Nature? he does not mean primary; he means which of the two exists.
 - 2) When he asks, Which is primary, thought or matter? he does indeed mean 'primary', but in the sense of Feuerbach.
 - 3) The second question is called "another side" of the problem only because the negative answer is tied up with the first in the Idealist position.

Assuming the Communist answer to the problem, viz. there is no Spirit and "the world and its laws are absolutely knowable to man" (Lenin) we can try to understand the Communist dialectic of knowledge.

II. The Communist Dialectic of Knowledge

A. The Dialectic as a theory of Knowledge:

1. It is in his theory of knowledge that Marx sees the fullest verification of Hegelian dialectics. First, admitting that mind is not exactly the same thing as matter, and, second, assuming that both matter and thought operate according to the laws of dialectic, Marx sees knowledge as the grand dialectic in synthesis.
 - a. First there is matter, "the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them." (Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-criticism, London 1952, p. 192)

- b. Then, this material reality is negated by our knowledge of the real world. This negation requires that thought be something somewhat different from matter as we know it.
- 1) "That thought and matter are real, that they exist is true. But to call thought matter is an erroneous step ... for once such an inclusion is made, the epistemological distinction between mind and matter.. has no meaning." (Lenin, *ibid.*)
 - 2) However, this distinction is admitted only for the purpose of epistemology and the grand dialectic. Mitin says, "We distinguish matter from mind and oppose them to one another, but this opposition is nonetheless relative and has meaning only in relation to the 'epistemological' problem... The contrast is between knowing matter and known matter, and nothing else."

Marxists insist that our perceptions are correct impressions of things. Sensation and knowledge are an accurate copy of reality. However, the mind does not copy reality in any passive sense. The mind itself operates dialectically, that is, it collects data, analyses the material according to the principles of Marxist philosophy, and determines the best means to attain the end:

"Assuming that everything develops, does this also extend to the most general concepts and categories of thought? If not,...thought has no connection with being. If it is so, then this means that there is a dialectic of concepts....having objective significance." (Lenin)

- c. Finally, knowledge itself must be negated by a return to the real world. It is in this return, when the negation (thought) is itself negated, that Communists locate their sole criterion of truth, i.e. objective truth. Knowledge which does not return to practice is useless and bourgeois.
- 1) In his Philosophical Notebooks Lenin wrote: "From living intuition to abstract thought, and from thence to practice -- that is the dialectical road to knowledge of the truth, to knowledge of objective reality. (p. 89)

Communism is not against abstract thinking. In fact Lenin insisted that even in the most abstract arguments "thought does not get farther away from truth, but comes closer to it." He even went so far as to say that "all scientific abstractions present a deeper, more faithful, more complete reflection of nature." (Phil. Notebooks)

- 2) But in the last analysis it is always practical workability which confirms or refutes theory:

"Practice is the foundation of the entire knowing process, from beginning to end." (Rutkevich, p.125)

- a) By practice is meant bringing about the dialectic in nature. This is what Marx meant when he said the "philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."
- b) This practice is the task not so much of individuals but of humanity. M. N. Rutkevich says:

"Practice includes both experiment and observation but the decisive role in the process is played by labour and the political activity of the masses-production and the class-struggle."

- c) For this reason the real purpose of the Communist epistemology is to show why all Communists must do everything in their power by whatever means available to bring about world Communism. F. I. Georgiev explicitly says:

"The Marxist-Leninist epistemology has no other aim beyond the service of revolutionary practice."

- d) Consequently, if a particular revolutionary movement should fail, this means that there must have been some failure of observation, analysis, timing selection of means or previous experiment. The truth of the dialectics is never questioned, but only an individual failure which must be remedied by other means.

B. The Objective and Absolute Character of Communist Truth

1. Communism has been accused of making all truth subjective and relative. There certainly are grounds for this accusation when examined from our point of view, especially when black is called white, tyranny called democracy, and war called co-existence.
2. However, the nature of truth must be examined from the Communist point of view:
 - a. First, Dialectical Materialism must admit the objective and absolute character of truth. By objective truth is meant:

"the content of human thought, as tested in practice, this is in conformity with objects, and is thus independent of the subject, man and humanity in general."
(Lenin and Rutkevich)

- b. This objective truth can be looked at in two ways: as the sum total of all human knowledge, or as the conformity of some human knowledge with practice.

- 1) If 'absolute' and 'objective' truth is taken to mean the sum total of all human knowledge, then man does not have absolute truth:

"Man is unable to grasp -- reflect -- copy -- Nature as a whole, a complete thing, in its 'immediate totality', he can only approach eternally closer to it, by creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific world-picture, and so on." (Lenin, Phil. Notebooks, p. 121)

In this sense Lenin said "Truth is a process" when commenting on Hegel's remark that the Idea itself is an historical process.

In this context, relative truth would be knowledge of some part of the whole. Thus it is said that "Absolute truth stands to relative as whole to part." Only in this sense do Communist philosophers say that all human knowledge is relative and subjective.

- 2) If, on the other hand, 'absolute' and 'objective' truth is taken to mean "an absolutely exact agreement of thought with its object, i.e. a content of our knowledge such that neither now nor in the future, in consequence of the further development of knowledge can it ever be proved false" (Rutkevich), then mankind knows many absolute truths, e.g. $2/2 = 4$.

Rutkevich provides further examples of 'absolute truths':

"All the fundamental theses and an enormous number of lesser tenets of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, economic science, and the theory of socialism and the class-struggle are absolutely true. That matter is primary and consciousness derivative, that the collapse of capitalism is inevitable, that 'the socialist system will follow capitalism as inevitably as day follows night' (Stalin), that the socialist economic system offers unlimited scope for the development of productive forces, etc. -- these are all absolute truths, so far confirmed by practice that nothing in the future can ever refute them." (Practice as the Foundation of Knowledge and Criterion of Truth, Moscow 1952, p. 183)

- c. Communists are convinced of the absolute truth of their system because they claim to see it working in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. The only disproof of the

system allowed by the theory of Communist epistemology is actual failure, which is unthinkable to a party member who sees 1/3 of the world population already accepting the philosophy of Communism, and 1/3 ripe for it. The remaining 1/3 is expected to collapse -- with a little help (practice).

C. Comment on Communist epistemology

1. Marx's fundamental error consists in denying the speculative intellect. From this follows his rejection of contemplation, and his reduction of all truth to workability (pragmatism).
 - a. Thomists would not deny that the criterion of some truths lies in workability of practice. These are truths which are known through art and prudence, both of which are practical virtues of the intellect.
 - b. But there are other truths, first principles of human reason, scientific truths, wisdom, which are known for their own sake, for this truth is an end in itself.
 - c. Karl Marx seems to have been the first philosopher in history to deny mankind contemplation. Not by bread alone will man survive, but by knowledge of the truth. "The truth will make you free." For Aristotle, St. Thomas and the Christian tradition, human happiness consists essentially and primarily in contemplation, in contemplation of speculative truths. Aristotle and traditional philosophers would consider the truth, $2 \times 2 = 4$, a speculative truth, since one cannot do anything about it. But Marx by eliminating distinctions by eliminating the distinction between speculation and action, contemplation and practice, is driven to confuse and confound sound thinking.
2. Marx's error is very similar to the so-called phantom heresy known as 'Americanism' condemned by Leo XIII on 22 Jan. 1899. This underestimated heresy exalted the active virtues over contemplation and prayer. Whether or not anyone ever taught this heresy, it is a real danger for American Catholics. The American temperament seems more inclined to action than to contemplation. Where such a danger exists, special effort must be made to seek prayer and contemplation. This does not mean we should cease our activity, but rather that we must balance it with the primacy of contemplation. There are two parts to St. Augustine's famous statement: "We should work as though everything depends on us -- and we should pray as though everything depends on God."

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

VII

Historical MaterialismIntroduction

1. In our last lecture we discussed the epistemology of Communism, and we saw that for Dialectical Materialism all knowledge and all truth must be productive of changes in the material world. This epistemology we have called the "theoretical corner-stone" of Communist philosophy. There is, however another element of Communist philosophy which is just as important. This is called the doctrine of Historical Materialism, or the economic interpretation of history; it is also called Economic Determinism.
2. Marx's doctrine of Historical materialism is so important that Engles considered it "destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology." (Preface to English ed. of Communist Manifesto of 1888) In fact, Marx believed that his discovery of economic determinism made a true "science" out of sociological and historical facts.
3. There are three major elements which make up Historical Materialism as understood by Marx: (i) historicism, (ii) economic interpretation, (iii) dialectical determinism. Each of these must be understood to appreciate the importance of the expression "Historical Materialism".

I. Preliminary notes:

1. First of all, Historical Materialism is really the application of Dialectical Materialism to the highest form of nature, viz. human society. We have already seen the meaning of Marx's dialectical process (thesis, antithesis and synthesis). For Marx, as for Hegel before him, the dialectic is the universal law governing all reality, animate and inanimate. Not only is nature governed by the dialectic, but also our knowledge and "practice" are governed by the inexorable law of dialectical progress. The culmination of all dialectics, however, is to be found in human society itself. Society is the highest stage of evolution. The science of society was called history by Marx. Today this science would be called sociology, a term coined later by Auguste Comte. In other words, everything that we have said to date about the philosophy of Communism is nothing more than a preparation for Marx's sociology.
2. The importance of Marx's Historical Materialism is that, among other things, it is an existentialist philosophy. Marx, indeed, can be called the first existentialist of modern times, and this fact is recognized by the leading contemporary Existentialist, Jean Paul Sartre. Although not a slavish follower of Communist philosophy, Sartre hails Marxism as the unsurpassable philosophy which best totalizes the demands of knowledge and reality, thought and work. For him historical materialism is the sole valid way of viewing man as he really is.

To understand Marxism we must appreciate its existential character.

When Marx arrived in Paris in 1843, he was still the philosopher engaged in philosophical "criticism". (cf. Lecture III) He thought that it was ideas which influenced mankind. It was, as we have said, Pierre Proudhon the French Socialist, who turned Marx's eyes to the concrete human being caught in the economic mesh. For the first time Marx saw the existential man scrapping for bread and butter. At that moment he had the three elements of his historical materialism: (i) the concrete, existential man in history, (ii) the basic economic driving force, (iii) the dialectic to interpret society.

With this background in mind we can discuss these three elements in detail.

II. History and Historicism

1. There is a big difference between history and historicism. The latter term, "Historismus", came into existence only in the 20th century, largely through the efforts of Friedrich Meinecke, e.g. his Die Entstehung des Historismus, 2 vols. (Munich 1936). But the philosophy signified by the word is typified by the 19th and early 20th century philosophers of history, whose roots are to be found in Hegel himself.
 - a. History, as historians understand the term, is the study of past events, their causes and effects. The Christian historian, as St. Augustine, Otto of Freising and others, sought his ultimate understanding of historical events in the providence of God. The separation of history from God's providence began in Italy with the works of Machiavelli and Guicciardini; it reached its fullest development in the historical and philosophical works of the 18th century. Men like Voltaire, Hume, Gibbon, Vico and Condorcet had no use for the "Providence with which God governs human affairs." Consequently the 18th century interpretation of history was completely secularistic; history was considered an imminent, autonomous process of human forces, actions and instincts, according to time and place. In Hegel's famous Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1836), the secularist philosophical tradition culminates in the self-realization of the historical consciousness of the Idea.
 - b. Historicism, although largely dependent on Hegel, is a reaction to all forms of rationalism, be it that of St. Augustine, Voltaire or Hegel. Historicism is rightly called "a by-product of the romantic revolt against enlightenment and rationalism." (H. Meyerhoff, Phil. of History in our Time, 1959, p.9) It replaces philosophical ideas such as "human nature", "substance", etc. with existential processes. In other words, there are at least three characteristics of historicism:
 - i. The existent reality is not a thing, but a process, a history. As Ortega y Gasset puts it, "Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has . . . is history."
 - ii. From this it follows that "the nature of anything is entirely comprehended in its development," i.e. in its history (Phenomenalism)
 - iii. This is based on evolutionism, i.e. the assumption that the historical process is a continuous development and improvement.

It is clear that in the historicism of Hegel, Croce, Dilthey, Ortega y Gasset and Collingwood, philosophy is history and history is a philosophy.

2. For Karl Marx history is philosophy, as much as it was for Hegel. Similarly for both men, history is an evolutionary process which can be described by the laws of dialectics. But unlike Hegel, Marx found the evolutionary process in the existential society of mankind driven by economic needs. It was in these economic needs that Marx found the key to interpret history.

"If historical science is to be a real science, it can no longer reduce the history of social development to the actions of kinds and generals, to the actions of 'conquerors' and 'subjugators' of states, but must above all devote itself to the history of the producers of material values, the history of the labouring masses, the history of peoples." (Stalin, History of the Com. Party, 1948, p. 148-9)

"Hence the prime task of historical science is to study and disclose the laws of production, the laws of development of the productive forces and the relations of production, the laws of economic development of society." (Stalin, ibid. p. 149)

III. Economic interpretation of history

1. By the economic interpretation of history, Communist philosophy means to exclude every other factor as primary. That is, the basic drive in history for Marx is not God, religion, ideas, pursuit of freedom or happiness.

The driving force of history is "the method of procuring the means of life necessary for human existence, the mode of production of material values - food, clothing, footwear, houses, fuel, instruments of production, etc. - which are indispensable for the life and development of society." (Stalin, op.cit., p. 146)

Notice that the Communist interpretation of history does not recognize religion, education, contemplation, art or any of the professions as "indispensable for the life and development of society." This will be important when we come to consider Marx's notion of labor in our next lecture, dealing with Marx's economic theory.

2. Having reduced all history to production of indispensables for the life and development of society, Marx sees three elements involved in every production:
 - a. the laborer in society;
 - b. the "productive forces" meaning the raw materials and the instruments of production.
 - c. the "relations of production" meaning the ownership of the means of production and the product.

For Marx every development in the means of production entails a co-relative alteration in the "relations of production", ie. in the economic relation between two classes of society, the oppressor and the oppressed.

3. Thus for Marx the entire history of mankind consists of two classes created by the "relations of production". These two classes, under various names (master and slave, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, bourgeois and proletarian) constitute the thesis and antithesis of the social dialectic.

For this reason Marx and Engels write in the Communist Manifesto: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."

4. Marxists recognize only five main types of "Relations of Production" in the history of mankind:

- a. primitive communal -- This was the stone age wherein the means of production as well as the fruits of production belonged to the community. On the hypothesis that there was no private property at this period, there could be no classes, and therefore no exploitation.
- b. ancient society -- As the means of production developed into metal tools, pasturage and tillage of the land, there developed a new relation of production, viz. private ownership not only of the means of production, but also of the worker. This is called the "slave system" wherein the master exploited the worker to the fullest.
- c. medieval society -- When the means of production developed into more complex techniques of smelting, agriculture, dairying, etc., there arose a new relationship, viz. that of feudal lord to the serf and of guildmaster to the journeyman. Here in "Feudal society" the lord owned the means of production, but not the serf's life, for although the lord can still buy and sell the serf, he could not kill him.
- d. capitalist society -- With the development of huge mills, machinery equipped factories, and agricultural machinery, there arises the capitalist who owns the means of production, but not the workers. Here Marx waxes eloquent on the evils of 19th century England: the exploitation of the workers, The inner contradictions of this society are apparent:

"By producing larger and larger quantities of commodities, and reducing their prices, capitalism intensifies competition, ruins the mass of small and medium private owners, converts them into proletarians and reduces their purchasing power, with the result that it becomes impossible to dispose of the commodities produced. On the other hand, by expanding production and concentrating millions of workers in huge mills and factories, capitalism lends the process of production a social character and thus undermines its own foundations, inasmuch as the social character of the process of production demands the social ownership of the means of production."

- e. socialist society -- Once the proletariat workers have overthrown the capitalist class and private ownership of property, there will no longer be class tensions between the exploiters and the exploited. "The basis of the relations of production under the Socialist system, which so far has been established only in the U.S.S.R. is the social ownership of the means of production. Here there are no longer exploiters and exploited. The goods produced are distributed according to labour performed, on the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." (Stalin, History of C.P., Moscow 1948, p. 155).

IV. Dialectical determinism in society

1. Upon this naive picture of history, Marx imposed dialectics as an inevitable driving force, i.e., each stage of history inevitably grows out of the preceding one. Thus, the man who was once a slave is freed and becomes a feudal lord oppressing the serf; the serf on obtaining his freedom becomes a bourgeois merchant and gradually a capitalist oppressing the proletariat. Once the proletarian masses free themselves through revolt, they will be socialists who will have no one to oppress!
2. Every society, therefore, is seen to be made up of classes (thesis and antithesis) in a struggle to the death. When the thesis has been sufficiently negated by the tensions, there is a revolution from which a synthesis (a negation of the antithesis) arises to become itself a thesis for further development. Between 1905 and 1912 Communists who thought that all changes in society were a gradual dissolution of the old systems were called Mensheviks, who were soon eliminated; while Communists like Lenin, Plekhanov, Trotsky and Stalin, insisted that all social changes occur through revolutions, and were called Bolsheviks.
3. Underlying the whole fabric of historical materialism is its inevitability. It insists that the inexorable dialectic is toward international Communism. This unshakable conviction is like a religious faith, a driving force, giving the party member prophetic illusions of success. "The collapse of capitalism is inevitable." "We will bury you." "Your grand-children will live under Communism." These are real Communist convictions. However, instead of sitting back and waiting for the inevitable to happen, Communists are committed to hastening the event by every means available legal and illegal.

V. Historical Materialism and the West

1. Three obvious comments:
 - a. It is obvious, I am sure, that the Communist view of history is extremely naive, over-simplified, and a prioristic.
 - b. Nevertheless, as McFadden correctly observes, "The philosophy of history which Marx formulated is a violent protest against the view that a Supreme Being guides the destinies of men." (Op.cit., p.83)
 - c. It is also obvious that the social evils of mid-19th century England (and the continent) were appalling. These conditions were depicted more movingly by Charles Dickens than by Marx himself. If the English government had not taken drastic measures to improve the condition of the working class, no doubt the revolution Marx had expected would have come to pass. Catholic organizations in Germany and the Encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII did much to bring about social reform. This should show us the importance of social reforms in preventing the spread of Communism.
2. Two not so obvious comments.

Previous lectures have pointed out (i) the dangerous superiority of certain Communist doctrines to western materialist philosophy, and (ii) the deplorable similarities of other doctrines between Communism and western materialism. In the doctrine of Historical Materialism there are also two similarities which must be remedied:

January 28, 1962

- a. **Historicism.** The attempt of western philosophers of history to substitute historicism for philosophy is a serious error. We must remember that if man did not have a nature, he could never have a history. To think that anything is explained by giving its history is erroneous, although history is an important aid to discovering philosophical truths.

Pope Pius XII condemned historicism in the following words:

"The term 'historicism' describes a philosophical system; that which sees only change and evolution in every spiritual reality, in the knowledge of what is true, in religion, morality and law, and rejects in consequence, everything that is permanent, eternally, of value and absolute. Such a system is assuredly not reconcilable with the Catholic conception of the world or, in general, with any religion that recognizes a personal God." (Address on the Church and History, Sept. 7) 1955

- b. Economic interpretation of history. While an economic sufficiency is necessary for life, too many western business men and even professional men evaluate the whole of human life in terms of economics. How many business men talk about nothing but business? How many schools are turning into business schools, to the detriment of true learning? How many families determine success solely in terms of luxuries and income? How many individuals prize values and standards beyond economic welfare? Money and comfort, we must remember, are only means, and not even indispensable means, toward a life of true happiness, virtue and learning.

The Communists have a theoretical interpretation of history geared to economics; western materialists, being less theoretical, live by an economic standard of value, which is far more dangerous. It is of great importance for western survival that society and individuals discover the true values of life, viz, God, religion, virtue and wisdom.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

VIII

Economic Theory

Introduction

1. In our last lecture we saw that for Marx the only true interpretation of human society is historical materialism. After his discussions with Pierre Proudhon Marx realized that it was not ideas which ruled human society but the existential, historical situation of man is ruled by the economic means of survival. For Sartre, Marx was realistic in turning from philosophical ideas to the existential situation of man. But Marx sought to find the key to that existential situation in economics. In our last lecture we granted that Marx was an Existentialist, but we doubted that he was being sufficiently realistic in concentrating entirely on economic values. After all, the philosophy of Marx is not itself an economics and a product of mid-19th century situations.
2. This morning we must turn briefly to an examination of Marx's economic theory of values. We will examine three points before giving our reflections on them: (i) the 19th century background, (ii) Marx's analysis of capitalism, (iii) Marx's economic solution.

I. The 19th century background

1. The first half of the 19th century climaxed the business boom of the industrial revolution, which began in England around the middle of the 18th century. But even this industrial revolution in power engines and the invention of large machines to take the place of hand labor, was the outcome of two centuries of commercial growth. The growth in trade increased the market; the development of machines increased the means of production; this brought more laborers to the cities, thus freeing the land for industrial use and exploitation.
 - a. in order to promote such growth there must be money capital to invest in raw materials, machinery and laborers.
 - b. control of this growth was not custom, as it had been for centuries, nor was it authoritative laws, as it had been in the guilds. Now the only controlling force was the market. This "market economy", impersonal and often unpredictable, spurred men on in the hope of economic gain.
 - c. in this hope for greater gain the laborer became a commodity, often a surplus commodity to be had cheaply.
2. This capitalistic system also had its philosophy -- economic liberalism. This philosophy, also known as rugged individualism or the policy of laissez-faire in government, has its roots in the liberal tradition of John Locke and the French Revolution. However, its chief philosopher was Adam Smith, author of Wealth of Nations, and professor at the university of Glasgow. From Smith developed the so-called English school of "classical economics" whose most famous representatives were

Jeremy Bentham, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus and John Stuart Mill. These exponents of economic liberalism claimed that the "market" was governed by laws as natural and fixed as those in physics, and that these laws should be left to take their natural course. According to them, the acquisition of wealth in society can best be realized under a system of free competition without government intervention; this is called the governmental policy of laissez-faire. The duty of government, it was claimed, was to maintain this system of economic freedom and to protect the liberty and property of its citizens.

This doctrine was followed almost to the letter by the English government between 1800 and 1860. The deplorable social conditions which resulted can be read in Das Kapital and in the novels of Charles Dickens.

There were various reactions to the inhumanity of this socialism:

- a. various types of socialism, which were later dubbed by Marx as "utopian". Such men as Robert Owen of England, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Louis Blanc, and Proudhon of France appealed to men's ideals and a sense of morality to alleviate the lot of the workers.
- b. various catholic movements, particularly in Germany, were directed to the formation of workers' unions for the protection of the laboring class. These movements, which insisted on the ideals of justice and responsibility, culminated in the great social encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII.
- c. finally there was the so-called "scientific socialism" of Karl Marx which insisted that the inevitable dialectic within human society would lead to the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of absolute communism.

II. Marx's analysis of capitalism

In our last lecture we saw that the ultimate foundation of Marx's philosophy of society was his economic interpretation of history, i.e. taking man, his existential, historical setting, Marx claimed that the basic driving force of all history is bread and butter (a given mode of production and the consequent type of ownership). This driving force not only develops according to the inevitable laws of dialectical materialism, but it also excludes every other possible driving force, such as philosophy, religion, morality and God.

Let us assume for sake of argument that economics is the basic driving force of human life, and let us consider what Marx meant by the capitalist system:

A. Origin of capitalist society:

1. For Marx capitalist society arose from the break-up of feudal society toward the end of the 15th century and the first decade of the 16th, i.e. between 1465 and 1510, when supposedly serfs obtained their freedom and began to build up capital through trade. These bourgeois merchants gradually acquired considerable masses of capital (to purchase raw material and means of production), while an ever increasing number of works became available. With the discovery of new lands, colonization became another form of exploitation; companies such as the British East India Company obtained exclusive trade monopolies. Then came the system of public credit and the national debt.

2. In all of this the root evil, according to Marx, is the private ownership of property by capitalists and the exploitation of the worker. Let us consider the foundation for this charge.

B. Theory of value:

1. The first question Marx considers in Das Kapital is, How do we measure the value of a commodity, for "the wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities."
2. In answer Marx took the famous labor theory of value taught by the classical economists, Adam Smith and David Ricardo, viz. that labor is the source of all economic value.

According to Marx's analysis, every commodity has a two-fold value:

- a. a use-value, i.e. the utility of the commodity for human needs, e.g. durability of iron, combustibility of coal, warmth of clothing, etc.
- b. an exchange-value, i.e. the equivalence to other commodities on the market, e.g. so much coal can be exchanged for so much food. According to Marx, "the exchange values of commodities must be capable of being expressed in terms of something common to them all, of which they represent a greater or less quantity."

This "something common" according to Marx can be nothing other than the human labor embodied in them. But there are many different kinds of labor, e.g. highly skilled worker, the unskilled worker, the technician, the farmer, etc. For Marx we must abstract from all these differences and talk about human labor in the abstract. He says, we must abstract from "the useful character of the various kinds of labor embodied in them and the concrete forms of that labor; there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labor, human labor in the abstract."

Consequently every individual unit of labor is equal to every other insofar as it has "the character of the average labor power of society," i.e., "so far as it requires for producing a commodity no more time than is needed on an average, no more than is socially necessary." Thus, if it takes twice as long to produce a Cadillac than it does to produce a Chevrolet, then all other conditions being equal, the Cadillac is worth twice as much.

C. Theory of surplus-value: This is the key point of capitalism.

1. In pre-capitalist periods according to Marx all selling was for the sake of buying, i.e. C-M-C, commodity exchanged for money in order to buy other commodities. But Marx sees capitalism as a means for making more money. Thus money capital is exchanged for commodities in order to make more money, i.e. M-C-M.
2. But where does this additional money come from? Capitalism must find a way of getting more money out of the commodity than he put into it. If the value of the commodity is no more than the sum of money

that went into it -- raw materials, tools, machinery, up-keep, and labor (all of which are reduced to labor time) -- then the capitalist gains nothing.

- a. But, according to Marx, there is one commodity in the process of production that is "a source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself"; it not only is value, but it also creates value. That commodity is labor. Labor, then, is the source of capitalist profit.
- b. How does the capitalist profit from the laborer? Simply by forcing the worker to create exchange-value beyond the use-value of his own wages. In other words, simply by exploiting the worker.
 1. Marx's analysis of this exploitation is complex, mainly because the worker in his day got paid by the day. Suppose a worker is getting a wage to support himself and his family for one day, the value of the commodity is no more than the sum total of raw material, machines, up-keep and the wages. But if the laborer produces the commodity in half a day (or if he produces more than one a day), then the fruits of his labor belong to the capitalist who then pockets the unpaid for labor.
 11. To put the matter simply, in Marxist theory the total value of all commodities is the sum total of all the labor that go into it, e.g. raw material, industrial plant, up-keep and total wages. To charge more than this is exploitation of the worker. The assumption here is that the employer is not entitled to a living wage, unless he is also an employee. Only a worker as such is entitled to the exchange value of his product.

D. Marx's concept of labor

1. The real root of Marx's extraordinary analysis of capitalism is his univocal concept of human labor.
 - a. Not only does Marx reduce the various types of labor, skilled and unskilled, to one common denominator of "work in the abstract", but he recognizes only one type of labor -- manual labor.
 - b. No where does Marx recognize any other kind of labor. For example, the ingenuity and ability of an employer are not considered labor by Marx; nor do such exhausting tasks as study, teaching, writing governing, and the like ever counted as labor by Marx.

It is extraordinary that a man who never did a day's "labor" in his own life should so glorify manual labor.

2. Marx waxes eloquent when he speaks of human labor. For him the very nature of man is to work: homo faber. In his craft man alienates something of himself in his product, for he has created something according to his own being. This materialization of human labor in a commodity is a product and expression of his essence. Therefore, this property rightfully belongs to him. Unless man repossess what he has produced, he will have alienated his real substance, and cease to be a man.

3. The root evil of capitalism, then, is the theft of man's labor; the employer claims as his private property the fruits of social labor. For this reason Communism insists on the abolition of private property - bourgeois private property (cf. Communist Manifesto, II)
4. In other words, according to Marx, capitalism has broken the sacred bond between labor and the fruits of labor - the bond which, for the Communist, is more sacred than the marriage contract. The breach of this bond is made possible according to Marx, because of bourgeois private property, i.e. property which belongs to an individual and not to society.

III. Marx's economic solution

- A. The first step is the abolition of "bourgeois private property" by giving to society, i.e. to the collective workers, ownership of the land and means of production. This is the collective ownership of the means of production.
- B. Since man by his nature is homo faber, all have "an equal obligation to work." In the Communist Manifesto Marx conceives the establishment of "industrial armies" formed on a free, cooperative, democratic basis in such a way that men will freely and willingly move to and fro, now with this job, now with that job, according as the demands of production require
- C. The fruits of labor will be distributed according to labor performed, on the principle, "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." (Stalin, Hist. of Com. Party, p.155) This is in order to eliminate the remnants of capitalistic greed until the ideal state of Communism is reached. In the ideal state part of the social product will go for further production, part will be deducted for the needs of the community, and the rest will be distributed for mass consumption and will become private property.

In the perfect stage of Communism, when all inequalities and divisions of labor will be eliminated, when "labor has ceased to be merely the means of sustaining life, but has become an urgent desire," then Marx's famous standard will be put into effect: "each according to his abilities, to each one according to his need."

- IV. Comment. This morning I wish to make only three comments on the Marxist theory of economics. The details of an adequate critique must be left to professional economists, who have already pointed out the many weaknesses of the Marxist theory. My own comments will be restricted to three reflections.

- A. The Marxist theory is not only erroneous, but even if it were correct, it is hopelessly out of date.
 1. It is erroneous because its assumptions are erroneous. (i) Marx assumes along with the classical economists, that labor alone determines the exchange value of a commodity, while in actual fact a complexity of factors are determinants of exchange value, and labor is not even the chief factor. (ii) Marx erroneously thinks that there is no greater value to skilled labor. Skilled labor even costs more to hire, and it is unrealistic to reduce all labor to an abstract common denominator. (iii) Marx is likewise erroneous in thinking that the employer should not get a living wage. Not only is this thesis fallacious, but it is unjust.

2. Even if Marx's theory were not full of loop-holes, it is not applicable to modern day society. In his masterpiece, Image of America (new York: Viking 1959), Father R. L. Bruckberger, O.P., shows conclusively that the economic theory of Henry Charles Carey and the economic practice of Henry Ford have created an entirely new economic society, vastly different from that of 19th century Europe. In his letter to Americans he insists that this new economic society should not be called 'capitalistic':

"I hold it very much against you that you insist upon using the word "capitalism" to define your economic and industrial structure. You who are the greatest travelers in the world should ask yourselves what people outside America think of the word capitalism. To them, capitalism stands for imperialism, for the exploitation of the poor by the rich, for colonialism. It is a dishonored word and one that breeds terror. You may well pay a visit to the moon, but you will never rehabilitate the word capitalism in the eyes of the world." (op.cit., p. 266-7)

We Catholics have no obligation to defend 19th century capitalism. In fact, we cannot do so in justice.

- B. My biggest objection to Marx's theory of economics is his concept of labor. For him there is only one kind of labor -- manual labor. Marx spoke of the "degrading distinction between intellectual and manual labor", and denied the existence of intellectual labor. This is unforgivable romanticism. Even the Soviet Union must recognize the need for government officials, scientists, teachers and professional men.
- C. The real solution to social evils does not lie in the enslavement of all men to production; it does not lie in the creation of the homo faber. It lies, rather, in social justice for all men. There are still many social injustices, even in the Catholic Church itself and in the U.S.A., to say nothing of South America and other countries of the world. But there are legitimate ways of correcting these injustices without throwing the baby out with the bath.
 1. The social encyclicals of the popes from Leo XIII to John XXIII point the way to social justice. This social justice is not just "a nice thing" it is a serious obligation in conscience. And every Catholic ought to be fully cognizant of the Church's teaching on social principles.
 2. It is painful to note the indifference of Americans, both clerical and lay, to the encyclical Mater et Magistra. Time magazine for Feb. 9, 1962, noted that in a recent survey of Catholic diocesan papers more than 70% of the 53 papers left unanswered a question on what they were doing to place Mater et Magistra in their parochial school curricula, and in 85 % of the dioceses there were apparently no plans by bishops, priests or diocesan groups for promotion of the encyclical.

The pope, who expressed an "earnest wish" that Roman Catholic bishops give "more and more attention" to spreading this social doctrine, has already given his own best answer to ecclesiastical indifference. "Should these teachings remain only a pronouncement without effect, he warned recently, "strength would be given to the arguments of those who hold that the church is incapable of facilitating the solution of the most difficult problems of temporal life.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

IX

View of the StateIntroduction

- 1 In the last two lectures, we examined Marx's historical view of human society. And we noted two points: (1) that human society, the center of Marx's concern, is simply an evolutionary process which develops according to the inevitable dialectics of thesis, antithesis and the resulting synthesis; and (2) for Marx the key to this historical process is economics, the struggle to survive. As Marx sees it, the root evil in this struggle to survive is private ownership of property and the means of production. This immediately sets up a division between the haves and the have-nots, between owners and owned, between exploiters and exploited, and in the last stage of development, between bourgeois capitalists and the proletarian laborers. This is the final stage of tension between thesis and antithesis which is destined for the revolutionary break which will usher in the synthesis.
- 2 For Marx, these two classes are the only reality making up society. Everything else is accessory and artificially created. Among the more important of these artificial creations for Marx are the state and religion. These he calls "super-structures".
- 3 This morning we will consider the first of these "super-structures", the state: (1) we will consider Marx's view of the state; (2) we will try to see this view in the context of 19th century thought; (3) we will examine the fundamental flaw in Marx's view.

I Marx's View of the State1 Preliminary notes:

- a First of all, it is important to understand what we mean by the State. Marx draws a sharp distinction between society on the one hand and State on the other. For him, society is necessary and permanent, although in a continual process of dialectical evolution; the State, on the other hand, is an unnecessary fabrication, necessarily at odds with society.
- b Simply speaking, the State for Marxists is the government. But instead of seeing some form of government as a necessary part of any society, he sees government as an enemy of society, an alien super-structure.
- c When Marx and Marxists speak of the State, it is not any particular state they have in mind, but every type of state, whether it be a monarchy, a republic, an oligarchy or a supposed democracy. In other words, every type of government is seen by Marxists to be an enemy of the people, an enemy of society.

2 The Origin of the State

- a We have already seen that in Marxist philosophy, private property is the cause of classes and the exploitation of one class by the other. When this

exploitation reaches a dangerous level, it becomes necessary for the ruling or exploiting class to call into being an organ of power whose purpose it will be to maintain what is euphemistically called "law and order", i.e., laws which will maintain the exploiting class in its position of power and which will forcibly maintain the exploited class in a position of subservience.

As Engels expresses it, "The State ... did not exist from all eternity. There have been societies without it, that had no idea of any State or public power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was of necessity accompanied by a division of society into classes, the State became the inevitable result of this division." (Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Chicago 1902, p.211)

- b The State then, according to Communist philosophy, is a creation by the exploiters in order to protect their own interests. Lenin expresses this bluntly when he says:

"The State is an organ of class domination, an organ of oppression of one class by another; its aim is the creation of 'order' which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the collisions between the classes." (Lenin, The State and Revolution, N.Y. 1935, p. 9)

Engels is no less blunt when he says, "In reality the State is nothing more than a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy." (Intro. to Marx's Civil War in France, N.Y. 1933, p. 19)

3 Characteristics of the State

In the Communist view of the State, every government has four characteristics which show that every government is an evil, an enemy of the people.

- a It is the product of an exploiting class. Lenin briefly sums up this characteristic in a single sentence: "According to Marx, the State is an organ of class domination." (op.cit., p.14)
- b It is an organized force of coercion. Thus an essential part of every government is its army and navy, its police force, its courts and prisons. All of these instruments of power according to Marxists are directed against the masses, taking away their freedom.
- c The third characteristic of government is taxation. Every State asserts it has the right to levy taxes, and even oppressive taxes, upon an already exploited people. For Marxists, every tax is oppressive because it is a form of exploitation.
- d Finally, in every government its ranking officials invariably hold a privileged place in society, i.e., government officials claim to be better than the masses, while in fact they live off the sweat of laborers.

4 What this comes down to is that every government is an enemy of the people, and it must be overthrown by any means possible, particularly by revolution. The Communist, therefore, is against the government, no matter what its capitalist form. He is against the police, against taxation and against every representative of authority.

5 One might ask what do the Communists want, if not some kind of government? The answer is simply that they want no government at all. They want anarchy in the strict sense of the term (an-arche: without a first, or ruler), i.e., a complete absence of any ruler.

But what would the Communist say when it is pointed out that the Soviet Union at present has not only government officials, but also a secret police, prisons and a military force? They would say three things:

- 1 a strong military force is necessary, because the Soviet Union is surrounded by capitalist nations which would like to destroy her;
- 2 within the Soviet Union the government, police and prisons are only a temporary measure to eliminate the remnants of bourgeois thinking and acting. This is known as "the dictatorship of the proletariat", which in the well-known words of Marx "will wither away" at the proper time;
- 3 even the present government of the Soviet Union and her satellites belongs to the people. It is a people's democracy. It is no longer an organ of the exploiting class, but it belongs to the workers. At the appropriate time, this proletarian government will wither away, and there will be no government - just a happy society in which there is no rule: anarchy.

II The Place of Anarchy in 19th Century Thought. For us it is perhaps difficult to imagine why anyone would want complete anarchy in place of government. Actually all the elements of Marx's view are supplied by modern western philosophy. To understand Marx a little better, let us consider briefly two extreme views of 19th century political philosophy.

1 Absolutism. The first view actually goes back to the Protestant Reformation and there are two important forms of this forming the background for Marx:

a Divine Right of Kings, or the view that the king's authority comes directly and absolutely from God, and the people have no authority whatever to elect their ruler or to criticize him. This was claimed by James I of England and ardently defended by the political philosopher, Sir Robert Filmer in his Patriarcha: or the Natural Power of Kings (London 1680).

- 1 This view is completely contrary to the teaching of all Catholic philosophers, e.g., Bellarmine, Vitoria, De Soto, etc.
- 2 It was attacked violently by John Locke (1632-1704) following Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), for reasons far from Catholic. For Hobbes and Locke the Body Politic is an artificial and non-natural association of men to protect their interests. The commonwealth is thus an "artificial animal".

- b German State and Hegel, for whom the State is the highest expression of the Absolute Idea, are the immediate background for Marx's anarchistic philosophy.
- 2 Individualism. Since the Reformation, there have always been individualistic philosophers for whom the individual is the supreme good, e.g., Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) for whom free individualism is the perfect state of man; Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) for whom nothing exists except the Absolute Ego, the infinite and boundless Self; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche who glorified individualism and liberalism. Add to this the rugged individualism of economics and the dominant liberalism of the 19th century, and the immediate background for Marx's anarchism becomes obvious.
- 3 But Marx was not simply an individualist. An individualist is willing to let others fend for themselves. Marx imposed an individualism on the "masses", the people, society. In other words, Marx personified society, people, and created a philosophy of individualism for it.
- a An individualist is one who sees every form of authority as an exploitation, an infringement on freedom.
- b But more important for Marx, the authority of the State was conceived as the gravest infringement on human liberty and the gravest exploitation:

"The modern State, no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine. ... The more it proceeds to the taking over of productive forces, the more does it actually become the national Capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit."
(Engels, Socialism, N.Y. 1935, p.67)

But why should Marx react so strongly to the State? Why should he resent all governing authority?

III The Fundamental Rub in the Marxist View of the State

- 1 I think the real reason Marx resented the State is that the State represents authority. Whether this authority is derived from the people, or constituted by popular vote, elected representatives, hereditary nobility, or by royal succession made no difference for Marx. Every State claims to have authority and coercive power to enforce that authority - and this is what Marx could not stand. He could not stand to be told to do anything by anyone. For this reason, Marxists insist on the absolute equality of men and women, parents and children. Marx could not stand to see anyone superior to anyone else. For this reason Marxists insist on an absolute egalitarianism of all workers.
- 2 But I think there is a deeper reason for this - in England and in Germany, the State claimed to represent the authority of God. This brings us back to the fundamental principle of Marxism, and the starting point of its philosophy - God cannot exist. Thus Marx's basic revolt is that of Lucifer, "I will not serve".

a We Catholics would admit that a legitimately constituted government has true authority, and all authority is from God. "Let everyone be subject to the higher authorities, for there exists no authority except from God, and those who exist have been appointed by God. Therefore he who resists the authority resists the ordinance of God; and they that resist bring on themselves condemnation." (Rom.13:1-2) And Christ Himself commanded us to "render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's." (Math.22:21)

b Thus, when Marx revolts against any government, it is really God he wishes to eliminate. It is the same reason that motivates Marxists against the Church - it represents authority from God.

In other words, a Marxist is essentially an anarchist, because ultimately all authority is from God.

3 And what does Marx propose as the ideal? The complete absence of all authority.

a But this is an impossibility. Nature itself gives authority to parents over their children, and by nature the husband has a certain authority over his wife. The very inequality of persons gives a certain eminence and authority of one over the other.

b Not only is the absence of all authority impossible in society, but the very philosophy of Communism imposes the worst kind of tyranny possible.

1 by imposing Communist "freedom" on all men because it is "good for them", man is deprived of his most fundamental freedom - the freedom to obey God and legitimate authority.

2 by not allowing man to serve God, Communism forces man to serve a Party and to adore self - a gloomy prospect, but one which Western philosophy itself has made.

4 Pope Leo XIII has explained beautifully in his encyclical "On Human Liberty" (Libertas Humana, June 20, 1888) - an encyclical every Catholic intellectual ought to read carefully - that there can be no liberty without law, and there can be no law without God. Leo XIII was writing against the individualistic liberalism, which still dominates much of our Western thinking, a liberalism which rejects all objective morality and sets the individual up to do as he pleases.

But the monolithic individualism of Communism is more like the chains of a hellish uniformity, far more shackling than the chains any worker of the 19th century ever wore, for it is the disappearance of the individual in the infinite abyss of the "masses" sentenced to manual labor for life.

One would like to say to all Communists, "Unite against your tyranny. You have nothing to lose but your chains."

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM
X

Philosophy of Religion

Introduction

1. "At the village church in Kalinovka, Russia, attendance at Sunday school picked up after the priest started handing out candy to the peasant children. One of the most faithful was apug-nosed, pugnacious lad who recited his scriptures with proper piety, pocketed his reward, then fled into the fields to munch on it. The priest took a liking to the boy, persuaded him to attend church school. This was preferable to doing household chores from which his devout parents excused him. By offering other inducements, the priest managed to teach the boy the four gospels. In fact, he won a special prize for learning all four by heart and reciting them non-stop in church. Now 60 years later, he still likes to recite scriptures but in a context that would horrify the old priest. For the prize pupil, who memorized so much of the Bible, is Nikita Krushchev, the Communist czar." (Anecdote of the Week, M.J. Feb. 18, 1962).
 2. In 1890, a Georgian boy of 11 entered the Gori Theological school, from which he graduated 4 years later, to enter the Tiflis Theological Seminary. But for some uncertain reason he was expelled from the seminary in 1899 shortly before graduation. In the words of a classmate who admitted that the youth was one of the best pupils in the theological school says that "In 1899 he left the seminary, taking with him a vicious, ferocious enmity against the school administration, against the bourgeoisie, against everything that existed in the country and embodied Tsarism; hatred against all authority." (Iremashvili, quoted in Trotsky's Stalin (London 1947), p.23). This boy, as you probably have suspected, is the late Josef Stalin.
 3. From the fact that a number of prominent and rabid Communists are apostates from Christianity, some might conclude that Communism is nothing but a reaction to Christianity. Or even worse, from the Catholic Church's opposition to Communism, one might simply think that Communism opposes the Church of Rome. This would be an over-simplification, missing Marx's carefully worked out philosophy of religion.
 4. To understand the Communist philosophy of religion more fully we must consider: (i) the 19th century background, (ii) Marx's philosophy of religion and (iii) the current struggle.
- I. The 19th century background
- A. The Christian Tradition
1. In the medieval synthesis, particularly of St. Thomas, a real distinction was recognized between the realms of faith and reason. Faith, being a free gift of God, was the intellectual and voluntary acceptance of divine revelation. In the schools of theology, this divine revelation found in Sacred Scripture was respectfully examined by theologians to grasp more fully and precisely the truths of salvation. This is called Scholastic Theology, the discursive and scientific investigation of divine revelation. Natural reason, on the other hand, had its own realm of investigation,

viz. all those truths which can be studied and understood by the human mind. This is called philosophy. The only region closed to philosophy is the region of religious faith. But there could be no contradiction between faith and reason, for God is the author of both.

2. The Reformers of the 16th century, particularly Luther and Calvin, disrupted the medieval synthesis (i) by denying the validity of corrupted human reason in philosophy, and (ii) by denying the propriety of theological investigations even within the realm of faith. In other words, the Reformers rejected the legitimacy of reason and substituted fideism.
3. When this faith itself was rejected by leaders of the Enlightenment (18th cent.) there was nothing left but scepticism in the realm of reason or extreme rationalism, which saw reason as the sole arbiter of truth.

B. Philosophies of Religion

1. Among rationalists who wished to retain Christianity there was a need to justify such doctrines as the Kingdom of God, the Fall and Redemption by pure reason. Such a rationalist was Immanuel Kant. In his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), Kant admitted no distinctive supernatural revelation but equated Christianity with the religion of pure practical reason. For him religion was an aspect of morality, a way of regarding our moral duties as if they were divine commands.
2. Hegel was the first to make the "philosophy of religion" an integral part of an all-embracing philosophy. (See Lecture II, Oct. 15) The doctrine of Absolute Spirit, which Hegel makes the climax of his system, is divided into three parts:
 - a. Art, giving rise to aesthetics, in which the Idea is self-conscious of beauty;
 - b. Religion, giving rise to the philosophy of religion, in which the Idea has evolved to a self-consciousness of feeling;
 - c. Philosophy, giving rise to the philosophy of history, in which the Idea is fully conscious of itself as Idea, i.e. as speculative.

For Hegel it was the task of the philosopher to explain religion along two lines: phenomenologically, or in function of human experience, wherein his main clue is found in "the death of God," and ontologically, or in reference to the systematic stages of the Absolute Idea.

Briefly, for Hegel the God of religion must finally give way in the 19th century before the absolute of Hegelian philosophy. The death of God is a speculative Good Friday -- a crisis affecting the metaphysical foundations of philosophical and religious theism -- and the resurrection which it heralds is the new life of Hegel's own speculative system. It is a passage from the personal God of religion to total absorption into the divine absolute.

3. Post-Hegelians like Bruno Bauer and David Strauss attempted to hasten the "death of God" by their critique of the Synoptic Gospels and the God of Christianity. Shortly after, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) will

March 11, 1962

announce triumphantly, "God is dead," and "We have killed him." Consequently there is no meaning whatever to existence.

4. The most famous 19th century philosopher of religion was Ludwig Feuerbach, whom we discussed in our second lecture (Oct. 15, 1961).

Briefly, Feuerbach examined the doctrines of Christianity Psychologically and saw them to be essentially equivalent to pagan mythology. For him every concept of religion, including that of God, turns out to be a projection and alienation of man's desires, fears and hopes. Seeing himself as finite, imperfect, temporal, weak and sinful, man projects his wishes to be infinite, perfect, eternal, almighty and holy by constructing a God alien to human nature." In his Essence of Christianity Feuerbach says:

"Our relation to religion is therefore not a merely negative, but a critical one; we only separate the true from the false."

Namely that the reality of man in society is first, the notion of God is derivative. Thus "Love to man must be no derivative love; it must be original."

II. Marx's Philosophy of Religion

- A. Marx, as we remember, at first became an enthusiastic supporter of Feuerbach, declaring that atheistic materialism had at long last been established and Idealism destroyed. But soon Marx rejected Feuerbach's analysis of religion as insufficient. Why?

1. Marx had no quarrel with Feuerbach's psychological approach to the question, nor with his comparative studies of Christianity and pagan mythology.
2. The simple objection was that it was not sufficiently existential; it was not rooted in history. By this date Marx had already found his economic key to history. Consequently the true origin of religion, its nature and purpose, must be sought in history, in that great dialectic of society driven on by economic forces.

B. Origin of religion

1. If religious concepts, like God, are mental alienations created by man (as Feuerbach concluded), then one must discover why man created such illusions in the first place.
 - a. Some religious beliefs existed in the earliest primitive society where man was not oppressed by exploiters. Therefore fear of natural forces like wind, rain, lightning and fire, must have been the origin of religion among such peoples.
 1. In an attempt to control the forces of nature, man offered prayers and sacrifices to the gods invented by him.
 - ii. The desire to have one omnipotent God, according to Engels, gave rise to monotheism.

111. Ignorance of the nature of man (e.g. dreams when asleep) gave rise to the idea of soul; and ignorance of what to do with this soul after death of the body gave rise to the notion of immortality.

"Not religious desire for consolation, but the quandary arising from the common universal ignorance of what to do with this soul (once its existence had been accepted) after the death of the body -- led in a general way to the tedious notion of personal immortality" (Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, N.Y. 1934, pp 30-31).

- b. The second stage of religion was created by the economic development of private property.

1. The exploited class created a religion of consolations in order to "escape" from the economic exploitation which had become so much a part of their life. As the historical dialectic proceeds through the various stages of society, ancient, feudal and capitalistic, religion becomes more complex.

11. Simultaneously the exploiting class devises intolerable commandments, threats and consolations to further exploitation of the ignorant masses.

Lenin summarizes the economic source of religion when he says: "The roots of modern religion are deeply imbedded in the social oppression of the working masses, and in their apparently complete helplessness before the blind forces of capitalism." (Religion, N.Y. 1935, p. 14)

C. Nature and Purpose of Religion

For Marx, Engels and Lenin the purpose of religion is twofold:

1. For the oppressed masses, religion serves as an opiate and consolation of future bliss:
 - a. "Religion is a kind of spiritual intoxicant, in which the slaves of capitalism drown their humanity and their desires for a decent human existence." (Lenin, Religion, N.Y. 1935, p.7)
 - b. "Religion teaches those who toil in poverty all their lives to be resigned and patient in this world, and consoles them with the hope of reward in heaven." (Lenin, ibid., p.7)
2. For the rich oppressors, religion serves to sanction oppression and reassure the wealthy:
 - a. "Ministers of religion, priests and parsons were paid to teach that the world of the exploiters, of the oppressors -- of the land-lords and the capitalists -- is a just world, a world in accordance with the laws of God." (Yaroslavsky)
 - b. "As for those who live upon the labor of others, religion teaches them to be charitable in earthly life, thus providing a cheap justification for their whole exploiting existence and selling them at a reasonable price tickets to heavenly bliss." (Lenin, Religion)

March 11, 1962

3. Thus the fundamental objection to religion, the illusion created by man is that it is an escape; it is passive; it is a sanction of the status quo. In the famous words of Marx, "It is the opium of the people."
 - a. Like the state, religion of every kind is a superstructure produced historically first by fear of natural forces and then by the exploiting class as an instrument of suppression.
 - b. Just as the state represents an authority which must be eliminated for the sake of man's freedom, so too every religion must be eliminated since it pretends to speak with supra-natural authority.

D. Future of Religion

1. One might have expected a fallen away Jew and Christian to be rabid on the question of religion. In fact, however, Marx takes the question of religion in stride and is less vehement about it than he is about capitalism and the state. It would seem that once Marx satisfied himself about the philosophy of religion, he was quite satisfied that it was a superstructure of little importance.

Lenin himself writes: "The religious question must not be pushed into the foreground where it does not belong. We must not allow the forces waging a genuinely revolutionary economic and political struggle to be broken up for the sake of opinions and dreams that are of third-rate importance, which are rapidly losing all political significance, and which are being steadily relegated to the rubbish heap by the normal course of economic development." (Religion, p.10)

2. In the Communist view, once classes are eliminated, religion itself will pass out of human life. Religion will just cease to have any reason for existing.
3. In the transitional "dictatorship of the proletariat" religion is permitted to a certain extent as "an opium" until all oppressions and fears are eliminated.
4. At the present time Communist revolutionaries must do everything in their power to eliminate the social roots of religion.

III. The Current Struggle

- A. Despite Soviet propaganda the Soviet Union is doing everything in its power to stamp out religion in Russia:
 1. Between 1917-1939 and 1953-54 the Soviet Union waged direct and violent attack against all religions. During the war years the attack on religion was sacrificed for a united front against Germany.
 2. Before April 1947 the section on religious activity came directly under the secret police of the NKVD. In 1947 this section was reorganized as section O under the Ministry of State Security and Major General Karpov was appointed its director.

March 11, 1962

- a. Today the attack on religion is not direct. The Soviet Union, as others have found out, knows that direct attack serves only to strengthen religion. Instead the USSR has succeeded in gaining direct control of all theological schools, seminaries, priests and churches, which are directed by the Council on Orthodox Affairs. The chairman of this Council on Orthodox Affairs is the same General Karlov who heads section O in the Council of ministers.
 - b. It is known that some security officers entered the seminary and were ordained and are now functioning as priests while remaining on the payroll of the Communist police. (See testimony of Petr S. Deriabin to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary investigating Communist controls on religious activity, May 5, 1959)
 - c. This policy is continued by Krushchev, whose attack on religion is primarily through scientific education and philosophical propaganda.
- B. The Communist policy in East Germany is similar to that in the satellite countries which were one time Catholic. Briefly, old people are allowed to attend the churches for its propaganda value and to prevent popular resistance, while the youth are indoctrinated with Communist doctrine.

IV. Comment

A. Observation:

1. The Marxist philosophy of religion is thoroughly erroneous. It assumes that all religion is man-made. But even assuming that it is man-made, comparative religion shows that man is naturally a religious animal. In the ideal Communist society something will have to fill this need -- and it will have to be something more than the love of a tractor!
 2. Marx's analysis includes all religions, even Buddhism and Mohammedanism. However, its principal target was Protestant Christianity in Germany and England, which everywhere in the 19th century was on the decline. The target of Lenin's writings was mainly Russian Orthodoxy, which likewise was ineffective and sterile.
 3. The Roman Catholic Church, however, is another matter, which Marx never grasped. The Catholic Church claims to be truly and per se supernatural in its origin, nature and goal. "The gates of hell shall not prevail against her."
- B. Question: There is still the startling question of how it was and is possible for Communism to flourish in Christian, and even Catholic, countries?
1. For Communists this confirms their contention that the Church is ineffective, intransigent and incapable of correcting abuses. Communists point to the wealth of the churches and to the privileged position of priests, etc. who live off the wages of the working man, while preaching for more money here and a happiness hereafter.
 2. The first answer would probably be that social injustices are not the fault of Christianity, but of individual Christians. Then, so much the worse for those Christians -- they are a scandal, a stumbling block.

March 11, 1962

3. It is precisely for this reason that Pope John XXIII expressed the "earnest wish" that Roman Catholic bishops, priests and the laity give "more and more attention" to the Catholic teaching in Mater et Magistra. The Holy Father explicitly stated: "Should these teachings remain only a pronouncement without effect, strength would be given to the arguments of those who hold that the Church is incapable of facilitating the solution of the most difficult problems of temporal life."

Therefore it is imperative that Catholics take the teachings of Christ to heart and by their lives eradicate the possibility of Communism.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

XI

The Concept of Morality

Introduction

1. The subject of our discussion this morning is the Communist conception of morality. To many this will seem an unnecessary subject of discussion. There seems to be ample evidence of the amoral and unethical character of Communist tactics.
 - a. Western observers recall well the many duplicities, broken promises, violated treaties and deceitful tactics of the Soviet Union. To recall but a few:
 1. We recall that in 1932 the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, a pact which was renewed in Oct. 1939, six weeks after the fate of these countries had been decided in a nonaggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany. On June 16, 1940, Latvia was invaded by the Red army and the territories of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were annexed to the Soviet Union.
 11. We recall that this same nonaggression treaty with Germany on Aug. 23, 1939, came as a shock to all the world. It was concluded at a time when negotiations were still proceeding between the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and France for a united front against Hitler's Germany.
 111. We recall even better the brazen disregard of the three year moratorium on nuclear testing last September. Without warning and contrary to the standing agreement Soviet scientists conducted a series of 31 tests between Sept. 1 and Nov. 4, 1961, and they even detonated a 50-megaton bomb in the atmosphere despite all protests. Nevertheless when the U.S. was forced to resume underground testing, the Soviet Union protested this crime against humanity.
 - b. These acts of duplicity are, in fact, in perfect accord with Lenin's own attitude during the October Revolution of 1917. The most forthright statement of Lenin's position in the period immediately following the October Revolution was made by Latsis, a member of the ruling collegium of the Cheka (Secret Police):

"Murder, lies, and treachery are immoral and shameful if they are harmful to the cause of the proletarian revolution; these same lies, treachery, and murder are moral and laudable if they serve this revolution." (quoted in V. Ferm, Encyclopedia of Morals, N.Y. 1956, p. 572)
1. On the other hand every philosophy of human actions in society must have some attitude toward morality. Further, the Soviet Union itself enacts laws for its people, especially regarding marriage and collectivization, and it expects people to observe them under heavy penalties. Therefore there must be some concept of morality in the philosophy of Communism.

3. Because of the peculiar character of Communist moral philosophy, we will have to discuss (i) the attitude of Marx and Engels toward morality, (ii) later adaptations, and (iii) the fundamental principle of Soviet morality.

I. The Attitude of Marx and Engels toward Morality

- A. In general the Marxist attitude toward morality is correctly expressed by Lenin. In his work on religion Lenin writes:

"Is there such a thing as Communist ethics? Is there such a thing as Communist morality? Of course there is. It is frequently asserted that we have no ethics, and very frequently the bourgeoisie make the charge that we Communists deny all morality. That is one of their methods of confusing the issue, of throwing dust into the eyes of the workers and peasants.... In what sense do we deny ethics, morals? In the sense in which they are preached by the bourgeoisie, which deduces these morals from god's commandments. ... We deny all morality taken from superhuman or non-class conceptions." (Religion, N.Y. 1935, pp.47-48)

In other words, Marxists make a distinction between bourgeois morality, which they reject, and proletarian or Communist morality, which they accept.

B. Moral Philosophy in Germany before Marx

For a clearer picture of original Marxism, we must recall the position of Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel.

1. Kant (1724-1804) started by trying to establish the possibility of metaphysics and ended by showing the impossibility of proving it. Pure reason for Kant was unable to demonstrate the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, or the existence of the natural law. Nevertheless Kant was unwilling to reject these ideas completely. Therefore what pure reason could not prove, practical reason had to accept as given. In other words, even though pure reason could not establish the foundations of morality, practical reason had to accept the dictates of morality. These dictates were inner categorical imperatives commanding man to do one thing, and forbidding man to do another. Morality, therefore, rested on the blind, subjective dictates of conscience, the inner law compelling blind obedience.

Kant's philosophy of duty was developed by Fichte and Schopenhauer, while later it was transformed into supreme individualism and voluntarism by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) with his Wille zur Macht and his "morality of self-glorification."

2. Hegel (1770-1831) could not be satisfied with the personalism of Kantian ethics. He therefore transformed the personal categorical imperative into the objective manifestation of universal Spirit. For Hegel morality consisted in obedience to the laws of the State. In other words, morality had nothing to do with natural law or religion, but was determined exclusively by the positive law of the State. For this reason Hegel expressly denied that the dialectical

movement of world history has anything to do with morality. The movement of history, as we have seen, is an evolutionary manifestation of the Spirit obeying only the laws of dialectics. This dialectic, obviously, is not legislated by the State.

C. Morality for Marx and Engels

1. Within this context Marx's view of morality is logical. If morality is enacted by the State, and the State itself is nothing but a superstructure created by the exploiting class, then both government and morality must give way to the classless society. For Marx all Christian moral laws are the products of superstition, and practically all state laws are the product of the current mode of economic production. They represent "bourgeois morality", for which Marx had nothing but contempt.

a. In Anti-Duhring Engels writes:

"We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and forever immutable moral law on the pretext that the moral world too has its permanent principles which transcend history and the differences between nations." (N.Y., 1935, p.109)

- b. The rejection of all morality depending on God, heaven, final retribution, etc. is an obvious conclusion in Marxist philosophy. But the rejection of natural morality is not so easy. Engels does it by pointing to the conflicting views of morality in the past and in the present. He sees "three great groups of moral theories which are in force simultaneously and alongside of each other":

1. Christian feudal morality, which is hopelessly divided
- ii. modern Bourgeois morality
- iii. the proletarian morality of the future

For Engels, Christian morality is superstitious, modern Bourgeois morality is a means of exploitation, and even the present proletarian morality has certain undesirable elements. But Engels was convinced that the only true morality is the proletarian morality of the future (Anti-Duhring, pp.107-8)

2. Just what this future proletarian morality is supposed to be was left vague by both Marx and Engels. The most that could be said was that it would be in favor of the masses, the workers. The one explicit point made by Engels was that there would be no room for the "commercial" attitude toward the marriage contract. Under Communism the family as a social unit would "wither away", and give place to free love and the upbringing of children would be in the hands of social agencies. In fact, between 1917 and 1936 the Soviet government provided for postcard divorces, legalized abortion, encouraged free-love, and undermined the unity of the family.

II. Later Adaptations

- A. The failure of Marx and Engels to provide a proletarian ethics for Communism was universally felt. In 1892 Werner Sombart wrote:

"Marxism is distinguished from all other socialist systems by its anti-ethical tendency. In all of Marxism from beginning to end, there is not a grain of ethics, and consequently no more of an ethical judgment than an ethical postulate." (Braun's Archiv, 5 1892), 489)

Even Lenin quoted this statement with emphatic approval in his younger days. About the same time the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, then sympathetic to Marxism, dismissed the moral question as one "of no great importance, and even somewhat inopportune, since neither Marx nor Engels were philosophers of ethics, nor bestowed much of their vigorous ability on these questions." Croce went on to say, "In truth, even if some may be able to write on the theory of knowledge according to Marx, to write on the principles of ethics according to Marx seems to me a somewhat hopeless undertaking." (Historical Materialism, N.Y. 1914, pp.113-17)

- B. But not all Marxists were happy about this absence of an ethics. The Russian intellectuals of the 19th century in particular were interested in the question of morality, and various efforts were made to incorporate an ethical theory into the philosophy of Communism. In the early 1890's there were already four different groups attempting to write a Communist philosophy of ethics:

1. One group, made up of P.B. Struve (1870-1944), S. N. Bulgakov (1871-1944) and N. A. Berdyaev (1874-1948), turned to Kant for an ethical theory to supplement historical materialism. These Kantians centered their attention on the problem of moral freedom and responsibility, and the origin and status of moral obligations.
2. A second group - including A. V. Lunacharski (1874-1933), A. A. Bogdanov (1873-1928), S. A. Volski (1880-1936?) and V. A. Bazarov (1874-1931?) - turned to Nietzsche for an ethical theory. These Nietzscheans sharply rejected the categories of duty and obligation (Volski even called them "bourgeois"), and they stressed the free creation of values, the "artistic" shaping of ideals and aesthetic self-expression. Maxim Gorky was closely associated with this group.
3. A third group developed largely outside Russia under the leadership of Karl Kautsky (the intellectual heir of Engels) and John Dewey. These European and American Socialists were opposed to violent revolutionary means and urged social reforms through constitutional and parliamentary procedures. Kautsky in particular was bitterly attacked by the fourth group.

4. The fourth group, known as the Bolsheviks, always had supporters from the earliest days of the Left-Wing Hegelians. Bakunin's notorious Revolutionist's Catechism (1869) insisted that the "good" revolutionary end justifies beforehand any means whatever, however "immoral" such means may appear from the viewpoint of a conventional or traditional ethics. To this group belonged Lenin, Trotsky, Radek and Bukharin. Trotsky's "theoretical justification" in 1920 of the use of terrorism, violence and fraud by a revolutionary proletariat was, in fact, a reply to Kautsky. Trotsky insisted that terrorism, violence and fraud are the only possible means of assuring the success of any revolution. He expressed nothing but scorn for what he called the "Kantian-clerical, vegetarian-Quaker chatter about the sanctity of human life." He asserted that wherever necessary, individuals are, and should be, treated merely as means.

With the success of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, Kantian and Nietzschean Marxists were declared deviationists. Many of the former Kantians like Berdyaev, Bulgakov and Struve left Marxism and returned to the Orthodox Church. The Nietzscheans, however, either became Leninists or were eliminated. In 1931 Deborin himself was accused, among other things, of "holding erroneous Kautskyan views in ethics," and no one ventured to raise a voice in defense of a Kautskyan, or indeed any other non-Leninist ethical position. With the promulgation of the Constitution of 1936, Stalin permanently established as a temporary measure Soviet laws and the socialist government. Addressing the 18th Party Congress in 1939, Stalin declared that the state and its laws would have to be preserved at maximum strength even after the achievement of full Communism, so as non-Communist states continued to exist.

- C. The anomalous position today is that proletarian morality is now dictated by law. A morality which was once illegal and anti-law is now subject to law, and indeed the laws of a legalized state.

III. The Fundamental Principle of Soviet Morality

- A. Despite this legalization of specific moral actions, the fundamental principle of Soviet morality is, in fact, identical with Lenin's view of revolutionary morality - anything and everything is "morally justified" if it is to the advantage of Communism. Whereas once this advantage was localized in the "masses", the "workers", the proletariat, now it is localized in a political party which has only one aim in view, viz. universal Communism.
- B. Soviet Morality is based on two principles:
 1. There is no such thing as "good" or "bad" actions in themselves. Those who recognize a natural moral law must admit that certain actions, e.g. murder, adultery, lying, etc., are always and everywhere evil in themselves, whether the state passes a law against these actions or not. The Communists, recognizing no such "natural law", absolutely deny the intrinsic morality of certain actions. In other words, nothing is "immoral" or "bad" in itself.
 2. Every action, of whatever nature, is justified by the revolutionary end. This follows immediately from the first principle. In modern Communist

ethics every means, no matter how atrocious, is justified if it succeeds. It is pure pragmatism, but a pragmatism which always works to the advantage of the Communist.

- a. This pragmatic principle has its foundation in Communist epistemology, viz. truth is whatever works, whatever succeeds in practice.
- b. The one thing which will inevitably succeed, according to Communist doctrine, is Communism itself. This conviction is founded on the certainty of the historical dialectic, which necessarily leads to the classless society.
- C. Just what kind of morality will obtain in the classless society is a point about which Soviet philosophers are understandably silent. Presumably in the ideal, classless society where the state, laws and religion have "withered away", nothing is "immoral". In the ideal society, where everyone works happily together, there would be no law, except perhaps an occasional failure, to make an act "immoral".

Conclusion

- 1. The really crucial point is the reality of natural law which makes certain actions morally evil and unjustifiable in every circumstance. It is tragic to notice how many people in the so-called free countries deny the natural moral law:
 - a. Protestantism has always denied the ability of the human mind to know the moral law. For Luther, Calvin and the rest, the human mind has been so corrupted by original sin that pure reason cannot discover the natural moral law, the existence of God, or the immortality of the soul.
 - b. Western philosophers since Immanuel Kant have fallen into this same trap. And when a Western philosopher rejects the Christian faith, as many have done after Kant, he has nothing to give him certainty about the most important truths of human life. There is nothing left but Western Pragmatism.
 - c. Finally, there is the ordinary pragmatism of the ordinary citizen: morality is whatever he can get away with in business, in society, and in private life. Of course, this pragmatism has been made respectable by John Dewey, Sidney Hook and the host of American philosophers and legalists.
- 2. In a practical way this shows how right is Pope John XXIII when he said in Mater et Magistra: "The guiding principles of morality and virtue can be based only on God; apart from Him, they necessarily collapse." (n.208)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM

XII

The Church's Answer to Communism

Introduction

- 1 In the course of eleven lectures, we have examined the philosophical doctrine of modern Communism in all of its basic aspects. The total picture of atheistic Communism, with its degradation of human nature, goals and freedom, its denial of Redemption and eternal salvation, and its destruction of human society, is indeed a very depressing and terrifying specter. Nevertheless, this doctrine is offered to mankind as the inevitable solution to all human problems.
 - a It has already captured one-third of the world's population, roughly 1,000,000,000 people.
 - b It has a strong appeal in the less developed areas inhabited by one-half of the world's population, roughly 1,500,000,000 people.
 - c It cannot rest content until the remaining one-sixth of the people have thrown off the chains of so-called capitalist exploitation together with religion, government, moral laws, and the "degrading distinction between intellectual and manual labor". And, as we have pointed out throughout our lectures, Western philosophies and ideologies are absolutely incapable of answering the Communist threat.
- 2 The question is, What is to be done? There are only two possibilities of defense: (1) a sudden military attack on Russia, i.e., a declaration of war, or (2) containment of Russia, while we remedy the situation which makes Communism possible. The first alternative could not be morally justified, and even if war did come, there would be serious question of how far the use of atom bombs would be justified. The next war will be so horrible and mutually destructive, that no sane person could want it. Therefore, we must take the second alternative: containment while the situation is remedied. But it is precisely here - the remedy - that Western philosophies are impotent and sterile. While Western democracies courted Russia, and while Western intellectuals fawned upon Communist leaders, the Catholic Church always realized the full dangers, and she alone has continued to expound the remedy during the past 80 years. Perhaps it is about time the West gave the Church's teaching a try..

I The Church and Communism

- 1 Even before the Communist Manifesto was written and before the West had anything to fear from the teachings of Marx, Pope Pius IX pronounced a solemn condemnation of Communism in his encyclical Qui pluribus of 1846. He spoke of "that infamous doctrine of so-called Communism, which is absolutely contrary to the natural law itself, and if once adopted, would utterly destroy the rights, property and possessions of all men, and even society itself". This condemnation was renewed in the famous Syllabus of December, 1846.

- 2 Even before Communism had succeeded in any country, Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical Quod apostolici muneris of 1878 defined Communism as: "the fatal plague which insinuates itself into the very marrow of human society only to bring about its ruin". And he pointed out that this atheistic movement of the masses in the machine age had its origin in the philosophical schools which for centuries sought to divorce science from Christianity. Moreover, not only did Leo XIII condemn Communism in numerous encyclicals, but he even explained the remedy in his famous Rerum novarum of 1891.
- 3 In 1924, the year in which England, France, Italy, Austria, the Scandinavian countries, Hungary and Mexico recognized the Soviet Union, Pope Pius condemned the errors and methods of Communism in a special allocution which he addressed to the whole world. (AAS, 16 (1924), 494-5) And in five encyclicals addressed to the entire world between 1928 and 1933, he raised a solemn protest against the persecutions unleashed in Russia, in Mexico, and in Spain.
- 4 At a time when Britain and France were negotiating a union with the Soviet Union against Germany, Pope Pius XI issued his famous encyclical on atheistic Communism, Divini Redemptoris, which came out on the Feast of St. Joseph, 1937. In this penetrating encyclical, the Holy Father not only "exposed the errors and the violent, deceptive tactics of Bolshevistic and Atheistic Communism" (n.25), but he also explained the true notion of human society and the demands of social justice.
- 5 When the Communist Party was on the verge of taking over Italy in the national elections, Pope Pius XII personally saved the day. Moreover, he excommunicated any Catholic who joined the Party, placed all Communist literature on the Index of Forbidden Books, and continuously insisted on social reform throughout the world, e.g. AAS, 33 (1941), 196-203.
- 6 In our own day, Pope John XXIII has issued a brilliant program in his Mater et magistra (15 May 1961) in which he "confirms and explains more fully.... the Church's teaching regarding the new and serious problems of our day" (n.50).

It is absolutely clear that the Catholic Church was fully aware of the dangers of Communism from the beginning, and that she alone stood out continuously in opposition to it. But far more important is the fact that the Church has analyzed in detail the social evils which give rise to Communism, and that she has repeatedly given the principles whereby those evils can be remedied.

II The Church is not Passive

- A The first point we must make explicit is that the Church is not at all passive or indifferent to the temporal needs of man. From the very beginning of her existence, the Church has done everything in her power to help the poor, the needy, the destitute, the suffering and the dying. This must be admitted even by the Jews who suffered during the last war. The Communist notion that Christianity is an escape, a sanction of the status quo, and an "opium of the people" is a typical fabrication of the Communists. Marx himself never came into contact with real Christianity, and he made no effort to learn the teachings of the Roman Church.

In his encyclical on Christianity and Social Progress (Mater et magistra) Pope John XXIII writes:

"Hence, although Holy Church has the special task of sanctifying souls and of making them sharers of heavenly blessings, she is also solicitous for the requirements of men in their daily lives, not merely those relating to food and sustenance, but also to their comfort and advancement in various kinds of goods and in varying circumstances of time." (n.3)

The Church's solicitude for the "comfort and advancement" of human beings in this world is clearly embodied in her social teaching and action. The most notable presentation of this social doctrine, as Pope John points out, is unquestionably the encyclical Rerum novarum of Leo XIII. The Church rightly raises her voice against social injustices, because, after all, the sins which "cry to heaven for vengeance" are such social sins as oppressing the poor (Deut.24:15), harming widows and orphans (Exod.22:23), and depriving laborers of their just wages (Jas.5:4). Therefore, in the words of Pope John XXIII, "the social teaching proclaimed by the Catholic Church cannot be separated from her traditional teaching regarding man's life." (n.222)

B On the other hand, unless individual Catholics allow this doctrine to shine through their personal activities, they are an obstacle to the divine message and a scandal, a stumbling-block to non-Christians. Greed, individualism and indifference to the needs of others all too easily thwart the Church's teaching. Perhaps the root difficulty is individualism and indifference.

We must remember the words of the Holy Father: "Should these teachings remain only a pronouncement without effect, strength would be given to the arguments of those who hold that the Church is incapable of facilitating the solution of the most difficult problems of temporal life."

III Need of Remedying Cause of Communism

A The second point that must be insisted upon is that while the free nations try to contain the Soviet Union and the Communist Party with all the diplomatic skill and military intelligence available, it is absolutely necessary that the causes which produced Communism be eliminated.

1 Marx, after all, proposed his philosophy as a remedy for real injustices existing in 19th century Europe. These real injustices can be read not only in Karl Marx and Charles Dickens, but even in Mater et magistra itself (n.13).

2 We can admit that real social injustices existed and still exist in many nations of the world. What we deny is that Communism is the remedy - much less the sole remedy. From our course in the philosophy of Communism, we have seen that it is a total way of life without God, without a soul, and without spiritual or intellectual values. Communism "remedies" the situation by throwing the baby out with the bath, thus making the second state of things worse than the first.

B Nevertheless, real social injustices do exist, and unless they are remedied according to the principles of a sound philosophy, something worse than

atheistic Communism may come forward. Therefore, the obligation to find a sound remedy is very real.

IV The Church's Social Remedy

A On the national level

1 Present difficulty in the national scene stems from a fundamental error which has persisted in this country from the very beginning.

- a This country was pioneered and built up largely by private enterprise. The spirit was one of individualism to begin with; this was sanctioned by the social philosophy of laissez faire, and the fierce competition which resulted produced the "rugged individualism" which was so typical of the 19th century and the early 20th century.
- b On the other hand, it was thought that whatever could not be handled by private enterprise, e.g. depressions, crop failures, great disasters, etc., had to be provided for by the national government. The tendency to hand over more and more enterprises to the government found many supporters not only among Socialists, but also among the Democrats. But this tendency has also found many opponents, not the least of whom are staunch Republicans.
- c This introduces a false alternative, viz. private enterprise vs. federal control. It is false to think that there is nothing between individualism and socialism.

2 The Church's teaching on the matter is very explicit in the writings of Pope Pius XI, Pius XII and John XXIII. Moreover, it is founded on the sound principles of the natural law and tested by ancient practice. The Church's teaching is based on the principle of subsidiarity:

- a Pope Pius XI already stated in his Quadragesimo anno: "It is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same time, a grave evil and disturbance of right order, to transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb them." (AAS, 23 (1931) 203)
- b Pope Pius XII made this more explicit in his allocution of 1941: "It is in the first place the responsibility of men themselves to regulate mutual labor relations. Only in the event that the interested parties are unwilling or unable to fulfill their functions, does it 'devolve upon the State to intervene and to assign labor equitably, safeguarding the standards, and aims that the common good properly understood demands'." (quoted in Mater et magistra, n.44)

c. The whole Second Part of Mater et magistra is taken up with a detailed explanation of this ancient teaching:

- 1) Basically it comes down to this: associations of labor and professional groups are natural units based on the natural law, having specific rights and obligations to the community. These natural units, e.g. miners, farmers, the medical profession, the teaching profession, etc. are intermediary between the individual and family unit on the one hand and the government on the other. Pope John explicitly states:

"We regard it as necessary that the various intermediary bodies and the numerous social undertaking wherein an expanded social structure primarily finds expression, be ruled by their own laws, and as the common good itself progresses, pursue this objective in a spirit of sincere concord among themselves. Nor is it less necessary that the above mentioned groups present the form and substance of a true community. This they will do, only if individual members are considered and treated as persons, and are encouraged to participate in the affairs of the group."
(n.65)

In other words, these intermediary groups of professional and non-professional men have a certain autonomy within the field of their competence, much like the guilds of the Middle Ages. They have certain rights which must be respected. But they also have certain obligations.

1. to the community at large by establishing standards of excellence;
 - ii. to the body politic by taking care of their own needs. This means that these intermediary groups have an obligation to solve their own problems to the best of their ability.
- 2) This brings us to the principle of subsidiarity, which has to do with the relations between the government and these intermediate groups and individuals. This principle can be broken down into three elements:
1. The government should allow individuals and intermediate groups to do as much as they can within the field of their competence on their own initiative. Pope John states this as follows:

"At the outset it should be affirmed that in economic affairs first place is to be given to the private initiative of individual men who, either working by themselves, or with others in one fashion or another, pursue their common interests." (n.51)
 - ii. Whatever individuals and intermediate groups cannot do should be supplied by governmental agencies by way of supplementing and complementing lesser agencies. This active interest of public authorities is necessary, the popes have pointed out, "the better to increase output

of goods and to further social progress for the benefit of all citizens." (n.52)

iii. Finally, if individuals and intermediate groups are unwilling to do anything, then for the sake of the common good, the government must intervene. That is, "only in the event that the interested parties are unwilling or unable to fulfill their functions, does it devolve upon the State to intervene and to assign labor equitably, safeguarding the standards and aims that the common good properly understood demands." (n.44, quoting Pius XII)

3. Application

a. In the third part, on "new aspects of the social question" Pope John deals specifically with national problems of agriculture. There he points out that farmers themselves constitute a natural intermediary group: "We are of the opinion that in rural affairs, the principal agents and protagonists of economic improvement, of cultural betterment, or of social advance, should be the men personally involved, namely, the farmers themselves." (n.144)

b. For our part, it may be better to take three current examples on the American scene:

1) First, there is the problem of automation. There are certainly many advantages to automation, but it will necessarily leave many men without their former jobs. No employer can introduce automation with complete disregard for the unemployment caused by his action. Rugged individualism would say that the resulting unemployment is not his problem. But a sound social philosophy would insist that it is very much his problem. The current American reaction is "Well, let the government take care of the problem."

The whole point of the papal teaching, however, is that the employers and employees are intermediate groups which must try to work something out on their own initiative. They owe this to the good of the whole society.

2) Second, there is the problem of medicine and hospitalization, the shortage of doctors, the high cost of drugs and treatment, the poor who are unable to pay for hospitalization. The solution here is not to shove the whole problem on to the government by way of socialized medicine. The medical profession forms a natural intermediate group with definite obligations to society. They themselves, the doctors, nurses, technicians, etc., must appoint a committee to study the situation and discover the best means of solving the problem. They owe this to society. The government can encourage and even assist their endeavor. But the government should not take over this function, unless absolutely necessary.

3) Finally, there is the problem of teachers, the shortage of teachers, and often insufficient competence. Teachers themselves form a natural intermediate group with serious obli-

gations to society. On them falls the first obligation to solve the problems besetting their profession. Only as a last resort should the government interfere with the education of the young.

- c. The Holy Father suggests that these natural groups should be organized as unions, or guilds, and that they should have the right to govern themselves.

B. On the international level

1. In the same third part of the encyclical, "new aspects of the social question," Pope John discusses three problems of international importance
 - a. aid to underdeveloped countries
 - b. the so-called "population explosion"
 - c. cooperation between countries.

2. Here, the important point is that wealthier countries have a real obligation to come to the aid of poorer countries in every way possible, viz. by way of food and clothing, scientific, technical and even financial assistance. "Justice and humanity require that these richer countries come to the aid of those in need." (n.161) Today, of course, there is greater need than ever to come to the aid of those in desperate need -- the danger that these countries may become Communist.!

However, the pope warns that this assistance must not aim at making "colonies" of those countries we help. There must be respect for the individual characteristics of those countries, and no attempt must be made to impose our wills upon those countries. "Should perchance such attempts be made, this clearly would be but another form of colonialism, which, although disguised in name, merely reflects their earlier but outdated dominion, now abandoned by many countries." (n.171)

3. On the so-called "population explosion" the pope is convinced that the problem of sustenance can be "posed and resolved in such a way that man does not have recourse to methods and means contrary to his dignity." (n.191)
4. Finally, it is essential that there be as much cooperation between countries as possible to solve global needs, and to resolve differences. For this reason the U.N., although not mentioned specifically in the encyclical, is a most important body for international peace and cooperation.

"However," the pope warns, "the guiding principles of morality and virtue can be based only on God; apart from Him, they necessarily collapse." (n.208) Consequently international problems "can be overcome only if (nations) duly recognize the authority of God, author and ruler of man and of all nature." (n.209) Implicit in the pope's closing remarks is the hope that at least the free nations of the world can solve the serious problems which affect them.

Conclusion: When all is said and done, it is clear that Communism must be contained and restrained to the best of our ability. It is also clear that by cooperation national and international problems can be solved so as to prevent Communism or even something worse. But economics is not the most serious problem. Far more serious is the "monstrous masterpiece" of our age, as Pope Pius XII called it, namely "to have transformed man, as it were into a giant as regards the order of nature, yet in the order of the supernatural and the eternal, to have changed him into a pygmy." (AAS, 46 (1954), 10) The real problem, then, is the philosophical and religious destitution of Western man. Without a renewal of sound philosophy and deep religious fervor, the West can still produce a Karl Marx or even something worse.